The sandbox docs overclaimed a containment contract the design never makes:
"capability access is routed through cordis services, never Node built-ins,
so everything a mounted plugin does stays inspectable and disposable". The
host-realm helpers on the sandbox global (harness, console, btoa) are
reachable functions, so mount code that goes looking can reach the host realm
through one of them — accepted under the trust stance, because the ctx a
mount ultimately receives is fully privileged anyway. Reword the sandbox
module doc, the README trust stance, and the RFC sandbox-semantics section to
say exactly that: the traps and small global surface STEER honest code onto
the cordis services; they are not a security boundary.
Review finding (#220): the guarded proxy only special-cased ctx.tools, so
mount code could reach an UNGUARDED context through ctx.root, ctx.extend(), or
a service instance's .ctx, then ctx.root.tools.register({…}) to bypass the
marker check and host-realm normalization — a raw vm-realm result would later
error a real agent turn at the session-log plainness check.
The sandbox ctx is now a whitelist façade, not a pass-through proxy: it exposes
only what a mount needs — tools.register (marker-guarded), on/once, provide, the
timer helpers, and injected services resolved through a guarded get — and denies
every framework-plumbing member (root, parent, fiber, reflect, registry, extend,
isolate, intercept, plugin, set, mixin, …) with a teaching error. Injected
services are wrapped so a method returning a Context is rejected on the way back
(the .ctx escape), closing the one indirect leak. There is no context-valued
member left to reach; cross-mount provide/inject is untouched (the plugin's own
inject and the fiber's pending/active gating are unchanged). ctx.plugin (child
plugins) and ctx.set are denied by design; ctx.effect is deferred (FIXME).
Adds tests/sandbox-context.spec.ts covering the escape class (root/extend/fiber/
plugin/set/… denied, the classic root.tools.register bypass, the .ctx escape,
read-only writes) plus the async-service and symbol/in-operator paths for 100%
coverage. RFC/README/tool-catalog/config-catalog updated; api-catalog.ts
regenerated (also picks up the codeRuntime service that entered on the master
merge and was left stale).
The tree SHAPE was the wrong surface for the model: what it needs from
cordis_inspect is what services, plugins, and capabilities are loaded, not the
fiber hierarchy. The plugins section is now a flat name + lifecycle-state list
from ctx.registry (deterministically sorted, one line per instance); the ASCII
tree renderer, the parent→child rebuild, and the dyn-id tree annotation are
deleted — dynamic mounts keep their own richer dynamic section (id, state,
provides, waits). Net -49 lines; RFC and READMEs state the flat-list contract.
New top-level packages/cordis/ group with the self-referential toolset:
cordis_inspect (services / plugin tree / tools / dynamic mounts / api / events,
the api section intersecting the generated catalog with the live service store),
cordis_mount (model-written code evaluated in a node:vm sandbox, mounted under
one cordis-dynamic group fiber as dyn-<n>), cordis_unmount (awaited disposal to
quiescence). Boundary mechanisms: dual-realm instanceof, JSON realm
normalization of dynamic tool results, marker-guarded registration, SchemaSpec
teaching errors, parse failures surfaced with the offending line + caret and a
line-scoped TypeScript hint, and the unmount-first recipe on tool-name
collisions. Config: vmTimeoutMs (schemastery, default 5000). Design record:
docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-08-self-referential-cordis-toolset.md.
The tool-catalog boot manifest, its regenerated output, and the pinned
tool-name list land here rather than with the other repo registration: the
completeness guard globs packages/*/tool-* and fails the generator (and the
core/tools spec) the moment the package directory exists.
