9aaa4a871f
Review fixes (ds-review-bot on #623): - overrideOf (both knobs) rejects a seedLength past the log end before slicing: a malformed durable boundary would otherwise empty the own-switch slice until the log outgrew it, letting a wide baseline shadow a REAL later tightening. Malformed durable metadata fails loud, never open. - The session-query derived index carries the two baseline fields end to end: schema columns on both session tables (SESSION_QUERY_SQLITE_SCHEMA _VERSION 6 — derived, rebuilds in place), inserts, header selects, the candidates CTE, rowHeader, sameHeader, and the cross-source assertSessionHeadersCompatible — so a search hit's header keeps the child's inherited confinement and conflicting live/persisted baselines reject. Red-first: out-of-range seedLength tests in both policy suites; baseline round-trip and live/persisted baseline-conflict tests in the session-query sqlite suite.
sandbox/ — process-sandbox capability family
English | 中文
The confinement half of the capability-seam split: an abstract provider interface, platform backends, and the shared policy home. Consumers hand ctx.sandbox the exact argv they are about to spawn and spawn the returned (wrapped) argv instead; a complete SandboxExecutionPolicy (mode + workspace root) rides each capability call, and its confined subset becomes the provider's SandboxPolicy. Different sessions and consumers can therefore confine under different policies at the same instant. All product packages.
| Package | Role | ctx key |
|---|---|---|
sandbox/ |
Abstract process-sandbox seam (the SandboxProvider contract + the mode/enforcement/policy vocabulary) plus the shared ESCALATION kit (approveEscalation, the strictly-wider ladder, the denial/hint markers) and the writableRoots derivation every enforcement dialect shares |
ctx.sandbox |
sandbox-local/ |
Local backends by platform chain: Linux bwrap else the landlock-run launcher (the npm-distributed node-addon-landlock-run family, built and released from its own repository), darwin sandbox-exec/Seatbelt — multi-candidate chains functionally probed, sole candidates selected directly, verdict cached, fail-closed |
(registers ctx.sandbox) |
sandbox-policy/ |
The policy resolver: deployment fallbacks plus each session's durable mode and immutable cwd root. Both enforcing families consume its complete per-call result, so bash and fs cannot confine to different roots | ctx.sandboxPolicy |
The seam confines SAME-WORLD subprocesses only (shared filesystem and kernel). Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends here — they replace whole capability implementations (ctx.bash, ctx.fs) as environment-coherent groups; the boundary is recorded in the sandbox Agent Note.
Consumers today: bash/bash-sandbox (wraps ['bash', '-c', command] through ctx.sandbox) and fs/fs-sandbox (an in-process path fence, not an argv wrapper — reads ctx.sandboxPolicy and enforces the shared mode on write/edit). The cross-family boundary is the sandbox Agent Note's cross-family fs sandbox phase; the shared vocabulary lets both families teach the model one denial marker and one escalation flow.