The `readDenyPaths` policy field shipped in the previous commit broke Linux
confinement outright. bwrap has to create the `/dev/null` bind's mount point
inside a tree its own profile has already made read-only, so it refused the
entire confinement whenever the parent directory was absent — every host that
has not stored a credential yet, including a fresh install:
bwrap: Can't mkdir parents for /home/runner/.dsh/.env: Read-only file system
which the executor correctly classifies as SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, so every
confined bash call failed closed. Landlock cannot subtract from its own `/`
read grant, so it reported `partial` enforcement on every confined call for a
file it never hid, with no way to switch the denial off (schemastery fills an
omitted array with `[]`, so empty and omitted were indistinguishable).
A protection that breaks confinement where it works and misreports it where it
does not is worse than a documented absence. Revert the field, both expressible
backends, the enforcement downgrade, and the policy default; state the residue
plainly in the credentials-local READMEs — file mode stops other OS users, not
the model — and keep the OS-keychain provider recorded as the real answer.
The narrower discipline stands: no surface hoists the credential document into
`process.env`, and the model is never handed a resolved path to it.
web_search and web_fetch returned only model-facing text, whose markdown source
list is lossy (title-or-hostname label, snippet and date concatenated), so a
client could not recover the structured sources. Add a card:'web' result view
with a kind discriminant ('search' carrying structured sources + answer +
truncated, 'fetch' carrying url + statusCode + truncated), projected through
each tool's output.presentationMeta and read back in presentResult. A UI
without the web card falls back to content; the TUI is unchanged. The web
consumer is a follow-up.
grep and glob returned only model-facing text; the structured matches/paths
never reached the client. Add a card:'search' result view with a kind
discriminant ('matches' grouped by file for grep, 'paths' for glob), projected
through each tool's output.presentationMeta and read back in presentResult. The
projections re-apply the same inline cap and per-line budget as the render text
and report total + truncated, so a UI never presents a capped page as complete.
A UI without the search card falls back to content; the TUI is unchanged. The
web consumer is a follow-up.
The read tool's result carries structured numbered lines, but only the
model-facing envelope text reached the client. Add a card:'read' result view
(ReadResultView) projecting {path, lines, totalLines, lang} through the tool's
output.presentationMeta so presentResult reproduces it on live and replay
paths; the pending call stays a generic read card. A UI without the read
capability falls back to the envelope-stripped content, so the TUI is
unchanged. The web consumer that renders the line-numbered view is a follow-up.
The effort field's existence check was unreachable — EFFORT_FIELD is
total over the two known families — and a coverage exemption was papering
over the branch, which the merged toolchain no longer honored. Taking the
narrowed family as a parameter makes the lookup total at the type level,
so the check and its exemption both disappear. The rendered output is
unchanged: the browser goldens replay byte-identical.
Both provider READMEs state what actually holds: credentials-local now
documents the physical-line editor, the read-modify-write under the
writer lock, and a Security boundary section saying plainly that the file
mode stops other OS users and not the model. sandbox-policy documents
readDenyPaths and its per-backend enforcement. The llm READMEs carry the
registration handle, pi-ai's credential-miss semantics, and DeepSeek's
same-generation snapshot; app-boot and the CLI README stop describing
$DSH_HOME/.env as an environment layer.
A new Agent Note records the round (and the prior seam note cross-links
it); the sandbox and core catalog pages gain readDenyPaths and
AdapterRegistrationHandle with their manifest entries. The headless
missing-credential snapshot re-records for the reworded guidance, pi-ai
gains the Loader-composition guard its twin already had, and the
deliberate provider symmetry is marked for the clone detector.
The write/edit tools already declare card:'diff' with applied hunks on
callView/resultView, but the Web client discarded it: a mutation landed on
GenericToolCard and the details panel flattened the result to a <pre>. Add
DiffBlock (ui-primitives), diff-card-model (the single callView/resultView
derivation), and FileMutationRow (keyed under write and edit), and make the
generic fallback row and the details panel diff-aware. The +/- block form,
per-file path header, same-file gap, and footer mirror the TUI diff card;
the chat row caps at CHAT_DIFF_MAX_LINES against the panel's full height.
The policy home's resolve() now stamps readDenyPaths, so every consumer
that pins the resolved shape (bash-sandbox hand-off, tool-fs stamps)
carries it, and three uncovered branches gained real tests: landlock
reporting partial enforcement for a denial it cannot express, the
policy's default under programmatic construction, and both ambient
credential paths in llm-deepseek without a mounted seam.
The credential store is 0600 under a 0700 directory, which stops other OS
users but not the model: tool processes run as the same user, so under
the shipped danger-full-access default they read it like any other file.
SandboxExecutionPolicy grows readDenyPaths, and sandbox-policy defaults
it to $DSH_HOME/.env — the exact file rather than the harness home, so
the model keeps its documented access to its own session log. Seatbelt
appends a trailing deny (last matching rule wins) and bwrap maps
/dev/null over each path after any workspace bind; Landlock grants are a
pure allow-list that cannot subtract from its own / read grant, so
confine() reports partial enforcement there instead of claiming a
boundary the process does not have.
A real-kernel Seatbelt e2e proves the shape: the same read succeeds
unconfined and fails under the denial, while a sibling file in the same
directory stays readable. Both READMEs state the residual boundary
plainly — no confining mode means no boundary — and record the OS
keychain provider as the real answer.
The helper's cleanup ran the same fallback for two different events. A
settings provider detaching leaves the consumer running, so falling back
to the composition entry and re-judging derived facts is right. The
consumer's own unload ran it too — re-registering routes and touching
resources the teardown was releasing. The disposer now checks the
consumer fiber's own state and returns when it is unloading or disposed.
Four review findings across the seam and both adapters.
registerAdapter now returns a handle carrying replace(providers): the
candidate route set is validated in full before anything moves, so a
route another adapter owns leaves the previous registration intact, and
the swap itself is one synchronous section with no observable gap. pi-ai
uses it instead of dispose-then-register — the old shape dropped every
route when the new set conflicted, and its facts cache could then equal
the registry's, so reverting to a working configuration never re-applied.
Its registration facts are also sorted by provider, so a settings
document that merely reorders keys no longer triggers a swap.
DeepSeek's per-request snapshot now carries the credential facts, and
resolveApiKey receives it instead of re-reading the raw config: a
settings generation the resolver rejects can no longer contribute its
literal key to a request the previous generation's endpoint serves.
pi-ai only defers to the SDK's provider-native discovery when a profile
names no credential at all; a configured apiKeyEnv that misses now fails
with MISSING_CREDENTIAL naming the route and the reference, instead of
handing pi-ai undefined and letting it authenticate with an unrelated
ambient key.
The eager boot-time credential probe is gone: it could run before the
credentials service mounted and reported every failure as a missing key.
The route stays registered and browsable; the first request gives the
accurate error, whose guidance now leads with the credential store and
mentions a literal apiKey last.
