6478da61e3
Durable record: bound to the owning session id and validated at the fold (orphan-SID shape, temp path inside the host temp root) — a fork's copied parent record no longer provisions the child, and a tampered record fails loud. Private temp dir: random unguessable name persisted in the record, created exclusively (pre-existing entries and reparse points fail EEXIST). Persistence: a fresh provision kicks an immediate flush (no write-behind debounce), narrowing the crash window to the flush latency — documented as the one self-healing gap. Runner-failure rules: exit-gated on 127 so a confined command that prints the signature on a non-127 exit is never misclassified. Spawn: AssignProcessToJobObject failure terminates the suspended child (no hanging orphans). SandboxExecutionPolicy.sessionId is the branded SessionId. Boundary docs: qualifying clause on the absolutist sentences, NULL-DACL Known Limitation, 'full' scoped to the supported NTFS surface, CLM gate comment.
@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox
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Abstract process-sandbox seam. Owns the ctx.sandbox service contract (SandboxProvider) and the confinement vocabulary the harness shares: SandboxMode (read-only / workspace-write / danger-full-access, file effects only), SandboxEnforcement (full / partial, per kernel ABI), SandboxExecutionPolicy (the complete per-call mode + workspace root), SandboxPolicy (its confined subset), and the fail-closed SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE error. Interface package of the capability-seam split: depends only on cordis (+ the harness error base), never on a backend.
The contract in one line: ctx.sandbox.confine(argv, policy) returns the argv to spawn INSTEAD of your own — wrapped so the process (and everything it spawns) runs confined — plus the selected backend's enforcement completeness, denial dialect (denialSignatures), and structured runner-failure evidence (runnerFailureRules); when no backend is usable it throws rather than passing the argv through unconfined. The core type catalog owns the exact classifier shape.
Policy rides the call, not the provider: two consumers may confine under different policies at the same instant (bash under read-only while a confined child agent keeps its state directory writable), and an approved escalated retry is just a new call with a wider policy.
Same-world confinement only. A backend shares the host's filesystem and kernel (bwrap, Landlock, Seatbelt); workspaceRoot names the filesystem-canonical real host directory. Workspace identity is resolved before lexical normalization, so a valid cwd containing symlink/.. grants the directory where chdir actually lands rather than an unrelated lexical parent. Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends of this seam — they replace whole capability implementations (ctx.bash, ctx.fs) as environment-coherent groups. The boundary and its rationale: the sandbox Agent Note.
Implementations: @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local (Linux: bwrap, else the per-platform Landlock launcher; macOS: sandbox-exec/Seatbelt). Consumers: @deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox (wraps ['bash', '-c', command]).
Model Experience
Confinement error, indirectly
What the model sees
Through dsh-bash-sandbox and dsh-tool-bash, failure to enforce a requested mode produces code SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE and the exact error below. An execution-time runner failure adds Runner failure: <detail>.
Exact error
sandbox mode "<mode>" is requested but no sandbox backend is usable on this host; refusing to run the command unconfined. Install bubblewrap or run a Landlock-enforcing kernel (Linux), ensure sandbox-exec is usable (macOS), or ensure the ACL restricted-token runner can start (Windows) — otherwise switch the consumer to danger-full-access.
Token effect
Conditional error text is visible for that call and retained in history until compaction.
KV Cache effect
Append-only; newly visible content follows the reusable request prefix and does not invalidate existing KV-cache entries.
Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- File effects are the whole policy vocabulary — the seam expresses no network, process, syscall, device, or credential restrictions.
- Same-world confinement only — containers, microVMs, and remote execution require replacing capability implementations rather than adding a provider here.
- Denial reporting is a stderr dialect — the seam returns backend signatures instead of a typed runtime denial channel, so consumers that need classification must infer it from the child process's output.
- Runner diagnostics are in-band — exit status plus stderr evidence cannot prove which process wrote a matching line, so a confined child that deliberately mimics its runner can cause an availability/diagnostic false attribution. This cannot bypass confinement; an out-of-band runner-status channel is deferred.
- One provider per context — composing different sandbox mechanisms simultaneously requires a provider-level ladder or separate Cordis contexts; callers choose policy per call, not backend identity.