deepseek-harness/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl

@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl

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Windows write-restriction sandbox backend for the harness sandbox seam: a Node.js/koffi port of the mechanism in huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (10e4dfb, the fixed revision), mounted as the win32 rung of the @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local chain (workspace-write / read-only modes); the same package carries the Linux/macOS backends.

Mechanism in one line: the caller's token is duplicated into a WRITE_RESTRICTED token whose restricting SIDs include an orphan SID (S-1-4-x-y) that only this sandbox instance has added to the workspace and temp directories' DACLs. Windows then grants a write only where BOTH the caller's normal access AND the restricting-SID intersection allow it — the orphan SID is the write allowlist, and it grants nothing anywhere else on the system.

Usage

import { AclSandbox } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl'

const workspaceRoot = process.cwd()

const sandbox = new AclSandbox({ writableDirs: [workspaceRoot] })
await sandbox.init() // throws on ANY Win32 failure — never spawns unrestricted

const child = sandbox.spawn({ command: 'pwsh', args: ['-NoProfile', '-Command', '...'], cwd: workspaceRoot })
const { stdout, stderr, exitCode } = await child.wait()

sandbox.dispose() // revokes all standing grants; reports every cleanup failure

Every Win32 API call in this package is checked; failures throw Win32Error carrying the API name, the exact Win32 code, the FormatMessageW system text, and the failing path/context. This is deliberate: the POC ignored every return value and, when CreateRestrictedToken failed, silently ran the child with the FULL unrestricted token (fail-open). This port fails closed by construction.

The confinement runner

The seam-facing shape is the runner entry (./runner), the argv-prefix wrapper @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local spawns in place of the caller's command — the same architecture as bwrap/landlock-run/sandbox-exec, so the sandbox seam's confine() contract needs no change. Stable argv contract:

node runner.js --workspace <dir> --temp <dir> --mode <read-only|workspace-write> -- <argv...>

The runner creates the restricted token, spawns the wrapped argv under it with the caller's stdio passed straight through (the caller's pipes, made inheritable around the spawn — Node clears stdio inheritability at startup, which raw spawns must compensate for), wraps the child in a KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE job (a dead runner kills the child), ignores its own console Ctrl+C so the child handles its own, mirrors the child's exit code, and revokes all grants on exit. Every runner-side failure prints windows-acl-run: <detail> to stderr and exits 127 — the seam's RUNNER_FAILURE_RULES match that signature, so a runner refusal is never mistaken for a denial.

Modes:

• workspace-write: the workspace and temp directories carry the orphan-SID Write grant; every other write is denied by the token intersection.
• read-only: STRICT zero grants — nothing is writable. The NUL device is a securable object and is NOT granted (unlike Linux's /dev/null sink): Set-Content NUL and native > NUL writes fail with access denied, while PowerShell's > $null redirection keeps working (it discards without opening NUL). Documented behavior, not a prompt promise — the model-facing surface makes no sink claims for read-only mode.

The AclSandbox class (tempDir: null disables the temp grant) remains the programmatic API for direct spawns.

Header verification

All constants, signatures, and struct layouts were verified against the Windows headers on the development machine (MinGW winnt.h / accctrl.h / aclapi.h / securitybaseapi.h / sddl.h / processthreadsapi.h / fileapi.h / namedpipeapi.h / synchapi.h / winbase.h) and are cross-checked at runtime by verify/abi-probe.cpp (sizes, offsets, enum values, static asserts):

g++ -std=c++20 -municode -O2 -o abi-probe.exe verify/abi-probe.cpp -ladvapi32 && ./abi-probe.exe

The koffi struct definitions assert their sizes against the probe at module load, so a header/koffi layout drift fails loudly instead of corrupting memory.

Verified boundaries (inherent to restricted tokens, not this port)

• Writes are restricted; reads, network, and process visibility are not. WRITE_RESTRICTED intersects write accesses only, so a confined child can read any caller-readable file and open sockets. read-only mode therefore cannot be expressed by this mechanism alone; pair it with a read-side policy or an AppContainer/S-1-15-2 capability token for stronger confinement.
• Console isolation is unavailable. Under the restricted token, children created with CREATE_NO_WINDOW / CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE die during DLL initialization with STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED (0xC0000142). The POC tried to fix this by adding the console logon SID (S-1-2-1) to the restricting list; on Windows 11 26200 CreateWellKnownSid(WinLocalLogonSid) fails with ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER (87), the correct WinConsoleLogonSid yields a valid S-1-2-1 but the child still dies, and the POC's final revision removed both the SID and console isolation. Children therefore share the host console; stdio redirection is pipe-based and unaffected.
• ACL grants are standing directory mutations. They persist if the process dies mid-run; dispose() revokes them, and init() revokes already-applied grants when a later step fails. The POC's documented manual cleanup (icacls <dir> /remove '*S-1-4-…') fails on this platform with ERROR_NONE_MAPPED (1332) — revoke through this module instead.
• Granted directories must be caller-owned. The owner's implicit WRITE_DAC is what lets the sandbox edit the DACL without elevation.
• The temp grant follows GetTempPathW — pass tempDir explicitly whenever possible. GetTempPathW reads the NATIVE environment block, which host runtimes that manage process.env through worker pools may not keep in sync (verified with vitest: a worker-side process.env.TMP change never reached the native block). A defaulted grant landing on the real temp dir inherits (OI)(CI) over every subdirectory of temp, silently widening the allowlist — point it at a per-sandbox directory instead.

Model Experience

Indirectly, through dsh-bash-sandbox, dsh-pwsh-sandbox, and their tools, which render this backend's enforcement and denial facts (the confined stderr the tool layer classifies through denialSignatures) while the dsh-sandbox seam owns the SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE text and runner selection.

KV Cache effect

None directly; the denial surface belongs to the tool layer.

Known Limitations and Deferred Work

• One write allowlist per instance — the orphan SID is the unit of the allowlist; reusing one sandbox instance across two workspaces widens both grants to both roots. Create one instance per workspace root.
• Cleanup is best-effort by design — dispose() attempts every revocation and aggregates failures into an AggregateError; a cleanup failure leaves a standing (but orphan-SID-only) ACE that this process's next init()/dispose() cycle or icacls (via the ACE, not the trustee name) can still remove.
• Read-side confinement and network policy are out of scope — WRITE_RESTRICTED intersects write accesses only; pair this backend with a read-side policy for stronger confinement.