a90ccc4453
The `readDenyPaths` policy field shipped in the previous commit broke Linux confinement outright. bwrap has to create the `/dev/null` bind's mount point inside a tree its own profile has already made read-only, so it refused the entire confinement whenever the parent directory was absent — every host that has not stored a credential yet, including a fresh install: bwrap: Can't mkdir parents for /home/runner/.dsh/.env: Read-only file system which the executor correctly classifies as SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, so every confined bash call failed closed. Landlock cannot subtract from its own `/` read grant, so it reported `partial` enforcement on every confined call for a file it never hid, with no way to switch the denial off (schemastery fills an omitted array with `[]`, so empty and omitted were indistinguishable). A protection that breaks confinement where it works and misreports it where it does not is worse than a documented absence. Revert the field, both expressible backends, the enforcement downgrade, and the policy default; state the residue plainly in the credentials-local READMEs — file mode stops other OS users, not the model — and keep the OS-keychain provider recorded as the real answer. The narrower discipline stands: no surface hoists the credential document into `process.env`, and the model is never handed a resolved path to it.
31 lines
480 B
JSON
31 lines
480 B
JSON
{
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"extends": "../../../tsconfig.base.json",
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"compilerOptions": {
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"rootDir": "src",
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"outDir": "lib/types"
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},
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"include": [
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"src"
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"path": "../../../vendor/cosmokit"
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},
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{
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"path": "../../../vendor/cordis"
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},
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{
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"path": "../../../vendor/schemastery"
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},
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{
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"path": "../sandbox"
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},
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{
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"path": "../../core/session"
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},
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{
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"path": "../../support/invariants"
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}
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]
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}
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