db857f62c0
The sandbox docs overclaimed a containment contract the design never makes: "capability access is routed through cordis services, never Node built-ins, so everything a mounted plugin does stays inspectable and disposable". The host-realm helpers on the sandbox global (harness, console, btoa) are reachable functions, so mount code that goes looking can reach the host realm through one of them — accepted under the trust stance, because the ctx a mount ultimately receives is fully privileged anyway. Reword the sandbox module doc, the README trust stance, and the RFC sandbox-semantics section to say exactly that: the traps and small global surface STEER honest code onto the cordis services; they are not a security boundary.
packages/cordis — the self-referential runtime toolset
Model-facing tools over the live cordis runtime the agent itself runs inside: inspect the loaded plugins and service surface, mount model-written plugins, and dispose them again. Design home: the toolset RFC.
| Package | Role | ctx key |
|---|---|---|
tool-cordis/ |
The cordis_inspect / cordis_mount / cordis_unmount tools: read the runtime, evaluate model-written plugin code in a node:vm sandbox, and manage the dynamic mounts under one group fiber |
registers on ctx.tools |