The approval panel replaces the InputBar while a sandbox escalation waits,
and its justification and command are unbounded model text. With no height
cap, a long command grew the card until the refuse/allow row went under the
fold: at 900x700 the action row's bottom landed at y=749, so the user could
read the request and not answer it.
Justification and command now scroll in one region capped at the same height
as the composer's draft area, with the amber strip and the action row outside
it. The cap is one value with two consumers — declared as
--dsh-composer-text-max-height on ConversationRoot's .composerSeat, the
composer chain's only shared ancestor — so the seat cannot cap its two states
differently. The card rebinds the l2 scrollbar pair like every other scrolling
surface on an elevated background.
Covered by a new web e2e scenario that drives the real composition (read-only
session, denied write, the model's escalation retry, answer clicked through
the panel) and measures the live panel at two viewport heights against the
composer's own cap, read off the textarea rather than hardcoded.
Consume the card:'web' result view (structured sources + answer for search, the
URL and HTTP status for fetch) the web backend PR added. WebBlock
(ui-primitives) draws both kinds via the kind discriminant: a citation list of
safe external links (the MarkdownText protocol allowlist, title-or-hostname
label), a truncation indicator, a height cap matching TerminalBlock; a fetch
summary for the other kind. web-card-model is the single resultView derivation;
a keyed WebRow registers under web_search and web_fetch with the card resident
under its summary. The generic fallback and the details panel are web-aware.
Fixture gains web_search and web_fetch turns for the built-boot snapshot.
The web command row renders `title · summary` from one logged command
lifecycle pair, and the two halves were written without knowing about each
other: the title was the dispatched line rebuilt from `command/run` and the
summary was `command/done`'s verbatim text, so every Access-chip pick read
`/permission workspace-write · Permission preset: workspace-write.` — the
command name twice and its argument twice.
The title is now the bare command name (no `/`, no arguments — the summary
already says what the command did), and a command handler's settlement text
never repeats the command's own name, so `/permission` returns `preset
workspace-write`. The row reads `permission · preset workspace-write`, and
the TUI notice still names the preset that now applies. The log is
unchanged: `command/run` keeps its structured name/args split for a richer
registered row.
The `readDenyPaths` policy field shipped in the previous commit broke Linux
confinement outright. bwrap has to create the `/dev/null` bind's mount point
inside a tree its own profile has already made read-only, so it refused the
entire confinement whenever the parent directory was absent — every host that
has not stored a credential yet, including a fresh install:
bwrap: Can't mkdir parents for /home/runner/.dsh/.env: Read-only file system
which the executor correctly classifies as SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, so every
confined bash call failed closed. Landlock cannot subtract from its own `/`
read grant, so it reported `partial` enforcement on every confined call for a
file it never hid, with no way to switch the denial off (schemastery fills an
omitted array with `[]`, so empty and omitted were indistinguishable).
A protection that breaks confinement where it works and misreports it where it
does not is worse than a documented absence. Revert the field, both expressible
backends, the enforcement downgrade, and the policy default; state the residue
plainly in the credentials-local READMEs — file mode stops other OS users, not
the model — and keep the OS-keychain provider recorded as the real answer.
The narrower discipline stands: no surface hoists the credential document into
`process.env`, and the model is never handed a resolved path to it.
The personal-config smoke asserted that `$DSH_HOME/.env` feeds a `!!js`
expression in the personal `config.yaml` — the hoist this branch removed so
`credentials-local` can own that document and keep stored keys rotatable.
Seed both layers instead and let one expression separate them: the welcome
prefers the personal variable, so it can only render the invoking directory's
value while the harness home's `.env` stays out of `process.env`. The negative
that made the removal worth doing is now asserted in the assembled
application, not just in the provider's unit tests.
web_search and web_fetch returned only model-facing text, whose markdown source
list is lossy (title-or-hostname label, snippet and date concatenated), so a
client could not recover the structured sources. Add a card:'web' result view
with a kind discriminant ('search' carrying structured sources + answer +
truncated, 'fetch' carrying url + statusCode + truncated), projected through
each tool's output.presentationMeta and read back in presentResult. A UI
without the web card falls back to content; the TUI is unchanged. The web
consumer is a follow-up.
The workspace header row is now wrapped by its HoverCard anchor span
(0b4a6196f), so the row's immediate parent no longer holds the session
subtree; the delete scenario anchors on the groupSection ancestor
instead. The flat-view and dwell failures were downstream of this one
(shared page state).
dsh-bash-local injects `subprocess`, which this tree never mounted, so the bash
chain sat PENDING and the bundle's tool-bash waited with it. The shared boot()
all-ACTIVE assertion now surfaces that as a load failure.
The scenario probes filesystem confinement only, so the rows are removed and the
bundle opts out with `toolBash: false`. The recorded transcript is unchanged
because bash never reached the model.