Merge branch 'master' into fix/web-details-session-lifecycle
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imccyu
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# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
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# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
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# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
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2026-07-23-web-permission-and-approval.md: cd402a039e55e7a24a038055dab5793aa0d08438
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2026-07-23-web-permission-and-approval.zh.md: ce4964789bc94a0962796bb2f5fbf1a94e8f5145
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# Agent Note: Web UI permission presets and approval answering
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Status: implemented
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English | [中文](2026-07-23-web-permission-and-approval.zh.md)
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## Problem
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The web host booted an unconfined agent: `bootHost` composed `dsh-bash-local` and `dsh-fs-local`, so every web session ran with full file access, no approval channel, and no permission control — while the ACP composition had shipped the complete sandboxed product path (sandbox provider + policy home + confined bash/fs + approval + presets) for months. The web wire contract had already reserved the seats — `approval/requested`/`approval/resolved` mux frames, `POST /api/respond` with `ApprovalResponsePayload`, client-side `pendingBuffers` — but the host `respond` was a stub, no answerer bridged `ctx.approval` to the stream, no RPC exposed the permission select, and the PendingCard rendered approvals as visible-but-unanswerable.
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## Decision
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The web host composes the same sandboxed product path as the acp-agent composition: `dsh-sandbox-local`, `dsh-sandbox-policy`, `dsh-bash-sandbox`, `dsh-fs-sandbox`, `dsh-user-approval`, and `dsh-permission`, with `BootHostOptions.sandbox` supplying the deployment defaults (`mode`, default `workspace-write`; `approvalPolicy`, default `ask`).
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`createApiProxy` owns the approval pending registry. Its `approval/request` waterfall answerer reads the approval id from the session's just-appended `approval/asked` audit event (an ask with no audit event is a foreign channel and delegates), mints one stable rpcId per question, broadcasts the answerable `approval/requested` frame to every open mux stream, and replays still-pending frames verbatim on each mux open — the refresh-recovery baseline the contract already promised. `respond` routes by the echoed rpcId, validates `ApprovalResponsePayload` with the existing zod schema, cross-checks the payload's audit correlation against the routed entry, resolves the answerer, and broadcasts `approval/resolved`; the ask's abort signal withdraws the question as `cancelled`.
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The permission select rides two new unary RPCs, `session.permissions` and `session.setPermission`, projecting `ctx.permission` into a protocol-owned `PermissionOption` DTO (the ACP bridge precedent: each protocol owns its presentation shape). A permission-less composition serves an empty select and clients hide the control. Idle switches are held last-write-wins in a proxy-side pending map and flushed on `agent/prompt-submit`, because knob events must stay turn-enclosed for durable replay; the shared `hasOpenTurn` fold moved to `dsh-session` and replaced the private copies in `dsh-user-approval`, the ACP bridge, and the proxy.
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Client-side, `Session` gained `permissions` and `setPermission`, and approval answering rides the runtime's `PendingWait` carrier. Per the designer draft, a pending approval takes over the composer: `ApprovalPanel` registers as a selector-routed entry of the conversation-declared `conversation.composer` chain (the ui-question pattern), replacing the InputBar with the justification headline, the paired command, and one-shot refuse/allow buttons; the `PendingApproval` domain face in ui-conversation's contract owns the `ApprovalResponsePayload` wire encoding over the carrier, and the broadcast resolved frame settles the wait and restores the composer. Question placeholders stay in the message flow. The sidebar mirrors the blocked state with an amber warning dot that outranks the running ring: the manager tracks per-session outstanding approvalIds (idempotent under mux-open replays, cleared per connection generation so the reopen replay is authoritative) rather than reading Session instances, so the dot lights for sessions never instantiated. The composer's bottom-row chip hosts the `PermissionSelect` control fed through the conversation inject face. The connection fixture mirrors the host: its resident approval is answerable once, and its permission select persists per session.
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## Alternatives considered
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**Reuse the ACP `session/set_config_option` shape on the web wire.** Rejected: the web contract's unary method registry (`RpcMethodMap` + per-method zod schemas) is its own dialect; a generic config-option surface would bypass the compiler-locked schema table for one select. A dedicated method pair keeps both sides derivable from the signature.
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**A session event for pending approvals instead of a proxy-side registry.** Rejected: approval requests are transient interaction state, not durable session data — the `approval/asked`/`decided` audit pair already logs the durable half. Persisting requested frames would re-ask dead questions on replay.
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**Registering the answerer only when a mux subscriber exists.** Rejected: the pending entry must survive client disconnects (refresh recovery is the point), so the registry outlives any one stream; a subscriber-gated answerer would fail asks closed during a reload window.
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**Optimistic card removal on click.** Rejected: the broadcast resolved frame is the truth; removing on click would hide a question that a rejected receipt or transport failure left standing. The panel disables its buttons locally and re-arms them on failure instead.
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## Consequences
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Web sessions now start confined (`workspace-write` + `ask` by default) and a sandbox-denial escalation reaches the browser as an answerable card; the deployment can widen or narrow the default through `BootHostOptions.sandbox` without touching the assembly. Question answering shipped separately through the same registry pattern (ui-question over the question pending table). The permission select reads once per mount; live refresh from another client's switch is deferred. Coverage: proxy registry and permission RPC unit suites, session-object and fixture unit suites, and the keyless web smoke exercises the fixture-mode approval answer and preset switch in a real browser.
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# Agent Note: Web UI 权限预设与审批应答
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Status: implemented
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[English](2026-07-23-web-permission-and-approval.md) | 中文
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## 问题
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Web 承载层启动的是一个不受限的 agent（智能体）：`bootHost` 组合了 `dsh-bash-local` 与 `dsh-fs-local`，因此每个 Web 会话都以完整文件访问权限运行，既无审批通道，也无权限管控——而 ACP 组合早在数月前就已交付完整的沙箱化产品路径（沙箱提供方 + 策略归属 + 受限的 bash/fs + 审批 + 预设）。Web 协议契约其实早已预留了对应位置——`approval/requested`/`approval/resolved` 的 mux 帧、携带 `ApprovalResponsePayload` 的 `POST /api/respond`、client 侧的 `pendingBuffers`——但 host 的 `respond` 只是一个 stub，没有应答者把 `ctx.approval` 桥接到流上，没有 RPC 暴露权限选择，PendingCard 把审批渲染成可见却无法应答的样子。
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## 决策
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Web 承载层组合与 acp-agent 相同的沙箱化产品路径：`dsh-sandbox-local`、`dsh-sandbox-policy`、`dsh-bash-sandbox`、`dsh-fs-sandbox`、`dsh-user-approval` 与 `dsh-permission`，由 `BootHostOptions.sandbox` 提供部署默认值（`mode`，默认 `workspace-write`；`approvalPolicy`，默认 `ask`）。
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`createApiProxy` 拥有审批 pending 注册表。它的 `approval/request` waterfall（瀑布式事件）应答者从会话刚追加的 `approval/asked` 审计事件中读取审批 id（没有审计事件的 ask 属于外部通道，予以委托），为每个问题 mint 一个稳定的 rpcId，向每个打开的 mux 流广播可应答的 `approval/requested` 帧，并在每次 mux 打开时原样重放仍处于 pending 的帧——这正是契约早已承诺的刷新恢复基线。`respond` 按回显的 rpcId 路由，用既有的 zod schema 校验 `ApprovalResponsePayload`，将载荷的审计关联与所路由的条目交叉核对，解析应答者，并广播 `approval/resolved`；ask 的中断信号会以 `cancelled` 撤回该问题。
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权限选择依托两个新的一元 RPC，`session.permissions` 与 `session.setPermission`，把 `ctx.permission` 投影为一个由协议拥有的 `PermissionOption` DTO（沿用 ACP bridge 的先例：每个协议拥有自己的呈现形状）。无权限的组合提供空的选择项，client 隐藏该控件。空闲期的切换以后写胜出（last-write-wins）的方式保存在 proxy 侧的 pending map 中，并在 `agent/prompt-submit` 时冲刷，因为旋钮事件必须保持轮次内闭合以支持持久回放；共享的 `hasOpenTurn` 折叠迁入 `dsh-session`，取代了 `dsh-user-approval`、ACP bridge 与 proxy 中各自的私有副本。
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在 client 侧，`Session` 新增了 `permissions` 与 `setPermission`，审批应答则依托运行时的 `PendingWait` 载体。按照设计师草稿，处于 pending 的审批会接管 composer：`ApprovalPanel` 注册为由会话声明的 `conversation.composer` 链中一个按选择器路由的条目（即 ui-question 模式），以理由标题、配对的命令与一次性的拒绝／允许按钮取代 InputBar；ui-conversation 契约中的 `PendingApproval` 领域面拥有 `ApprovalResponsePayload` 在该载体上的协议编码（wire encoding），广播的 resolved 帧使该等待落定并恢复 composer。问题占位符仍留在消息流中。侧边栏用一枚琥珀色警示圆点同步呈现这一阻塞状态，且其优先级高于表示运行中的圆环：manager 跟踪每个会话尚未解决的 approvalId（对 mux 打开时的回放幂等，并按连接代次清除，以保证重开后的回放才是权威依据），而非读取 Session 实例，因此从未实例化过的会话也能点亮该圆点。composer 底行的 chip 经会话注入面挂载 `PermissionSelect` 控件。连接 fixture（测试前置数据）与 host 保持一致：它的常驻审批可应答一次，其权限选择项按会话持久保存。
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## 曾考虑的替代方案
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**在 Web 协议上复用 ACP 的 `session/set_config_option` 形状。** 不予采纳：Web 契约的一元方法注册表（`RpcMethodMap` + 逐方法的 zod schema）是它自成一体的方言；一个通用的 config-option 接口会为一个选择项绕开编译期锁定的 schema 表。一对专用方法让两侧都能从签名推导得出。
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**用一个会话事件承载 pending 审批，而非 proxy 侧注册表。** 不予采纳：审批请求是瞬态的交互状态，而非持久的会话数据——`approval/asked`/`decided` 审计对已经记录了持久的那一半。持久化 requested 帧会在回放时重新问出已经作废的问题。
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**仅在存在 mux 订阅者时才注册应答者。** 不予采纳：pending 条目必须在 client 断连后依然存活（刷新恢复正是要点所在），因此注册表的生命周期长于任何单个流；一个受订阅者门控的应答者，会让在重载窗口期间关闭的 ask 落空。
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**点击即乐观移除卡片。** 不予采纳：广播的 resolved 帧才是真相；点击即移除会隐藏一个因拒绝回执或传输失败而仍然悬置的问题。面板改为在本地禁用其按钮，并在失败时重新启用。
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## 后果
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Web 会话现在从受限状态启动（默认 `workspace-write` + `ask`），一次沙箱拒绝的升级会以可应答的卡片形式抵达浏览器；部署方可以通过 `BootHostOptions.sandbox` 放宽或收紧默认值，无需触动装配。问题应答已通过同一注册表模式单独交付（ui-question 基于问题 pending 表）。权限选择在每次挂载时读取一次；来自另一个 client 切换的实时刷新暂缓实现。覆盖情况：proxy 注册表与权限 RPC 的单元测试套件、会话对象与 fixture 的单元测试套件，以及无密钥 Web 冒烟测试在真实浏览器中演练 fixture 模式的审批应答与预设切换。
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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
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# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
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# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-27-worktree-local-lefthook.md
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2026-07-27-worktree-local-lefthook.md: d18f6c1bf8fe240759ad48f67ca6b231000eaf2c
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2026-07-27-worktree-local-lefthook.zh.md: 42a1625a3b2ec7b00942dc46b0c9c64058ecd2fc
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2026-07-27-worktree-local-lefthook.md: 75dfd47087356c34005ec4673e174e451a72c660
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2026-07-27-worktree-local-lefthook.zh.md: bc4902769561c3d33d2101de55e28e70d114f39b
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@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ Hook installation is worktree-scoped. With `CI=true` or `GITHUB_ACTIONS=true`, t
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Before upgrading format 0, the installer refuses direct common-config `extensions.*`; it also refuses direct `core.worktree` or `core.bare=true` and non-empty dormant worktree configs that enabling the extension would activate. The migration removes direct `core.bare=false` because false is Git's default. The common repository config and every existing `config.worktree` must be regular files. These checks disable include expansion because Git's repository-format parser also ignores included targets. A repository-scoped lock serializes migration and hook writes; its process ID, random token, file identity, and exact contents must still match at release. Dead or invalid locks require manual recovery rather than automatic breaking.
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Each hook directory carries a JSON ownership marker containing the absolute path last published to worktree config. After a checkout moves, that marker permits replacement of only the exact stale owned value. Before Lefthook runs, the marker and every existing generated hook must be unaliased regular files. The installer resolves the effective scope, origin, and value of `core.hooksPath`, including active `config.worktree` includes; it refuses command-scoped paths, unowned worktree-scoped paths, and unowned reserved directories. An inherited system, global, or common-repository path requires `DSH_LEFTHOOK_ALLOW_HOOKS_PATH_OVERRIDE=1`, which opts only the current worktree into Lefthook. Inactive `includeIf` targets are not recursively inspected because they do not affect the current configuration. Command-scoped Git configuration is removed from the Lefthook subprocess environment after validation.
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Each hook directory carries a JSON ownership marker containing the absolute path last published to worktree config. After a checkout moves, that marker permits replacement of only the exact stale owned value. Git seeds a new linked worktree's `config.worktree` from the main worktree; when that seed contains the marker-backed reserved hook path of a registered worktree, the installer replaces only the new worktree's config with its own path. Before Lefthook runs, the marker and every existing generated hook must be unaliased regular files. The installer resolves the effective scope, origin, and value of `core.hooksPath`, including active `config.worktree` includes; it refuses command-scoped paths, unowned worktree-scoped paths, and unowned reserved directories. An inherited system, global, or common-repository path requires `DSH_LEFTHOOK_ALLOW_HOOKS_PATH_OVERRIDE=1`, which opts only the current worktree into Lefthook. Inactive `includeIf` targets are not recursively inspected because they do not affect the current configuration. Command-scoped Git configuration is removed from the Lefthook subprocess environment after validation.
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If Lefthook fails after changing `core.hooksPath`, the installer restores the previous worktree value; a rollback failure is reported alongside the installation failure. Existing files in `$GIT_COMMON_DIR/hooks` are never removed or rewritten. Focused installer tests pin isolation, migration refusal, ownership and relocation, concurrent installation, custom paths, and rollback.
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If Lefthook fails after changing `core.hooksPath`, the installer restores the previous worktree value; a rollback failure is reported alongside the installation failure. Existing files in `$GIT_COMMON_DIR/hooks` are never removed or rewritten. Focused installer tests pin isolation, copied new-worktree configuration, migration refusal, ownership and relocation, concurrent installation, custom paths, and rollback.
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## Alternatives considered
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@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ Lefthook 生成的钩子会优先使用安装时从对应 worktree 记录的绝
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升级格式 0 之前，安装程序会拒绝共用配置中直接设置的 `extensions.*`；它还会拒绝直接设置的 `core.worktree` 或 `core.bare=true`，以及启用扩展后将被激活的非空且尚未生效的 worktree 配置。迁移会移除直接设置的 `core.bare=false`，因为 false 是 Git 的默认值。共用仓库配置和每个已有的 `config.worktree` 都必须是常规文件。这些检查会禁用 include 展开，因为 Git 的仓库格式解析器也会忽略 include 目标。仓库级锁会串行化迁移和钩子写入；释放时，锁的进程 ID、随机令牌、文件身份和完整内容必须仍然匹配。所属进程已结束或内容无效的锁必须手动恢复，不会被自动破坏。
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每个钩子目录都有一个 JSON 所有权标记，其中包含上次写入 worktree 配置的绝对路径。检出目录移动后，该标记只允许替换确切的陈旧自有值。Lefthook 运行前，所有权标记和每个已有的生成钩子都必须是不带别名的常规文件。安装程序会解析 `core.hooksPath` 的生效作用域、来源和值，包括通过当前生效的 `config.worktree` include 加载的值；它会拒绝命令作用域路径、非自有的 worktree 作用域路径以及非自有的保留目录。继承自系统、全局或共用仓库配置的路径必须设置 `DSH_LEFTHOOK_ALLOW_HOOKS_PATH_OVERRIDE=1`，从而只让当前 worktree 显式启用 Lefthook。未生效的 `includeIf` 目标不会被递归检查，因为它们不影响当前配置。完成验证后，Lefthook 子进程的环境会移除命令作用域的 Git 配置。
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每个钩子目录都有一个 JSON 所有权标记，其中包含上次写入 worktree 配置的绝对路径。检出目录移动后，该标记只允许替换确切的陈旧自有值。Git 会以主 worktree 的配置为新链接 worktree 初始化 `config.worktree`；当该初始配置包含某个已注册 worktree 中由所有权标记佐证的保留钩子路径时，安装程序只会在新 worktree 的配置中将其替换为新 worktree 自有的路径。Lefthook 运行前，所有权标记和每个已有的生成钩子都必须是不带别名的常规文件。安装程序会解析 `core.hooksPath` 的生效作用域、来源和值，包括通过当前生效的 `config.worktree` include 加载的值；它会拒绝命令作用域路径、非自有的 worktree 作用域路径以及非自有的保留目录。继承自系统、全局或共用仓库配置的路径必须设置 `DSH_LEFTHOOK_ALLOW_HOOKS_PATH_OVERRIDE=1`，从而只让当前 worktree 显式启用 Lefthook。未生效的 `includeIf` 目标不会被递归检查，因为它们不影响当前配置。完成验证后，Lefthook 子进程的环境会移除命令作用域的 Git 配置。
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若 Lefthook 在更改 `core.hooksPath` 后失败，安装程序会恢复先前的 worktree 值；若回滚失败，会与安装失败一并报告。`$GIT_COMMON_DIR/hooks` 中的现有文件绝不会被移除或改写。聚焦的安装程序测试固定了隔离、迁移拒绝、所有权和检出目录移动、并发安装、自定义路径及回滚行为。
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若 Lefthook 在更改 `core.hooksPath` 后失败，安装程序会恢复先前的 worktree 值；若回滚失败，会与安装失败一并报告。`$GIT_COMMON_DIR/hooks` 中的现有文件绝不会被移除或改写。聚焦的安装程序测试固定了隔离、复制的新 worktree 配置、迁移拒绝、所有权和检出目录移动、并发安装、自定义路径及回滚行为。
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## 考虑过的替代方案
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user