7606a99813
The credential store is 0600 under a 0700 directory, which stops other OS users but not the model: tool processes run as the same user, so under the shipped danger-full-access default they read it like any other file. SandboxExecutionPolicy grows readDenyPaths, and sandbox-policy defaults it to $DSH_HOME/.env — the exact file rather than the harness home, so the model keeps its documented access to its own session log. Seatbelt appends a trailing deny (last matching rule wins) and bwrap maps /dev/null over each path after any workspace bind; Landlock grants are a pure allow-list that cannot subtract from its own / read grant, so confine() reports partial enforcement there instead of claiming a boundary the process does not have. A real-kernel Seatbelt e2e proves the shape: the same read succeeds unconfined and fails under the denial, while a sibling file in the same directory stays readable. Both READMEs state the residual boundary plainly — no confining mode means no boundary — and record the OS keychain provider as the real answer.
34 lines
526 B
JSON
34 lines
526 B
JSON
{
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"extends": "../../../tsconfig.base.json",
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"compilerOptions": {
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"rootDir": "src",
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"outDir": "lib/types"
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},
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"include": [
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"src"
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"path": "../../../vendor/cosmokit"
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},
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{
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"path": "../../../vendor/cordis"
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},
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{
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"path": "../../../vendor/schemastery"
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},
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{
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"path": "../sandbox"
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},
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{
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"path": "../../util/paths"
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},
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{
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"path": "../../core/session"
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},
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{
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"path": "../../support/invariants"
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}
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]
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}
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