- .loadingFloat moved after the .status/.error block (its padding was
losing the same-specificity race) and re-anchored bottom-right: the
truncated/error rows own the bottom left and keep rendering through a
scan, so the pill can never cover them; confirmCreate's relist now
clears the stale failure text like every other scan launch.
- The close edge resets loading, so the slow-scan effect disarms while
hidden and a reopened dialog waits out a fresh silence window
(regression test added).
- The truncated note's survival through a scan is now asserted in the
slow-scan test; the wait-bound test moved to fake timers with the
200ms bound explicit.
- select()'s exemption from the one-frame rule and the constants' local
calibration premise are recorded in JSDoc and the capability-seam
Agent Note; the themed-scrollbars note's rebinding enumeration is
replaced by a pointer to the mechanical gate (it had drifted twice).
Both pairs re-recorded.
The loading pill's layer-2 background made the sheet an
elevated-surface painter, and the ui-theme scrollbar invariant rightly
flagged what was already latent: the dialog's columns scroll on an l2
card while the thumbs rendered in the base-surface pair. Rebind the
indirection on the card rule so it inherits to the scrolling columns.
Navigations keep the previous view rendering while scanning: target and
parent legs land as one two-pane frame when the parent leg settles within
a 200ms wait bound (past it the target lands alone and the late leg
upgrades in place; Escape inside the landing window withdraws the
navigation). The loading indicator floats over the content on the card
background and appears only once a scan outlives a 300ms silence window,
so navigation never shifts the columns or flashes an intermediate frame.
The truncated note now describes the on-screen panes instead of hiding
during scans.
The `readDenyPaths` policy field shipped in the previous commit broke Linux
confinement outright. bwrap has to create the `/dev/null` bind's mount point
inside a tree its own profile has already made read-only, so it refused the
entire confinement whenever the parent directory was absent — every host that
has not stored a credential yet, including a fresh install:
bwrap: Can't mkdir parents for /home/runner/.dsh/.env: Read-only file system
which the executor correctly classifies as SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, so every
confined bash call failed closed. Landlock cannot subtract from its own `/`
read grant, so it reported `partial` enforcement on every confined call for a
file it never hid, with no way to switch the denial off (schemastery fills an
omitted array with `[]`, so empty and omitted were indistinguishable).
A protection that breaks confinement where it works and misreports it where it
does not is worse than a documented absence. Revert the field, both expressible
backends, the enforcement downgrade, and the policy default; state the residue
plainly in the credentials-local READMEs — file mode stops other OS users, not
the model — and keep the OS-keychain provider recorded as the real answer.
The narrower discipline stands: no surface hoists the credential document into
`process.env`, and the model is never handed a resolved path to it.
Both provider READMEs state what actually holds: credentials-local now
documents the physical-line editor, the read-modify-write under the
writer lock, and a Security boundary section saying plainly that the file
mode stops other OS users and not the model. sandbox-policy documents
readDenyPaths and its per-backend enforcement. The llm READMEs carry the
registration handle, pi-ai's credential-miss semantics, and DeepSeek's
same-generation snapshot; app-boot and the CLI README stop describing
$DSH_HOME/.env as an environment layer.
A new Agent Note records the round (and the prior seam note cross-links
it); the sandbox and core catalog pages gain readDenyPaths and
AdapterRegistrationHandle with their manifest entries. The headless
missing-credential snapshot re-records for the reworded guidance, pi-ai
gains the Loader-composition guard its twin already had, and the
deliberate provider symmetry is marked for the clone detector.
The policy home's resolve() now stamps readDenyPaths, so every consumer
that pins the resolved shape (bash-sandbox hand-off, tool-fs stamps)
carries it, and three uncovered branches gained real tests: landlock
reporting partial enforcement for a denial it cannot express, the
policy's default under programmatic construction, and both ambient
credential paths in llm-deepseek without a mounted seam.
The credential store is 0600 under a 0700 directory, which stops other OS
users but not the model: tool processes run as the same user, so under
the shipped danger-full-access default they read it like any other file.
SandboxExecutionPolicy grows readDenyPaths, and sandbox-policy defaults
it to $DSH_HOME/.env — the exact file rather than the harness home, so
the model keeps its documented access to its own session log. Seatbelt
appends a trailing deny (last matching rule wins) and bwrap maps
/dev/null over each path after any workspace bind; Landlock grants are a
pure allow-list that cannot subtract from its own / read grant, so
confine() reports partial enforcement there instead of claiming a
boundary the process does not have.
A real-kernel Seatbelt e2e proves the shape: the same read succeeds
unconfined and fails under the denial, while a sibling file in the same
directory stays readable. Both READMEs state the residual boundary
plainly — no confining mode means no boundary — and record the OS
keychain provider as the real answer.
The helper's cleanup ran the same fallback for two different events. A
settings provider detaching leaves the consumer running, so falling back
to the composition entry and re-judging derived facts is right. The
consumer's own unload ran it too — re-registering routes and touching
resources the teardown was releasing. The disposer now checks the
consumer fiber's own state and returns when it is unloading or disposed.
