Assistant footers and the stats line gain TTFT/tok-per-second readings
folded from step timings; context occupancy moves off the stats line onto
a composer ring whose panel shows a heuristic system/tools/messages
breakdown from the new token-meter contextBreakdown session projection.
The e2e store and the web-search store still named a `.env` path; the
e2e one also wrote dotenv syntax, which the YAML document rejects. That
path now names the ordinary environment layer, so a test pointing the
credential store at it asserts the distinction this PR removes.
Injected context reached the transcript as one anonymous shape whose
expanded body was the whole message serialized as inline JSON, so the
escaping collapsed the only readable part — the model-facing prose —
into a single line.
`MessageSource` gains an optional producer-declared `form`, a small
semantic vocabulary of information shapes independent of `kind`: kind
says who produced the context, form says what shape it is, so several
producers may share one presentation. Two values ship.
`instructions` (workspace-context) lists the reconciled files above
their text and keeps the `<system-reminder>` framing verbatim, because
the framing is part of what the model read. `catalog` moves dsh-tool-skill
off the shared plugin kind onto a `skill-catalog` source carrying the
published name/description entries, and the body lists those instead of
re-parsing `<available_skills>` out of the prose. Catalog identity moves
with it: the republish digest now covers the durable entries, deleting
the text-slicing that recovered them from a logged message.
Everything else renders the opaque body — the model-facing text with its
real line breaks, then the remaining provenance as fields. That is the
documented default, not a leftover: a resumed, forked, or foreign log
must render whether or not its producer is mounted here, which is why
the classification lives in the durable source rather than a client-side
table keyed by producer.
Two had real security consequences:
The bootstrap rejection ran on npm dotenv's parser while process.loadEnvFile
applied the file with Node's own. Two independently maintained dialects meant
the check and the thing it guards could disagree: a name Node accepts but the
checker misses would reach process.env unchecked, and BASH_ENV there runs a
file of the project's choosing on every `bash -c` the bash tool issues. Parse
once with node:util's parseEnv — the same engine loadEnvFile uses — and assign
the entries already checked, which also drops the dotenv dependency.
llm-pi-ai still returned a literal profile.apiKey ahead of everything, and it
registers a settings namespace, so the defect removed from llm-deepseek
survived intact in its design twin. The field is gone from the profile schema,
the resolution path, and the tests.
The rest are consistency and documentation defects the review named:
- verify-config-source-ownership did not scan the Python runtime's bundled
cordis.yml, which still inlined apiKey and baseURL. Both are covered now, and
the line-anchored INLINE_DENY documents that it is a tripwire, not a parser.
- The deny list missed NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED, the askpass hooks, the
GIT_CONFIG_* redirections, and PYTHONHOME — all implied by its own stated
rule about what a variable does.
- Snapshot lookups folded case on Windows, where environment names are
case-insensitive and an exact-match Map could miss a higher-ranked layer.
- The credentials note claimed a read-time permission check was "not taken"
while this PR implemented it; the credentials-local README still described
two layers, live process.env reads, dotenv-era limitations, and a renamed
anchor; the llm-deepseek README still advertised the removed literal apiKey;
and web.ts and base.cordis.yml kept personal-overlay wording.
- The ownership note's literal-apiKey claim now names its scope: the
web-search providers keep a literal field but register no settings
namespace, so nothing can shadow a stored credential through them.
Review found five real defects in the configuration-source work, all confirmed
against the code rather than argued:
1. The note claimed --config outranks settings.yaml. It does not: the settings
seam registers a plugin's cordis entry config as the `base` layer and the
user section layers over it, and the seam cannot tell a shipped value from a
--config one. The note now states shipped reality and names --config-replace
as the lever for a deployment that must win. Separately, a literal `apiKey`
in settings outranked both the environment and .credentials.yaml — the field
is removed, so configuration carries a reference and nothing else.
2. DEEPSEEK_SEARCH_BASE_URL was functionally deleted: the shipped inline went
away without the provider learning to read it. It now resolves from the
environment snapshot, as the README always claimed.
3. The bootstrap deny list missed the interpreter start-up hooks. BASH_ENV is
the sharpest: `bash -c` sources it on every bash tool call, so a project
.env could run a file of its choosing before every command. The list now
covers BASH_ENV and its per-language siblings, the Git hook commands, and
the remaining preload and CA variables, organised by what a variable does
rather than which runtime owns it.
4. YAML parse errors quoted the offending source line — which in a credentials
document is the secret — into boot stderr and the watcher's logger. Only the
error code and position are reported now, in credentials-local and
settings-local alike, pinned by a test that asserts the secret is absent.
5. 0600 governed only files the harness wrote. A hand-created 0644 document was
read normally. POSIX now checks the mode before reading contents, at boot
and on every reload; Windows has no mode to inspect and is skipped rather
than faked.
The project a session is launched in is trusted by default, with no prompt and
no stored trust record: it may supply its own endpoint, ordinary variables, and
a key ranked below the managed store. Trust stops at the harness itself — a
discovered file still cannot set DSH_PERMISSION_MODE, PATH, BASH_ENV, or the
rest, because those take effect with no user action, before any turn, outside
the permission policy and the sandbox.
$DSH_HOME/.env had just become an ordinary environment layer, which left the
harness resolving user-facing values from a flattened process.env that could
no longer say where a value came from. A key stored through the web page
stayed shadowed by an older key in the user's own .env. An endpoint could be
redirected by the project: the invoking directory's .env is materialized like
every other layer, and a base URL decides where a resolved API key is sent, so
a DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL written into a model-editable workspace would send the
user's credential — and the prompts carrying their code — to whatever host
that file named.
Give every user-facing value one ordering, with four kinds of source:
explicit for this run per-operation override, CLI argument
> authored by deployment --config / --config-replace
> this launch's shell inherited process environment
> product-managed store settings.yaml, .credentials.yaml
> discovered file $DSH_HOME/.env
> defaults schema default, shipped base, public default
The domains differ only in which tiers exist. The earlier split — credentials
ranking the environment over the managed file while settings ranked over the
environment — was inconsistent: the distinguishing fact is who authored the
source, not the domain.
packages/util/environment owns an immutable snapshot with per-layer
provenance. getFrom(name, sources) searches only the layers a caller names,
and omitting one is a refusal rather than a demotion: the adapters ask for
['process', 'user-env'], so no reordering can let a project file back into a
decision it was excluded from.
isBootstrapOnly rejects, before anything is materialized, any .env setting a
variable that governs how a process launches (PATH, SHELL, NODE_OPTIONS,
LD_PRELOAD), where code or model-visible instructions load from (the whole
DSH_* namespace, HOME, XDG_*), or how the network is reached (proxy and CA
variables). The namespace is denied wholesale so a switch added later cannot
become settable by being forgotten, and there is no opt-out.
verify-config-source-ownership keeps both rules: no unregistered process.env
read under packages/*/*/src (26 allowlisted with reasons), and no apiKey,
baseURL, or headers inlined from the environment in shipped Cordis config —
removing those inlines is what makes the deployment tier meaningful.
A catalog entry may now carry its own `maxTokens`, matching the shape the
pi-ai adapter already exposes. Exact-model resolution prefers it over the
profile value, so capping one model no longer means capping the route.
Defaults are unchanged: an entry without a cap, and any unlisted
pass-through id, still resolve to the profile `maxTokens` (256,000), and the
shipped catalog keeps its context windows.
$DSH_HOME/.env carried two incompatible jobs. As credentials-local's writable
secret store it could not be hoisted into process.env — hoisting makes every
stored key read as a read-only launch override and blocks rotation from the
TUI and the web page. But its name and dotenv format promise an environment
file, so a DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL sitting beside a working DEEPSEEK_API_KEY in the
same file was silently ignored: only the credential provider read the
document, and it addresses credential references alone.
Split the two jobs into two files.
.credentials.yaml is the provider-managed store: a strict YAML mapping of
CredentialRef to non-empty string, no version field, no wrapper level. Because
it holds credentials and nothing else, a non-mapping root, a non-identifier
key, a non-string value, an empty string, a duplicate key, and malformed YAML
are all rejections rather than skipped entries — loud at boot and at a write,
warn-and-keep-last-good on a live reload. The dotenv physical-line editor
gives way to a patch of the parsed document, so comments and untouched entries
keep their formatting and any string value round-trips, multi-line included.
Writer lock, read-modify-write, atomic 0600 write under a 0700 directory,
watcher, self-write suppression, and quiescent disposal are unchanged.
$DSH_HOME/.env becomes the user's ordinary environment layer. app-boot's new
loadLayeredEnv loads the invoking directory's .env then the Harness home's,
giving user < project < inherited; the home resolves from the inherited
environment first, so a project .env cannot redirect it.
Credential precedence is unchanged: the live environment still wins read-only
over the file, and shadowed writes still reject. Whether a provider-managed
store should instead win over the environment is a separate decision.
No migration: a key already in $DSH_HOME/.env keeps resolving through the new
environment layer, as a read-only env source that shadows the stored one.
TurnEndReasonMap.error now carries a single `error: LlmFailure` field:
an LlmError keeps its structured facts, any other error flattens to
errorChain text under the UNKNOWN code. Consumers read message/code
directly instead of defending against an unknown union — this also fixes
errorChain() rendering structured failures as '[object Object]' in the
TUI and ACP error paths. Document the turn-stopping contract: a
concludesTurn result never short-circuits already-submitted next-step
work (same-step additionalContexts or racing steering still runs), data
decides.
Two lifecycle holes the registry and the consumer helper left open.
`AdapterRegistrationHandle.replace` had no liveness guard: after the handle's
disposer ran, a replace put routes back into the registry with nothing left to
release them, so the adapter leaked permanently. `owned` being empty cannot
carry that fact, because `replace([])` is the legal empty-section state, so the
disposer records it explicitly.
`installSettingsSection`'s watcher lacked the guard its own disposer carries:
a stored change landing while the consumer unloads reached `onChange`, which
re-registers routes against a fiber whose resources are being released.
Also documents `withFileLock` in the atomic-write README (it claimed one
export), records the age-based lock takeover as a known limitation, and lists
ctx.settings and ctx.credentials in the architecture capability table.
The remaining P1 from the #939 review, plus the P2 it shares a mechanism with.
Nothing carried a version, so two tabs editing one namespace silently
overwrote each other — reproduced as tab B's `reasoning` lost to tab A's
older draft. The seam's per-namespace write queue orders writes; it cannot
tell a fresh writer from one replaying a snapshot a predecessor superseded.
Each namespace now carries a monotonic `revision` over its RAW section. A
write may send `expectedRevision`, checked at the FRONT of the queue (not at
call time, which would race the very predecessor it guards against); a
mismatch rejects with `SettingsConflictError` → `settings-conflict` on the
wire, carrying both revisions. The editor captures the revision it opened at
and, on conflict, asks the user to reopen rather than replaying its snapshot.
The same counter fixes the missing broadcast. `settings/updated` is gated on
the resolved value — correct for consumers, wrong for configuration surfaces:
storing an override equal to the composition base leaves the resolved value
alone while changing what the document says (the field is now overridden, not
inherited) and moving every open editor's revision. `settings/document-updated
(ns, revision)` fires on any raw-section change, in-process or external, and
`host/settings-changed` now rides it.
That event also closes the stale model picker: editing a provider's `models`
changes no route, so `llm/adapters-updated` never fired and an open picker
kept serving the old catalog. A change to an exposed provider namespace now
emits `host/models-changed` too — that namespace holds the catalog.
Docs: both sides of the five touched README pairs, a type-equiv block for
`SettingsPathOp`, and an Agent Note recording what the plane exposes and who
may overwrite what. The deferred wire-redaction gaps (secrets behind
union/intersection/transform, `.default(...)` in the served envelope, schema
text in rejection messages, `new Function` rehydration, pi-ai's `headers`) are
recorded as TODO(settings-wire-redaction) and in Known Limitations rather than
half-fixed.
Five findings from the #939 review, each reproduced before being fixed.
**Configuration reads are as privileged as writes.** `settings.describe`
returns every exposed namespace's configuration and `credentials.describe`
reports whether an arbitrary environment-variable name is configured and from
where — reconnaissance no anonymous caller should have. Both join
PRIVILEGED_METHODS, so the whole configuration plane is loopback-only until
real authentication exists; `trustedHosts` was never authentication. The model
catalog stays reachable: it carries no endpoints or key state, and a LAN
client's model picker legitimately needs it. Asserted over a real HTTP server,
because the Host header a browser actually sends is what decides this.
**The proxy serves only namespaces a registered model provider addresses.**
The settings seam is general — any plugin may register one — but the Web
configuration plane is the model-provider surface. Without the gate, every
future `settings.register()` would silently become remotely readable and
writable configuration. An unregistered namespace and an unexposed one answer
identically, so no caller can enumerate the registry one probe at a time.
**Path-addressed writes replace the redacted-document rebuild.** The editor
reads the REDACTED descriptor, so rebuilding a section from it and replacing
wholesale deleted every literal secret the wire never returned — reproduced as
`{baseURL, reasoning}` in, stored `apiKey` gone out. `settings.mutate` applies
set/unset ops to the section as it stands at the front of the seam's write
queue, and the client names only fields it can see, so an unseen secret is
untouched by construction rather than by care.
P2s in the same pass: `llm/adapters-updated` now contains async listener
rejections (an uncontained one escaped as unhandledRejection, contradicting
the documented "observer failures are contained"); llm-deepseek's retry-policy
swap uses the atomic `registration.replace` instead of dispose-then-register,
which published `[]` then `["deepseek-official"]` so an observer saw the
provider disappear and come back; and a transport rejection no longer strands
the page in `loading` or a card in `busy`, with removal failures surfaced on
the page banner instead of swallowed.
