Confine Windows command execution through a WRITE_RESTRICTED token whose restricting SIDs carry an orphan-SID write allowlist, ported from https://github.com/huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (@ 10e4dfb). Every Win32 call is checked and fails closed - the POC silently ran children with the FULL token when CreateRestrictedToken failed. - @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl: koffi primitives verified against the MinGW Windows headers (verify/abi-probe.cpp) plus the confinement runner ([node, runner, --workspace, --temp, --mode, --, argv...]: kill-on-close job, stdio passthrough, exit-code mirroring, windows-acl-run: failure signature, grant revocation). read-only = strict zero grants (NUL device not writable; documented). Windows-only execution: exempted from the Linux coverage lane (windowsOnlyCoverageExclusions). - @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local: PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32 filled with the windows-acl runner (full enforcement, ACL denial dialect, runner-failure rules). - @deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox: sandbox-consuming pwsh executor (call-for-call mirror of dsh-bash-sandbox) over a new argv-level seam in dsh-pwsh-local; per-file coverage complete via the fake-provider spec. - bundle/base: the Windows platform layer mounts the confined pwsh roster - sandbox/policy/fs-sandbox/permission/approval re-enabled, the POSIX bash stack stays disabled. Co-authored-by: Huo Yaoyuan <huoyaoyuan@hotmail.com>
108 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript
108 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* End-to-end runner tests: spawn the REAL runner entry through tsx (exactly
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* the argv shape dsh-sandbox-local's confine() builds), with piped stdio
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* inherited through the runner into the confined child — the same chain a
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* production confined execution walks.
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*/
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import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
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import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
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import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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const isWin32 = process.platform === 'win32'
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const runnerEntry = fileURLToPath(new URL('../src/runner.ts', import.meta.url))
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function pwshAvailable(): boolean {
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try {
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spawnSync('where.exe', ['pwsh'], { stdio: 'ignore' })
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return true
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} catch {
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return false
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}
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}
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function runRunner(args: string[], timeoutMs = 30_000) {
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return spawnSync(process.execPath, ['--import', 'tsx/esm', runnerEntry, ...args], {
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timeout: timeoutMs,
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encoding: 'utf8',
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})
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}
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describe.skipIf(!isWin32 || !pwshAvailable())('windows-acl runner', () => {
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let scratchRoot!: string
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let writableDir!: string
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let isolatedTemp!: string
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let secretFile!: string
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let escapeFile!: string
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beforeAll(() => {
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scratchRoot = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-acl-runner-'))
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writableDir = join(scratchRoot, 'writable')
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mkdirSync(writableDir)
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isolatedTemp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-acl-runner-temp-'))
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secretFile = join(scratchRoot, 'secret.txt')
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writeFileSync(secretFile, 'top secret - must stay readable to prove the read boundary')
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escapeFile = join(scratchRoot, 'escaped.txt')
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})
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afterAll(() => {
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rmSync(scratchRoot, { recursive: true, force: true })
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rmSync(isolatedTemp, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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it('workspace-write: the confined child writes granted directories only', () => {
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const probe = [
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"$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue';",
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`try{Set-Content -Path '${writableDir}\\child-wrote.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'TARGET-WRITE: OK'}catch{'TARGET-WRITE: DENIED'};`,
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`try{Set-Content -Path '${isolatedTemp}\\child-wrote.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'TEMP-WRITE: OK'}catch{'TEMP-WRITE: DENIED'};`,
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`try{Set-Content -Path '${escapeFile}' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'ESCAPE-WRITE: OK (ESCAPE!)'}catch{'ESCAPE-WRITE: DENIED'};`,
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`try{Get-Content '${secretFile}' -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null;'SECRET-READ: OK'}catch{'SECRET-READ: DENIED'}`,
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].join('')
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const result = runRunner([
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'--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', 'workspace-write',
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'--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', probe,
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])
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expect(result.status, `stderr: ${result.stderr}`).toBe(0)
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expect(result.stdout).toContain('TARGET-WRITE: OK')
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expect(result.stdout).toContain('TEMP-WRITE: OK')
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expect(result.stdout).toContain('ESCAPE-WRITE: DENIED')
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expect(result.stdout).toContain('SECRET-READ: OK')
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expect(existsSync(escapeFile)).toBe(false)
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expect(existsSync(join(writableDir, 'child-wrote.txt'))).toBe(true)
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}, 30_000)
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it('read-only: strict zero grants — no writes anywhere (not even NUL), reads and $null redirection fine', () => {
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const probe = [
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"$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue';",
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'\'LANGMODE: \' + $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode;',
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`try{Set-Content -Path '${writableDir}\\readonly-child-wrote.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'TARGET-WRITE: OK'}catch{'TARGET-WRITE: DENIED'};`,
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`try{Set-Content -Path '${isolatedTemp}\\readonly-child-wrote.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'TEMP-WRITE: OK'}catch{'TEMP-WRITE: DENIED'};`,
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// The NUL device is a securable object: strict zero grants deny it too.
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'try{Set-Content -Path \'NUL\' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;\'NUL-WRITE: OK\'}catch{\'NUL-WRITE: DENIED\'};',
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// PowerShell's $null redirection discards without opening NUL — must keep working.
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'echo hi > $null;\'DOLLAR-NULL: OK\';',
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`try{Get-Content '${secretFile}' -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null;'SECRET-READ: OK'}catch{'SECRET-READ: DENIED'}`,
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].join('')
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const result = runRunner([
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'--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', 'read-only',
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'--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', probe,
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])
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expect(result.status, `stderr: ${result.stderr}`).toBe(0)
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expect(result.stdout).toContain('TARGET-WRITE: DENIED')
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expect(result.stdout).toContain('TEMP-WRITE: DENIED')
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expect(result.stdout).toContain('NUL-WRITE: DENIED')
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expect(result.stdout).toContain('DOLLAR-NULL: OK')
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expect(result.stdout).toContain('SECRET-READ: OK')
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expect(existsSync(join(writableDir, 'readonly-child-wrote.txt'))).toBe(false)
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}, 30_000)
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it('runner-side failure: signature on stderr and exit 127, the command never runs', () => {
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const result = runRunner(['--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', 'workspace-write'])
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expect(result.status).toBe(127)
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expect(result.stderr).toContain('windows-acl-run: ')
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}, 15_000)
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})
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