3e9527278a
Two review findings (#220) on the sandbox context façade: - Undeclared services were reachable: the façade resolved any live global via ctx.get(name), so ctx.bash worked without inject: ['bash']. A cross-mount consumer could then depend on a provider cordis never saw — unmounting the provider would neither park the consumer nor unwind its registered tools, leaving a model-visible tool that fails only at execution. The façade now reads ctx.fiber.inject and refuses any service the mount did not declare (with a teaching error naming the inject fix), so the dependency is always visible to cordis and its activation/unload semantics bind. - ctx.tools.get returned the live ToolDefinition, including execute — mount code could call another tool directly and bypass ToolRegistry.execute and its pre/post-execute hooks and accounting. get now returns the same read-only name/description/parameters view as schemas(), never an invocable. Adds inject-gate and schema-view regression cases to sandbox-context.spec.ts (undeclared property/get denied, declared allowed, the cross-mount zombie-tool scenario refused at call time, get exposes no execute). Package stays at per-file 100% coverage. RFC, mount description, and tool-catalog updated.
@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-cordis
The self-referential cordis toolset: three model-facing tools over the live runtime the agent runs inside. Design home — sandbox semantics, mount lifecycle, cross-mount composition, the generated API catalog, standing decisions: the toolset RFC.
What it does
cordis_inspect— read-only report over the runtime: services, the loaded-plugin list, registered tools, the dynamic-mount table, and the catalog-backedapi/eventsreferences.cordis_mount— evaluates model-written JavaScript (the body of an async function) in anode:vmsandbox; the code mustreturna cordis plugin, which is mounted under thecordis-dynamicgroup fiber and tracked asdyn-<n>.cordis_unmount— disposes one mount by id, returning only after quiescence.
Exact model-facing schemas: the generated tool catalog.
Trust stance
The sandbox isolates the global context only — it is not a security boundary. No Node API is provided: require, the timers, and fetch are callable traps that throw a redirect to the cordis alternative (ctx.fs / ctx.web / ctx.bash / inject: ['timer'] + ctx.setTimeout); process and Buffer are undefined; globalThis writes stay inside. The ctx a mounted plugin's apply receives is a whitelist façade — register tools, observe events, provide/consume services, use timers; framework internals (ctx.root, ctx.fiber, ctx.extend, ctx.plugin, …) are withheld — but the capabilities it does expose reach the real runtime, so load this plugin as deliberately as you would grant a bash tool.
Config
| Field | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
vmTimeoutMs |
5000 |
Bound on the SYNCHRONOUS portion of mount-code evaluation; an async body escapes it |
The generated API catalog
src/api-catalog.ts is generated by scripts/gen-cordis-api.ts from the same AST walk as docs/cordis-catalog and freshness-gated by pnpm run verify-cordis-api (in doc-sync) — never edit it by hand. cordis_inspect intersects it with the live service store at call time.
Rendering
All three tools render generic cards (read / execute / delete); cordis_mount carries the mount code as rawInput. Presenters are pure functions of the args; results keep the default text rendering.
Export shape
Namespace plugin: named exports name / inject / Config / apply, no default export (docs/postmortem/0001).