quoteArg doubles end-of-string backslashes (real CommandLineToArgvW round-trip test; first-token exemption noted); grantWrite merges into the current DACL instead of replacing it, and both grant/revoke hold a LockFileEx per-path lock under GetTempPathW/dsh-acl-locks (koffi crashes on NULL lpOverlapped — a zeroed OVERLAPPED is used); GRANT_MASK gains DELETE|FILE_DELETE_CHILD (never WRITE_DAC/WRITE_OWNER) though the win32 26200 second check only constrains the WRITE bit; failure paths close all handles (CreateProcessAsUserW pipe set, ResumeThread thread/process/job) with stub-api tests; getTempPathW refuses undersized buffers; drainPipe backs off; runner.spec pwshAvailable uses the resolvePwshPath probe; NTSTATUS exit codes mirror bit-exact (verified end-to-end); WinLocalSid JSDoc re-attributed to WinLocalLogonSid. All gates green: 42 passed/2 skipped, typecheck, oxlint, 0 clones, constraints, knip.
Confine Windows command execution through a WRITE_RESTRICTED token whose restricting SIDs carry an orphan-SID write allowlist, ported from https://github.com/huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (@ 10e4dfb). Every Win32 call is checked and fails closed - the POC silently ran children with the FULL token when CreateRestrictedToken failed.
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl: koffi primitives verified against the MinGW Windows headers (verify/abi-probe.cpp) plus the confinement runner ([node, runner, --workspace, --temp, --mode, --, argv...]: kill-on-close job, stdio passthrough, exit-code mirroring, windows-acl-run: failure signature, grant revocation). read-only = strict zero grants (NUL device not writable; documented). Windows-only execution: exempted from the Linux coverage lane (windowsOnlyCoverageExclusions).
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local: PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32 filled with the windows-acl runner (full enforcement, ACL denial dialect, runner-failure rules).
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox: sandbox-consuming pwsh executor (call-for-call mirror of dsh-bash-sandbox) over a new argv-level seam in dsh-pwsh-local; per-file coverage complete via the fake-provider spec.
- bundle/base: the Windows platform layer mounts the confined pwsh roster - sandbox/policy/fs-sandbox/permission/approval re-enabled, the POSIX bash stack stays disabled.
Co-authored-by: Huo Yaoyuan <huoyaoyuan@hotmail.com>
