policy: resolve every knob consumer through the shared override chain

Review fixes (ds-review-bot warnings on #623):

- One chain, every consumer: the override resolution (own post-seed
  switches ?? header baseline, closed-vocabulary validated) moves into pure
  exports (sandboxOverrideOf / approvalOverrideOf); the services delegate,
  and the permission presets consume them — current(session) and set()
  now see inherited baselines, so a child inheriting danger-full-access
  gets REAL knob switches when workspace-write is selected instead of a
  silent no-op, and a seed-carried preset selection is subsumed by the
  baseline. current(events) becomes current(session) (pre-release; the
  only callers were tests).
- Unconditional durable validation: a malformed header baseline fails
  loud on every read, no longer shadowed by an own switch.
- The two policy peers are declared optional (peerDependenciesMeta), so a
  thin spawn/fork deployment without policy plugins can consume the
  driver; verify-runtime-closure honors the flag.

Red-first: inherited-preset derive/switch-away and seeded-selection tests
in the permission suite; malformed-baseline-with-own-switch tests in both
policy suites.

packages/ui/user-approval/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
-README.md: 537fda6e16c2e21d22a1809e1e91fc0c3ddeee94
-README.zh.md: 132b145ee3c7f7cea7aa0529358ed4982615499f
+README.md: f6eaf049a46bc2faa7e0b12809d3d8c63d7792d6
+README.zh.md: a286d13eb7c5a3e7893a8269c6d50175eff47046

packages/ui/user-approval/README.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Each request must belong to an open agent turn. The service appends a paired `ap
 
 Answerers are `approval/request` waterfall listeners. Return an outcome to answer for an owned agent or call `next()` to delegate. Agent-scoped listeners receive only that agent's requests; compose one terminal answerer per deployment because sibling listener order is not a policy priority mechanism. The ACP automation bridge supplies one-shot machine decisions for sessions it owns.
 
-`ApprovalPolicy` is `'ask'` or `'never'`. The effective value is the last `approval/policy` event, falling back to config; `setApprovalPolicy()` is the write path. `'never'` rejects before interactive dispatch and is the only policy stated in the prompt. Switches produce at most one coalesced notice, attributed to the user when the override follows the last `request/header` and to operator/config otherwise. `ctx.approval.overrideOf(session)` resolves the session's override chain, never the configured default: the fold of the session's OWN switches (events past `SessionHeader.seedLength`), else the header's inherited `approvalPolicy` delegation baseline, validated against the closed vocabulary on read; the in-process subagent driver captures this at delegation and writes it into each child's creation-time header, so a `'never'` parent cannot mint prompting children, with no first-turn timing window ([rationale](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md)).
+`ApprovalPolicy` is `'ask'` or `'never'`. The effective value is the last `approval/policy` event, falling back to config; `setApprovalPolicy()` is the write path. `'never'` rejects before interactive dispatch and is the only policy stated in the prompt. Switches produce at most one coalesced notice, attributed to the user when the override follows the last `request/header` and to operator/config otherwise. `ctx.approval.overrideOf(session)` (the pure `approvalOverrideOf` export, also consumed by the permission presets) resolves the session's override chain, never the configured default: the fold of the session's OWN switches (events past `SessionHeader.seedLength`), else the header's inherited `approvalPolicy` delegation baseline, validated against the closed vocabulary on read; the in-process subagent driver captures this at delegation and writes it into each child's creation-time header, so a `'never'` parent cannot mint prompting children, with no first-turn timing window ([rationale](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md)).
 
 The tools pipeline routes `ask` decisions through this seam and fails closed when it is absent; the sandboxed bash tool also uses it for escalated retries. The ACP automation bridge answers calls for its own agents through the client's machine policy. Audit events remain log-only, so the model sees only the asking consumer's result. See the [approval-seam Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md) and [sandbox Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
 

packages/ui/user-approval/README.zh.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 
 应答者是 `approval/request` waterfall（瀑布式事件）监听器。要回答所拥有 agent 的请求，请返回一个结果；否则调用 `next()` 委托。限定到 agent 的监听器只接收该 agent 的请求；每项部署应当组合一个终端应答者，因为同级监听器的顺序不是策略优先级机制。ACP（Agent Client Protocol）自动化桥接层为其拥有的会话提供一次性机器决定。
 
-`ApprovalPolicy` 为 `'ask'` 或 `'never'`。实际值取最后一条 `approval/policy` 事件，并回退到配置；`setApprovalPolicy()` 是写入路径。`'never'` 会在交互式分发之前拒绝请求，也是提示词中唯一声明的策略。切换最多产生一条合并通知：如果覆盖发生在最后一个 `request/header` 之后，则归因于用户；否则归因于操作方／配置。`ctx.approval.overrideOf(session)` 解析会话的覆盖链，绝不包含配置默认值：先折叠会话自己的切换（`SessionHeader.seedLength` 之后的事件），否则取会话头中继承的 `approvalPolicy` 委派基线，读取时按封闭词汇校验；进程内 subagent 驱动器在委派时捕获该值，并写入每个子 agent 创建时的会话头，使 `'never'` 父级无法造出会弹出提示的子 agent，且不存在任何第一轮次的时序窗口（参见[设计原理](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md)）。
+`ApprovalPolicy` 为 `'ask'` 或 `'never'`。实际值取最后一条 `approval/policy` 事件，并回退到配置；`setApprovalPolicy()` 是写入路径。`'never'` 会在交互式分发之前拒绝请求，也是提示词中唯一声明的策略。切换最多产生一条合并通知：如果覆盖发生在最后一个 `request/header` 之后，则归因于用户；否则归因于操作方／配置。`ctx.approval.overrideOf(session)`（即纯函数导出 `approvalOverrideOf`，也供权限 preset 消费）解析会话的覆盖链，绝不包含配置默认值：先折叠会话自己的切换（`SessionHeader.seedLength` 之后的事件），否则取会话头中继承的 `approvalPolicy` 委派基线，读取时按封闭词汇校验；进程内 subagent 驱动器在委派时捕获该值，并写入每个子 agent 创建时的会话头，使 `'never'` 父级无法造出会弹出提示的子 agent，且不存在任何第一轮次的时序窗口（参见[设计原理](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md)）。
 
 工具流水线通过此 seam 路由 `ask` 决定，并在该 seam 缺失时以拒绝方式关闭；沙箱 bash 工具也会将它用于升权重试。ACP 自动化桥接层根据客户端的机器策略，回答其自有 agent 的调用。审计事件仍只写入日志，因此模型只会看到发起请求的消费方所返回的结果。详见[审批 seam Agent Note（agent 决策记录）](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md)和[沙箱 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)。
 

packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts

@@ -138,6 +138,29 @@ export function effectiveApprovalPolicy(events: readonly SessionEvent[]): Approv
   return undefined
 }
 
+/**
+ * The session's complete approval-policy OVERRIDE chain — the one home every
+ * consumer (this service's policy tier, the permission presets) resolves
+ * through: the fold of the session's OWN switches (events past the seed
+ * boundary — a fork seed's stale parent switch is subsumed by the delegation
+ * baseline captured after it), else the header's inherited baseline. Never
+ * the configured default. The durable baseline is validated UNCONDITIONALLY —
+ * a corrupt or foreign header must fail loud on every read, not only when no
+ * own switch happens to shadow it.
+ * @param session - the session whose override chain to resolve.
+ * @returns the effective override, or `undefined` for a session following
+ *   the configured default.
+ * @throws when the header baseline is outside the closed policy vocabulary.
+ */
+export function approvalOverrideOf(session: Session): ApprovalPolicy | undefined {
+  const baseline = session.header.approvalPolicy
+  if (baseline !== undefined && !APPROVAL_POLICIES.includes(baseline as ApprovalPolicy)) {
+    throw new Error(`session header approvalPolicy "${baseline}" is outside the closed policy vocabulary`)
+  }
+  const own = effectiveApprovalPolicy(session.events.slice(session.header.seedLength ?? 0))
+  return own ?? baseline as ApprovalPolicy | undefined
+}
+
 /**
  * Whether the log currently sits inside an open turn (a `turn/start` not yet
  * closed by a `turn/end`) — the {@link ApprovalService.request} precondition.
@@ -342,14 +365,7 @@ export class ApprovalService extends Service {
    *   vocabulary (a corrupt or foreign log; durable-boundary validation).
    */
   overrideOf(session: Session): ApprovalPolicy | undefined {
-    const own = effectiveApprovalPolicy(session.events.slice(session.header.seedLength ?? 0))
-    if (own !== undefined) return own
-    const baseline = session.header.approvalPolicy
-    if (baseline === undefined) return undefined
-    if (!APPROVAL_POLICIES.includes(baseline as ApprovalPolicy)) {
-      throw new Error(`session header approvalPolicy "${baseline}" is outside the closed policy vocabulary`)
-    }
-    return baseline as ApprovalPolicy
+    return approvalOverrideOf(session)
   }
 
   /**

packages/ui/user-approval/tests/approval.spec.ts

@@ -636,4 +636,12 @@ describe('delegation inheritance (overrideOf over the header baseline)', () => {
 
     expect(() => ctx.approval.overrideOf(child)).toThrow(/approvalPolicy/)
   })
+
+  it('rejects a malformed baseline even when an own switch would win (validation is unconditional)', async () => {
+    const ctx = await mounted()
+    const child = inheritedSession('sess-appr-invalid-own', { approvalPolicy: 'always' })
+    setApprovalPolicy(child, 'never')
+
+    expect(() => ctx.approval.overrideOf(child)).toThrow(/approvalPolicy/)
+  })
 })