Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into feat/todo-multi-in-progress

packages/client/connection/src/api-request-trust.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+/**
+ * Browser-trust fence for every /api request. Defends the two confused-deputy
+ * paths a browser opens against a local HTTP API — DNS rebinding (Host names
+ * the attacker's domain while the socket reaches this server) and cross-site
+ * requests fired from a malicious page. The Host fence binds every request,
+ * browser-looking or not: over plain HTTP a browser attaches neither Origin
+ * nor Fetch-Metadata to reads (EventSource, images, navigations — those
+ * headers go only to trustworthy destinations), so an unmarked request may
+ * still be a rebound browser read and Host is the one header rebinding cannot
+ * forge. Non-browser and remote clients pass the same fence via loopback, the
+ * CLI-derived LAN IP literals, or a declared `trustedHosts` authority.
+ * Network reachability and authentication stay out of scope: binding policy
+ * belongs to the webserver config, and this fence is not an auth layer.
+ */
+
+import type { IncomingHttpHeaders } from 'node:http'
+
+/** The request facts the fence reads (structural subset of IncomingMessage). */
+interface ApiTrustRequest {
+  headers: IncomingHttpHeaders
+}
+
+function header(headers: IncomingHttpHeaders, name: string): string | undefined {
+  const value = headers[name]
+  return typeof value === 'string' ? value : undefined
+}
+
+function isLoopbackHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
+  if (hostname === 'localhost' || hostname === '[::1]') return true
+  const parts = hostname.split('.')
+  return parts.length === 4
+    && parts[0] === '127'
+    && parts.every(part => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(part) && Number(part) <= 255)
+}
+
+/** Normalized URL of a Host-header authority (hostname lowercased, default port stripped, IPv6 bracketed), or undefined when unparsable. */
+function parseAuthority(authority: string): URL | undefined {
+  try {
+    // http: is a WHATWG "special scheme": parsing yields a non-empty hostname or throws.
+    return new URL(`http://${authority}`)
+  } catch {
+    return undefined
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Assert one configured `trustedHosts` entry is a bare authority (`host` or
+ * `host:port`) in canonical form: it must survive WHATWG parsing unchanged
+ * (case aside). Anything parsing would silently rewrite is refused as a typo
+ * that must fail the load loudly instead of being ignored until requests 403
+ * or quietly changing the grant: URL parts beyond the authority
+ * (`harness.internal/path`, `user@harness.internal` — which would authorize
+ * the embedded hostname), stripped whitespace, a dangling colon or
+ * zero-padded port (which would broaden an intended exact-port grant to every
+ * port), and non-canonical host spellings (`0x7f.0.0.1`, percent-encoding,
+ * unbracketed IPv6; IDN hosts are declared in punycode, the form the wire
+ * carries).
+ * @param entry - the configured value, verbatim.
+ */
+export function assertTrustedAuthority(entry: string): void {
+  const entryUrl = parseAuthority(entry)
+  if (entryUrl !== undefined && canonicalAuthority(entry, entryUrl) === entry.toLowerCase()) return
+  throw new Error(`client-connection: trustedHosts entry ${JSON.stringify(entry)} is not a bare host[:port] authority`)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical form of a parsed authority: `hostname` when no port was written,
+ * else `hostname:port`. The port is judged from URL parses under both special
+ * schemes (their default ports differ, so `:80` and `:443` still count as
+ * explicit), never from the raw string, where WHATWG trimming would misread
+ * shapes like `host:port ` as port-less.
+ */
+function canonicalAuthority(entry: string, entryUrl: URL): string {
+  // An authority that parsed under http cannot fail under https.
+  const port = entryUrl.port !== '' ? entryUrl.port : new URL(`https://${entry}`).port
+  return port === '' ? entryUrl.hostname : `${entryUrl.hostname}:${port}`
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether the request authority matches a `trustedHosts` entry. An entry with
+ * an explicit port matches that exact authority; a port-less entry matches the
+ * hostname on any port (the shape the CLI derives for IP-literal LAN serving,
+ * where the bound port may be OS-assigned). Both sides compare through WHATWG
+ * normalization, so case and a redundant `:80` never decide trust.
+ */
+function isTrustedAuthority(hostUrl: URL, trustedHosts: readonly string[]): boolean {
+  return trustedHosts.some((entry) => {
+    const entryUrl = parseAuthority(entry)
+    if (entryUrl === undefined) return false
+    return canonicalAuthority(entry, entryUrl) === entryUrl.hostname
+      ? entryUrl.hostname === hostUrl.hostname
+      : entryUrl.host === hostUrl.host
+  })
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decide whether one /api request may reach the RPC bridge.
+ * @param request - node HTTP request facts (headers).
+ * @param trustedHosts - non-loopback authorities this deployment serves: exact `host:port`, or port-less `host` matching any port.
+ * @returns true when the Host is ours (loopback or trusted) and any attached browser markers are same-origin.
+ */
+export function isTrustedApiRequest(request: ApiTrustRequest, trustedHosts: readonly string[]): boolean {
+  // Host fence (DNS-rebinding defense), applied to every request: the browser
+  // fills Host from the URL it believes it is talking to, so a rebound page
+  // carries the attacker's domain here even though the socket lands on this
+  // server. There is no marker shortcut — a browser read over plain HTTP
+  // (EventSource, images, navigations) arrives with neither Origin nor
+  // Fetch-Metadata, indistinguishable from curl, and its response is readable
+  // by the rebound page.
+  const host = header(request.headers, 'host')
+  if (host === undefined) return false
+  const hostUrl = parseAuthority(host)
+  if (hostUrl === undefined) return false
+  if (!isLoopbackHostname(hostUrl.hostname) && !isTrustedAuthority(hostUrl, trustedHosts)) return false
+  // Cross-site fence: modern browsers label the initiator relationship on
+  // every fetch; an explicit cross-site marker is refused regardless of Origin.
+  if (header(request.headers, 'sec-fetch-site') === 'cross-site') return false
+  // Origin fence: when a browser attaches an Origin it must be exactly this
+  // authority (compared through the same normalization as the Host). Absent
+  // Origin is fine — the Host fence above already bound the request. The
+  // literal "null" (sandboxed iframes, file: pages) is an opaque origin, refused.
+  const origin = header(request.headers, 'origin')
+  if (origin === undefined) return true
+  try {
+    return new URL(origin).host === hostUrl.host
+  } catch {
+    return false
+  }
+}

packages/client/connection/src/client/api.ts

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 export type {
   ApiProxy, SessionsApi, SessionSummary, HostApi, EventsApi, MuxFrame, HostFrame,
   ApprovalResponsePayload, QuestionResponsePayload, HistoryEntry, ToolEventView,
+  DirectoryEntry, DirectoryListing,
   WorkspaceApi, WorkspaceId, WorkspaceView,
   CommandsApi, CommandDescriptor, SkillsApi, SkillEntry,
   ModelCatalogFailure, ModelCatalogModel, ModelProviderGroup, ModelReasoning,

packages/client/connection/src/client/fixture.ts

@@ -578,6 +578,37 @@ export function createFixtureApi(options: FixtureOptions = {}): ApiProxy {
     updatedAt: fixtureEpoch,
   }]
   let nextWorkspace = 1
+
+  // In-memory browse tree behind the fixture's `browse` picker capability —
+  // deterministic content mirroring the design mock so assembled Web tests
+  // and snapshots can walk it. Leaves are materialized lazily: a child listed
+  // by its parent lists as empty until something is created inside it.
+  const FIXTURE_HOME = '/home/fixture'
+  const directoryTree = new Map<string, string[]>([
+    ['/', ['home']],
+    ['/home', ['fixture']],
+    [FIXTURE_HOME, ['Documents', 'Downloads', '.config']],
+    [`${FIXTURE_HOME}/Documents`, [
+      'project', 'deepseek-iOS', 'deepseek-android', 'deepseek-platform',
+      'deepseek-web', 'deepseek-harness', 'deepseek-app', 'deepseek-landing-blog',
+    ]],
+  ])
+  const childrenOf = (path: string): string[] | undefined => {
+    const known = directoryTree.get(path)
+    if (known !== undefined) return known
+    const parent = path.slice(0, path.lastIndexOf('/')) || '/'
+    const name = path.slice(path.lastIndexOf('/') + 1)
+    return directoryTree.get(parent)?.includes(name) === true ? [] : undefined
+  }
+  const crumbsOf = (path: string): { name: string; path: string; hidden: boolean }[] => {
+    const crumbs = [{ name: '/', path: '/', hidden: false }]
+    let acc = ''
+    for (const segment of path.split('/').filter(Boolean)) {
+      acc += `/${segment}`
+      crumbs.push({ name: segment, path: acc, hidden: false })
+    }
+    return crumbs
+  }
   const mint = (): ReturnType<typeof RpcId> => RpcId(`fx-rpc-${nextRpc++}`)
   /** Resident pending approval (stable rpcId: every mux open replays the same id, matching host replay semantics). */
   const pendingApprovalRpcId = mint()
@@ -983,7 +1014,42 @@ export function createFixtureApi(options: FixtureOptions = {}): ApiProxy {
     },
     host: {
       describe: request => ok(request, { version: '0.0.0-fixture', cwd: '/tmp/fixture', attachedSessions }),
-      pickDirectory: request => ok(request, { path: null }),
+      // Deterministic native pick: the keyless lanes drive the full
+      // pick-then-adopt path without an OS chooser (design-mock content,
+      // same tree the browse primitives serve).
+      pickDirectory: request => ok(request, { path: `${FIXTURE_HOME}/Documents/project` }),
+      listDirectory: (request) => {
+        const target = request.payload.path ?? FIXTURE_HOME
+        const children = childrenOf(target)
+        if (children === undefined) {
+          return err(request, { code: 'directory-unreadable', message: `cannot list ${target}: not in the fixture tree`, details: { path: target } })
+        }
+        return ok(request, {
+          path: target,
+          home: FIXTURE_HOME,
+          crumbs: crumbsOf(target),
+          entries: [...children].sort((a, b) => a.localeCompare(b))
+            .map(name => ({ name, path: target === '/' ? `/${name}` : `${target}/${name}`, hidden: name.startsWith('.') })),
+          // The fixture tree is tiny; no level ever reaches a backend bound.
+          truncated: false,
+        })
+      },
+      createDirectory: (request) => {
+        const parent = request.payload.path
+        const children = childrenOf(parent)
+        if (children === undefined) {
+          return err(request, { code: 'directory-create-failed', message: `missing parent ${parent}`, details: { path: parent } })
+        }
+        // Same root special case as listDirectory's entry paths: a plain join
+        // under '/' would mint '//name' and fork the tree's identity.
+        const target = parent === '/' ? `/${request.payload.name}` : `${parent}/${request.payload.name}`
+        if (children.includes(request.payload.name)) {
+          return err(request, { code: 'directory-exists', message: `${target} already exists`, details: { path: target } })
+        }
+        directoryTree.set(parent, [...children, request.payload.name])
+        directoryTree.set(target, [])
+        return ok(request, { path: target })
+      },
       openPath: request => ok(request, { opened: true as const }),
     },
     workspace: {
@@ -1338,6 +1404,8 @@ export class FixtureApiClient extends AbstractApiClient {
       case 'session.cancel': return this.api.sessions.cancel(request)
       case 'host.describe': return this.api.host.describe(request)
       case 'host.pickDirectory': return this.api.host.pickDirectory(request, new AbortController().signal)
+      case 'host.listDirectory': return this.api.host.listDirectory(request, new AbortController().signal)
+      case 'host.createDirectory': return this.api.host.createDirectory(request)
       case 'host.openPath': return this.api.host.openPath(request, new AbortController().signal)
       case 'workspace.list': return this.api.workspace.list(request)
       case 'workspace.create': return this.api.workspace.create(request)

packages/client/connection/src/client/index.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { WebApiClient } from './web-api-client.ts'
 export type {
   ApiProxy, SessionsApi, SessionSummary, HostApi, EventsApi, MuxFrame, HostFrame,
   ApprovalResponsePayload, QuestionResponsePayload, HistoryEntry, ToolEventView,
+  DirectoryEntry, DirectoryListing,
   ToolCallView, ToolResultView, WorkspaceApi, WorkspaceId, WorkspaceView,
   CommandsApi, CommandDescriptor, SkillsApi, SkillEntry,
   ModelCatalogFailure, ModelCatalogModel, ModelProviderGroup, ModelReasoning,

packages/client/connection/src/index.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
 /** Host HTTP bridge for browser-client RPC. */
 import type { Context } from 'cordis'
+import z from 'schemastery'
 // Activates the httpServer Context merge used below.
 import type { WebRoute } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-host-webserver'
 import { toFetchHandler } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-host-apiproxy'
 import { API_PATH } from './api-path.ts'
 import { bridge } from './http-bridge.ts'
-import { isTrustedNativeDialogRequest } from './native-dialog-request.ts'
+import { assertTrustedAuthority, isTrustedApiRequest } from './api-request-trust.ts'
 
 export { API_PATH } from './api-path.ts'
 
@@ -15,20 +16,42 @@ export const name = 'client-connection'
 /** Services required before mounting the route. */
 export const inject = ['httpServer', 'apiProxy']
 
+/** Plugin config: the deployment's non-loopback serving authorities. */
+export interface ConnectionConfig {
+  /**
+   * Authorities this deployment serves beyond loopback: exact `host:port`, or
+   * port-less `host` matching any port. The /api trust fence refuses any
+   * request whose Host is neither loopback nor listed here, so a
+   * non-loopback (`0.0.0.0`) deployment must declare the names it is reached
+   * by (the dsh CLI derives the machine's LAN IP literals itself). An entry
+   * that is not a bare, canonical authority fails the plugin load.
+   */
+  trustedHosts?: string[]
+}
+
+export const Config: z<ConnectionConfig> = z.object({
+  trustedHosts: z.array(String).default([]),
+})
+
 /**
- * Mounts the API gateway under the browser transport prefix.
+ * Mounts the API gateway under the browser transport prefix. Every request on
+ * the prefix passes the browser-trust fence first (DNS-rebinding and
+ * cross-site defense — [api-request-trust](./api-request-trust.ts)).
  * @param ctx - Host plugin context.
+ * @param config - resolved plugin config (schema defaults applied).
  */
-export function apply(ctx: Context): void {
+export function apply(ctx: Context, config?: ConnectionConfig): void {
+  // The Loader resolves schema defaults; hand-built test contexts may pass none.
+  const trustedHosts = config?.trustedHosts ?? []
+  // Config boundary: a malformed entry fails the load loudly here rather than
+  // silently authorizing its hostname prefix at request time.
+  for (const entry of trustedHosts) assertTrustedAuthority(entry)
   const apiHandler = toFetchHandler(ctx.apiProxy)
   const route: WebRoute = {
     kind: 'prefix',
     path: API_PATH,
     handler: async (req, res) => {
-      const pathname = new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://dsh.internal').pathname
-      if ((pathname === `${API_PATH}/host.pickDirectory`
-        || pathname === `${API_PATH}/host.openPath`)
-        && !isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(req)) {
+      if (!isTrustedApiRequest(req, trustedHosts)) {
         res.writeHead(403)
         res.end('forbidden')
         return

packages/client/connection/src/native-dialog-request.ts

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-/** Trust check for browser requests that can invoke privileged native host actions. */
-
-import type { IncomingHttpHeaders } from 'node:http'
-
-interface NativeDialogRequest {
-  headers: IncomingHttpHeaders
-  socket: { remoteAddress?: string | undefined }
-}
-
-function header(headers: IncomingHttpHeaders, name: string): string | undefined {
-  const value = headers[name]
-  return typeof value === 'string' ? value : undefined
-}
-
-function isLoopback(address: string | undefined): boolean {
-  if (address === undefined) return false
-  if (address === '::1') return true
-  const ipv4 = address.startsWith('::ffff:') ? address.slice('::ffff:'.length) : address
-  const first = ipv4.split('.')[0]
-  return first === '127'
-}
-
-function isLoopbackHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
-  if (hostname === 'localhost' || hostname === '[::1]' || hostname === '::1') return true
-  const parts = hostname.split('.')
-  return parts.length === 4
-    && parts[0] === '127'
-    && parts.every(part => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(part) && Number(part) <= 255)
-}
-
-/**
- * Require a local socket plus browser-controlled same-origin metadata.
- * @param request - the node HTTP request facts used by the carrier guard.
- * @returns true only for a same-origin browser request whose peer and URL are loopback.
- */
-export function isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request: NativeDialogRequest): boolean {
-  if (!isLoopback(request.socket.remoteAddress)) return false
-  if (header(request.headers, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return false
-  const origin = header(request.headers, 'origin')
-  const host = header(request.headers, 'host')
-  if (origin === undefined || host === undefined) return false
-  try {
-    const parsed = new URL(origin)
-    const hostUrl = new URL(`http://${host}`)
-    return (parsed.protocol === 'http:' || parsed.protocol === 'https:')
-      && parsed.host === host
-      && isLoopbackHostname(parsed.hostname)
-      && isLoopbackHostname(hostUrl.hostname)
-  } catch {
-    return false
-  }
-}