The parent implementation introduced sandboxMode and approvalPolicy as generic SessionHeader fields, then propagated those fields through both persistence backends, session-query indexes, collision checks, policy-specific seed-boundary folds, catalogs, and a broad test matrix. That storage plane is unnecessary: Session already accepts a validated constructor seed, and persistence captures that seed when the session is announced before committing its first batch.
Capture each parent override synchronously at delegation, append source-tagged sandbox/mode and approval/policy records after the optional fork prefix, and create the child with that combined seed. Keeping header.seedLength at the original fork-prefix length preserves lineage while ordinary last-event-wins folds make the inherited records outrank stale parent history and remain subordinate to later child switches. Unswitched parents still stamp nothing, so children continue to follow deployment defaults.
Remove the generic header fields and every persistence/query/schema branch built around them. Collapse the inheritance suite from ten leaking scenarios to four owned-context cases covering real filesystem confinement, stale fork precedence, delegation-time capture, and the no-override path. The assembled headless snapshot now asserts the persisted inheritance event directly.
This keeps the security behavior while restoring policy ownership to the existing event log and deleting the speculative durability machinery that the original tests did not exercise.
Review fix (ds-review-bot on #623): the unconditional slice regressed the
public SessionStore.fork path — a generic fork child gets seedLength but no
policy baseline, so slicing discarded its seed-carried sandbox/approval
switches and silently widened it to the deployment defaults (a forked
read-only/never parent produced a workspace-write/ask child).
overrideOf now branches on baseline presence: with a header baseline (a
delegation child) the fold covers only own post-seed switches — the
baseline captured from the parent's FULL log subsumes seed history; without
one, the whole log — seeded switches ARE the replayed inherited truth. The
permission preset fold scopes the same way. Red-first: generic-fork
seed-carried override tests in both policy suites.
Review fixes (ds-review-bot warnings on #623):
- One chain, every consumer: the override resolution (own post-seed
switches ?? header baseline, closed-vocabulary validated) moves into pure
exports (sandboxOverrideOf / approvalOverrideOf); the services delegate,
and the permission presets consume them — current(session) and set()
now see inherited baselines, so a child inheriting danger-full-access
gets REAL knob switches when workspace-write is selected instead of a
silent no-op, and a seed-carried preset selection is subsumed by the
baseline. current(events) becomes current(session) (pre-release; the
only callers were tests).
- Unconditional durable validation: a malformed header baseline fails
loud on every read, no longer shadowed by an own switch.
- The two policy peers are declared optional (peerDependenciesMeta), so a
thin spawn/fork deployment without policy plugins can consume the
driver; verify-runtime-closure honors the flag.
Red-first: inherited-preset derive/switch-away and seeded-selection tests
in the permission suite; malformed-baseline-with-own-switch tests in both
policy suites.
The automation-only rewrite edited many implemented Agent Notes; several
edits replaced still-live or historical rationale instead of reframing:
- llm-model-catalog: restore the prompt/request consistency section and
selection-ownership alternatives — installAgentLlmTarget and the TUI
/model selector still ship that design; only the ACP wire is gone.
- plan-specific-collaboration-state, acp-multi-session, todo-write,
ask-user-question: link the superseding automation-only note instead
of silently rewriting the original decision or motivation; drop a
paragraph duplicating the Web-provider facts stated two paragraphs up.
- sandbox: stop claiming unit coverage for turn-enclosed config writes
(that mechanism left with the bridge) and retitle the commit-boundary
paragraph accordingly.
- Fix the missing blank line before '## Consequences' in the
plugin-command-registration pair, the JSON-RPC/Web render-intent
consumer misattribution (the second consumer is the host/client
runtime), stale bash_output/bash_kill names, and 'optional goals' in
architecture.md.
- examples/acp-agent/README.md: point at the package contract instead
of restating it; packages/ui/permission and plan-mode READMEs record
the consumer-less preset service and the exit_plan_mode coverage gap
under Known Limitations.
- 2026-06-19-acp-snapshot-tests: the new note defers the corpus
migration rather than committing to it; say so.
Re-record the touched bilingual pairs.
- fs-sandbox: delegate the mutation with the freshly re-canonicalized target
(not the stale one), so the checked identity is the mutated identity — a
symlink swapped in after resolve() can no longer escape workspace-write.
- tool-fs: map a denial to an FsError carrying FS_SANDBOX_DENIED (not a plain
Error), so ToolRegistry keeps the structured code on result.error for
retry/observers while the message stays the shared marker.
- sandbox-local: derive the Seatbelt writable set from the shared
writableRoots() helper, so the profile and the fs fence cannot drift.
- gen-doc-graphs: ctx.sandboxPolicy is owned by dsh-sandbox-policy and read only
by the sandboxed executor/provider (the tool layers use the pure fold).
- docs: bash-sandbox/bash/permission READMEs and bash.md reflect the relocated
policy home and the sandbox/mode rename; drop the stale stdout.golden.jsonl.
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.
- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.
RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
A preset names a bundle of the two mechanism knobs — request =
workspace-write + ask, yolo = danger-full-access + never — so the editor
shows ONE 'Permissions' select where the sandbox-mode and approval-policy
tiers stay orthogonal capabilities (the Codex /approvals shape: presets over
two dials). ctx.permission (dsh-permission) owns the config-defined table,
validates the default preset's bundle against the composed knob defaults at
load (fails loud), and writes a switch THROUGH: one log-only
permission/preset event (the audit fact reverse-mapping cannot recover —
the planned 'agent' preset shares request's knob values and differs only in
composed policy) plus each knob event via its own setter, deduped — a
net-zero switch appends nothing. Every knob consumer keeps reading its own
fold, untouched.
The current preset DERIVES from the effective knob values — the fold breaks
bundle ties, a knob state outside the table is the reserved 'custom' value
(a state, not an error: shown while it holds, switchable FROM, never a
target), and defaultPreset disappears (zero-event state reverse-maps from
the composition defaults).
The ACP bridge drops the two per-knob selects for the one preset select
(advertised only when ctx.permission is composed); pending/anchor/no-op
semantics carry over unchanged, with the no-op echo acknowledged before
vocabulary validation so a client re-pushing a derived 'custom' current
never errors. The sandbox variant example composes the
service with a workspace-write default; the permission-switching,
escalation-approved and escalation-rejected scenarios are re-recorded under
it (escalations now target an outside-workspace /tmp path under
danger-full-access, self-cleaning) and config-options is re-authored on the
single-select wire.
