Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into feat/todo-multi-in-progress

packages/client/connection/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
-#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
-README.md: 80228a180faba0c556ff720e999b29b5bb1635b6
-README.zh.md: f4b857886bfafa891ceb1bd6b79b27e1fb725819
+#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/client/connection/README.md
+README.md: 173a9b9998e17d201b2d31d73ea74a94b319dae6
+README.zh.md: ca5da643db443956c25399f07c8b460900942ad4

packages/client/connection/README.md

@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ English | [中文](README.zh.md)
 
 Wire consumer layer: the client plugin's apply mounts `ctx.connection` (shared api client + single-consumer stream-loop starter); the export face carries the wire contract types, the `AbstractApiClient` seam, and the loop's sink/config types. The platform subclasses (WebApiClient/FixtureApiClient), the ConnectionController loop, and the fixture data source are package-internal — apply selects and drives them; tests reach them via src. Contract: api-contracts v3 §3.
 
+## /api browser-trust fence
+
+The node half guards every request under `/api` before bridging (`src/api-request-trust.ts`). Every request — browser-marked or not — must present a `Host` that is a loopback authority or matches a `trustedHosts` entry: exact on `host:port` entries, any port on port-less entries, both sides compared through WHATWG normalization (DNS-rebinding defense). There is deliberately no shortcut for requests without browser markers: over plain HTTP a browser attaches neither `Origin` nor Fetch-Metadata to reads (EventSource, images, navigations — those headers go only to trustworthy destinations), so an unmarked request may still be a rebound browser read with a readable response, and Host is the one header rebinding cannot forge; non-browser clients pass the same fence via loopback, the CLI-derived LAN IP literals, or a declared authority. When markers are present, an attached `Origin` must equal the Host authority, and an explicit `sec-fetch-site: cross-site` marker is refused. A `trustedHosts` entry that is not a bare, canonical `host[:port]` authority — one WHATWG parsing reads back exactly as written — fails the plugin load loudly: parsing would otherwise quietly authorize the hostname inside `harness.internal/path`, or broaden a dangling-colon or zero-padded port to an any-port grant. Failures answer plain 403 before any RPC dispatch. A non-loopback (`--host 0.0.0.0`) deployment therefore needs its serving authorities trusted: the dsh CLI derives the machine's LAN IP literals itself and its `--trusted-host` flag declares named ones, so `trustedHosts` in cordis.yml is for compositions the CLI does not boot. The fence is deliberately not an authentication layer — reachability policy stays with the webserver binding, and auth remains deferred work. Decision record: [the api browser-trust boundary Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md).
+
 ## Keyless fixture
 
 Any `fixture` query parameter selects the in-memory carrier. `fixture=empty` starts with no Workspace or Session; `fixturePrompt=reject` rejects prompts before acceptance; `fixtureAttach=fail` publishes a Session but rejects its Workspace attachment; `fixtureSessionCreate=drop-response` publishes and frames a Session before dropping the create response; and `fixtureFrames=workspace-first` reverses the default session-first create-frame order. Workspace creation by name/path and caller-preallocated SessionIds remain deterministic enough for assembled Web tests to reconcile list and frame arrival.

packages/client/connection/README.zh.md

@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
 
 协议消费层：客户端插件的 apply 会挂载 `ctx.connection`（共享 API 客户端 + 单消费方流循环启动器）；导出表层携带协议契约类型、`AbstractApiClient` seam，以及循环的 sink／配置类型。平台子类（WebApiClient/FixtureApiClient）、ConnectionController 循环和 fixture 数据源都属于包内部：apply 负责选择并驱动它们，测试则通过 src 访问。契约：api-contracts v3 §3。
 
+## /api 浏览器信任栅栏
+
+node 半侧在桥接前守卫 `/api` 下的每个请求（`src/api-request-trust.ts`）。每个请求——无论是否带浏览器标记——`Host` 都必须是回环地址权威，或与某个 `trustedHosts` 条目匹配：带端口的 `host:port` 条目精确匹配，不带端口的条目匹配任意端口，两侧均经 WHATWG 归一化后比较（DNS rebinding 防御）。刻意不为无浏览器标记的请求开捷径：明文 HTTP 下浏览器的读取（EventSource、图片、导航——这些头只发给可信目标）既不带 `Origin` 也不带 Fetch-Metadata，因此无标记请求仍可能是被重绑页面发起的、响应可被读走的读取，而 Host 是重绑唯一伪造不了的请求头；非浏览器客户端经由回环地址、CLI 推导的 LAN IP 字面量或已声明的权威通过同一道栅栏。当标记存在时，`Origin` 必须与 Host 权威完全一致；显式的 `sec-fetch-site: cross-site` 标记一律拒绝。不是纯的、规范形 `host[:port]` 权威的 `trustedHosts` 条目——即 WHATWG 解析读回后与原文不完全一致的——会让插件加载大声失败：否则解析会悄悄授权 `harness.internal/path` 这类笔误里的 hostname，或把悬空冒号、补零端口放大成任意端口授权。失败在任何 RPC 分发之前以纯 403 应答。因此非回环（`--host 0.0.0.0`）部署需要让自己的服务权威被信任：dsh CLI 会自行推导本机的 LAN IP 字面量，其 `--trusted-host` flag 用于声明具名权威，所以 cordis.yml 中的 `trustedHosts` 面向 CLI 不参与引导的组合。这道栅栏刻意不承担认证职责——可达性策略归 webserver 绑定配置，认证仍是延期工作。决策记录：[api 浏览器信任边界 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md)。
+
 ## 无密钥 fixture
 
 任何 `fixture` 查询参数都会选择内存载体。`fixture=empty` 启动时不含 Workspace 或 Session；`fixturePrompt=reject` 在接受前拒绝提示词；`fixtureAttach=fail` 发布 Session 但拒绝将其附加到 Workspace；`fixtureSessionCreate=drop-response` 在丢弃创建响应前发布 Session 并为其发出帧；`fixtureFrames=workspace-first` 则反转默认的 Session 优先创建帧顺序。按名称／路径创建 Workspace 以及由调用方预先分配 SessionId，均具有足够的确定性，组装后的 Web 测试可以据此协调列表与帧的到达。

packages/client/connection/package.json

@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
     "@deepseek-ai/dsh-commands": "workspace:^",
     "@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm": "workspace:^",
     "@deepseek-ai/dsh-session": "workspace:^",
-    "@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools": "workspace:^"
+    "@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools": "workspace:^",
+    "schemastery": "^3.18.0"
   },
   "files": [
     "lib/index.js",

packages/client/connection/src/api-request-trust.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+/**
+ * Browser-trust fence for every /api request. Defends the two confused-deputy
+ * paths a browser opens against a local HTTP API — DNS rebinding (Host names
+ * the attacker's domain while the socket reaches this server) and cross-site
+ * requests fired from a malicious page. The Host fence binds every request,
+ * browser-looking or not: over plain HTTP a browser attaches neither Origin
+ * nor Fetch-Metadata to reads (EventSource, images, navigations — those
+ * headers go only to trustworthy destinations), so an unmarked request may
+ * still be a rebound browser read and Host is the one header rebinding cannot
+ * forge. Non-browser and remote clients pass the same fence via loopback, the
+ * CLI-derived LAN IP literals, or a declared `trustedHosts` authority.
+ * Network reachability and authentication stay out of scope: binding policy
+ * belongs to the webserver config, and this fence is not an auth layer.
+ */
+
+import type { IncomingHttpHeaders } from 'node:http'
+
+/** The request facts the fence reads (structural subset of IncomingMessage). */
+interface ApiTrustRequest {
+  headers: IncomingHttpHeaders
+}
+
+function header(headers: IncomingHttpHeaders, name: string): string | undefined {
+  const value = headers[name]
+  return typeof value === 'string' ? value : undefined
+}
+
+function isLoopbackHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
+  if (hostname === 'localhost' || hostname === '[::1]') return true
+  const parts = hostname.split('.')
+  return parts.length === 4
+    && parts[0] === '127'
+    && parts.every(part => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(part) && Number(part) <= 255)
+}
+
+/** Normalized URL of a Host-header authority (hostname lowercased, default port stripped, IPv6 bracketed), or undefined when unparsable. */
+function parseAuthority(authority: string): URL | undefined {
+  try {
+    // http: is a WHATWG "special scheme": parsing yields a non-empty hostname or throws.
+    return new URL(`http://${authority}`)
+  } catch {
+    return undefined
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Assert one configured `trustedHosts` entry is a bare authority (`host` or
+ * `host:port`) in canonical form: it must survive WHATWG parsing unchanged
+ * (case aside). Anything parsing would silently rewrite is refused as a typo
+ * that must fail the load loudly instead of being ignored until requests 403
+ * or quietly changing the grant: URL parts beyond the authority
+ * (`harness.internal/path`, `user@harness.internal` — which would authorize
+ * the embedded hostname), stripped whitespace, a dangling colon or
+ * zero-padded port (which would broaden an intended exact-port grant to every
+ * port), and non-canonical host spellings (`0x7f.0.0.1`, percent-encoding,
+ * unbracketed IPv6; IDN hosts are declared in punycode, the form the wire
+ * carries).
+ * @param entry - the configured value, verbatim.
+ */
+export function assertTrustedAuthority(entry: string): void {
+  const entryUrl = parseAuthority(entry)
+  if (entryUrl !== undefined && canonicalAuthority(entry, entryUrl) === entry.toLowerCase()) return
+  throw new Error(`client-connection: trustedHosts entry ${JSON.stringify(entry)} is not a bare host[:port] authority`)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical form of a parsed authority: `hostname` when no port was written,
+ * else `hostname:port`. The port is judged from URL parses under both special
+ * schemes (their default ports differ, so `:80` and `:443` still count as
+ * explicit), never from the raw string, where WHATWG trimming would misread
+ * shapes like `host:port ` as port-less.
+ */
+function canonicalAuthority(entry: string, entryUrl: URL): string {
+  // An authority that parsed under http cannot fail under https.
+  const port = entryUrl.port !== '' ? entryUrl.port : new URL(`https://${entry}`).port
+  return port === '' ? entryUrl.hostname : `${entryUrl.hostname}:${port}`
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether the request authority matches a `trustedHosts` entry. An entry with
+ * an explicit port matches that exact authority; a port-less entry matches the
+ * hostname on any port (the shape the CLI derives for IP-literal LAN serving,
+ * where the bound port may be OS-assigned). Both sides compare through WHATWG
+ * normalization, so case and a redundant `:80` never decide trust.
+ */
+function isTrustedAuthority(hostUrl: URL, trustedHosts: readonly string[]): boolean {
+  return trustedHosts.some((entry) => {
+    const entryUrl = parseAuthority(entry)
+    if (entryUrl === undefined) return false
+    return canonicalAuthority(entry, entryUrl) === entryUrl.hostname
+      ? entryUrl.hostname === hostUrl.hostname
+      : entryUrl.host === hostUrl.host
+  })
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decide whether one /api request may reach the RPC bridge.
+ * @param request - node HTTP request facts (headers).
+ * @param trustedHosts - non-loopback authorities this deployment serves: exact `host:port`, or port-less `host` matching any port.
+ * @returns true when the Host is ours (loopback or trusted) and any attached browser markers are same-origin.
+ */
+export function isTrustedApiRequest(request: ApiTrustRequest, trustedHosts: readonly string[]): boolean {
+  // Host fence (DNS-rebinding defense), applied to every request: the browser
+  // fills Host from the URL it believes it is talking to, so a rebound page
+  // carries the attacker's domain here even though the socket lands on this
+  // server. There is no marker shortcut — a browser read over plain HTTP
+  // (EventSource, images, navigations) arrives with neither Origin nor
+  // Fetch-Metadata, indistinguishable from curl, and its response is readable
+  // by the rebound page.
+  const host = header(request.headers, 'host')
+  if (host === undefined) return false
+  const hostUrl = parseAuthority(host)
+  if (hostUrl === undefined) return false
+  if (!isLoopbackHostname(hostUrl.hostname) && !isTrustedAuthority(hostUrl, trustedHosts)) return false
+  // Cross-site fence: modern browsers label the initiator relationship on
+  // every fetch; an explicit cross-site marker is refused regardless of Origin.
+  if (header(request.headers, 'sec-fetch-site') === 'cross-site') return false
+  // Origin fence: when a browser attaches an Origin it must be exactly this
+  // authority (compared through the same normalization as the Host). Absent
+  // Origin is fine — the Host fence above already bound the request. The
+  // literal "null" (sandboxed iframes, file: pages) is an opaque origin, refused.
+  const origin = header(request.headers, 'origin')
+  if (origin === undefined) return true
+  try {
+    return new URL(origin).host === hostUrl.host
+  } catch {
+    return false
+  }
+}

packages/client/connection/src/client/api.ts

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 export type {
   ApiProxy, SessionsApi, SessionSummary, HostApi, EventsApi, MuxFrame, HostFrame,
   ApprovalResponsePayload, QuestionResponsePayload, HistoryEntry, ToolEventView,
+  DirectoryEntry, DirectoryListing,
   WorkspaceApi, WorkspaceId, WorkspaceView,
   CommandsApi, CommandDescriptor, SkillsApi, SkillEntry,
   ModelCatalogFailure, ModelCatalogModel, ModelProviderGroup, ModelReasoning,

packages/client/connection/src/client/fixture.ts

@@ -578,6 +578,37 @@ export function createFixtureApi(options: FixtureOptions = {}): ApiProxy {
     updatedAt: fixtureEpoch,
   }]
   let nextWorkspace = 1
+
+  // In-memory browse tree behind the fixture's `browse` picker capability —
+  // deterministic content mirroring the design mock so assembled Web tests
+  // and snapshots can walk it. Leaves are materialized lazily: a child listed
+  // by its parent lists as empty until something is created inside it.
+  const FIXTURE_HOME = '/home/fixture'
+  const directoryTree = new Map<string, string[]>([
+    ['/', ['home']],
+    ['/home', ['fixture']],
+    [FIXTURE_HOME, ['Documents', 'Downloads', '.config']],
+    [`${FIXTURE_HOME}/Documents`, [
+      'project', 'deepseek-iOS', 'deepseek-android', 'deepseek-platform',
+      'deepseek-web', 'deepseek-harness', 'deepseek-app', 'deepseek-landing-blog',
+    ]],
+  ])
+  const childrenOf = (path: string): string[] | undefined => {
+    const known = directoryTree.get(path)
+    if (known !== undefined) return known
+    const parent = path.slice(0, path.lastIndexOf('/')) || '/'
+    const name = path.slice(path.lastIndexOf('/') + 1)
+    return directoryTree.get(parent)?.includes(name) === true ? [] : undefined
+  }
+  const crumbsOf = (path: string): { name: string; path: string; hidden: boolean }[] => {
+    const crumbs = [{ name: '/', path: '/', hidden: false }]
+    let acc = ''
+    for (const segment of path.split('/').filter(Boolean)) {
+      acc += `/${segment}`
+      crumbs.push({ name: segment, path: acc, hidden: false })
+    }
+    return crumbs
+  }
   const mint = (): ReturnType<typeof RpcId> => RpcId(`fx-rpc-${nextRpc++}`)
   /** Resident pending approval (stable rpcId: every mux open replays the same id, matching host replay semantics). */
   const pendingApprovalRpcId = mint()
@@ -983,7 +1014,42 @@ export function createFixtureApi(options: FixtureOptions = {}): ApiProxy {
     },
     host: {
       describe: request => ok(request, { version: '0.0.0-fixture', cwd: '/tmp/fixture', attachedSessions }),
-      pickDirectory: request => ok(request, { path: null }),
+      // Deterministic native pick: the keyless lanes drive the full
+      // pick-then-adopt path without an OS chooser (design-mock content,
+      // same tree the browse primitives serve).
+      pickDirectory: request => ok(request, { path: `${FIXTURE_HOME}/Documents/project` }),
+      listDirectory: (request) => {
+        const target = request.payload.path ?? FIXTURE_HOME
+        const children = childrenOf(target)
+        if (children === undefined) {
+          return err(request, { code: 'directory-unreadable', message: `cannot list ${target}: not in the fixture tree`, details: { path: target } })
+        }
+        return ok(request, {
+          path: target,
+          home: FIXTURE_HOME,
+          crumbs: crumbsOf(target),
+          entries: [...children].sort((a, b) => a.localeCompare(b))
+            .map(name => ({ name, path: target === '/' ? `/${name}` : `${target}/${name}`, hidden: name.startsWith('.') })),
+          // The fixture tree is tiny; no level ever reaches a backend bound.
+          truncated: false,
+        })
+      },
+      createDirectory: (request) => {
+        const parent = request.payload.path
+        const children = childrenOf(parent)
+        if (children === undefined) {
+          return err(request, { code: 'directory-create-failed', message: `missing parent ${parent}`, details: { path: parent } })
+        }
+        // Same root special case as listDirectory's entry paths: a plain join
+        // under '/' would mint '//name' and fork the tree's identity.
+        const target = parent === '/' ? `/${request.payload.name}` : `${parent}/${request.payload.name}`
+        if (children.includes(request.payload.name)) {
+          return err(request, { code: 'directory-exists', message: `${target} already exists`, details: { path: target } })
+        }
+        directoryTree.set(parent, [...children, request.payload.name])
+        directoryTree.set(target, [])
+        return ok(request, { path: target })
+      },
       openPath: request => ok(request, { opened: true as const }),
     },
     workspace: {
@@ -1338,6 +1404,8 @@ export class FixtureApiClient extends AbstractApiClient {
       case 'session.cancel': return this.api.sessions.cancel(request)
       case 'host.describe': return this.api.host.describe(request)
       case 'host.pickDirectory': return this.api.host.pickDirectory(request, new AbortController().signal)
+      case 'host.listDirectory': return this.api.host.listDirectory(request, new AbortController().signal)
+      case 'host.createDirectory': return this.api.host.createDirectory(request)
       case 'host.openPath': return this.api.host.openPath(request, new AbortController().signal)
       case 'workspace.list': return this.api.workspace.list(request)
       case 'workspace.create': return this.api.workspace.create(request)

packages/client/connection/src/client/index.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { WebApiClient } from './web-api-client.ts'
 export type {
   ApiProxy, SessionsApi, SessionSummary, HostApi, EventsApi, MuxFrame, HostFrame,
   ApprovalResponsePayload, QuestionResponsePayload, HistoryEntry, ToolEventView,
+  DirectoryEntry, DirectoryListing,
   ToolCallView, ToolResultView, WorkspaceApi, WorkspaceId, WorkspaceView,
   CommandsApi, CommandDescriptor, SkillsApi, SkillEntry,
   ModelCatalogFailure, ModelCatalogModel, ModelProviderGroup, ModelReasoning,

packages/client/connection/src/index.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
 /** Host HTTP bridge for browser-client RPC. */
 import type { Context } from 'cordis'
+import z from 'schemastery'
 // Activates the httpServer Context merge used below.
 import type { WebRoute } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-host-webserver'
 import { toFetchHandler } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-host-apiproxy'
 import { API_PATH } from './api-path.ts'
 import { bridge } from './http-bridge.ts'
-import { isTrustedNativeDialogRequest } from './native-dialog-request.ts'
+import { assertTrustedAuthority, isTrustedApiRequest } from './api-request-trust.ts'
 
 export { API_PATH } from './api-path.ts'
 
@@ -15,20 +16,42 @@ export const name = 'client-connection'
 /** Services required before mounting the route. */
 export const inject = ['httpServer', 'apiProxy']
 
+/** Plugin config: the deployment's non-loopback serving authorities. */
+export interface ConnectionConfig {
+  /**
+   * Authorities this deployment serves beyond loopback: exact `host:port`, or
+   * port-less `host` matching any port. The /api trust fence refuses any
+   * request whose Host is neither loopback nor listed here, so a
+   * non-loopback (`0.0.0.0`) deployment must declare the names it is reached
+   * by (the dsh CLI derives the machine's LAN IP literals itself). An entry
+   * that is not a bare, canonical authority fails the plugin load.
+   */
+  trustedHosts?: string[]
+}
+
+export const Config: z<ConnectionConfig> = z.object({
+  trustedHosts: z.array(String).default([]),
+})
+
 /**
- * Mounts the API gateway under the browser transport prefix.
+ * Mounts the API gateway under the browser transport prefix. Every request on
+ * the prefix passes the browser-trust fence first (DNS-rebinding and
+ * cross-site defense — [api-request-trust](./api-request-trust.ts)).
  * @param ctx - Host plugin context.
+ * @param config - resolved plugin config (schema defaults applied).
  */
-export function apply(ctx: Context): void {
+export function apply(ctx: Context, config?: ConnectionConfig): void {
+  // The Loader resolves schema defaults; hand-built test contexts may pass none.
+  const trustedHosts = config?.trustedHosts ?? []
+  // Config boundary: a malformed entry fails the load loudly here rather than
+  // silently authorizing its hostname prefix at request time.
+  for (const entry of trustedHosts) assertTrustedAuthority(entry)
   const apiHandler = toFetchHandler(ctx.apiProxy)
   const route: WebRoute = {
     kind: 'prefix',
     path: API_PATH,
     handler: async (req, res) => {
-      const pathname = new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://dsh.internal').pathname
-      if ((pathname === `${API_PATH}/host.pickDirectory`
-        || pathname === `${API_PATH}/host.openPath`)
-        && !isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(req)) {
+      if (!isTrustedApiRequest(req, trustedHosts)) {
         res.writeHead(403)
         res.end('forbidden')
         return

packages/client/connection/src/native-dialog-request.ts

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-/** Trust check for browser requests that can invoke privileged native host actions. */
-
-import type { IncomingHttpHeaders } from 'node:http'
-
-interface NativeDialogRequest {
-  headers: IncomingHttpHeaders
-  socket: { remoteAddress?: string | undefined }
-}
-
-function header(headers: IncomingHttpHeaders, name: string): string | undefined {
-  const value = headers[name]
-  return typeof value === 'string' ? value : undefined
-}
-
-function isLoopback(address: string | undefined): boolean {
-  if (address === undefined) return false
-  if (address === '::1') return true
-  const ipv4 = address.startsWith('::ffff:') ? address.slice('::ffff:'.length) : address
-  const first = ipv4.split('.')[0]
-  return first === '127'
-}
-
-function isLoopbackHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
-  if (hostname === 'localhost' || hostname === '[::1]' || hostname === '::1') return true
-  const parts = hostname.split('.')
-  return parts.length === 4
-    && parts[0] === '127'
-    && parts.every(part => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(part) && Number(part) <= 255)
-}
-
-/**
- * Require a local socket plus browser-controlled same-origin metadata.
- * @param request - the node HTTP request facts used by the carrier guard.
- * @returns true only for a same-origin browser request whose peer and URL are loopback.
- */
-export function isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request: NativeDialogRequest): boolean {
-  if (!isLoopback(request.socket.remoteAddress)) return false
-  if (header(request.headers, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return false
-  const origin = header(request.headers, 'origin')
-  const host = header(request.headers, 'host')
-  if (origin === undefined || host === undefined) return false
-  try {
-    const parsed = new URL(origin)
-    const hostUrl = new URL(`http://${host}`)
-    return (parsed.protocol === 'http:' || parsed.protocol === 'https:')
-      && parsed.host === host
-      && isLoopbackHostname(parsed.hostname)
-      && isLoopbackHostname(hostUrl.hostname)
-  } catch {
-    return false
-  }
-}

packages/client/connection/tests/api-request-trust.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/** Behavior of the /api browser-trust fence (rebinding + cross-site defense). */
+
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
+import { assertTrustedAuthority, isTrustedApiRequest } from '../src/api-request-trust.ts'
+
+function request(headers: Record<string, string | undefined>): { headers: Record<string, string | undefined> } {
+  return { headers }
+}
+
+describe('isTrustedApiRequest', () => {
+  it('holds markerless requests to the same Host fence — a plain-HTTP browser read carries no markers', () => {
+    // Over plain HTTP a browser attaches neither Origin nor Fetch-Metadata to
+    // reads (EventSource, images, navigations), so a rebound-origin GET is
+    // markerless and its response readable: no marker shortcut may exist.
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080' }), [])).toBe(true)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: '192.168.1.5:3080' }), ['192.168.1.5'])).toBe(true)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: '192.168.1.5:3080' }), [])).toBe(false)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'harness.example' }), [])).toBe(false)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({}), [])).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('accepts loopback Hosts in every spelling, with and without ports, for browser requests', () => {
+    for (const host of ['localhost', 'localhost:3080', '127.0.0.1', '127.0.0.1:3080', '127.8.9.10:80', '[::1]', '[::1]:3080', 'LOCALHOST:3080']) {
+      expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host, origin: `http://${host}` }), [])).toBe(true)
+    }
+  })
+
+  it('refuses a rebound Host: the attacker domain names the socket it did not expect', () => {
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({
+      host: 'evil.example:3080',
+      origin: 'http://evil.example:3080',
+      'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
+    }), [])).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('accepts a declared public authority: exact on host:port entries, any port on port-less entries', () => {
+    const headers = { host: 'harness.internal:3080', origin: 'http://harness.internal:3080' }
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request(headers), ['harness.internal:3080'])).toBe(true)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request(headers), ['harness.internal'])).toBe(true)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request(headers), ['harness.internal:9999'])).toBe(false)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request(headers), [])).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('matches Host, Origin, and trusted entries through WHATWG normalization (case, default port)', () => {
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'Harness.INTERNAL:3080', origin: 'http://harness.internal:3080' }), ['harness.internal:3080'])).toBe(true)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'harness.internal', origin: 'http://harness.internal' }), ['HARNESS.internal:80'])).toBe(true)
+    // An unparsable entry never matches; it must not poison the rest of the list.
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'harness.internal', origin: 'http://harness.internal' }), ['bad entry', 'harness.internal'])).toBe(true)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'harness.internal', origin: 'http://harness.internal' }), ['bad entry'])).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('refuses cross-origin browser markers even on a loopback Host', () => {
+    // Origin present and different → cross-site request that survived preflight rules.
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', origin: 'http://evil.example' }), [])).toBe(false)
+    // Explicit cross-site label → refused regardless of Origin.
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' }), [])).toBe(false)
+    // Opaque origin (sandboxed iframe, file: page) parses to no authority.
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', origin: 'null' }), [])).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('accepts a same-origin browser request, with or without an Origin header', () => {
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({
+      host: 'localhost:3080',
+      origin: 'http://localhost:3080',
+      'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
+    }), [])).toBe(true)
+    // Origin-less browser shapes (same-origin GETs) still carry sec-fetch-site.
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'localhost:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' }), [])).toBe(true)
+  })
+
+  it('assertTrustedAuthority accepts bare authorities and throws on anything more', () => {
+    for (const entry of ['harness.internal', 'harness.internal:3080', 'HARNESS.internal:80', '10.0.0.9', '[::1]:3080']) {
+      expect(() => { assertTrustedAuthority(entry) }).not.toThrow()
+    }
+    // WHATWG parsing would quietly read a hostname out of each of these; the
+    // config boundary must refuse them instead of authorizing the prefix.
+    for (const entry of ['harness.internal/path', 'harness.internal/', 'user@harness.internal', 'harness.internal?x', 'harness.internal#f', 'harness.internal\\path', 'bad entry', '']) {
+      expect(() => { assertTrustedAuthority(entry) }).toThrow(/not a bare host\[:port\] authority/)
+    }
+    // WHATWG trimming would silently strip these; the entry must fail instead.
+    for (const entry of ['harness.internal:3080 ', ' harness.internal', 'harness.internal:30\t80']) {
+      expect(() => { assertTrustedAuthority(entry) }).toThrow(/not a bare host\[:port\] authority/)
+    }
+    // WHATWG parsing would silently rewrite these — a dangling colon or
+    // zero-padded port would broaden an intended exact-port grant to every
+    // port, and non-canonical host spellings would not read back as written.
+    for (const entry of ['harness.internal:', '[::1]:', 'harness.internal:0080', '0x7f.0.0.1', '[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]']) {
+      expect(() => { assertTrustedAuthority(entry) }).toThrow(/not a bare host\[:port\] authority/)
+    }
+  })
+
+  it('never lets stray whitespace broaden an exact-port entry to every port', () => {
+    // Defense in depth below the load-time assert: the explicit-port judgment
+    // reads the parsed URL, so a trimmed `host:port ` entry stays exact.
+    const trusted = ['harness.internal:3080 ']
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'harness.internal:9999', origin: 'http://harness.internal:9999' }), trusted)).toBe(false)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ host: 'harness.internal:3080', origin: 'http://harness.internal:3080' }), trusted)).toBe(true)
+  })
+
+  it('refuses malformed or untrusted authorities on browser requests', () => {
+    const markers = { 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' }
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ ...markers }), [])).toBe(false)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ ...markers, host: '' }), [])).toBe(false)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ ...markers, host: 'bad host' }), [])).toBe(false)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ ...markers, host: '127.0.0.999' }), [])).toBe(false)
+    expect(isTrustedApiRequest(request({ ...markers, host: '128.0.0.1' }), [])).toBe(false)
+  })
+})

packages/client/connection/tests/fake-api.ts

@@ -70,6 +70,18 @@ export class FakeApiClient implements IApiClient {
   onOpenPath: (payload: unknown) => Promise<RpcResponse<{ opened: true }>> =
     () => Promise.resolve(ok({ opened: true as const }))
 
+  onListDirectory: (payload: unknown) => Promise<RpcResponse<{
+    path: string
+    home: string
+    crumbs: { name: string; path: string; hidden: boolean }[]
+    entries: { name: string; path: string; hidden: boolean }[]
+    truncated: boolean
+  }>> =
+    () => Promise.resolve(ok({ path: '/home/fake', home: '/home/fake', crumbs: [{ name: '/', path: '/', hidden: false }], entries: [], truncated: false }))
+
+  onCreateDirectory: (payload: unknown) => Promise<RpcResponse<{ path: string }>> =
+    () => Promise.resolve(ok({ path: '/home/fake/new' }))
+
   private readonly muxConns: StreamConn<MuxFrame>[] = []
   private readonly hostConns: StreamConn<HostFrame>[] = []
 
@@ -91,6 +103,8 @@ export class FakeApiClient implements IApiClient {
   readonly host: IApiClient['host'] = {
     describe: payload => this.record('host.describe', payload, this.onDescribe(payload)),
     pickDirectory: payload => this.record('host.pickDirectory', payload, this.onPickDirectory(payload)),
+    listDirectory: payload => this.record('host.listDirectory', payload, this.onListDirectory(payload)),
+    createDirectory: payload => this.record('host.createDirectory', payload, this.onCreateDirectory(payload)),
     openPath: payload => this.record('host.openPath', payload, this.onOpenPath(payload)),
   }
 

packages/client/connection/tests/fixture.spec.ts

@@ -323,6 +323,22 @@ describe('createFixtureApi', () => {
     expect(empty.result).toMatchObject({ ok: true, value: { attachedSessions: 0 } })
   })
 
+  it('createDirectory under the root mints /name whose listing and crumbs share the identity', async () => {
+    const api = createFixtureApi()
+    const created = await api.host.createDirectory(req({ path: '/', name: 'srv' }))
+    if (!created.result.ok) throw new Error('create failed')
+    expect(created.result.value.path).toBe('/srv')
+    const listed = await api.host.listDirectory(req({ path: '/srv' }), new AbortController().signal)
+    if (!listed.result.ok) throw new Error('list failed')
+    expect(listed.result.value.crumbs).toEqual([
+      { name: '/', path: '/', hidden: false },
+      { name: 'srv', path: '/srv', hidden: false },
+    ])
+    const root = await api.host.listDirectory(req({ path: '/' }), new AbortController().signal)
+    if (!root.result.ok) throw new Error('root list failed')
+    expect(root.result.value.entries).toContainEqual({ name: 'srv', path: '/srv', hidden: false })
+  })
+
   it('workspace.list serves the resident account and create reuses on path collision', async () => {
     const api = createFixtureApi()
     const listed = await api.workspace.list(req({}))

packages/client/connection/tests/native-dialog-request.spec.ts

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-import type { IncomingHttpHeaders } from 'node:http'
-import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
-import { isTrustedNativeDialogRequest } from '../src/native-dialog-request.ts'
-
-function request(
-  remoteAddress: string | undefined,
-  headers: IncomingHttpHeaders = {
-    host: '127.0.0.1:3080',
-    origin: 'http://127.0.0.1:3080',
-    'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
-  },
-) {
-  return { socket: { remoteAddress }, headers }
-}
-
-describe('native dialog request trust', () => {
-  it('accepts loopback same-origin browser requests', () => {
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('127.0.0.1'))).toBe(true)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('::1', {
-      host: '[::1]:3080', origin: 'http://[::1]:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
-    }))).toBe(true)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('::ffff:127.0.0.1'))).toBe(true)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('127.0.0.1', {
-      host: 'localhost:3080', origin: 'http://localhost:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
-    }))).toBe(true)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('127.0.0.2', {
-      host: '127.0.0.2:3080', origin: 'https://127.0.0.2:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
-    }))).toBe(true)
-  })
-
-  it('rejects remote sockets and requests without matching browser metadata', () => {
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('192.168.1.5'))).toBe(false)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request(undefined))).toBe(false)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('127.0.0.1', {
-      host: '127.0.0.1:3080', origin: 'http://evil.example', 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site',
-    }))).toBe(false)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('127.0.0.1', {
-      host: '127.0.0.1:3080', origin: 'http://localhost:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
-    }))).toBe(false)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('127.0.0.1', { host: '127.0.0.1:3080' }))).toBe(false)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('127.0.0.1', {
-      origin: 'http://127.0.0.1:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
-    }))).toBe(false)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('127.0.0.1', {
-      host: 'attacker.example:3080', origin: 'http://attacker.example:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
-    }))).toBe(false)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('127.0.0.1', {
-      host: '127.0.0.1:3080', origin: 'ftp://127.0.0.1:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
-    }))).toBe(false)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('127.0.0.1', {
-      host: '127.999.0.1:3080', origin: 'http://127.999.0.1:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
-    }))).toBe(false)
-    expect(isTrustedNativeDialogRequest(request('127.0.0.1', {
-      host: '[invalid', origin: 'http://[invalid', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
-    }))).toBe(false)
-  })
-})

packages/client/connection/tests/node-half.spec.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 /** Node half: registers the /api prefix route bridging to the api gateway. */
+import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events'
+import { Readable } from 'node:stream'
 import { Context } from 'cordis'
 import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
 import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http'
@@ -6,48 +8,113 @@ import type { ApiProxy } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-host-apiproxy/api'
 import type { HttpServerService, WebRoute } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-host-webserver'
 import { API_PATH, apply, inject } from '../src/index.ts'
 
-describe('connection node half', () => {
-  it('registers the /api prefix route and removes it with the fiber', async () => {
-    const ctx = new Context()
-    const routes: WebRoute[] = []
-    // Structural fake: the plugin only touches register(); the service class
-    // carries private state a literal cannot (and need not) reproduce.
-    const httpServer: Pick<HttpServerService, 'register' | 'tapIndex' | 'port'> = {
-      register(route) {
-        routes.push(route)
-        return () => { routes.splice(routes.indexOf(route), 1) }
-      },
-      tapIndex: () => () => {},
-      port: 0,
-    }
-    ctx.provide('httpServer', httpServer as HttpServerService)
-    ctx.provide('apiProxy', {} as unknown as ApiProxy)
+/** Structural httpServer fake: the plugin only touches register(). */
+function fakeHttpServer(routes: WebRoute[]): Pick<HttpServerService, 'register' | 'tapIndex' | 'port'> {
+  return {
+    register(route) {
+      routes.push(route)
+      return () => { routes.splice(routes.indexOf(route), 1) }
+    },
+    tapIndex: () => () => {},
+    port: 0,
+  }
+}
 
-    const fiber = ctx.plugin({ inject: [...inject], apply })
-    await fiber.await()
+/** Bodyless GET carrying the given headers (enough for the trust fence + bridge). */
+function fakeRequest(headers: Record<string, string>): IncomingMessage {
+  const request = Readable.from([]) as unknown as IncomingMessage
+  Object.assign(request, { url: `${API_PATH}/session.list`, method: 'GET', headers })
+  return request
+}
+
+/** Response recorder compatible with both the fence's short-circuit and the bridge. */
+function fakeResponse(): { response: ServerResponse; state: { status?: number; body?: unknown } } {
+  const state: { status?: number; body?: unknown } = {}
+  const response = Object.assign(new EventEmitter(), {
+    writableEnded: false,
+    writeHead(value: number) { state.status = value; return this },
+    write() { return true },
+    end(this: { writableEnded: boolean }, value?: unknown) {
+      if (value !== undefined) state.body = value
+      this.writableEnded = true
+      return this
+    },
+  }) as unknown as ServerResponse
+  return { response, state }
+}
+
+async function mounted(config?: { trustedHosts?: string[] }): Promise<{ routes: WebRoute[]; dispose: () => Promise<void> }> {
+  const ctx = new Context()
+  const routes: WebRoute[] = []
+  ctx.provide('httpServer', fakeHttpServer(routes) as HttpServerService)
+  ctx.provide('apiProxy', {} as unknown as ApiProxy)
+  const fiber = ctx.plugin({ inject: [...inject], apply }, config)
+  await fiber.await()
+  return { routes, dispose: () => fiber.dispose() }
+}
+
+describe('connection node half', () => {
+  it('fails the load on a trustedHosts entry that is not a bare authority', async () => {
+    const routes: WebRoute[] = []
+    const ctx = new Context()
+    ctx.provide('httpServer', fakeHttpServer(routes) as HttpServerService)
+    ctx.provide('apiProxy', {} as unknown as ApiProxy)
+    // The apply throw also escapes cordis as a late rejection — the shape the
+    // boot's installFailLoud is contracted to catch. Capture it so the run
+    // stays clean, same pattern as the webserver bind-failure test.
+    const rejections: unknown[] = []
+    const onUnhandled = (err: unknown): void => { rejections.push(err) }
+    process.on('unhandledRejection', onUnhandled)
+    try {
+      const fiber = ctx.plugin({ inject: [...inject], apply }, { trustedHosts: ['harness.internal/path'] })
+      await expect(fiber.await()).rejects.toThrow(/not a bare host\[:port\] authority/)
+      expect(routes).toHaveLength(0)
+      for (let i = 0; i < 100 && rejections.length === 0; i++) {
+        await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 10))
+      }
+      expect(rejections.map(String).join('\n')).toContain('not a bare host[:port] authority')
+    } finally {
+      process.off('unhandledRejection', onUnhandled)
+    }
+  })
+
+  it('registers the /api prefix route and removes it with the fiber', async () => {
+    const { routes, dispose } = await mounted()
     expect(routes).toHaveLength(1)
     expect(routes[0]).toMatchObject({ kind: 'prefix', path: API_PATH })
-
-    for (const url of ['/api/host.pickDirectory', '/api/host.openPath']) {
-      let status: number | undefined
-      let body: unknown
-      const deniedRequest = {
-        url,
-        headers: {
-          host: 'harness.example', origin: 'http://harness.example', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
-        },
-        socket: { remoteAddress: '192.168.1.8' },
-      } as unknown as IncomingMessage
-      const deniedResponse = {
-        writeHead(value: number) { status = value; return this },
-        end(value?: unknown) { body = value; return this },
-      } as unknown as ServerResponse
-      await routes[0]!.handler(deniedRequest, deniedResponse)
-      expect(status).toBe(403)
-      expect(body).toBe('forbidden')
-    }
-
-    await fiber.dispose()
+    await dispose()
     expect(routes).toHaveLength(0)
   })
+
+  it('refuses an untrusted Host on any /api path before the bridge runs', async () => {
+    const { routes, dispose } = await mounted()
+    const { response, state } = fakeResponse()
+    await routes[0]!.handler(fakeRequest({
+      host: 'harness.example', origin: 'http://harness.example', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
+    }), response)
+    expect(state.status).toBe(403)
+    expect(state.body).toBe('forbidden')
+    await dispose()
+  })
+
+  it('passes loopback and declared-authority requests through to the bridge', async () => {
+    const { routes, dispose } = await mounted({ trustedHosts: ['harness.example:3080', '192.168.1.5'] })
+    // Loopback, no browser markers (curl shape): the fence passes; the carrier
+    // answers 404 for a GET unary path — proof the bridge ran.
+    const loopback = fakeResponse()
+    await routes[0]!.handler(fakeRequest({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080' }), loopback.response)
+    expect(loopback.state.status).toBe(404)
+    // LAN authority declared as a port-less IP literal — the shape the CLI
+    // derives for `--host 0.0.0.0` — passes markerless curl on any port.
+    const lan = fakeResponse()
+    await routes[0]!.handler(fakeRequest({ host: '192.168.1.5:3080' }), lan.response)
+    expect(lan.state.status).toBe(404)
+    // Declared public authority, same-origin browser shape.
+    const declared = fakeResponse()
+    await routes[0]!.handler(fakeRequest({
+      host: 'harness.example:3080', origin: 'http://harness.example:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
+    }), declared.response)
+    expect(declared.state.status).toBe(404)
+    await dispose()
+  })
 })