Merge branch 'master' into feat/read-image-context

# Conflicts:
#	docs/module-graph.i18n.yaml
#	docs/module-graph.md
#	docs/module-graph.zh.md

packages/e2b/subprocess-e2b/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/e2b/subprocess-e2b/README.md
-README.md: bb0ac1d5f1f3dbfd0f021d5fbebbab13dcee37ee
-README.zh.md: d511df72284b047626ece628b702a2ac8d2f873d
+README.md: e27582e5603e430e1467cb6e47c6f12bd1a0b886
+README.zh.md: 788c6273f1f2f30795d8d1ea09b481a85b88a2f6

packages/e2b/subprocess-e2b/README.md

@@ -38,6 +38,6 @@ No direct invalidation; the named consumers own any request-prefix changes.
 - **Control state shares the sandbox user's UID** — E2B runs every command as the same default user, so `0700`/`0600` modes cannot isolate `.dsh-e2b` control files from concurrently running sandbox processes. A background process could rewrite `pid`/`exit-code` or read a not-yet-consumed `environment` file. The adapter validates published values and refuses group ids whose negative form is unsafe to signal (`<= 1`), but real isolation needs an E2B per-command user or an out-of-band control channel.
 - **Numeric process identities are not reuse-fenced** — E2B exposes numeric PID/PGID PTY input, signalling, and cleanup operations but no atomic identity-bound alternative. The adapter minimizes host round trips and live coverage exercises the reproducible stale-interrupt overlap; replacement is deferred until E2B adds an identity primitive or a failure demonstrates a narrower protocol.
 - **The initial environment probe inherits sandbox defaults** — E2B merges command overrides with default environment entries, so the probe cannot blank unknown credential-shaped names before enumerating them. A same-UID untrusted process already in the sandbox could inspect that short-lived control shell; this POC therefore does not support secrets in sandbox-default environment variables and requires an E2B replacement-environment primitive to close the gap.
-- **E2B exposes no signal fact** — an adapter-requested `SIGTERM` or `SIGKILL` is reported only when no wrapper-published direct exit code wins; every unrequested SDK exit remains an exit code, including values shaped like `128 + signal`.
+- **E2B exposes no signal fact** — an adapter-requested `SIGTERM` or `SIGKILL` is reported only when no wrapper-published direct exit code wins; every unrequested SDK exit remains an exit code, including values equal to `128 + signal`.
 - **Exact terminal stdin-wait inspection is unavailable** — E2B exposes the foreground process group but not the syscall evidence needed to prove it is waiting on fd 0, so the generic PTY backend falls back to controlled prompt markers and bounded silence.
 - **Linux utility and E2B transport semantics are assumed** — there is no Windows, escaped-session recovery, or network-partition fidelity layer.

packages/e2b/subprocess-e2b/README.zh.md

@@ -38,6 +38,6 @@ E2B 默认基础镜像提供该适配器调用的运行时和 Bash/GNU 工具：
 - **控制状态与沙箱用户同 UID**：E2B 以同一默认用户运行每条命令，因此 `0700`/`0600` 权限无法把 `.dsh-e2b` 控制文件与并发运行的沙箱进程隔离开。后台进程可以改写 `pid`/`exit-code`，或读取尚未被消费的 `environment` 文件。适配器会验证已发布的值，并拒绝取负后不安全的进程组 ID（`<= 1`），但真正的隔离需要 E2B 提供按命令用户或带外控制通道。
 - **数值进程身份没有复用围栏**：E2B 公开基于数值 PID/PGID 的 PTY 输入、信号发送和清理操作，却没有与身份原子绑定的替代方案。适配器会尽量减少宿主往返，真实环境测试会覆盖可复现的陈旧中断重叠；在 E2B 新增身份原语，或实际故障证明需要更窄的协议之前，替代方案会继续延后。
 - **初始环境探测会继承沙箱默认值**：E2B 会把命令覆盖与默认环境条目合并，因此探测无法在枚举未知且形似凭据的名称之前将它们置空。一个已在沙箱内运行的同 UID 不可信进程可以检查该短时存在的控制 shell；因此，该 POC 不支持把 secret 放入沙箱默认环境变量，需要 E2B 的替换环境原语才能弥合该缺口。
-- **E2B 不公开信号事实**：适配器请求的 `SIGTERM` 或 `SIGKILL` 只有在包装层发布的直接退出码没有胜出时才报告为信号；其他未请求的 SDK 退出始终保留为退出码，包括形似 `128 + signal` 的值。
+- **E2B 不公开信号事实**：适配器请求的 `SIGTERM` 或 `SIGKILL` 只有在包装层发布的直接退出码没有胜出时才报告为信号；其他未请求的 SDK 退出始终保留为退出码，包括等于 `128 + signal` 的值。
 - **无法精确检查终端 stdin 等待状态**：E2B 会公开前台进程组，但不提供证明其正在等待 fd 0 所需的 syscall 证据，因此通用 PTY 后端会回退到受控提示符标记与有界静默机制。
 - **依赖 Linux 工具与 E2B 传输语义**：没有 Windows、逃逸会话恢复或网络分区的保真层。