Machine-produced by `pnpm run rescope-vendor --apply` plus the regeneration it prints: `pnpm install` for the lockfile, `pnpm run gen-third-party-notices`, `verify-translation-pairing --write` for the touched bilingual pairs, `gen-doc-graphs`, and one typert snapshot whose ids embed character offsets. `pnpm run rescope-vendor --check` verifies the result. Renames nine vendored packages (cordis, cosmokit, schemastery and the six @cordisjs plugins) and every reference that resolves them: manifest names and dependency keys, module specifiers including declare-module merges, cordis.yml plugin names, tsconfig paths, every Markdown fence, and `docs/` prose. Directory names, upstream versions, and dependency ranges are unchanged, so vendor/README.md still reads as an upstream snapshot; its manifest table gains an upstream-name column so THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES keeps MIT attribution pointed at each fork's origin. The tutorial tier follows the rename end to end: its yaml fences named plugins the Loader can no longer resolve, its `ts ignore-check` fences disagreed with the compiled fences beside them, and its prose quoted both. The contracts that told readers to keep upstream names — the root convention and the vendoring cookbook's tree comment and manifest invariant — now say to rescope instead. Two rules read `@deepseek-ai/` as "another workspace plugin": the client bundle purity gate now names the vendored libraries a browser bundle inlines, and the files where a bare `cordis` is an agent-preset id keep that product data.
113 lines
5.3 KiB
TypeScript
113 lines
5.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
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import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
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import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
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import { homedir, tmpdir } from 'node:os'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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import { Context } from '@deepseek-ai/cordis'
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import type { SandboxPolicy } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
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import { LocalSandboxProvider } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local'
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import { seatbeltProfileArgs } from '../src/profiles.ts'
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/**
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* Keyless backend integration through `confine()` and a real macOS Seatbelt process, with Linux
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* rungs forced off. Tests assert world effects and that the kernel denial matches the advertised
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* dialect; consumer coverage lives in dsh-bash-sandbox. Skips off macOS or when the profile probe
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* fails. HOME-based workspaces avoid Seatbelt's wholesale temp-directory grants, so
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* workspace-write proves the workspace-root grant itself.
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*/
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const probe = spawnSync('sandbox-exec', [...seatbeltProfileArgs({ mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: '/' }), '--', 'true'], { timeout: 5_000, stdio: 'ignore' })
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const seatbeltUsable = probe.status === 0
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let ctx: Context | undefined
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const tempDirs: string[] = []
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afterEach(async () => {
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await ctx?.fiber.dispose()
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ctx = undefined
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await Promise.all(tempDirs.splice(0).map(dir => rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })))
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})
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async function tempDir(base: string): Promise<string> {
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const dir = await mkdtemp(join(base, 'dsh-seatbelt-e2e-'))
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tempDirs.push(dir)
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return dir
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}
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async function provider(): Promise<LocalSandboxProvider> {
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ctx = new Context()
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await ctx.plugin(LocalSandboxProvider, {})
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const sandbox = ctx.sandbox as LocalSandboxProvider
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sandbox.internals = { probeBwrap: () => false, probeLandlock: () => 'unusable' }
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return sandbox
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}
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/** Confine a shell command under `policy` and run it for real; returns the spawn result and the wrap's facts. */
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function runConfined(sandbox: LocalSandboxProvider, command: string, policy: SandboxPolicy) {
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const confined = sandbox.confine(['bash', '-c', command], policy)
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const result = spawnSync(confined.argv[0] as string, confined.argv.slice(1), { timeout: 30_000, encoding: 'utf8' })
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return { result, confined }
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}
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describe.skipIf(!seatbeltUsable)('sandbox-local: real Seatbelt confinement through sandbox-exec', () => {
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it('read-only denies a write — the file must NOT exist, and the kernel speaks the advertised dialect', async () => {
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const workdir = await tempDir(tmpdir())
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const sandbox = await provider()
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const { result, confined } = runConfined(sandbox, `echo hi > ${workdir}/denied.txt`, { mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: workdir })
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expect(result.status).not.toBe(0)
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expect(confined.enforcement).toBe('full')
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// The wrap's denialSignatures must be what the kernel actually prints.
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expect(result.stderr.toLowerCase()).toContain('operation not permitted')
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expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
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})
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it('read-only keeps the tree readable/executable and /dev/null writable', async () => {
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const workdir = await tempDir(tmpdir())
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const sandbox = await provider()
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const { result } = runConfined(sandbox, 'ls / > /dev/null && echo dev-ok', { mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: workdir })
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expect(result.status).toBe(0)
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expect(result.stdout).toBe('dev-ok\n')
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})
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it('read-only grants no temp area: a write under the user temp dir is denied too', async () => {
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// The per-user darwin temp dir is a workspace-write grant, not a
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// read-only one — under read-only the only write-shaped path is /dev/null.
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const workdir = await tempDir(tmpdir())
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const sandbox = await provider()
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const target = join(workdir, 'tmp-denied.txt')
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const { result } = runConfined(sandbox, `echo hi > ${target}`, { mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: await tempDir(homedir()) })
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expect(result.status).not.toBe(0)
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expect(existsSync(target)).toBe(false)
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})
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it('workspace-write lands a write inside the workspace root and still denies one beside it', async () => {
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const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
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const outside = await tempDir(homedir())
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const sandbox = await provider()
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const inside = runConfined(sandbox, `printf seatbelt-ok > ${workdir}/allowed.txt`, { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: workdir })
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expect(inside.result.status).toBe(0)
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expect(readFileSync(join(workdir, 'allowed.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('seatbelt-ok')
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const denied = runConfined(sandbox, `echo hi > ${outside}/denied.txt`, { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: workdir })
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expect(denied.result.status).not.toBe(0)
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expect(existsSync(join(outside, 'denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
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})
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it('workspace-write grants /tmp and the user temp dir (the documented Seatbelt-profile temp areas)', async () => {
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const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
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const hostTmp = await tempDir('/tmp')
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const userTmp = await tempDir(tmpdir())
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const sandbox = await provider()
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const { result } = runConfined(
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sandbox,
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`printf tmp-ok > ${hostTmp}/scratch.txt && printf user-tmp-ok > ${userTmp}/scratch.txt`,
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{ mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: workdir },
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)
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expect(result.status).toBe(0)
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expect(readFileSync(join(hostTmp, 'scratch.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('tmp-ok')
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expect(readFileSync(join(userTmp, 'scratch.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('user-tmp-ok')
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})
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})
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