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New objects created without an explicit security descriptor take their DACL from the token's default DACL, which CreateRestrictedToken builds from the user's ambient SIDs — none of them a restricting SID. Confined children therefore failed the write pass-2 check when creating anonymous pipes (CreatePipe: ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED, surfaced as Node EPERM), breaking PowerShell pipelines and other CreatePipe consumers. Merge a full-access write-SID ACE (Everyone under read-only) into the token default DACL at init via SetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl). Named pipes are EXEMPT: their default security descriptor is the kernel's PUBLIC template (owner/SYSTEM/Admins full, Everyone read-only), which no token change influences, so libuv's piped stdio capture stays denied for confined grandchildren — the POC-documented boundary, now pinned by the runner suite (inherit/ignore OK, pipe DENIED) and documented in the README pair. The NUL paragraph is corrected to the measured matrix (Everyone has 0x1201BF on the device: cmd/node writes land; Set-Content fails at the PS layer).
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446 B
YAML
7 lines
446 B
YAML
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
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# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
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# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md
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README.md: 835b7dace0baf10eec78b35172109a37688d99c2
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README.zh.md: 82a890d75f857b766c7ae47cef7a374edb5ecd63
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