[ Upstream commit 0bd1fb5862 ]
LIMITED_DISCOVERABLE flag is not reset from Class of Device and
advertisement on limited discoverable timeout. This prevents to pass PTS
test GAP/DISC/LIMM/BV-02-C
Calling set_discoverable_sync as when the limited discovery is set
correctly update the Class of Device and advertisement.
Signed-off-by: Frédéric Danis <frederic.danis@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2535b848fa ]
During our fuzz testing of the connection and disconnection process at the
RFCOMM layer, we discovered this bug. By comparing the packets from a
normal connection and disconnection process with the testcase that
triggered a KASAN report. We analyzed the cause of this bug as follows:
1. In the packets captured during a normal connection, the host sends a
`Read Encryption Key Size` type of `HCI_CMD` packet
(Command Opcode: 0x1408) to the controller to inquire the length of
encryption key.After receiving this packet, the controller immediately
replies with a Command Completepacket (Event Code: 0x0e) to return the
Encryption Key Size.
2. In our fuzz test case, the timing of the controller's response to this
packet was delayed to an unexpected point: after the RFCOMM and L2CAP
layers had disconnected but before the HCI layer had disconnected.
3. After receiving the Encryption Key Size Response at the time described
in point 2, the host still called the rfcomm_check_security function.
However, by this time `struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->conn;`
had already been released, and when the function executed
`return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, d->sec_level, auth_type, d->out);`,
specifically when accessing `conn->hcon`, a null-ptr-deref error occurred.
To fix this bug, check if `sk->sk_state` is BT_CLOSED before calling
rfcomm_recv_frame in rfcomm_process_rx.
Signed-off-by: Yuxuan Hu <20373622@buaa.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 413dafc817 ]
When a station has not been uploaded yet, receiving SMPS or channel width
notification action frames can lead to rate_control_rate_update calling
drv_sta_rc_update with uninitialized driver private data.
Fix this by adding a missing check for sta->uploaded.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240221140535.16102-1-nbd@nbd.name
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b4ea9b6a18 ]
iucv_path_table is a dynamically allocated array of pointers to
struct iucv_path items. Yet, its size is calculated as if it was
an array of struct iucv_path items.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Commit a4104821ad upstream.
Since we no longer allow sending io_uring fds over SCM_RIGHTS, move to
using io_is_uring_fops() to detect whether this is a io_uring fd or not.
With that done, kill off io_uring_get_socket() as nobody calls it
anymore.
This is in preparation to yanking out the rest of the core related to
unix gc with io_uring.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d380ce7005 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bc76645ebd ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b5dffcb8f7 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f99b494b40 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a2e7068414 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 43547d8699 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 806f462ba9 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e799299aaf ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 60a7a152ab ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 119cae5ea3 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cfd9f4a740 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value
because the value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 958d6145a6 ]
We need to protect the reader reading sysctl_netrom_default_path_quality
because the value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 767146637e ]
UBSAN load reports an exception of BRK#5515 SHIFT_ISSUE:Bitwise shifts
that are out of bounds for their data type.
vmlinux get_bitmap(b=75) + 712
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:0>
vmlinux decode_seq(bs=0xFFFFFFD008037000, f=0xFFFFFFD008037018, level=134443100) + 1956
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:592>
vmlinux decode_choice(base=0xFFFFFFD0080370F0, level=23843636) + 1216
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:814>
vmlinux decode_seq(f=0xFFFFFFD0080371A8, level=134443500) + 812
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:576>
vmlinux decode_choice(base=0xFFFFFFD008037280, level=0) + 1216
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:814>
vmlinux DecodeRasMessage() + 304
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:833>
vmlinux ras_help() + 684
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_main.c:1728>
vmlinux nf_confirm() + 188
<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:137>
Due to abnormal data in skb->data, the extension bitmap length
exceeds 32 when decoding ras message then uses the length to make
a shift operation. It will change into negative after several loop.
UBSAN load could detect a negative shift as an undefined behaviour
and reports exception.
So we add the protection to avoid the length exceeding 32. Or else
it will return out of range error and stop decoding.
Fixes: 5e35941d99 ("[NETFILTER]: Add H.323 conntrack/NAT helper")
Signed-off-by: Lena Wang <lena.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9999378996 ]
Following is rejected but should be allowed:
table inet t {
ct expectation exp1 {
[..]
l3proto ip
Valid combos are:
table ip t, l3proto ip
table ip6 t, l3proto ip6
table inet t, l3proto ip OR l3proto ip6
Disallow inet pseudeo family, the l3num must be a on-wire protocol known
to conntrack.
Retain NFPROTO_INET case to make it clear its rejected
intentionally rather as oversight.
Fixes: 8059918a13 ("netfilter: nft_ct: sanitize layer 3 and 4 protocol number in custom expectations")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit aa82ac51d6 upstream.
syzbot reported another task hung in __unix_gc(). [0]
The current while loop assumes that all of the left candidates
have oob_skb and calling kfree_skb(oob_skb) releases the remaining
candidates.
However, I missed a case that oob_skb has self-referencing fd and
another fd and the latter sk is placed before the former in the
candidate list. Then, the while loop never proceeds, resulting
the task hung.
__unix_gc() has the same loop just before purging the collected skb,
so we can call kfree_skb(oob_skb) there and let __skb_queue_purge()
release all inflight sockets.
[0]:
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 2784 Comm: kworker/u4:8 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-01028-g71b605d32017 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x0/0x70 kernel/kcov.c:200
Code: 89 fb e8 23 00 00 00 48 8b 3d 84 f5 1a 0c 48 89 de 5b e9 43 26 57 00 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 <f3> 0f 1e fa 48 8b 04 24 65 48 8b 0d 90 52 70 7e 65 8b 15 91 52 70
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a17fa78 EFLAGS: 00000287
RAX: ffffffff8a0a6108 RBX: ffff88802b6c2640 RCX: ffff88802c0b3b80
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000a17fbf0 R08: ffffffff89383f1d R09: 1ffff1100ee5ff84
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100ee5ff85 R12: 1ffff110056d84ee
R13: ffffc9000a17fae0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff8f47b840
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffef5687ff8 CR3: 0000000029b34000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<NMI>
</NMI>
<TASK>
__unix_gc+0xe69/0xf40 net/unix/garbage.c:343
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0x913/0x1420 kernel/workqueue.c:2706
worker_thread+0xa5f/0x1000 kernel/workqueue.c:2787
kthread+0x2ef/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
</TASK>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+ecab4d36f920c3574bf9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ecab4d36f920c3574bf9
Fixes: 25236c91b5 ("af_unix: Fix task hung while purging oob_skb in GC.")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 10048689de upstream.
when MPTCP server accepts an incoming connection, it clones its listener
socket. However, the pointer to 'inet_opt' for the new socket has the same
value as the original one: as a consequence, on program exit it's possible
to observe the following splat:
BUG: KASAN: double-free in inet_sock_destruct+0x54f/0x8b0
Free of addr ffff888485950880 by task swapper/25/0
CPU: 25 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/25 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1+ #609
Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-6027R-72RF/X9DRH-7TF/7F/iTF/iF, BIOS 3.0 07/26/2013
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x32/0x50
print_report+0xca/0x620
kasan_report_invalid_free+0x64/0x90
__kasan_slab_free+0x1aa/0x1f0
kfree+0xed/0x2e0
inet_sock_destruct+0x54f/0x8b0
__sk_destruct+0x48/0x5b0
rcu_do_batch+0x34e/0xd90
rcu_core+0x559/0xac0
__do_softirq+0x183/0x5a4
irq_exit_rcu+0x12d/0x170
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x80
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0x175/0x300
Code: 30 00 0f 84 1f 01 00 00 83 e8 01 83 f8 ff 75 e5 48 83 c4 18 44 89 e8 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc fb 45 85 ed <0f> 89 60 ff ff ff 48 c1 e5 06 48 c7 43 18 00 00 00 00 48 83 44 2b
RSP: 0018:ffff888481cf7d90 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88887facddc8 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 1ffff1110ff588b1 RSI: 0000000000000019 RDI: ffff88887fac4588
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000043080
R10: 0009b02ea273363f R11: ffff88887fabf42b R12: ffffffff932592e0
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000022c880ec80
cpuidle_enter+0x4a/0xa0
do_idle+0x310/0x410
cpu_startup_entry+0x51/0x60
start_secondary+0x211/0x270
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x184/0x18b
</TASK>
Allocated by task 6853:
kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xb0
__kmalloc+0x1eb/0x450
cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x96/0x360
netlbl_sock_setattr+0x132/0x1f0
selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create+0x6c/0x110
selinux_socket_post_create+0x37b/0x7f0
security_socket_post_create+0x63/0xb0
__sock_create+0x305/0x450
__sys_socket_create.part.23+0xbd/0x130
__sys_socket+0x37/0xb0
__x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
Freed by task 6858:
kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x1f0
kfree+0xed/0x2e0
inet_sock_destruct+0x54f/0x8b0
__sk_destruct+0x48/0x5b0
subflow_ulp_release+0x1f0/0x250
tcp_cleanup_ulp+0x6e/0x110
tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x5a/0x3a0
inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x135/0x390
tcp_fin+0x416/0x5c0
tcp_data_queue+0x1bc8/0x4310
tcp_rcv_state_process+0x15a3/0x47b0
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2c1/0x990
tcp_v4_rcv+0x41fb/0x5ed0
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x6d/0x9f0
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x278/0x360
ip_local_deliver+0x182/0x2c0
ip_rcv+0xb5/0x1c0
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x16e/0x1b0
process_backlog+0x1e3/0x650
__napi_poll+0xa6/0x500
net_rx_action+0x740/0xbb0
__do_softirq+0x183/0x5a4
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888485950880
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
64-byte region [ffff888485950880, ffff8884859508c0)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:0000000056d1e95e refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888485950700 pfn:0x485950
flags: 0x57ffffc0000800(slab|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 0057ffffc0000800 ffff88810004c640 ffffea00121b8ac0 dead000000000006
raw: ffff888485950700 0000000000200019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888485950780: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888485950800: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888485950880: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888485950900: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888485950980: 00 00 00 00 00 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Something similar (a refcount underflow) happens with CALIPSO/IPv6. Fix
this by duplicating IP / IPv6 options after clone, so that
ip{,6}_sock_destruct() doesn't end up freeing the same memory area twice.
Fixes: cf7da0d66c ("mptcp: Create SUBFLOW socket for incoming connections")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240223-upstream-net-20240223-misc-fixes-v1-8-162e87e48497@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b9cd26f640 upstream.
when inserting not contiguous data in the subflow write queue,
the protocol creates a new skb and prevent the TCP stack from
merging it later with already queued skbs by setting the EOR marker.
Still no push flag is explicitly set at the end of previous GSO
packet, making the aggregation on the receiver side sub-optimal -
and packetdrill self-tests less predictable.
Explicitly mark the end of not contiguous DSS with the push flag.
Fixes: 6d0060f600 ("mptcp: Write MPTCP DSS headers to outgoing data packets")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240223-upstream-net-20240223-misc-fixes-v1-4-162e87e48497@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f78c137533 upstream.
It's currently possible to change the mesh ID when the
interface isn't yet in mesh mode, at the same time as
changing it into mesh mode. This leads to an overwrite
of data in the wdev->u union for the interface type it
currently has, causing cfg80211_change_iface() to do
wrong things when switching.
We could probably allow setting an interface to mesh
while setting the mesh ID at the same time by doing a
different order of operations here, but realistically
there's no userspace that's going to do this, so just
disallow changes in iftype when setting mesh ID.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 29cbe68c51 ("cfg80211/mac80211: add mesh join/leave commands")
Reported-by: syzbot+dd4779978217b1973180@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 13114dc554 ]
When the decrypt request goes to the backlog and crypto_aead_decrypt
returns -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption will wait until all async
decryptions have completed. If one of them fails, tls_do_decryption
will return -EBADMSG and tls_decrypt_sg jumps to the error path,
releasing all the pages. But the pages have been passed to the async
callback, and have already been released by tls_decrypt_done.
The only true async case is when crypto_aead_decrypt returns
-EINPROGRESS. With -EBUSY, we already waited so we can tell
tls_sw_recvmsg that the data is available for immediate copy, but we
need to notify tls_decrypt_sg (via the new ->async_done flag) that the
memory has already been released.
Fixes: 8590541473 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4755dd8d9bebdefaa19ce1439b833d6199d4364c.1709132643.git.sd@queasysnail.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 41532b785e ]
If we're not doing async, the handling is much simpler. There's no
reference counting, we just need to wait for the completion to wake us
up and return its result.
We should preferably also use a separate crypto_wait. I'm not seeing a
UAF as I did in the past, I think aec7961916 ("tls: fix race between
async notify and socket close") took care of it.
This will make the next fix easier.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/47bde5f649707610eaef9f0d679519966fc31061.1709132643.git.sd@queasysnail.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 13114dc554 ("tls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6caaf10442 ]
If we peek from 2 records with a currently empty rx_list, and the
first record is decrypted synchronously but the second record is
decrypted async, the following happens:
1. decrypt record 1 (sync)
2. copy from record 1 to the userspace's msg
3. queue the decrypted record to rx_list for future read(!PEEK)
4. decrypt record 2 (async)
5. queue record 2 to rx_list
6. call process_rx_list to copy data from the 2nd record
We currently pass copied=0 as skip offset to process_rx_list, so we
end up copying once again from the first record. We should skip over
the data we've already copied.
Seen with selftest tls.12_aes_gcm.recv_peek_large_buf_mult_recs
Fixes: 692d7b5d1f ("tls: Fix recvmsg() to be able to peek across multiple records")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1b132d2b2b99296bfde54e8a67672d90d6d16e71.1709132643.git.sd@queasysnail.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f7fa16d498 ]
With mixed sync/async decryption, or failures of crypto_aead_decrypt,
we increment decrypt_pending but we never do the corresponding
decrement since tls_decrypt_done will not be called. In this case, we
should decrement decrypt_pending immediately to avoid getting stuck.
For example, the prequeue prequeue test gets stuck with mixed
modes (one async decrypt + one sync decrypt).
Fixes: 94524d8fc9 ("net/tls: Add support for async decryption of tls records")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c56d5fc35543891d5319f834f25622360e1bfbec.1709132643.git.sd@queasysnail.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 51dd4ee037 ]
Current HSR implementation uses following supervisory frame (even for
HSRv1 the HSR tag is not is not present):
00000000: 01 15 4e 00 01 2d XX YY ZZ 94 77 10 88 fb 00 01
00000010: 7e 1c 17 06 XX YY ZZ 94 77 10 1e 06 XX YY ZZ 94
00000020: 77 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
The current code adds extra two bytes (i.e. sizeof(struct hsr_sup_tlv))
when offset for skb_pull() is calculated.
This is wrong, as both 'struct hsrv1_ethhdr_sp' and 'hsrv0_ethhdr_sp'
already have 'struct hsr_sup_tag' defined in them, so there is no need
for adding extra two bytes.
This code was working correctly as with no RedBox support, the check for
HSR_TLV_EOT (0x00) was off by two bytes, which were corresponding to
zeroed padded bytes for minimal packet size.
Fixes: eafaa88b3e ("net: hsr: Add support for redbox supervision frames")
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Majewski <lukma@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240228085644.3618044-1-lukma@denx.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 743ad091fb ]
In the commit d73ef2d69c ("rtnetlink: let rtnl_bridge_setlink checks
IFLA_BRIDGE_MODE length"), an adjustment was made to the old loop logic
in the function `rtnl_bridge_setlink` to enable the loop to also check
the length of the IFLA_BRIDGE_MODE attribute. However, this adjustment
removed the `break` statement and led to an error logic of the flags
writing back at the end of this function.
if (have_flags)
memcpy(nla_data(attr), &flags, sizeof(flags));
// attr should point to IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS NLA !!!
Before the mentioned commit, the `attr` is granted to be IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS.
However, this is not necessarily true fow now as the updated loop will let
the attr point to the last NLA, even an invalid NLA which could cause
overflow writes.
This patch introduces a new variable `br_flag` to save the NLA pointer
that points to IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS and uses it to resolve the mentioned
error logic.
Fixes: d73ef2d69c ("rtnetlink: let rtnl_bridge_setlink checks IFLA_BRIDGE_MODE length")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227121128.608110-1-linma@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 62e7151ae3 ]
conntrack nf_confirm logic cannot handle cloned skbs referencing
the same nf_conn entry, which will happen for multicast (broadcast)
frames on bridges.
Example:
macvlan0
|
br0
/ \
ethX ethY
ethX (or Y) receives a L2 multicast or broadcast packet containing
an IP packet, flow is not yet in conntrack table.
1. skb passes through bridge and fake-ip (br_netfilter)Prerouting.
-> skb->_nfct now references a unconfirmed entry
2. skb is broad/mcast packet. bridge now passes clones out on each bridge
interface.
3. skb gets passed up the stack.
4. In macvlan case, macvlan driver retains clone(s) of the mcast skb
and schedules a work queue to send them out on the lower devices.
The clone skb->_nfct is not a copy, it is the same entry as the
original skb. The macvlan rx handler then returns RX_HANDLER_PASS.
5. Normal conntrack hooks (in NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) confirm the orig skb.
The Macvlan broadcast worker and normal confirm path will race.
This race will not happen if step 2 already confirmed a clone. In that
case later steps perform skb_clone() with skb->_nfct already confirmed (in
hash table). This works fine.
But such confirmation won't happen when eb/ip/nftables rules dropped the
packets before they reached the nf_confirm step in postrouting.
Pablo points out that nf_conntrack_bridge doesn't allow use of stateful
nat, so we can safely discard the nf_conn entry and let inet call
conntrack again.
This doesn't work for bridge netfilter: skb could have a nat
transformation. Also bridge nf prevents re-invocation of inet prerouting
via 'sabotage_in' hook.
Work around this problem by explicit confirmation of the entry at LOCAL_IN
time, before upper layer has a chance to clone the unconfirmed entry.
The downside is that this disables NAT and conntrack helpers.
Alternative fix would be to add locking to all code parts that deal with
unconfirmed packets, but even if that could be done in a sane way this
opens up other problems, for example:
-m physdev --physdev-out eth0 -j SNAT --snat-to 1.2.3.4
-m physdev --physdev-out eth1 -j SNAT --snat-to 1.2.3.5
For multicast case, only one of such conflicting mappings will be
created, conntrack only handles 1:1 NAT mappings.
Users should set create a setup that explicitly marks such traffic
NOTRACK (conntrack bypass) to avoid this, but we cannot auto-bypass
them, ruleset might have accept rules for untracked traffic already,
so user-visible behaviour would change.
Suggested-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217777
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7e0f122c65 ]
Commit d0009effa8 ("netfilter: nf_tables: validate NFPROTO_* family") added
some validation of NFPROTO_* families in the nft_compat module, but it broke
the ability to use legacy iptables modules in dual-stack nftables.
While with legacy iptables one had to independently manage IPv4 and IPv6
tables, with nftables it is possible to have dual-stack tables sharing the
rules. Moreover, it was possible to use rules based on legacy iptables
match/target modules in dual-stack nftables.
As an example, the program from [2] creates an INET dual-stack family table
using an xt_bpf based rule, which looks like the following (the actual output
was generated with a patched nft tool as the current nft tool does not parse
dual stack tables with legacy match rules, so consider it for illustrative
purposes only):
table inet testfw {
chain input {
type filter hook prerouting priority filter; policy accept;
bytecode counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
}
}
After d0009effa8 ("netfilter: nf_tables: validate NFPROTO_* family") we get
EOPNOTSUPP for the above program.
Fix this by allowing NFPROTO_INET for nft_(match/target)_validate(), but also
restrict the functions to classic iptables hooks.
Changes in v3:
* clarify that upstream nft will not display such configuration properly and
that the output was generated with a patched nft tool
* remove example program from commit description and link to it instead
* no code changes otherwise
Changes in v2:
* restrict nft_(match/target)_validate() to classic iptables hooks
* rewrite example program to use unmodified libnftnl
Fixes: d0009effa8 ("netfilter: nf_tables: validate NFPROTO_* family")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zc1PfoWN38UuFJRI@calendula/T/#mc947262582c90fec044c7a3398cc92fac7afea72 [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240220145509.53357-1-ignat@cloudflare.com/ [2]
Reported-by: Jordan Griege <jgriege@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e4b019515f ]
Right now Linux BT stack cannot pass test case "GAP/CONN/CPUP/BV-05-C
'Connection Parameter Update Procedure Invalid Parameters Central
Responder'" in Bluetooth Test Suite revision GAP.TS.p44. [0]
That was revoled by commit c49a8682fc ("Bluetooth: validate BLE
connection interval updates"), but later got reverted due to devices
like keyboards and mice may require low connection interval.
So only validate the max value connection interval to pass the Test
Suite, and let devices to request low connection interval if needed.
[0] https://www.bluetooth.org/docman/handlers/DownloadDoc.ashx?doc_id=229869
Fixes: 68d19d7d99 ("Revert "Bluetooth: validate BLE connection interval updates"")
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 61a5ab72ed ]
hci_store_wake_reason() wrongly parses event HCI_Connection_Request
as HCI_Connection_Complete and HCI_Connection_Complete as
HCI_Connection_Request, so causes recording wakeup BD_ADDR error and
potential stability issue, fix it by using the correct field.
Fixes: 2f20216c1d ("Bluetooth: Emit controller suspend and resume events")
Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e5469adb2a ]
During suspend, only wakeable devices can be in acceptlist, so if the
device was previously added it needs to be removed otherwise the device
can end up waking up the system prematurely.
Fixes: 3b42055388 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix attempting to suspend with unfiltered passive scan")
Signed-off-by: Clancy Shang <clancy.shang@quectel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2449007d3f ]
While handling the HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event, if the underlying
BT controller is not responding, the GPIO reset mechanism would
free the hci_dev and lead to a use-after-free in hci_error_reset.
Here's the call trace observed on a ChromeOS device with Intel AX201:
queue_work_on+0x3e/0x6c
__hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x2ee/0x4c0 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a6>]
? init_wait_entry+0x31/0x31
__hci_cmd_sync+0x16/0x20 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>]
hci_error_reset+0x4f/0xa4 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>]
process_one_work+0x1d8/0x33f
worker_thread+0x21b/0x373
kthread+0x13a/0x152
? pr_cont_work+0x54/0x54
? kthread_blkcg+0x31/0x31
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
This patch holds the reference count on the hci_dev while processing
a HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event to avoid potential crash.
Fixes: c7741d16a5 ("Bluetooth: Perform a power cycle when receiving hardware error event")
Signed-off-by: Ying Hsu <yinghsu@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6b3899be24 ]
There's a very confusing mistake in the code starting a HCI inquiry: We're
calling hci_dev_test_flag() to test for HCI_INQUIRY, but hci_dev_test_flag()
checks hdev->dev_flags instead of hdev->flags. HCI_INQUIRY is a bit that's
set on hdev->flags, not on hdev->dev_flags though.
HCI_INQUIRY equals the integer 7, and in hdev->dev_flags, 7 means
HCI_BONDABLE, so we were actually checking for HCI_BONDABLE here.
The mistake is only present in the synchronous code for starting an inquiry,
not in the async one. Also devices are typically bondable while doing an
inquiry, so that might be the reason why nobody noticed it so far.
Fixes: abfeea476c ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY")
Signed-off-by: Jonas Dreßler <verdre@v0yd.nl>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 10bfd453da ]
It seems that if userspace provides a correct IFA_TARGET_NETNSID value
but no IFA_ADDRESS and IFA_LOCAL attributes, inet6_rtm_getaddr()
returns -EINVAL with an elevated "struct net" refcount.
Fixes: 6ecf4c37eb ("ipv6: enable IFA_TARGET_NETNSID for RTM_GETADDR")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3773d65ae5 ]
Currently, mctp_local_output only takes ownership of skb on success, and
we may leak an skb if mctp_local_output fails in specific states; the
skb ownership isn't transferred until the actual output routing occurs.
Instead, make mctp_local_output free the skb on all error paths up to
the route action, so it always consumes the passed skb.
Fixes: 833ef3b91d ("mctp: Populate socket implementation")
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240220081053.1439104-1-jk@codeconstruct.com.au
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5ae1e9922b ]
syzkaller triggered following kasan splat:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __skb_flow_dissect+0x19d1/0x7a50 net/core/flow_dissector.c:1170
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812fb4000e by task syz-executor183/5191
[..]
kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:588
__skb_flow_dissect+0x19d1/0x7a50 net/core/flow_dissector.c:1170
skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys include/linux/skbuff.h:1514 [inline]
___skb_get_hash net/core/flow_dissector.c:1791 [inline]
__skb_get_hash+0xc7/0x540 net/core/flow_dissector.c:1856
skb_get_hash include/linux/skbuff.h:1556 [inline]
ip_tunnel_xmit+0x1855/0x33c0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:748
ipip_tunnel_xmit+0x3cc/0x4e0 net/ipv4/ipip.c:308
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13d/0x6d0 net/core/dev.c:3564
__dev_queue_xmit+0x7c1/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4349
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline]
neigh_connected_output+0x42c/0x5d0 net/core/neighbour.c:1592
...
ip_finish_output2+0x833/0x2550 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235
ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323
..
iptunnel_xmit+0x5b4/0x9b0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:82
ip_tunnel_xmit+0x1dbc/0x33c0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:831
ipgre_xmit+0x4a1/0x980 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:665
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13d/0x6d0 net/core/dev.c:3564
...
The splat occurs because skb->data points past skb->head allocated area.
This is because neigh layer does:
__skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb));
... but skb_network_offset() returns a negative offset and __skb_pull()
arg is unsigned. IOW, we skb->data gets "adjusted" by a huge value.
The negative value is returned because skb->head and skb->data distance is
more than 64k and skb->network_header (u16) has wrapped around.
The bug is in the ip_tunnel infrastructure, which can cause
dev->needed_headroom to increment ad infinitum.
The syzkaller reproducer consists of packets getting routed via a gre
tunnel, and route of gre encapsulated packets pointing at another (ipip)
tunnel. The ipip encapsulation finds gre0 as next output device.
This results in the following pattern:
1). First packet is to be sent out via gre0.
Route lookup found an output device, ipip0.
2).
ip_tunnel_xmit for gre0 bumps gre0->needed_headroom based on the future
output device, rt.dev->needed_headroom (ipip0).
3).
ip output / start_xmit moves skb on to ipip0. which runs the same
code path again (xmit recursion).
4).
Routing step for the post-gre0-encap packet finds gre0 as output device
to use for ipip0 encapsulated packet.
tunl0->needed_headroom is then incremented based on the (already bumped)
gre0 device headroom.
This repeats for every future packet:
gre0->needed_headroom gets inflated because previous packets' ipip0 step
incremented rt->dev (gre0) headroom, and ipip0 incremented because gre0
needed_headroom was increased.
For each subsequent packet, gre/ipip0->needed_headroom grows until
post-expand-head reallocations result in a skb->head/data distance of
more than 64k.
Once that happens, skb->network_header (u16) wraps around when
pskb_expand_head tries to make sure that skb_network_offset() is unchanged
after the headroom expansion/reallocation.
After this skb_network_offset(skb) returns a different (and negative)
result post headroom expansion.
The next trip to neigh layer (or anything else that would __skb_pull the
network header) makes skb->data point to a memory location outside
skb->head area.
v2: Cap the needed_headroom update to an arbitarily chosen upperlimit to
prevent perpetual increase instead of dropping the headroom increment
completely.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+bfde3bef047a81b8fde6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller-bugs/c/fL9G6GtWskY/m/VKk_PR5FBAAJ
Fixes: 243aad830e ("ip_gre: include route header_len in max_headroom calculation")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240220135606.4939-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
