Research across 8 multi-server agent clients (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini
CLI, VS Code, Cline, Roo Code, Goose, OpenCode) showed all of them keep
the server namespace in model-facing MCP tool names; the RFC's premise
for raw names ("servers already prefix their tools") is false for the
official GitHub/filesystem/Sentry servers.
- Config: drop toolPrefix; require serverName ([A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,32}),
duplicate serverName fails the later instance at load (per-root
reservation, released on dispose)
- Names: always mcp__<serverName>__<rawName>; normalize to the DeepSeek
64-char [A-Za-z0-9_-] contract with a deterministic 12-hex identity
hash on lossy normalization; raw name is the only thing sent on the
wire (tools/call)
- Sync: two-phase fetch/swap — fetch failure keeps the previous
generation; a swap conflict rolls back the whole generation (never a
partial set); duplicate raw names reject the tool list
- RFC: moved to implemented/ (status + skeleton rewritten per the
format contract), naming design + tier-level test coverage recorded
- Tests: naming algorithm unit suite; keyless Streamable HTTP e2e
against an in-process StreamableHTTPServerTransport (namespace
discovery, execution, per-request auth headers); dotted-name
normalization e2e via a new fixture tool
Add canonical Chinese bindings for build target, deploy root, peer
dependency, serving surface, wheel, wrapper, and VFS so future translations
have one source of truth. Apply the existing runtime, plugin, artifact, and
pipeline bindings throughout every Chinese counterpart touched by this PR.
Require the first Chinese use of peer dependency to retain the English term
so readers can map it back to the package-manager concept without
reintroducing mixed prose throughout the document.
Rewrite mixed-language prose where the English term is not an identifier,
while retaining package names, paths, flags, pkg, single-exe, and other
literal names exactly. Explain VFS on first use and keep technical constraints
readable without inventing compatibility terminology.
Describe single-executable worker support as implemented behavior, including
the filesystem-string entry contract and CommonJS worker artifact required by
the pkg loader, and remove the obsolete bundled-but-unsupported limitation.
Regenerate pairing fingerprints and the generated catalog reference so the
mechanical documentation gates validate the revised English and Chinese
pairs. This keeps the terminology table authoritative and prevents the two
languages from drifting as the runtime documentation evolves.
A preset names a bundle of the two mechanism knobs — request =
workspace-write + ask, yolo = danger-full-access + never — so the editor
shows ONE 'Permissions' select where the sandbox-mode and approval-policy
tiers stay orthogonal capabilities (the Codex /approvals shape: presets over
two dials). ctx.permission (dsh-permission) owns the config-defined table,
validates the default preset's bundle against the composed knob defaults at
load (fails loud), and writes a switch THROUGH: one log-only
permission/preset event (the audit fact reverse-mapping cannot recover —
the planned 'agent' preset shares request's knob values and differs only in
composed policy) plus each knob event via its own setter, deduped — a
net-zero switch appends nothing. Every knob consumer keeps reading its own
fold, untouched.
The current preset DERIVES from the effective knob values — the fold breaks
bundle ties, a knob state outside the table is the reserved 'custom' value
(a state, not an error: shown while it holds, switchable FROM, never a
target), and defaultPreset disappears (zero-event state reverse-maps from
the composition defaults).
The ACP bridge drops the two per-knob selects for the one preset select
(advertised only when ctx.permission is composed); pending/anchor/no-op
semantics carry over unchanged, with the no-op echo acknowledged before
vocabulary validation so a client re-pushing a derived 'custom' current
never errors. The sandbox variant example composes the
service with a workspace-write default; the permission-switching,
escalation-approved and escalation-rejected scenarios are re-recorded under
it (escalations now target an outside-workspace /tmp path under
danger-full-access, self-cleaning) and config-options is re-authored on the
single-select wire.
Rewrite the agent-scope RFC with executable examples and an explicit security non-goal. Harden subagent scalar and depth validation, and pin live tool-filter semantics across code, tests, and generated docs.
Make Cordis construction and teardown ownership reentrancy-safe, then carry caller and provider ownership through reservation, setup, publication, quiescence, and sentinel retirement.
Stabilize registry carriers and factory/workflow boundaries, add adversarial lifecycle regressions, and align the rewritten RFC plus generated contracts with the enforced behavior.
