chore: add shared skills catalog (19 skills), installers, manifest, validator
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skills/security-audit/SKILL.md
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skills/security-audit/SKILL.md
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name: security-audit
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description: Use when performing security audits, vulnerability scanning, threat modeling, or reviewing code for OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities, injection flaws, and authentication/authorization issues.
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---
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# Security Audit & Threat Modeling
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## Purpose
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Rigorously review code, APIs, and infrastructure configurations for security vulnerabilities, information leaks, authorization flaws, and untrusted input exploitation.
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## Core Audit Vectors
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### 1. Injection & Deserialization
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- **SQL / NoSQL Injection:** Are queries parameterized? Are dynamic clauses safely validated against strict allowlists?
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- **Command Injection:** Are subprocess arguments passed as arrays (`argv`) rather than concatenated shell strings? Is shell evaluation (`shell: true`, `eval`, `exec`) avoided?
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- **Unsafe Deserialization:** Is arbitrary YAML/JSON deserialization guarded against code execution (`js-yaml` with `DEFAULT_SCHEMA` vs dangerous constructors)?
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### 2. Authentication & Access Control (Broken Object-Level Auth)
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- Are access checks enforced on every endpoint/resolver, or solely in the UI?
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- Can user A access or mutate resources of user B by altering IDs/keys in requests (IDOR)?
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- Are session tokens and credentials rotated and scrubbed from telemetry/logs?
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### 3. File System & Path Traversal
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- Are file paths normalized and verified to stay within designated workspace/sandbox boundaries (`path.resolve`, canonical path traversal checks)?
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- Are symlinks resolved to prevent sandbox escaping?
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### 4. Data Exposure & Secrets Management
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- Are API keys, tokens, and database passwords excluded from git commits and client bundles?
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- Are errors sanitized in production to avoid leaking internal stack traces and server topology?
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- Is CORS and CSP configured to minimum required access?
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## Deliverables
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1. **Threat Model:** Identified attack surfaces and threat actors.
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2. **Vulnerabilities List:** Ranked by CVSS/Severity (Critical, High, Medium, Low) with concrete PoC scenarios.
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3. **Remediation Plan:** Immediate patch and long-term architectural defense-in-depth.
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