Every packages/*/* README now carries a canonical '## Known Limitations and
Deferred Work' section: condensed, evidence-backed bullets for consumer-visible
gaps (unimplemented features, platform caveats, MVP cuts) and consciously
postponed work (TODO/FIXME/XXX markers, RFC deferrals still open). The ten
pre-existing ad-hoc variants ('What is NOT here (TODO)', 'Deferred',
'Limitations (MVP)', 'Known limitations (tracked TODOs)', ...) are normalized
into the canonical heading.
A new doc-sync gate, scripts/verify-readme-limitations.ts, enforces the shape:
exactly one limitations-like heading per package README, byte-equal to the
canonical h2, with at least one bullet; near-miss headings fail so variants
cannot creep back. Packages with genuinely nothing to declare (dsh-brand,
dsh-timeout, dsh-subagent-mock, dsh-app-boot) are whitelisted in the script and
must NOT carry the section; whitelist entries are validated against the scanned
package set so a rename fails loud.
Wired into the doc-sync chain (package.json) and the run-gates doc-sync leaf
set; the standing rule lands in packages/AGENTS.md and the adding-a-package
cookbook; decision record in
docs/rfc/implemented/process/2026-07-10-readme-known-limitations-gate.md
(RFC index regenerated).
Also fixes two stale '(deferred)' markers claiming dsh-compact-basic is
unimplemented (the dsh-compact seam README's package table and the seam's
module doc comment).
3.6 KiB
@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-cordis
The self-referential cordis toolset: three model-facing tools over the live runtime the agent runs inside. Design home — sandbox semantics, mount lifecycle, cross-mount composition, the generated API catalog, standing decisions: the toolset RFC.
What it does
cordis_inspect— read-only report over the runtime: services, the loaded-plugin list, registered tools, the dynamic-mount table, and the catalog-backedapi/eventsreferences.cordis_mount— evaluates model-written JavaScript (the body of an async function) in anode:vmsandbox; the code mustreturna cordis plugin, which is mounted under thecordis-dynamicgroup fiber and tracked asdyn-<n>.cordis_unmount— disposes one mount by id, returning only after quiescence.
Exact model-facing schemas: the generated tool catalog.
Trust stance
The sandbox isolates the global context only — it is not a security boundary. No Node API is provided: require, the timers, and fetch are callable traps that throw a redirect to the cordis alternative (ctx.fs / ctx.web / ctx.bash / inject: ['timer'] + ctx.setTimeout); process and Buffer are undefined; globalThis writes stay inside. These traps steer honest code onto the cordis services; they do not contain a mount that goes looking — the host-realm helpers on the sandbox global (harness, console, btoa) are reachable functions, so mount code can reach the host realm and Node through one of them, which is fine because ctx is fully privileged anyway. The ctx a mounted plugin's apply receives is a whitelist façade — register tools, observe events, provide/consume services, use timers; framework internals (ctx.root, ctx.fiber, ctx.extend, ctx.plugin, …) are withheld — but the capabilities it does expose reach the real runtime, so load this plugin as deliberately as you would grant a bash tool.
Config
| Field | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
vmTimeoutMs |
5000 |
Bound on the SYNCHRONOUS portion of mount-code evaluation; an async body escapes it |
The generated API catalog
src/api-catalog.ts is generated by scripts/gen-cordis-api.ts from the same AST walk as docs/cordis-catalog and freshness-gated by pnpm run verify-cordis-api (in doc-sync) — never edit it by hand. cordis_inspect intersects it with the live service store at call time.
Rendering
All three tools render generic cards (read / execute / delete); cordis_mount carries the mount code as rawInput. Presenters are pure functions of the args; results keep the default text rendering.
Export shape
Namespace plugin: named exports name / inject / Config / apply, no default export (docs/postmortem/0001).
Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- The sandbox is containment for honest code, not a security boundary — host-realm helpers on the sandbox global are reachable, so mount code can reach Node; load this plugin as deliberately as you would grant a bash tool (see § Trust stance).
- The
ctxfaçade exposes noeffect()— mount code cannot register a bespoke disposer;on/provide/tools.registercover every mount seen so far, and a guardedeffectwaits on a real need (FIXME(sandbox-effect)). vmTimeoutMsbounds only synchronous evaluation — an async mount body escapes it; there is no async budget on mount code.