The `readDenyPaths` policy field shipped in the previous commit broke Linux confinement outright. bwrap has to create the `/dev/null` bind's mount point inside a tree its own profile has already made read-only, so it refused the entire confinement whenever the parent directory was absent — every host that has not stored a credential yet, including a fresh install: bwrap: Can't mkdir parents for /home/runner/.dsh/.env: Read-only file system which the executor correctly classifies as SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, so every confined bash call failed closed. Landlock cannot subtract from its own `/` read grant, so it reported `partial` enforcement on every confined call for a file it never hid, with no way to switch the denial off (schemastery fills an omitted array with `[]`, so empty and omitted were indistinguishable). A protection that breaks confinement where it works and misreports it where it does not is worse than a documented absence. Revert the field, both expressible backends, the enforcement downgrade, and the policy default; state the residue plainly in the credentials-local READMEs — file mode stops other OS users, not the model — and keep the OS-keychain provider recorded as the real answer. The narrower discipline stands: no surface hoists the credential document into `process.env`, and the model is never handed a resolved path to it.
119 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript
119 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* The sandbox POLICY home (`ctx.sandboxPolicy`): the single owner of the
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* deployment's sandbox fallbacks plus per-session resolution: the file-effect
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* {@link SandboxMode}, the `workspace-write` root, and the override kit (the
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* `sandbox/mode` event, its fold, and its write path, from `./session-mode.ts`).
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*
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* Both enforcing capability families read the SAME policy here: the sandboxed
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* bash executor (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`) and the sandboxed filesystem
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* provider (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox`) consume the SAME resolved per-call
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* policy, so bash and fs can never confine to different roots — the split
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* world the sandbox RFC warns about. The service reads session state once at
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* the tool boundary; executors and providers remain session-free.
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*
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* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy
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*/
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import { resolve as resolvePath } from 'node:path'
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import { Context, Service } from 'cordis'
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import z from 'schemastery'
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import { canonicalPath, type SandboxExecutionPolicy, type SandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
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import type { Session } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
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import { effectiveSandboxMode } from './session-mode.ts'
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export { SANDBOX_MODES, effectiveSandboxMode, setSandboxMode } from './session-mode.ts'
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/** Resolve filesystem identity before lexical normalization can erase symlink-sensitive components. */
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function resolveWorkspaceRoot(path: string): string {
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return resolvePath(canonicalPath(path))
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}
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declare module 'cordis' {
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interface Context {
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sandboxPolicy: SandboxPolicyService
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}
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}
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/**
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* Plugin config: the deployment's sandbox default. All optional — `Config`
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* supplies the defaults (`mode: 'read-only'` is the fail-safe default; a
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* deployment that wants a workspace-writable agent opts in explicitly). The
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* runner choice is NOT here (it is the `ctx.sandbox` provider's config), nor
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* is any per-family knob: this is the one shared policy home.
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*/
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export interface Config {
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/** File-sandbox mode a session starts from (default: `read-only`). */
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mode?: SandboxMode
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/**
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* Fallback root for agentless calls and sessions without a cwd (default:
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* `process.cwd()`). Normal agent calls use their session cwd instead.
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*/
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workspaceRoot?: string
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}
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/** Inputs that select the sandbox policy for one capability call. */
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export interface SandboxPolicyRequest {
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/** Calling session; its immutable cwd becomes the workspace boundary. */
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session?: Session
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/** Explicit approved mode override, which outranks session policy. */
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mode?: SandboxMode
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}
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/**
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* The sandbox-policy service (`ctx.sandboxPolicy`). Owns the deployment
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* default mode and fallback workspace root. Tool layers call {@link resolve}
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* for each execution so a session's mode log and immutable cwd travel together
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* to every enforcing capability.
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*/
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export class SandboxPolicyService extends Service {
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// Inline schema call: the config catalog walks `static Config` statically.
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static Config: z<Config> = z.object({
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mode: z.union(['read-only', 'workspace-write', 'danger-full-access'] as const).default('read-only'),
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// No schema default: process.cwd() is resolved in the constructor so the
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// stored root is always absolute regardless of how it was supplied.
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workspaceRoot: z.string(),
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})
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/** The deployment default mode — the fallback beneath a session override. */
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readonly defaultMode: SandboxMode
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/** The absolute `workspace-write` fallback root for calls without a session cwd. */
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readonly workspaceRoot: string
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constructor(ctx: Context, config: Config) {
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super(ctx, 'sandboxPolicy')
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// schemastery (static Config) already filled `mode`; the cast records that
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// runtime fact. `workspaceRoot` has NO schema default, so its fallback to
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// the process cwd is real branching, resolved absolute either way.
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this.defaultMode = config.mode as SandboxMode
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this.workspaceRoot = resolveWorkspaceRoot(config.workspaceRoot ?? process.cwd())
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}
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/**
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* Resolve the complete policy for one capability call. An approved explicit
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* mode outranks the session's last `sandbox/mode` event, which outranks the
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* deployment default. A session cwd is its workspace-write boundary; the
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* configured root is the fallback for agentless calls and sessions without a
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* cwd.
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* @param request - optional session and approved mode override.
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* @returns the fully resolved per-call mode and absolute workspace root.
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*/
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resolve(request: SandboxPolicyRequest = {}): SandboxExecutionPolicy {
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const { session } = request
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return {
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mode: request.mode ?? (session === undefined ? undefined : this.overrideOf(session)) ?? this.defaultMode,
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workspaceRoot: resolveWorkspaceRoot(session?.header.cwd ?? this.workspaceRoot),
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}
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}
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/**
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* Read the session override without applying the deployment default.
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* @param session - session whose log supplies the override.
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* @returns the last logged mode, or `undefined` without one.
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*/
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overrideOf(session: Session): SandboxMode | undefined {
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return effectiveSandboxMode(session.events)
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}
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}
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export default SandboxPolicyService
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