The web GUI's folder picking was hardwired to one interaction: a native
OS chooser compiled into the gateway, unusable for remote deployments
and swappable only by editing apiproxy source.
Directory picking becomes a three-package capability seam in
packages/host: ctx.directoryPicker returns a discriminated capability —
dialog (the extracted native chooser; host-display only) or browse
(new: one-level listing + child creation over Node stdlib, hidden flags
host-stamped, symlinks followed, ancestry crumbs; remote-capable). The
gateway injects the seam, advertises the kind via
host.describe.directoryPicker, serves host.listDirectory /
host.createDirectory under browse, and answers
directory-picker-unavailable across kinds. cordis.yml is the swap
point; apps/cli keeps dialog mounted, so behavior is unchanged until
the in-app browser PR flips the default. The connection fixture serves
a deterministic browse tree; WorkspacesService gains the browse calls
the browser UI will drive. Decision record:
.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-directory-picker-capability-seam.md
The only browser-trust guard covered host.pickDirectory, while the
consequential methods (session.prompt drives bash) accepted any Host —
open to DNS rebinding, where a rebound page reads and writes the API as
if same-origin and only the Host header betrays the attacker's domain.
The pickDirectory-specific loopback guard becomes a prefix-wide fence:
Host must be loopback or an exact host[:port] from the new trustedHosts
config, an attached Origin must equal that authority, and explicit
cross-site markers are refused; requests without browser markers (curl,
tests, native clients) pass, because without a browser there is no
confused deputy. The loopback-socket check is dropped — binding policy
expresses reachability, and the fence is not an auth layer. The Agent
Note records the full threat model and the alternatives.
Browsers send "simple" POSTs (text/plain, form encodings) without a CORS
preflight, so a malicious page could execute side-effectful RPCs blind —
the response stays unreadable cross-origin, but session.prompt would
still run. The carrier now answers 415 unless the declared media type is
application/json, forcing every cross-site attempt into a preflight this
server never answers. Raw-fetch specs gain the header; a new handler case
proves the fence rejects before the impl runs.
Three ds-review-bot round-8 findings on the todo display surfaces.
TodoPanel took the whole `useSession` hook and cast the snapshot to reach
`todos`, which put slot plumbing and an unchecked cast inside the presentation
component. The panel now takes `todos: readonly TodoItem[]`; TodoDock does the
selecting, matching the QueueDock posture the dock slot already establishes.
The todo row carried `onClick` with no keyboard route, so its details panel was
mouse-only. It now takes ToolRow's route verbatim: `role="button"`,
`tabIndex={0}`, and an Enter/Space handler that claims the event. The row stays
a `<div>` because a `<button>` flattens its inline spans.
`session.history`'s tail-only `todos` field was documented at the TS signature
but not in the apiproxy README pair, and the Agent Note claimed the feature
added no new wire vocabulary. Both README sides now state the tail/omission
semantics (an omitted field on a tail response is the empty plan, not unchanged
state), and the note records the one added field instead of denying it.
Tests: TodoPanel specs render the plain list; new TodoDock specs cover selection,
live follow, rollback-to-empty, and the registration shape; a new row spec pins
Enter/Space activation and non-activating keys.
