7c400e9c02
Collapse docs/adr/ and docs/rfc/ into a single docs/rfc/ with proposed/, implemented/, and rejected/ subfolders. Every file is renamed to yyyy-mm-dd-topic-title.md, where the date is when the topic was first proposed (from git history). ADRs and RFCs that covered exactly the same topic are merged (property-based testing, session persistence); the umbrella RFC 005 stays split across its three implemented decisions, and RFC 006's deferred part-3 (API extractor reports) splits into its own proposed RFC. All cross-references become machine-checkable relative links instead of bare "ADR NNNN" / "RFC NNN" prose. Add a verify-md-links doc-sync gate (scripts/verify-md-links.ts) that checks every relative Markdown cross-link resolves, wired into doc-sync alongside verify-md-wrap. This makes the reorganization self-verifying: the same change that rewrote ~forty inter-doc links adds the check that proves none dangle. Document the cross-link convention in a new docs/AGENTS.md and record the gate as an implemented RFC. doc-sync, typecheck, lint, and the full test suite (667) all pass.
35 lines
4.5 KiB
Markdown
35 lines
4.5 KiB
Markdown
# RFC: Multiplex concurrent ACP sessions over one connection
|
|
|
|
Status: proposed
|
|
|
|
<!-- XXX: legacy ADR/RFC body format, not yet normalized to a unified RFC template. -->
|
|
|
|
## Problem
|
|
|
|
[ACP support](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md) ships with a single active session per connection: a second `session/new` is rejected. Editors expect to run several conversations over one agent subprocess — a user opens multiple threads, or a client pre-warms sessions. The single-session guard is a deliberate MVP scope cut, not an architectural limit; this RFC lifts it.
|
|
|
|
## Proposal
|
|
|
|
The harness core already supports many agents (`AgentRegistry.list()` and `AgentLoop.create` impose no count limit), so multiplexing is a bridge-layer change in `@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp`, not a loop or core change.
|
|
|
|
- Lift the single-session guard in `session/new`; allow N live sessions, each mapped to its own `LoopAgent`.
|
|
- The bridge's `sessionId→agent` and `Session→sessionId` maps (introduced single-entry by [the ACP support RFC](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)) become true multi-entry, plus a third `agent→sessionId` reverse map: the `tools/execute` permission gate receives only `exec.agent` (no sessionId), so it needs an O(1) reverse lookup to find the owning session. Every `agent/*` event and every `session/event` is demuxed strictly by id, so two sessions streaming at once never interleave their `session/update` notifications.
|
|
- Per-session prompt queues: [the ACP support RFC](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)'s single-entry in-flight-prompt state becomes multi-entry — one in-flight prompt *per session*, tracked per `sessionId`.
|
|
- Per-session cancel routing: `session/cancel` aborts only its own session's agent and settles only that session's in-flight prompt. `agent.abort()` drives a per-agent `AbortController`, so the per-session `exec.signal` is the natural isolation fence.
|
|
- Per-session permission ownership: a `session/request_permission` and its outcome are bound to the originating session via the reverse map, so a permission prompt or a cancel in one session can never resolve another session's pending permission.
|
|
|
|
## Plan
|
|
|
|
1. Generalize the two id maps to multi-entry and add the `agent→sessionId` reverse map; add a per-session record holding the agent, the in-flight-prompt state, the pending-permission registry, and the session's disposer scope (see step 2).
|
|
2. Give each session a real per-session disposer scope, NOT `ctx.extend()` — in Cordis `ctx.extend()` only creates a child context/prototype, but `ctx.on()` registered on it is still owned by the current plugin fiber, so disposing it would not remove that session's listeners. Use a genuine child fiber (load a per-session sub-plugin, e.g. `ctx.plugin(...)` returning a fork, or collect each session's `ctx.on` disposers in its session record and call them on teardown). Demux every `agent/*` and `session/event` by id into the right session record. Note the single global `tools/execute` listener stays on the bridge root (it must see all agents) and routes via the reverse map.
|
|
3. Lift the `session/new` guard; keep `session/load` ([from ACP support](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)) working per session.
|
|
4. Tests for cross-session isolation: two sessions streaming and permission-prompting concurrently never interleave; a cancel/abort in one session leaves the other's stream and pending permission untouched; per-session in-flight-prompt enforcement holds independently; disposing one session leaves the others running.
|
|
|
|
## Risks
|
|
|
|
Listener fan-out cost: each session adds listeners; ensure disposal of one session removes exactly its own and the connection teardown ([from ACP support](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)) still reaches quiescence across all sessions.
|
|
|
|
The subtle correctness trap is cross-session leakage — a cancel or abort on one session settling another session's pending permission. The per-session permission ownership rule (routed via the `agent→sessionId` reverse map) and its isolation test are the guard.
|
|
|
|
Shared background-task state: the bash executor's task ids are global and predictable (`bash-1`, `bash-2`, …), and `bash_output`/`bash_kill` look up by id without checking the caller. Under one session this is benign; under N sessions one session's agent could read or kill another's background task. This is a pre-existing `tool-bash` gap that multi-session turns into a real isolation hole — fixing it (validate the caller against the task owner) belongs with this RFC or a companion `tool-bash` change.
|