The arrow shorthand implicitly returns rmSync's void, which the
no-confusing-void-expression rule forbids; the block body keeps the
fallback without the violation.
The durable sandbox/acl-session event carried a workspace binding that
always equals the session cwd and a random temp path that only needed
to be stable per session. Both are now derived: the temp subdirectory
is sha256(session id + workspace), created exclusively and removed on
provider dispose, so fork/resume semantics fall out of the derivation
and the record, its fold/provision/tamper validation, the immediate
flush kick, and the session-store dependency all disappear.
The reparse case reuses the standing workspace grant of the preceding
case (same workspace -> map hit), so the failed temp grant is the third
grant, not the fourth; the dispose-warning text carries 'failure(s)'.
The per-session random write SID forced a full tree propagation per
session per server lifetime (minutes on large workspaces). The write
SID is now the per-workspace identity derived from the canonical
workspace path (workspaceWriteSid: sha256 -> S-1-4-x-y), stored
nowhere: the workspace-root ACE materializes once per workspace per
machine and every later provision hits the exact-ACE skip.
- workspace ACEs are STANDING (never revoked - the reuse cache); temp
ACEs stay revocable (disposed with the provider), so an inheritable
ACE never outlives its session's temp dir on the ambient temp root
- AclSandbox requires the write SID under workspace-write; read-only
parses/grants nothing; the runner derives the SID itself (the
--write-sid flag's presence still marks the seam-managed contract)
- the acl-session record drops writeSid (sessionId/workspace/tempDir
remain): the SID-tamper surface and its validation are gone
- sandbox-local holds two grant maps: standing workspace grants and
revocable per-session temp grants
Docs (README pair, design note pair, catalogs, type-equiv) and the
acl-session/grant/acl/probe/runner suites updated; workspace-sid.spec
pins the derivation contract.
Durable record: bound to the owning session id and validated at the fold (orphan-SID shape, temp path inside the host temp root) — a fork's copied parent record no longer provisions the child, and a tampered record fails loud. Private temp dir: random unguessable name persisted in the record, created exclusively (pre-existing entries and reparse points fail EEXIST). Persistence: a fresh provision kicks an immediate flush (no write-behind debounce), narrowing the crash window to the flush latency — documented as the one self-healing gap. Runner-failure rules: exit-gated on 127 so a confined command that prints the signature on a non-127 exit is never misclassified. Spawn: AssignProcessToJobObject failure terminates the suspended child (no hanging orphans). SandboxExecutionPolicy.sessionId is the branded SessionId. Boundary docs: qualifying clause on the absolutist sentences, NULL-DACL Known Limitation, 'full' scoped to the supported NTFS surface, CLM gate comment.
workspace-write now runs [logon SID, Everyone, orphan]: the two lists differ only by the orphan, and the keep-alive group (logon SID + Everyone) is the single shared invariant. The WMI namespace security check fails in BOTH modes (0x80041003), so CIM/Get-ComputerInfo are unavailable everywhere — the price of closing the C:\\-root tree-creation escape (AU:(AD) + AU:(OI)(CI)(IO)(M)) in workspace-write too. The unused WinLocalSid/WinInteractiveSid/WinAuthenticatedUserSid constants and their ABI-probe prints are removed; the enforcement 'full' claim now stands on a closed NTFS surface. New regression: a C:\\Users\\Public subdirectory write is denied under BOTH modes (the ambient-writable blind spot the review flagged — INTERACTIVE is absent from both lists). FAT-class (non-ACL) targets outside the granted roots remain writable (no security descriptors to intersect) — documented as a legacy residue, warn-only, not engineered around. Docs/design note/PR body updated in both languages (list I/J terminology gone everywhere).
A session that materialized its workspace-write grant and then switched to read-only (or crashed and resumed under read-only) kept a writable workspace for the server lifetime: the standing orphan-SID ACE survived the downgrade and list I still carried the orphan, so the write-restricted pass-2 check granted it. List I is now [logon SID, EVERYONE] only — the standing ACE stays inert under read-only while the unrevoked ACE keeps the re-upgrade free (map hit, no re-propagation). Pinned by the runner's real-token mode-downgrade regression (standing ACE denied under read-only, effective again on re-upgrade), the acl-session mode-switch cycle (nothing under read-only, one materialization on upgrade, no revoke on downgrade), and ConstrainedLanguage pins in both modes.
sandbox-local now depends on @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl, so the packed-install e2e must carry its tarball in the workspace closure — npm cannot resolve the private package from the registry. koffi and the shared peers (dsh-invariants, cordis) already resolve from the registry or the existing closure.
The self-hosted Linux runners ship no pwsh, and the pwshAvailable probes used spawnSync('where.exe'), which reports a missing binary as status null instead of throwing — the suites never skipped and failed with spawn pwsh ENOENT. Probe with resolvePwshPath() status instead, the same gate the coverage exemption uses. Exempt pwsh-sandbox src from coverage on pwsh-less hosts (its remaining helpers branch and the invariant companion ride the executor suites' real pwsh runs); pwsh-ful hosts keep the full 100% bar. Cover the windows-acl probe case and the runner-entry resolution in sandbox-local on Linux (chain-seam tests plus a windowsAclRunnerEntry seam) — the package's POSIX-only suites are Linux's only chance to cover the new lines. Static gate fixes: declare dsh-pwsh-sandbox in the base bundle, register the runner files entry in constraints, knip entries for the e2e suite and where.exe, regenerate the module graph. Verified in WSL (no-pwsh Linux): pwsh-sandbox 5 pass/13 skip with the exemption active, sandbox-local coverage 100%.
Confine Windows command execution through a WRITE_RESTRICTED token whose restricting SIDs carry an orphan-SID write allowlist, ported from https://github.com/huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (@ 10e4dfb). Every Win32 call is checked and fails closed - the POC silently ran children with the FULL token when CreateRestrictedToken failed.
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl: koffi primitives verified against the MinGW Windows headers (verify/abi-probe.cpp) plus the confinement runner ([node, runner, --workspace, --temp, --mode, --, argv...]: kill-on-close job, stdio passthrough, exit-code mirroring, windows-acl-run: failure signature, grant revocation). read-only = strict zero grants (NUL device not writable; documented). Windows-only execution: exempted from the Linux coverage lane (windowsOnlyCoverageExclusions).
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local: PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32 filled with the windows-acl runner (full enforcement, ACL denial dialect, runner-failure rules).
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox: sandbox-consuming pwsh executor (call-for-call mirror of dsh-bash-sandbox) over a new argv-level seam in dsh-pwsh-local; per-file coverage complete via the fake-provider spec.
- bundle/base: the Windows platform layer mounts the confined pwsh roster - sandbox/policy/fs-sandbox/permission/approval re-enabled, the POSIX bash stack stays disabled.
Co-authored-by: Huo Yaoyuan <huoyaoyuan@hotmail.com>
The earlier fix only widened the vitest timeout, but the real race is the
patient probe reading the 1s launcher under the 5000ms *default* probe budget:
under a full parallel run spawnSync blocks the worker and fork/exec latency can
push the launcher's wall-clock past 5000ms, so the patient probe wrongly reads
unusable and the assertion fails. Give the patient probe a generous explicit
15000ms budget (still far below its 1s launcher runtime margin) so only the
250ms impatient probe races the launcher; keep a 30s vitest timeout above the
patient budget.
`bounds the default probes` runs a real launcher that sleeps 1s under the
5000ms default probe budget, all wrapped in vitest's 5000ms default test
timeout. The blocking spawnSync races that wrapper and tips over under the
load spike of a full parallel run — a pre-existing, load-sensitive flake
(noted as unrelated in this PR's original description). Give the test an
explicit 20s timeout so its bounded subprocess work never races the default.
- fs-sandbox: delegate the mutation with the freshly re-canonicalized target
(not the stale one), so the checked identity is the mutated identity — a
symlink swapped in after resolve() can no longer escape workspace-write.
- tool-fs: map a denial to an FsError carrying FS_SANDBOX_DENIED (not a plain
Error), so ToolRegistry keeps the structured code on result.error for
retry/observers while the message stays the shared marker.
- sandbox-local: derive the Seatbelt writable set from the shared
writableRoots() helper, so the profile and the fs fence cannot drift.
- gen-doc-graphs: ctx.sandboxPolicy is owned by dsh-sandbox-policy and read only
by the sandboxed executor/provider (the tool layers use the pure fold).
- docs: bash-sandbox/bash/permission READMEs and bash.md reflect the relocated
policy home and the sandbox/mode rename; drop the stale stdout.golden.jsonl.
