The e2e measured the reserved band but never the symptom the change is
named for. Headless chromium defaults to an overlay scrollbar, which is
the configuration where a bar can cover row content at all, so the
scenario already ran in the right mode: against clean master the band is
0 and the bar covers 7px of the relative time.
Adds timeCoveredBy, the overlap between the relative time's right edge
and the range the bar occupies, taking the bar's width from the sheet
where it applies and from the UA's overlay width otherwise. Assuming 0
there would report no occlusion in precisely the state that has it.
Keeps the band assertion rather than replacing it: the two catch
different regressions. Removing only scrollbar-gutter leaves
timeCoveredBy at 0, because the bar is then 8px and the row's right
padding is also 8px, so it abuts the timestamp without covering it.
Removing the pseudo-element width as well is what produces the overlap.
Each was mutation-checked with the other assertions in its test silenced.
Records in the note that the gutter and the ::-webkit-scrollbar width are
jointly necessary against an overlay bar, measured by deleting each from
the live cascade with the other in force: either alone drops the band
from 8 to 0.
Fetch-Metadata and Origin are only attached to trustworthy destinations, so
over plain HTTP a rebound page's same-origin GET (EventSource, images,
navigations) arrives with no browser markers and a readable response. Remove
the marker shortcut; non-browser clients pass the same fence via loopback,
the CLI-derived LAN IP literals, or a declared authority.
A dangling colon (harness.internal:) or zero-padded port parses cleanly while
WHATWG silently rewrites it, turning an intended exact-port grant into an
any-port grant. Replace the character blacklist with a round-trip check: an
entry must read back from parsing exactly as written (case aside), refusing
the whole rewrite class at load.
WHATWG trimming strips stray whitespace before parsing, so 'host:port ' passed
the load assert while the raw-string port regex read it as port-less —
broadening an exact-port grant to every port on that hostname. The explicit-
port judgment now reads URL parses under both special schemes (:80/:443 stay
explicit), and the load assert refuses whitespace outright.
The wine blocking job flaked with ERR_PNPM_ENOENT rename '_tmp_*' ->
'<pkg>/node_modules/esbuild' during workspace snapshot + pnpm install
(runs 30334004123 and 30340039598), and a plain rerun passed. Root
cause is upstream pnpm/pnpm#12880: the hoisted linker's parallel
linkers race to rename their _tmp_* staging directory onto the same
nested package path, and the loser exits although an identical
re-install succeeds. Only this lane uses nodeLinker: hoisted, so only
this lane hits it.
snapshot_and_install now retries exactly that log signature up to two
times, wiping the scratch tree's node_modules first (the snapshot
itself contains none, so the wipe restores the pre-install state) and
logging each retry with the upstream issue. Any other install failure
still fails on the first attempt, and a race that survives the final
attempt still fails loud with the install log tail.
WHATWG parsing would quietly read a hostname out of harness.internal/path or
user@harness.internal, authorizing the typo's hostname; other typos would sit
silently ignored until requests 403. Refuse every URL part beyond host[:port]
at plugin load.
Markerless requests pass on any Host (a non-browser sender is the principal
and forges headers anyway); browser Host matching gains port-less entries and
WHATWG normalization; dsh derives LAN IP-literal authorities for an
all-interfaces bind and web grows --trusted-host for named ones.
Both web-GUI groups shipped without the group README that the packages
table names as each group's canonical package/ctx-key map, and without
rows in that table. Adds both bilingual pairs, the two table rows
(ceiling 835→870: two genuinely new product groups joined the canonical
table at minimal row width), and fixes webserver README drift
(WebServerService/ctx.webServer → HttpServerService/ctx.httpServer,
matching src/index.ts).
A non-`auto` `scrollbar-width` or `scrollbar-color` makes Chromium and Safari
discard every `::-webkit-scrollbar*` rule for that element, including
`::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover`. Declaring both unconditionally left the
hover tokens rendering nowhere: the engines implementing the hover
pseudo-element are exactly the ones the standard properties silence, and
Firefox has no hover pseudo-element to fall back on. Both hover tokens and all
four elevated surfaces' hover rebinds were therefore dead code.
Measured in chromium on probe elements with `scrollbar-gutter: stable`: an 8px
`::-webkit-scrollbar` alone reserved a 30px band, and adding
`scrollbar-width: thin` dropped it to the 10px `thin` reserves.
The standard properties now sit inside `@supports not
selector(::-webkit-scrollbar)`, so Firefox takes them and WebKit-based engines
take the pseudo-elements. The WebKit rules stay ungated: an engine without
those pseudo-elements drops them as unknown selectors, and gating them would
hide them from an engine that implements them without `selector()` — the
pre-16.4 Safari the ungated form serves correctly.
Three unit assertions pin the split by source offset, which the existing
at-rule-flattening parser cannot see. The web e2e now reads the path chromium
actually takes: the `auto` standard properties as the gate's signature, the
pseudo-element sizing and track, the indirection variables resolved per
throwaway probe, and the hover declaration as cascade rule text — chromium
folds the `:hover` rule into `getComputedStyle(el,
'::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb')`, so no computed query separates the states.
The only browser-trust guard covered host.pickDirectory, while the
consequential methods (session.prompt drives bash) accepted any Host —
open to DNS rebinding, where a rebound page reads and writes the API as
if same-origin and only the Host header betrays the attacker's domain.
The pickDirectory-specific loopback guard becomes a prefix-wide fence:
Host must be loopback or an exact host[:port] from the new trustedHosts
config, an attached Origin must equal that authority, and explicit
cross-site markers are refused; requests without browser markers (curl,
tests, native clients) pass, because without a browser there is no
confused deputy. The loopback-socket check is dropped — binding policy
expresses reachability, and the fence is not an auth layer. The Agent
Note records the full threat model and the alternatives.
