A preset names a bundle of the two mechanism knobs — request =
workspace-write + ask, yolo = danger-full-access + never — so the editor
shows ONE 'Permissions' select where the sandbox-mode and approval-policy
tiers stay orthogonal capabilities (the Codex /approvals shape: presets over
two dials). ctx.permission (dsh-permission) owns the config-defined table,
validates the default preset's bundle against the composed knob defaults at
load (fails loud), and writes a switch THROUGH: one log-only
permission/preset event (the audit fact reverse-mapping cannot recover —
the planned 'agent' preset shares request's knob values and differs only in
composed policy) plus each knob event via its own setter, deduped — a
net-zero switch appends nothing. Every knob consumer keeps reading its own
fold, untouched.
The current preset DERIVES from the effective knob values — the fold breaks
bundle ties, a knob state outside the table is the reserved 'custom' value
(a state, not an error: shown while it holds, switchable FROM, never a
target), and defaultPreset disappears (zero-event state reverse-maps from
the composition defaults).
The ACP bridge drops the two per-knob selects for the one preset select
(advertised only when ctx.permission is composed); pending/anchor/no-op
semantics carry over unchanged, with the no-op echo acknowledged before
vocabulary validation so a client re-pushing a derived 'custom' current
never errors. The sandbox variant example composes the
service with a workspace-write default; the permission-switching,
escalation-approved and escalation-rejected scenarios are re-recorded under
it (escalations now target an outside-workspace /tmp path under
danger-full-access, self-cleaning) and config-options is re-authored on the
single-select wire.
sandbox-acp-agent's whole surface moves into examples/acp-agent following
the example's existing multi-variant shape (the code-mode/both-mode
overlays): sandbox.cordis.yml + its replay overlay, the four snapshot
scenarios (config-options / mode-switching / escalation-approved /
escalation-rejected) as a 'sandbox' header class over per-scenario
configPath — goldens byte-identical, zero re-recording — and
escalation.e2e.ts unchanged apart from the config path. One ACP example
remains; demo:sandbox-acp keeps its name and boots the variant. References
(both RFCs, group/package READMEs, the examples table and test map, the
e2e workflow comment) now point at the variant.
Rewrite the agent-scope RFC with executable examples and an explicit security non-goal. Harden subagent scalar and depth validation, and pin live tool-filter semantics across code, tests, and generated docs.
Queue worker results before settlement cleanup, claim terminal and death boundaries before provider callbacks, and close late-message admission.
Make child cancellation and disposal reentrancy-safe across the workflow bridge and generic subagent wrapper, with adversarial regression coverage and RFC documentation.
Make Cordis construction and teardown ownership reentrancy-safe, then carry caller and provider ownership through reservation, setup, publication, quiescence, and sentinel retirement.
Stabilize registry carriers and factory/workflow boundaries, add adversarial lifecycle regressions, and align the rewritten RFC plus generated contracts with the enforced behavior.
Drain idle injection flushes before agent teardown, snapshot approval and subagent provider inputs, and gate subagent lifecycle events on real child readiness. Align the RFCs and generated contracts with the hardened behavior.
The three-entry cordis.yml (dsh-sandbox-local + dsh-bash-sandbox at a
read-only default + dsh-approval) served over ACP: the first live approval
composition. Recorded snapshot scenarios pin the wire end to end —
config-options advertisement, the mode-switching arc as the suite pinned
header (both switches, the prompt-section delta, one changed-by-the-user
notice per knob, a confined write landing under the switched mode), and
both escalation branches over scripted permissionAnswers (a grant runs
confined under workspace-write; a rejection executes nothing and pins the
fail-closed text). The with-key escalation e2e drives a real model +
real runner + the real bridge answerer, world-verified; ci.yml snapshot
lane and e2e.yml install bubblewrap so the confined replays actually
execute.
Both RFCs move to implemented/ (Decision/Consequences form, deferred
phases tracked in their own sections), with every cross-reference flipped.
