Merge origin/master into codex/send-one-turn
# Conflicts: # docs/cordis-catalog/events.md # docs/event-producer-consumer.md # docs/persistence-catalog.md # packages/core/agent-loop/src/loop.ts # packages/core/agent/README.md # website/zh-CN/api/harness/events.md
This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ The harness needs one internal language for messages that the loop, session log,
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Own the vocabulary: messages are arrays of typed content blocks (`text`, `reasoning`, `tool-call`, `tool-result`), with the union derived from the merge-extensible `ContentBlockMap` so plugins add block types via declaration merging. The same merge-extensible-map pattern types every "stringly" field (`MessageSource`, `FinishReason`, `TurnTrigger`, `TurnEndReason`). Streaming is a raw chunk protocol; `BlockAssembler` is the single shared assembly implementation. Adapters translate to provider wire formats — mapping cost lives in adapters, where it belongs.
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In-session context injection (`context/message`, `steering/message`) renders as tagged user-role envelopes (the system-reminder pattern) rather than a new role, so adapters carry zero burden. Live-adapter validation confirms this rendering for current DeepSeek behavior; a future provider-specific mismatch belongs in that adapter rather than a new canonical role.
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In-session context injection (`context/message`) and mid-turn steering (`steering/message`) originally rendered as tagged user-role envelopes (the system-reminder pattern) rather than a new role, so adapters carry zero burden. Both now project as plain user content with no wrapper; see [the injected-content-envelope Agent Note](../simplification/2026-07-20-unwrap-injected-content-envelopes.md). Live-adapter validation confirms this rendering for current DeepSeek behavior; a future provider-specific mismatch belongs in that adapter rather than a new canonical role.
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## Alternatives considered
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@@ -68,3 +68,5 @@ Every surface-eligible event must carry `surfaceOp` or it would disappear from d
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- **`packages/session-persistence/session-persistence`**: Abstract interface unchanged.
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The surface is the foundation for future history manipulation. A compaction or tool-result-prune plugin appends one of the existing message-producing event types (a `user/message` carrying the summary, say) with `surfaceOp: { op: 'replace', start, end }` and `sourceEventSeqs` covering the shadowed entries — the new event takes the range's place on the surface while the plugin's own trace events (e.g. `compaction/start`, `compaction/end`) stay off it. Replay preserves the decision deterministically.
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A `tool/result` replacement may rewrite exactly one current `tool/result` and must preserve every data field except `content`. Session acceptance enforces this rule together with positional range and provenance validation, independent of optional diagnostic plugins.
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@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
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# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
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# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
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2026-07-10-after-call-compaction-pressure-and-overflow-recovery.md: f1a1868cd00007fb24efb21779dcc94c098b54e2
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2026-07-10-after-call-compaction-pressure-and-overflow-recovery.zh.md: a4993de2830301610bb2a9b0d28e8bbdf0ed9c46
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2026-07-10-after-call-compaction-pressure-and-overflow-recovery.md: d470cceaff68229b3872d0ade93d5fabc2e10c3f
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2026-07-10-after-call-compaction-pressure-and-overflow-recovery.zh.md: b7753fb226638b16b0f244b681cd2b9bcc9f25c2
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@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ Successful calls are not the only pressure signal. A provider can reject a reque
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`agent/pre-step` is narrowed to `(agent, turn, step, signal)`. It remains a generic serial checkpoint before `step/start`, but it carries no compaction-only prompt or prefix fields.
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The loop fires awaited serial `agent/post-step(agent, turn, step, signal)` after assistant output, every dispatched or synthetic tool result, post-tool context, and steering are durable, but before `step/end`. This placement gives pressure policy the complete successful-call state without splitting an assistant tool call from its result. A listener failure is an ordinary turn failure; it never enters model-request recovery.
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The loop fires awaited serial `agent/post-step(agent, turn, step, signal)` after assistant output, every dispatched or synthetic tool result, post-tool context, and steering are durable, but before `step/end`. This placement gives pressure policy the complete successful-call state without splitting an assistant tool call from its result. A propagated listener failure is an ordinary turn failure; it never enters model-request recovery. Compact-basic contains its expected operational failures as described below.
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`dsh-compact-basic` reads the exact latest routed model from the durable request header only to establish that a completed route exists, then asks the singleton `ctx.tokenMeter` to measure the canonical logged envelope and current surface. It does not fall back to `AgentOptions.model` for automatic pressure. A headerless session has no completed routed request to assess and produces no work; any durable non-empty model name uses the same estimator. Operational measurement or summarization failures warn and continue with full history.
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`dsh-compact-basic` reads the exact latest routed model from the durable request header only to establish that a completed route exists, then asks the singleton `ctx.tokenMeter` to measure the canonical logged envelope and current surface. It does not fall back to `AgentOptions.model` for automatic pressure. A headerless session has no completed routed request to assess and produces no work; any durable non-empty model name uses the same estimator. Operational measurement or summarization failures warn and continue from the latest durable surface: full history before any replacement, or the pruned surface if pruning already landed.
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### Request recovery is limited to the final model boundary
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@@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ If cancellation lands after assistant tool calls are durable but before all call
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`CompactService.compactIfNeeded(agent, trigger, signal)` accepts `trigger: 'pressure' | 'context-overflow'`. The interface gains no estimation methods or token types; `ctx.tokenMeter` remains the reusable accounting owner.
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For `pressure`, compact-basic applies the service-wide threshold and retained-tail policy to one unified `ctx.tokenMeter.measure()` result. The same singleton meter owns range pricing, provenance, shadowed token counts, and non-shrinking-summary rejection. The common defaults remain threshold ratio `0.8`, retained history `floor(contextWindow × 0.16)`, summarization provider/model `''`, `maxTokens: 8192`, `compactionRetries: 1`, and `auto: true`.
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For `pressure`, compact-basic applies the service-wide threshold and retained-tail policy to one unified `ctx.tokenMeter.measure()` result. Below pressure it returns without pruning. Once pressure qualifies, optional `ctx.toolResultPrune` rewrites oversized current results and compact-basic remeasures through the same meter; safe pressure skips the model call, while remaining pressure selects and summarizes from the pruned surface. The same singleton meter owns range pricing, provenance, shadowed token counts, and non-shrinking-summary rejection. The common defaults remain threshold ratio `0.8`, retained history `floor(contextWindow × 0.16)`, summarization provider/model `''`, `maxTokens: 8192`, `compactionRetries: 1`, and `auto: true`.
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For canonical overflow, compact-basic bypasses scalar pressure and the normal retained-token budget. It chooses the maximal tool-balanced head range while leaving the newest indivisible unit, then attempts exactly one shrinking compaction under the same signal. The automatic listener snapshots `session.surface.replaceGeneration` and returns `{ action: 'retry' }` only when compaction succeeds and the generation increases. A backend returning a result without replacement cannot authorize retry.
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For canonical overflow, compact-basic bypasses scalar pressure and the normal retained-token budget. It prunes first, then chooses the maximal tool-balanced head range while leaving the newest indivisible unit and attempts one shrinking summary compaction under the same signal when a range exists. The automatic listener snapshots `session.surface.replaceGeneration` and returns `{ action: 'retry' }` whenever pruning or summarization increases it. This remains true when pruning lands before later summary work throws; cancellation still wins. A backend returning a result without replacement cannot authorize retry, while pruning-only progress can authorize a retry without a `CompactionResult`.
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`maxOverflowRetries` is optional and defaults to `1`; `0` disables overflow recovery without disabling pressure. `auto: false` registers neither automatic listener. Noncanonical errors, exhausted attempts, an already-aborted signal, a missing routed model, no safe range, no generation change, and recovery throws all delegate to the next listener. With no later recovery, the loop reports the original provider error object and code. Cancellation or disposal remains authoritative even if recovery work completes concurrently.
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`maxOverflowRetries` is optional and defaults to `1`; `0` disables overflow recovery without disabling pressure. `auto: false` registers neither automatic listener. Noncanonical errors, exhausted attempts, an already-aborted signal, a missing routed model, no safe range, no generation change, and recovery throws before any replacement all delegate to the next listener. With no later recovery, the loop reports the original provider error object and code. A recovery throw after generation advances authorizes retry from durable progress; cancellation or disposal remains authoritative even if recovery work completes concurrently.
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The default summarizer resolves explicit configuration, then the latest logged route, then agent options. Because direct `llm/stream` middleware may reroute that auxiliary call, `compact/summary.{provider, model}` records the final mutable `GenerateOptions` target observed after dispatch rather than the pre-waterfall candidate.
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## Testing
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Unit tests cover final-adapter failure provenance and identity, closed-step retry numbering and reset, cancellation and disposal, post-step ordering, routed-envelope pressure, balanced overflow reduction, generation proof, caps, delegation, and auxiliary-call routing. Real-loop tests cover thrown and in-band overflow through compaction to a reconstructed retry request.
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Unit tests cover final-adapter failure provenance and identity, closed-step retry numbering and reset, cancellation and disposal, post-step ordering, routed-envelope pressure, pressure-gated pruning, pruning-only relief, pruned-input summarization, balanced overflow reduction, durable prune progress before later failure, generation proof, caps, delegation, and auxiliary-call routing. Real-loop tests cover thrown and in-band overflow through pruning or summary compaction to a reconstructed retry request.
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## Alternatives considered
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@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ Unit tests cover final-adapter failure provenance and identity, closed-step retr
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## Consequences
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Post-step pressure describes the completed routed request, including durable tool results and request-only prefix fields. Canonical overflow supplies the backstop when no successful usage anchor exists. Recovery is bounded, cancellation-owned, and monotonic: it retries only after a visible surface generation change.
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Post-step pressure describes the completed routed request, including durable tool results and request-only prefix fields. Optional model-free pruning removes predictable tool-output bulk before summary selection and can independently create retry-worthy progress. Canonical overflow supplies the backstop when no successful usage anchor exists. Recovery is bounded, cancellation-owned, and monotonic: it retries only after a visible surface generation change.
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The cost is one additional serial checkpoint on successful steps and adapter-maintained overflow classification. Provider wording and heuristic character density remain maintenance risks. Surface compaction still cannot repair an envelope that alone exceeds the window or split one indivisible oversized message/tool unit.
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The cost is one additional serial checkpoint on successful steps and adapter-maintained overflow classification. Provider wording and heuristic character density remain maintenance risks. Surface compaction still cannot repair an envelope that alone exceeds the window, split an indivisible non-tool node, or repair a tool unit whose non-prunable remainder remains oversized. The optional pruner can repair an otherwise indivisible tool pair when removable text-bearing tool-result content is the bulk.
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This Agent Note supersedes only the pre-step automatic-trigger portion of the [compaction capability-seam Agent Note](../feature/2026-06-18-compaction-capability-seam.md). The service split, standalone token meter, balanced range contract, log-recorded lock, summary replacement, and sole `summarize()` subclass hook remain unchanged.
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@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ Status: implemented
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`agent/pre-step` 收窄为 `(agent, turn, step, signal)`。它仍是 `step/start` 之前的通用串行检查点，但不再携带压缩专用的提示词或前缀字段。
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循环在 assistant 输出、所有已分发或合成的工具结果、工具后上下文与 steering 都持久化之后、`step/end` 之前，触发等待式串行 `agent/post-step(agent, turn, step, signal)`。该位置让压力策略看到完整的成功调用状态，同时不会拆开 assistant 工具调用与其结果。监听器失败属于普通 turn 失败，绝不会进入模型请求恢复。
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循环在 assistant 输出、所有已分发或合成的工具结果、工具后上下文与 steering 都持久化之后、`step/end` 之前，触发等待式串行 `agent/post-step(agent, turn, step, signal)`。该位置让压力策略看到完整的成功调用状态，同时不会拆开 assistant 工具调用与其结果。向外传播的监听器失败属于普通 turn 失败，绝不会进入模型请求恢复；compact-basic 会按下文所述在内部处理其预期的操作性失败。
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`dsh-compact-basic` 从持久请求头读取精确的最新实际路由模型，只用它确认已经存在完整路由，随后让单例 `ctx.tokenMeter` 计量规范日志信封与当前表层。自动压力不会回退到 `AgentOptions.model`。没有请求头的会话尚无已完成路由请求可供判断，因此不执行工作；任意持久记录的非空模型名都使用同一个估算器。操作性的计量或摘要失败会发出警告，并继续使用完整历史。
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`dsh-compact-basic` 从持久请求头读取精确的最新实际路由模型，只用它确认已经存在完整路由，随后让单例 `ctx.tokenMeter` 计量规范日志信封与当前表层。自动压力不会回退到 `AgentOptions.model`。没有请求头的会话尚无已完成路由请求可供判断，因此不执行工作；任意持久记录的非空模型名都使用同一个估算器。操作性的计量或摘要失败会发出警告，并从最新持久表层继续：任何替换发生前使用完整历史；若剪枝已经落盘，则使用已剪枝表层。
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### 请求恢复只覆盖最终模型边界
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@@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ Status: implemented
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`CompactService.compactIfNeeded(agent, trigger, signal)` 接收 `trigger: 'pressure' | 'context-overflow'`。接口不增加估算方法或 token 类型；`ctx.tokenMeter` 继续作为可复用的核算所有者。
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对于 `pressure`，compact-basic 把服务级阈值与保留尾部策略应用到一次统一的 `ctx.tokenMeter.measure()` 结果。范围定价、来源、被遮蔽 token 数与非缩小摘要拒绝也由同一个单例 meter 完成。通用默认值保持为阈值比例 `0.8`、保留历史 `floor(contextWindow × 0.16)`、摘要提供方/模型 `''`、`maxTokens: 8192`、`compactionRetries: 1` 与 `auto: true`。
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对于 `pressure`，compact-basic 把服务级阈值与保留尾部策略应用到一次统一的 `ctx.tokenMeter.measure()` 结果。低于压力时直接返回，不执行剪枝。压力达到条件后，可选的 `ctx.toolResultPrune` 会改写当前表层中过大的工具结果，compact-basic 再通过同一个 meter 重新计量；若压力恢复安全则跳过模型调用，否则从已剪枝表层选择范围并生成摘要。范围定价、来源、被遮蔽 token 数与非缩小摘要拒绝也由同一个单例 meter 完成。通用默认值保持为阈值比例 `0.8`、保留历史 `floor(contextWindow × 0.16)`、摘要提供方/模型 `''`、`maxTokens: 8192`、`compactionRetries: 1` 与 `auto: true`。
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对于规范化溢出，compact-basic 绕过标量压力与普通保留 token 预算。它在保留最新不可分割单元的同时，选择最大的工具配对平衡头部范围，并在同一 signal 下只尝试一次缩小压缩。自动监听器先记录 `session.surface.replaceGeneration`，只有压缩成功且 generation 增加时才返回 `{ action: 'retry' }`。后端若只返回结果但没有替换表层，不能授权重试。
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对于规范化溢出，compact-basic 绕过标量压力与普通保留 token 预算。它先执行剪枝，再在保留最新不可分割单元的同时选择最大的工具配对平衡头部范围；存在范围时，才在同一 signal 下尝试一次缩小摘要压缩。自动监听器先记录 `session.surface.replaceGeneration`，剪枝或摘要让 generation 增加时就返回 `{ action: 'retry' }`。即使剪枝先落盘而后续摘要工作抛错，这条规则仍然成立；取消依然优先。后端若只返回结果但没有替换表层，不能授权重试；只有剪枝取得进展时，即使没有 `CompactionResult` 也可以授权重试。
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`maxOverflowRetries` 可选且默认为 `1`；`0` 只禁用溢出恢复，不会禁用压力检查。`auto: false` 不注册任何自动监听器。非规范化错误、尝试耗尽、已经中止的 signal、缺失路由模型、没有安全范围、generation 未变化，以及恢复抛错都会委托给下一个监听器。若没有后续恢复，循环报告原始提供方错误对象与代码。即使恢复工作并发完成，取消或销毁仍具有最终优先级。
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`maxOverflowRetries` 可选且默认为 `1`；`0` 只禁用溢出恢复，不会禁用压力检查。`auto: false` 不注册任何自动监听器。非规范化错误、尝试耗尽、已经中止的 signal、缺失路由模型、没有安全范围、generation 未变化，以及在任何替换之前恢复抛错，都会委托给下一个监听器。若没有后续恢复，循环报告原始提供方错误对象与代码。generation 增加后的恢复抛错会基于持久进展授权重试；即使恢复工作并发完成，取消或销毁仍具有最终优先级。
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默认摘要器依次解析显式配置、最近记录的路由与 agent options。因为直接 `llm/stream` 中间件可以重新路由该辅助调用，`compact/summary.{provider, model}` 记录分发后最终可变的 `GenerateOptions` 目标，而不是 waterfall 之前的候选值。
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## 测试
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单元测试覆盖最终适配器失败的来源与身份、已关闭 step 的重试编号与重置、取消与销毁、post-step 顺序、已路由信封压力、平衡溢出缩减、generation 证明、上限、委托与辅助调用路由。真实循环测试覆盖抛出式和带内溢出，并验证压缩后的重试请求从替换表层重建。
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单元测试覆盖最终适配器失败的来源与身份、已关闭 step 的重试编号与重置、取消与销毁、post-step 顺序、已路由信封压力、压力门控剪枝、剪枝独立解除压力、从已剪枝输入生成摘要、平衡溢出缩减、后续失败前已落盘的剪枝进展、generation 证明、上限、委托与辅助调用路由。真实循环测试覆盖抛出式和带内溢出，并验证剪枝或摘要压缩后的重试请求从替换表层重建。
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## 考虑过的替代方案
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@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ Status: implemented
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## 后果
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Post-step 压力描述已完成的路由请求，包括持久工具结果与仅请求前缀字段。当成功 usage 锚点不存在时，规范化溢出提供兜底路径。恢复有明确上限、以取消为准，并保持单调：只有模型可见的表层 generation 变化后才重试。
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Post-step 压力描述已完成的路由请求，包括持久工具结果与仅请求前缀字段。可选的无模型剪枝会在选择摘要前移除可预测的工具输出体积，也能独立产生足以重试的进展。当成功 usage 锚点不存在时，规范化溢出提供兜底路径。恢复有明确上限、以取消为准，并保持单调：只有模型可见的表层 generation 变化后才重试。
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代价是成功 step 增加一个串行检查点，并需要适配器持续维护溢出分类。提供方措辞与启发式字符密度仍是维护风险。表层压缩依然无法修复仅信封本身就超出窗口的情况，也不能拆分单个不可分割的超大消息或工具单元。
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代价是成功 step 增加一个串行检查点，并需要适配器持续维护溢出分类。提供方措辞与启发式字符密度仍是维护风险。表层压缩依然无法修复仅信封本身就超出窗口的情况，也不能拆分不可分割的非工具节点，或修复非可剪枝剩余部分仍然过大的工具单元。若可移除的文本工具结果是主要体积，可选剪枝器仍可修复原本不可分割的工具配对。
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本 Agent Note 只取代[压缩能力接缝 Agent Note](../feature/2026-06-18-compaction-capability-seam.md) 中的 pre-step 自动触发部分。服务拆分、独立 token meter、平衡范围契约、日志记录锁、摘要替换与唯一 `summarize()` 子类 hook 均保持不变。
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@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ Per the [capability-seams Agent Note](../architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seam
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1. **Interface** — `@deepseek-ai/dsh-compact`: an abstract `CompactService` owning the `ctx.compact` key, the `CompactionResult` vocabulary, and the `compact/*` session events. It declares `compactIfNeeded()` and `compactRegion()` as **abstract** — the contract states *what* compaction does, not *how*.
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2. **Implementation** — `@deepseek-ai/dsh-compact-basic`: a concrete `BasicCompactService` that consumes `ctx.tokenMeter` and owns the tail→head retention walk, summarization via `ctx.llm.stream()`, the surface replacement, the lock, post-step pressure, and canonical context-overflow recovery. `summarize()` is its sole subclass hook; pricing and replay stay with the meter.
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3. **Consumer** — deferred. A `/compact` tool and slash command will `inject: ['compact']` and call the contract; they are intentionally out of scope here so the seam settles first.
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3. **Model-free companion** — `@deepseek-ai/dsh-compact-tool-result-prune`: a concrete optional service that rewrites oversized current `tool/result` nodes before the backend selects a summary range. It is not a second compaction implementation and does not implement `CompactService`.
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4. **Consumer** — deferred. A `/compact` tool and slash command will `inject: ['compact']` and call the contract; they are intentionally out of scope here so the seam settles first.
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### The contract depends on `dsh-session` and `dsh-llm` — a deliberate deviation
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@@ -34,9 +35,9 @@ An earlier draft put the full algorithm (the retention walk, token-summing, text
|
||||
|
||||
### Automatic pressure runs after successful durable step work
|
||||
|
||||
Successful-call pressure cannot run at pre-step because final `agent/request` routing, provider output, tool results, buffered context, and steering do not exist there. Serial `agent/post-step(agent, turn, step, signal)` fires after those facts are durable and before `step/end`. `dsh-compact-basic` measures the canonical logged request through `ctx.tokenMeter`, so the next request sees any replacement without a speculative envelope override.
|
||||
Successful-call pressure cannot run at pre-step because final `agent/request` routing, provider output, tool results, buffered context, and steering do not exist there. Serial `agent/post-step(agent, turn, step, signal)` fires after those facts are durable and before `step/end`. `dsh-compact-basic` measures the canonical logged request through `ctx.tokenMeter`, so the next request sees any replacement without a speculative envelope override. Once pressure qualifies, optional `ctx.toolResultPrune` rewriting runs before summary selection; compact-basic remeasures the durable surface and skips summarization if pruning restores safe pressure.
|
||||
|
||||
Canonical provider context overflow takes a separate path. The failed step closes, `agent/request-error` receives the original request error and consecutive retry count, and compact-basic forces one useful balanced reduction. It returns retry only if `session.surface.replaceGeneration` increases; the loop then opens a new numbered step and reconstructs its request from the durable log. No range, no replacement, recovery failure, cancellation, an exhausted cap, or an unrelated error preserves the original provider failure. The complete lifecycle decision is in the [after-call recovery Agent Note](../architecture/2026-07-10-after-call-compaction-pressure-and-overflow-recovery.md).
|
||||
Canonical provider context overflow takes a separate path. The failed step closes, `agent/request-error` receives the original request error and consecutive retry count, and compact-basic prunes before forcing one useful balanced reduction. It returns retry only if `session.surface.replaceGeneration` increases, including pruning-only progress when no summary range exists; the loop then opens a new numbered step and reconstructs its request from the durable log. No replacement, a recovery failure before any replacement, cancellation, an exhausted cap, or an unrelated error preserves the original provider failure. If pruning already advanced the generation before later summary work fails, recovery retries from that durable pruned surface unless cancellation or disposal wins. The complete lifecycle decision is in the [after-call recovery Agent Note](../architecture/2026-07-10-after-call-compaction-pressure-and-overflow-recovery.md).
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
assistant/message → tool/result/context/steering
|
||||
@@ -56,7 +57,7 @@ Auto-compaction checks after **every successful** step, not once per turn. This
|
||||
|
||||
A runaway turn thus compacts exactly like any other history: its early *closed* steps get summarized while its recent steps stay verbatim. When the only compactable content left is an un-splittable open tail step (its tool-calls have no results yet), compaction declines (`null`) and retries once that step closes.
|
||||
|
||||
**Single-unit overflow is out of scope, by design.** If a single retained unit — one closed step, or a large free entry such as a pasted `user/message` — *alone* exceeds the budget, compaction cannot help and the next model call may go out over-budget. Bounding an individual unit's size is a separate concern (output truncation), handled elsewhere; compaction makes no promise about it, and the harness without such a mechanism can still break on a single oversized unit. This is named honestly rather than papered over.
|
||||
**Some single-unit overflow remains out of scope.** Summary range selection cannot split an indivisible unit. The optional pruner can repair a closed tool pair when removable text-bearing tool-result content is the bulk and the pruned remainder fits. Envelope-only pressure, an oversized indivisible non-tool node such as a pasted `user/message`, and a tool unit whose non-prunable remainder is still oversized remain outside compaction; bounding those units is a separate concern.
|
||||
|
||||
### Head-anchoring: one auto checkpoint, always at the head
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -94,8 +95,8 @@ The `compact/start … compact/end` bracket is justified, in order of what now d
|
||||
|
||||
Two failure paths, both documented:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Crash** (the loop dies mid-summarization): a dangling `compact/start`, no closer. Because `compact/*` are **log-only**, the orphan is **inert** — the surface replacement never landed, so the full, uncompacted history derives correctly. Generic turn-repair (`interruptedTurnClosers`) closes the turn with a synthetic `turn/end`; the orphan sits *before* that `turn/end`, so the turn-scoped in-progress check never sees it and a crash cannot wedge future compaction.
|
||||
- **Recoverable** (summarization throws but the loop survives): the backend appends `compact/end` with its **`error`** field set and leaves the surface untouched. Post-step pressure warns and continues; overflow recovery delegates so the original provider error remains authoritative.
|
||||
- **Crash** (the loop dies mid-summarization): a dangling `compact/start`, no closer. Because `compact/*` are **log-only**, the orphan is **inert** — no summary replacement lands. The derived surface remains the durable surface present at `compact/start`: full history when pruning made no replacement, or the already-pruned history when it did. Generic turn-repair (`interruptedTurnClosers`) closes the turn with a synthetic `turn/end`; the orphan sits *before* that `turn/end`, so the turn-scoped in-progress check never sees it and a crash cannot wedge future compaction.
|
||||
- **Recoverable** (summarization throws but the loop survives): the backend appends `compact/end` with its **`error`** field set and lands no summary replacement. Post-step pressure warns and continues from the latest durable surface — full history if no replacement preceded the attempt, or the pruned surface if pruning already landed. Overflow recovery delegates only before any replacement; generation progress from earlier pruning authorizes a retry from that durable surface unless cancellation or disposal wins.
|
||||
|
||||
`compact/end` keeps its `error?` field (mirroring `tool/result`'s self-contained error — one event tells success from failure without correlating a sibling). There is no separate `compact/error` event.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -110,16 +111,16 @@ Two failure paths, both documented:
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
- **Packages**: `packages/compact/compact` supplies the interface and `compact-basic` supplies the backend. `packages/llm/token-meter` owns replay-aware measurement independently. The consumer tier is deferred.
|
||||
- **Packages**: `packages/compact/compact` supplies the interface, `compact-basic` supplies the backend, and `compact-tool-result-prune` supplies optional deterministic rewriting. `packages/llm/token-meter` owns replay-aware measurement independently. The consumer tier is deferred.
|
||||
- **Automatic seams**: `agent/post-step` (`@mode serial`) handles successful-call pressure and `agent/request-error` (`@mode waterfall`) handles final request failures after the failed step closes. Generic `agent/pre-step` remains a four-argument checkpoint with no compaction-only prompt/prefix payload.
|
||||
- **`SessionEventMap`** gains `compact/start` / `compact/summary` / `compact/end` by declaration merging (merge-extensible); `SurfaceEventType` is **not** touched. These are session events, not cordis `Events`, so the event-taxonomy gate needs no entry.
|
||||
- **`dsh-compact`** owns `toolPairingBalancedBefore(session, seq)` and `toolPairingBalancedAfter(session, seq)`, the cached surface-edge checks that `compactRegion` and `compactIfNeeded` use to avoid splitting a tool-call/result pair. The cache validates current membership by seq and answers both edges from one per-cut balance sequence; stale or missing seqs and orphan results reject. `dsh-session` continues to own the surface `replace` operation, ordered event sequences, and rewrite generation.
|
||||
- **`dsh-invariants`** drops its `surface replace: start must be <= end` assertion: a head-anchored compaction lands a high-seq replacement entry at an older range's *position*, so `start > end` numerically is normal and valid (the range is positional, validated by the surface's `indexOf` checks that remain). The turn-enclosure invariant is reused unchanged.
|
||||
- **Wiring**: `examples/repl-agent/cordis.yml` loads zero-config `dsh-token-meter` before `dsh-compact-basic`; the service-wide window and compact defaults make the pair usable without repeated numeric policy.
|
||||
- **`dsh-compact`** owns `toolPairingBalancedBefore(session, seq)` and `toolPairingBalancedAfter(session, seq)`, the cached surface-edge checks that `compactRegion` and `compactIfNeeded` use to avoid splitting a tool-call/result pair. The cache validates current membership by seq and answers both edges from one per-cut balance sequence; stale or missing seqs and orphan results reject.
|
||||
- **`dsh-session`** validates positional replacement, complete provenance, and content-only single-node `tool/result` rewrites through its one surface manager. `dsh-invariants` treats fresh appended tool results as executions that require an open step and pending call; validated replacements remain turn-enclosed rewrites.
|
||||
- **Wiring**: `examples/repl-agent/cordis.yml` loads zero-config `dsh-token-meter`, `dsh-compact-tool-result-prune`, then `dsh-compact-basic`; service-wide defaults make the composition usable without repeated numeric policy.
|
||||
|
||||
## Testing
|
||||
|
||||
- **Unit:** Real Loader and invariant plugins cover whole-unit retention, convergence failure, both `compact/end` outcomes, head anchoring, open-tail refusal, inert crash orphans, forced below-threshold overflow, generation proof, caps, and original-error preservation.
|
||||
- **Unit:** Real Loader and invariant plugins cover whole-unit retention, pruning configuration and replay, rich-block ordering, metadata preservation, convergence, both `compact/end` outcomes, open-tail refusal, pruning-only and summarized overflow recovery, generation proof, caps, and original-error preservation.
|
||||
- **Loop:** Tests pin post-step after durable tool results and before `step/end`, actual `agent/request` routing, closed failed steps, fresh retry numbering, and complete thrown/in-band overflow → compaction → reconstructed retry composition.
|
||||
- **With-key e2e:** A real model and bash session with lowered limits triggers compaction, records a complete `compact/start…end` pair, shrinks the surface, and finishes the task.
|
||||
- **Snapshot gap:** Runaway-turn compaction cannot yet replay because the summarization call records no `assistant/chunk` events or `sessionId`; interleaved summarization-call replay remains follow-up work.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ After a successful first-party `read`, `write`, or `edit` call, the `tools/post-
|
||||
|
||||
A content edit appends `Updated instructions from: <path>`, states that the new content replaces the previous content, and includes the complete current file. If precedence changes from one candidate to another, the message also names the previous path and says it no longer applies. If no candidate remains, the plugin appends `Instructions removed: <path>` and states that the previously loaded instructions no longer apply.
|
||||
|
||||
Dynamic messages use a raw `context/message` envelope because the plugin owns the complete system-reminder framing. Core context injection therefore supports `envelope: 'raw'`; callers that omit it retain the canonical `<context source="...">` wrapper. `context/message.meta` carries opaque JSON state that is persisted but never rendered to the model.
|
||||
Dynamic messages carry their complete system-reminder framing in `content`, and every `context/message` reaches the model verbatim as a user-role message (there is no core wrapper to opt out of). `context/message.meta` carries opaque JSON state that is persisted but never rendered to the model.
|
||||
|
||||
Shell commands are not discovery triggers. Local bash calls start fresh shells, and inferring reached paths from arbitrary command strings would require shell semantics the prompt plugin does not own.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ There is intentionally no watcher. Detection occurs at the next successful struc
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
Workspace guidance is isolated per session and shared by both product front doors and every tool presentation mode. Initial instructions benefit from stable prefix caching, while nested and changed content remains durable and replayable. The generic session/agent context contract includes optional raw framing and JSON metadata, both propagated through prompt-submit and post-tool `additionalContexts` arrays without flattening entries.
|
||||
Workspace guidance is isolated per session and shared by both product front doors and every tool presentation mode. Initial instructions benefit from stable prefix caching, while nested and changed content remains durable and replayable. The generic session/agent context contract carries JSON metadata propagated through prompt-submit and post-tool `additionalContexts` arrays without flattening entries.
|
||||
|
||||
Repository text remains untrusted input. Lower-authority user-role framing, explicit precedence language, delimiter escaping, and symlink rejection reduce risk but do not eliminate prompt injection. Permission and sandbox layers treat workspace files as data rather than authority.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ The canonical surface separates transformable policy, around-dispatch control, a
|
||||
- `agent/session-start(agent, source)` — emit, once before turn 1, carrying a `SessionStartSource` (`startup` for a fresh/forked create, `resume` for a reloaded persisted session; `clear`/`compact` reserved). A pure notification — it CANNOT block startup (a deliberate gap: a bridge logs/injects, it does not gate startup). A listener seeds context via `agent.inject()`.
|
||||
- `agent/prompt-submit(agent, content, source, next) → PromptDecision` — waterfall, fired for the turn's single claimed queued message before the `user/message` append. `allow` optionally rewrites the prompt `content` or attaches separately sourced `additionalContexts[]`; `block` appends a durable `prompt/blocked` and rejects that zero-step turn.
|
||||
|
||||
**`agent/turn-continuation`** receives and returns a `ContinuationDecision`. A `{action:'continue', reason?}` may carry model-facing content and source recorded as next-step steering in the same turn — the typed twin of the `/goal` step-end-steer pattern. It is not a `context/message`, so its type does not offer a context envelope or durable context metadata.
|
||||
**`agent/turn-continuation`** receives and returns a `ContinuationDecision`. A `{action:'continue', reason?}` may carry model-facing content and source recorded as next-step steering in the same turn — the typed twin of the `/goal` step-end-steer pattern. It is not a `context/message`, so its type does not offer durable context metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
### The tool pipeline gives each phase one kind of authority
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ The default is composition config (`cordis.yml`) — operator-owned, process-wid
|
||||
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
interface SessionEventMap {
|
||||
'bash/sandbox-mode': { mode: 'read-only' | 'workspace-write' | 'danger-full-access' }
|
||||
'sandbox/mode': { mode: 'read-only' | 'workspace-write' | 'danger-full-access' }
|
||||
'approval/policy': { policy: 'ask' | 'never' }
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -111,9 +111,7 @@ Sandbox mode is not narrated in the prompt; denial results report the mode when
|
||||
|
||||
#### In-process tools
|
||||
|
||||
fs/web/todo execute in-process, so their sandbox semantics are policy at their seams: the fs intent gates deciding by the shared mode vocabulary (§ Deferred phases, cross-family) make `read-only` a real boundary instead of a bash-only approximation — until then the contract says so honestly. No generic per-tool sandbox runtime: a host-mediated tool leaves the process only by returning declarative effects the host validates, which is a rewrite, not a wrapper.
|
||||
|
||||
FIXME: Revisit this tool-local boundary. The follow-up design needs to determine whether sandboxing becomes a global harness capability that applies uniformly to every tool, instead of expressing in-process enforcement independently at each tool seam.
|
||||
fs/web/todo execute in-process, so their sandbox semantics are policy at their seams. The fs seam now enforces the shared mode vocabulary through a sandboxed provider (`dsh-fs-sandbox` fences write/edit by mode; see [the cross-family fs sandbox RFC](2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md)), so `read-only`/`workspace-write` are real boundaries for the filesystem tools, not a bash-only approximation. web/todo remain unfenced (web's only effect is network, outside the file-effect mode vocabulary). No generic per-tool sandbox runtime: a host-mediated tool leaves the process only by returning declarative effects the host validates, which is a rewrite, not a wrapper — the follow-up settled on one shared policy home (`ctx.sandboxPolicy`) with per-seam enforcement, not a uniform wrapper.
|
||||
|
||||
### Testing
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -126,8 +124,7 @@ FIXME: Revisit this tool-local boundary. The follow-up design needs to determine
|
||||
|
||||
Each phase gets its full design when picked up, validated against the code at that time, and lands with unit, real-API e2e, and snapshot coverage at the tiers it touches.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Per-session workspace root** — the executor's write boundary stays config-fixed for its lifetime while each ACP session has its own cwd; a per-session root rides the same per-call policy carrier once designed.
|
||||
- **Cross-family boundary** — the fs intent gates decide by the shared mode, making `read-only`/`workspace-write` real boundaries beyond bash.
|
||||
- **Per-session workspace root** — the executor's write boundary stays config-fixed for its lifetime while each ACP session has its own cwd; a per-session root rides the same per-call policy carrier once designed. Centralizing the root on `ctx.sandboxPolicy` (the [cross-family fs sandbox RFC](2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md)) is the groundwork.
|
||||
- **Second consumer** — `subagent-acp` optionally confines child agents (per-call policy; unconfined default — a child agent must write its own persistence).
|
||||
- **More environments** — an environment-coherent capability group example (e.g. bash+fs against one container).
|
||||
- **Windows chain** — `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` is reserved and empty (fail-closed); filling it means a confinement runner from the AppContainer/restricted-token family, shipped from its own repository on the `node-addon-landlock-run` template, plus its profile dialect and denial/runner-failure signatures.
|
||||
@@ -171,7 +168,7 @@ What shipped pins — the tiers in Testing hold each:
|
||||
Costs and accepted limits:
|
||||
|
||||
- **The one-wrapper illusion is given up knowingly.** A `tools/pre-execute` wrapper plus prompt conventions does not solve sandbox approval — the correct design costs structured denials, native runner probes, per-call policy carriage, and consistent cross-family enforcement, and this design pays it.
|
||||
- **`read-only` is not yet a cross-family boundary.** Until the fs intent gates decide by the shared mode, the claim holds for bash only; the contract says so honestly (§ In-process tools).
|
||||
- **`read-only` became a cross-family boundary through a follow-up.** This RFC shipped bash-only enforcement; the [cross-family fs sandbox RFC](2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md) extends the same mode vocabulary to the filesystem tools through a sandboxed `ctx.fs` provider and relocates the mode/root config and the `sandbox/mode` override to `ctx.sandboxPolicy` (§ In-process tools).
|
||||
- **Windows has no backend.** Its chain slot is reserved empty — fail-closed, never a fallthrough; filling it is a deferred phase.
|
||||
- **The Seatbelt rung leans on Apple's deprecated-but-shipped `sandbox-exec` CLI.** As darwin's sole candidate it is selected without probing, so a future removal surfaces at execution as the runner-failure classification — re-thrown `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`, the command never runs; fail closed, never open.
|
||||
- **Landlock confinement is only as complete as the running kernel's ABI.** Reported as `enforcement: 'partial'` rather than refused — the deliberate trade that keeps the fallback available on older-kernel hosts.
|
||||
@@ -191,9 +188,9 @@ Costs and accepted limits:
|
||||
- **What happens on a platform with no backend — Windows today?** `confine()` throws the fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` and the command never spawns; `win32` is a reserved EMPTY chain, pinned by test to fail closed identically until a Windows runner fills it (§ Deferred phases).
|
||||
- **`bwrap` is installed on my host but unusable (disabled unprivileged userns, an LSM denying `mount`) — what happens?** The chain probe is functional — it builds and enforces a real profile rather than checking `--version` — so a present-but-unusable `bwrap` fails its probe, selection falls to the registry-installed Landlock launcher, and the verdict is cached for the provider's lifetime.
|
||||
- **Does the sandbox restrict network or process visibility?** No — `SandboxMode` claims FILE effects only; the bwrap profile deliberately does not unshare pid, and no backend claims network. Whether network restriction becomes its own knob is left open in § The seam.
|
||||
- **Which tools actually run confined?** OS subprocesses through `ctx.bash` — the bash tools, and hook commands transitively. fs/web/todo execute in-process, where an `execve` wrapper is mechanically meaningless; their `read-only` semantics arrive with the cross-family deferred phase, and until then the contract says bash-only honestly.
|
||||
- **Which tools actually run confined?** OS subprocesses through `ctx.bash` — the bash tools, and hook commands transitively — plus the filesystem tools (`read`/`write`/`edit`) through the sandboxed `ctx.fs` provider (the [cross-family fs sandbox RFC](2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md)): bash confines via the OS runner, fs via an in-process path fence, both keying off the same `ctx.sandboxPolicy` mode. web/todo stay in-process and unfenced (web's only effect is network, outside the file-effect mode vocabulary).
|
||||
- **Does a granted escalation persist?** No. The grant is consumed by the exact foreground or background call that asked; every neighboring call keeps its own effective mode. A later background denial surfaces through `task_output` and may ground a new exact-command retry.
|
||||
- **When does an editor's mode switch take effect?** Mid-turn: appended immediately, honored by the very next call's stamp. Idle: held on the bridge's session record, anchored at the next turn's `agent/prompt-submit`, with N flips coalescing to at most one event (none if net-zero); a crash before anchoring reverts it and `session/load` reports the truth. The model is not told — its next command simply behaves under the new mode.
|
||||
- **When does an editor's mode switch take effect?** Mid-turn: appended immediately, honored by the very next call's stamp. Idle: held on the bridge's session record, anchored at the next `agent/prompt-submit` inside its open turn, with N flips coalescing to at most one event (none if net-zero); a crash before anchoring reverts it and `session/load` reports the truth. The model is not told — its next command simply behaves under the new mode.
|
||||
- **What survives a restart — and what if the operator changed the config default while the process was down?** Overrides replay from the session log (`effective = fold ?? config`), so a resumed session keeps its modes with zero catch-up machinery; a default that drifted offline changes behavior the same way a switch does (the approval policy, being stated, is additionally narrated with operator/config attribution).
|
||||
- **What does `enforcement: 'partial'` on a result mean?** The selected backend enforces the subset its kernel ABI governs — e.g. Landlock before ABI v3 does not govern path truncate — and says so structurally instead of refusing the host; the probe's report line distinguishes the cases. The bwrap and Seatbelt profiles govern every promised file effect by construction, so they always report `full`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
|
||||
2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md: 9b6312e5994469606bd1645902fc798f70258580
|
||||
2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.zh.md: d4816e03d94bdf12b2db875d71dccb7db3a2c0d7
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, a sandboxed fs provider, and fs escalation parity
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
English | [中文](2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.zh.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
`SandboxMode` claims file effects, but originally only `ctx.bash` enforced it. The fs tools (`write`/`edit`) mutate the host filesystem in-process through `ctx.fs`, where an OS argv wrapper is mechanically meaningless — [the sandbox Agent Note](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) § In-process tools records this and left cross-family enforcement as a deferred phase with an open question: whether in-process enforcement stays per-seam or becomes a uniform harness capability. This Agent Note is that phase, and answers it: one shared policy home, per-seam enforcement at each family's correct altitude.
|
||||
|
||||
The gap was not read-only-shaped. A confined coding agent's product mode is `workspace-write`: bash may already write under the workspace root while everything outside is denied, so an fs enforcement that could only deny-all would be strictly worse than disabling the fs tools — the model would attempt an in-workspace `write`, be denied, and learn to detour through `bash` heredocs. Cross-family enforcement therefore speaks the full mode ladder, including the path-containment judgment `workspace-write` requires (canonical targets; `..`/symlink/absolute-path escapes) and the same escalation lever bash carries.
|
||||
|
||||
A second enforcing family also exposed an ownership problem in the original layout. The deployment default (`mode` + `workspaceRoot`) was configured on `dsh-bash-sandbox`, and the per-session override event was `bash/sandbox-mode`, folded and written by `dsh-bash`'s session-mode kit. With fs enforcing the same policy, either fs reads bash's config and events (a capability family depending on a sibling's plugin config) or each family carries its own copy — and two copies of `workspaceRoot` drift into exactly the split world the sandbox RFC warns about: bash confined to one root while fs fences another.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
Three coordinated pieces, all composed from the leaf `cordis.yml`, none touching `agent-loop`.
|
||||
|
||||
### `ctx.sandboxPolicy` — one home for mode and workspace root
|
||||
|
||||
`packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/` (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy`) registers `ctx.sandboxPolicy`, the single owner of the deployment's sandbox policy:
|
||||
|
||||
- `Config`: `mode` (the closed `SandboxMode` union, default `read-only`) and `workspaceRoot` (default the process cwd, resolved absolute). Misconfiguration fails loud at load.
|
||||
- The per-session override event `sandbox/mode`, with its pure fold (`effectiveSandboxMode(events)`), its write path (`setSandboxMode(session, mode)`), and `SANDBOX_MODES`. The event is policy state — consumed by two families — so it lives here, not in either capability's seam. Its shape and log-only semantics match the `approval/*` precedent.
|
||||
- `defaultMode` / `workspaceRoot` accessors the enforcing implementations read for their resolve fallback and boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-bash-sandbox` carries no sandbox config of its own — it injects `sandboxPolicy` and reads the default from it; its `resolve()` precedence is unchanged (escalation grant > per-call stamp > default). `dsh-tool-bash` and `dsh-tool-fs` fold the session's `sandbox/mode` with `effectiveSandboxMode` to stamp each call; `dsh-permission` presets and the ACP bridge write through the relocated setter. The seam that owns bash execution no longer depends on `dsh-session` at all — the session dependency moved to the policy package with the fold.
|
||||
|
||||
### `dsh-fs-sandbox` — enforcement inside the provider
|
||||
|
||||
`packages/fs/fs-sandbox/` (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox`) mirrors the `bash-local`/`bash-sandbox` split: `SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem`, registered as `ctx.fs`, injecting `sandboxPolicy`. Reads (`resolve`/`stat`/`readText`/`streamText`/`listDir`) pass through untouched — every mode permits reading. The two mutations enforce by mode before delegating to the inherited atomic write:
|
||||
|
||||
- `read-only` denies `writeText`/`editText` outright.
|
||||
- `workspace-write` fences the canonicalized target against the writable-root set — `writableRoots(policy)` in `dsh-sandbox`: the workspace root plus the platform temp areas (`/tmp`, `os.tmpdir()`), each realpathed — the SAME set the Seatbelt profile grants, so the fs fence is the fourth dialect of one mode meaning alongside the bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt profiles, and "the write tool cannot write `/tmp` but bash can" asymmetries cannot arise. Containment is prefix-inclusion on real paths; the target is re-canonicalized (`resolve` realpaths the deepest existing ancestor) immediately before delegating, so an ancestor symlink swapped since the tool resolved it is caught.
|
||||
- `danger-full-access` delegates unfenced.
|
||||
|
||||
A denial is the structured `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED` carrying the effective mode — distinct from `FS_PERMISSION_DENIED` (a host EACCES is the world refusing; this is policy refusing). No text inference: an in-process fence knows exactly what it denied. The per-call carrier is a trailing optional `sandboxMode` on `writeText`/`editText` (the filesystem twin of `BashExecRequest.sandboxMode`); the seam stays session-free (the caller stamps, exactly as `resolve` takes a cwd), and the bare local backend carries-and-ignores it. `FileSystem.sandboxMode` is the capability fact (`undefined` on the base and `fs-local`, the default on `SandboxedFileSystem`), so the tool layer advertises escalation from composition truth.
|
||||
|
||||
The threat model is stated in the package README: a policy fence in trusted code over model-controlled paths, not a kernel boundary — the operations are the seam's own, only the target path is untrusted, so canonicalize-then-contain is the complete answer to this surface (the `code-runtime` "containment, not a security boundary" precedent). Kernel-grade isolation of untrusted CODE stays `ctx.bash`'s job. The residual resolve-to-syscall race is narrowed by the in-place re-canonicalization and eliminated only by platform primitives (`openat2` `RESOLVE_BENEATH`) not worth their portability cost here.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tool parity — one denial marker, one escalation flow
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-tool-fs` stamps the effective mode onto each mutation and maps `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED` to the marker the model already knows from bash: `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]`. When `ctx.fs.sandboxMode` reports a confining mode at registration, `write` and `edit` advertise the same `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` fields, teach the same same-turn retry, and resolve the same `ctx.approval` request before executing — the four outcomes and their verbatim fail-closed texts carried over from [the sandbox Agent Note](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) § Escalation (strict widening checked at execution against the call's effective mode; a grant consumed by the one call that asked; no new session events).
|
||||
|
||||
The shared pieces live in `dsh-sandbox`, which owns the mode types: `WIDER_MODES`, the escalation-target enum, the argument-pairing validation, the denial/hint marker builders, and `approveEscalation` — the ordered fail-closed choreography. `approveEscalation` takes a minimal STRUCTURAL approver (`EscalationApprover`, generic over the agent and call-id types), not the approval service type, so `dsh-sandbox` gains no dependency on the approval or agent packages: each tool passes its own `ctx.approval`, agent, call id, and tool name as ingredients. `dsh-tool-bash` and `dsh-tool-fs` both use these; the cross-file duplication gate holds the single-sourcing honest.
|
||||
|
||||
The [`examples/acp-agent`](../../../../examples/acp-agent/cordis.yml) composition loads `dsh-sandbox-policy` and `dsh-fs-sandbox`, moves the `mode`/`workspaceRoot` config to the policy entry, and drops the old gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes; `fs-policy` (read-before-edit) composes orthogonally on top. The system prompt still states no sandbox mode — the marker teaches the boundary at the moment it matters, per the sandbox Agent Note's live evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
### The enforcement point: provider, not intent gate
|
||||
|
||||
The sandbox Agent Note's original cross-family sketch put fs enforcement on the `fs/write-intent`/`fs/edit-intent` events. This Agent Note enforces in the provider instead, on two mechanical facts: the intent slots are single-decision first-wins (occupied by `dsh-fs-policy`, whose contract names a second decider a misconfiguration), and the intent events are dispatched only by `dsh-tool-fs` — a direct `ctx.fs` caller (a cordis-mounted plugin, a custom tool) bypasses them, where provider-level enforcement covers every caller by construction. The sandbox Agent Note's deferred-phase wording is updated to match in the same change.
|
||||
|
||||
### Out of scope
|
||||
|
||||
- **Network policy for `ctx.web`** — `SandboxMode` claims file effects only; a web-only network knob while bash `curl` runs free would be a false boundary. Revisit when a bash backend enforces network (bwrap `--unshare-net`, Landlock ABI v4+).
|
||||
- **The `subagent-acp` consumer** and **per-session workspace root** — unchanged deferred phases of the sandbox RFC; centralizing the root in `ctx.sandboxPolicy` is groundwork for the latter, not its design.
|
||||
- **A uniform per-tool sandbox runtime** — remains rejected for the reasons in the sandbox RFC.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
- **Enforce on the `fs/*` intent events (the sandbox Agent Note's original sketch)** — rejected on the two mechanical facts in § The enforcement point: single-slot first-wins already occupied, and a bypass for direct `ctx.fs` callers. Provider-level enforcement covers every caller and mirrors bash's swap-the-implementation shape.
|
||||
- **Enforce in `tools/pre-execute`** — rejected: the listener sees the model's raw path string before `resolve()`, so it would re-implement cwd defaulting and symlink canonicalization and still race the real resolve. Disqualifying for `workspace-write`, a judgment over canonical paths.
|
||||
- **Inline checks in `dsh-tool-fs`** — rejected: covers only the tool path (same bypass as the intent events) and duplicates resolve knowledge one layer above where the canonical target already exists.
|
||||
- **A `mode` flag on `dsh-fs-local` instead of a sibling backend** — rejected: the capability fact must be composition truth the way `dsh-bash-local` vs `dsh-bash-sandbox` is; a config flag makes the tool's advertisement conditional on configuration, and the bash family already establishes the sibling-package shape.
|
||||
- **Kernel-enforced fs mutations via a confined helper subprocess** — rejected: a process per write; `editText`'s read-match-write critical section would have to move wholesale into the child to stay atomic; and the threat surface (trusted operations, untrusted path argument) does not need a kernel — the fence in trusted code is the complete answer, while untrusted-code isolation stays on `ctx.bash`.
|
||||
- **Per-family policy config with a load-time consistency check** — rejected: two homes for one fact, patched by a check that must enumerate every future enforcing family; the policy service makes drift inexpressible instead of detected.
|
||||
- **Keep the override event in `dsh-bash` as `bash/sandbox-mode`** — rejected: the event is policy state consumed by two families; leaving it bash-named forces `dsh-fs-sandbox` to depend on bash vocabulary. Pre-release, the rename is a same-change move with snapshot re-records, no shims.
|
||||
- **Escalation choreography imported from the approval/agent packages into `dsh-sandbox`** — rejected: it would invert the layering (a base vocabulary package depending on UI/agent packages). The structural approver keeps the logic single-sourced in `dsh-sandbox` while the dependencies stay in the tool layer that already holds them.
|
||||
- **A consolidated mutation-options object on the fs seam** (the shape first sketched for the per-call carrier) — rejected on friction: it churns every `writeText`/`editText` caller and splits `signal` across an options bag for mutations while reads keep it positional. A trailing optional `sandboxMode` matches bash's carry-and-ignore pattern and keeps `signal` symmetric across the seam.
|
||||
- **Extra writable-root grants on `SandboxPolicy` now** — deferred unchanged: `writableRoots()` derives from the mode meaning today; ad-hoc grants are an escalation-scope question the sandbox RFC left open.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
What shipped — the tiers in § Testing hold each:
|
||||
|
||||
- Under `read-only`, `write`/`edit` return the `[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]` marker and the disk is untouched; `read`/`listDir` behave identically to `dsh-fs-local`.
|
||||
- Under `workspace-write`, mutations land under the workspace root and the temp areas and are denied outside; the containment matrix — `..` traversal, absolute paths outside, a pre-existing symlinked directory inside pointing out, and a new file created under such a symlink — denies every escape on real disks.
|
||||
- A denied fs mutation retried once with `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` prompts through the composed approval chain; a grant runs exactly that call under the wider mode and the write lands; rejected/cancelled/unavailable each produce their verbatim fail-closed text and mutate nothing.
|
||||
- One `permission` preset switch governs both families: after a session switches modes, the next bash call and the next fs mutation both honor the new mode from the same `sandbox/mode` fold.
|
||||
- A direct `ctx.fs.writeText` with no per-call stamp is confined at the deployment default.
|
||||
- The escalation fields on `write`/`edit` exist exactly when the mounted `ctx.fs` confines, absent under `dsh-fs-local`.
|
||||
- `agent-loop` is untouched — everything rides `ctx.sandboxPolicy`, the `ctx.fs` seam, `SessionEventMap` merging, and the tool-execution pipeline.
|
||||
|
||||
Costs and accepted limits:
|
||||
|
||||
- **The fs fence is a policy boundary, not a kernel one.** Its threat surface is model-chosen paths, not adversarial host processes; the residual resolve-to-syscall TOCTOU is narrowed, not eliminated, and the README says so. Kernel boundaries remain bash's.
|
||||
- **`dsh-bash-sandbox` gains a hard dependency on `ctx.sandboxPolicy`.** Every sandboxed composition adds one `cordis.yml` entry or fails loud at load — the intended pre-release foundation move; the examples update in the same change.
|
||||
- **Fence-vs-runner parity is derived, not asserted.** The fs fence and the Seatbelt profile both take their writable set from `writableRoots`, and a parity unit test pins the sets; a runner profile changing its writable set without that function would drift.
|
||||
- **The marker and escalation teaching now serve two families.** A wording change is a coordinated edit behind one builder in `dsh-sandbox`; the duplication gate and pinned snapshots hold it single-sourced, at the cost that fs and bash cannot deliberately diverge in phrasing without splitting the builder.
|
||||
|
||||
## Testing
|
||||
|
||||
- Unit: `dsh-sandbox` pins the escalation ladder, the marker builders, the argument-pairing validation, and `approveEscalation`'s ordered fail-closed sequence (non-widening, no-approval, no-agent, each outcome), plus `writableRoots`/`canonicalPath`. `dsh-sandbox-policy` pins the default accessors, the fold/setter, the load-time mode rejection, and HMR safety. `dsh-fs-sandbox` pins the per-mode fence and the containment matrix (inside, temp area, absolute-outside, `..`, symlinked-out directory, new file under one, path-equals-root, root-ending-in-separator) on a real filesystem, plus the per-call override and HMR safety. `dsh-tool-fs` pins advertisement gating, the mode stamp, the fold, denial-marker mapping, and the full escalation matrix (grant, reject, no-service, no-agent, pairing, non-confining guard). `dsh-tool-bash`, `dsh-bash-sandbox`, and `dsh-permission` migrate to the relocated policy/kit.
|
||||
- Snapshot: the acp-agent example composes `dsh-sandbox-policy` + `dsh-fs-sandbox`; the pinned header carries the fs escalation fields and the `sandbox/mode` event name, re-recorded once.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: 跨家族文件沙箱——统一策略归属、沙箱化 fs 提供方、fs 升级对等
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
[English](2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md) | 中文
|
||||
|
||||
## 问题
|
||||
|
||||
`SandboxMode` 声明的是文件效果,但最初只有 `ctx.bash` 执行它。fs 工具(`write`/`edit`)在进程内经由 `ctx.fs` 变更宿主文件系统,那里的 OS argv 包装在机制上毫无意义——[沙箱 RFC](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) § In-process tools 记录了这一点,并把跨家族执行留作一个延后阶段,附带一个未决问题:进程内执行是各 seam 各自表达,还是变成一个统一的 harness 能力。本 Agent Note 就是那个阶段,并给出答案:一个共享的策略归属,在每个家族各自正确的高度上做 per-seam 执行。
|
||||
|
||||
这个缺口不是 read-only 形状的。一个受限编码 agent 的产品模式是 `workspace-write`:bash 已经可以在工作区根目录下写入,而其外的一切都被拒绝,所以一个只能全部拒绝的 fs 执行会严格劣于禁用 fs 工具——模型会尝试在工作区内 `write`,被拒,然后学会绕道 `bash` heredoc。因此跨家族执行必须讲完整的模式阶梯,包括 `workspace-write` 要求的路径包含判定(规范化目标;`..`/符号链接/绝对路径逃逸),以及与 bash 相同的升级杠杆。
|
||||
|
||||
第二个执行家族还暴露了原布局中的一个归属问题。部署默认值(`mode` + `workspaceRoot`)配置在 `dsh-bash-sandbox` 上,而 per-session 覆盖事件是 `bash/sandbox-mode`,由 `dsh-bash` 的 session-mode 工具集折叠与写入。当 fs 执行同一套策略时,要么 fs 读取 bash 的配置与事件(一个能力家族依赖同级插件的配置),要么各家族各持一份副本——两份 `workspaceRoot` 会漂移进沙箱 RFC 警告过的那个割裂世界:bash 受限于一个根,而 fs 围栏另一个根。
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
三个相互协调的部分,全部在叶子 `cordis.yml` 中组合,均不触及 `agent-loop`。
|
||||
|
||||
### `ctx.sandboxPolicy`——mode 与工作区根的统一归属
|
||||
|
||||
`packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/`(`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy`)注册 `ctx.sandboxPolicy`,即部署沙箱策略的唯一所有者:
|
||||
|
||||
- `Config`:`mode`(封闭的 `SandboxMode` 联合,默认 `read-only`)与 `workspaceRoot`(默认进程 cwd,解析为绝对路径)。配置错误在加载时高声失败。
|
||||
- per-session 覆盖事件 `sandbox/mode`,连同它的纯折叠(`effectiveSandboxMode(events)`)、写入路径(`setSandboxMode(session, mode)`)与 `SANDBOX_MODES`。该事件是策略状态——被两个家族消费——所以它住在这里,而不在任一能力的 seam 里。它的形状与仅日志(log-only)语义遵循 `approval/*` 的先例。
|
||||
- `defaultMode` / `workspaceRoot` 访问器,供执行实现读取其 resolve 回退值与边界。
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-bash-sandbox` 自身不再携带任何沙箱配置——它注入 `sandboxPolicy` 并从中读取默认值;其 `resolve()` 优先级不变(升级授权 > per-call 盖章 > 默认)。`dsh-tool-bash` 与 `dsh-tool-fs` 用 `effectiveSandboxMode` 折叠会话的 `sandbox/mode` 以对每次调用盖章;`dsh-permission` 预设与 ACP bridge 经由迁移后的 setter 写入。拥有 bash 执行的那个 seam 不再依赖 `dsh-session`——会话依赖随折叠一起迁到了策略包。
|
||||
|
||||
### `dsh-fs-sandbox`——在提供方内部执行
|
||||
|
||||
`packages/fs/fs-sandbox/`(`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox`)镜像 `bash-local`/`bash-sandbox` 的拆分:`SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem`,注册为 `ctx.fs`,注入 `sandboxPolicy`。读取(`resolve`/`stat`/`readText`/`streamText`/`listDir`)原样透传——每种模式都允许读。两个变更操作在委托给继承来的原子写之前按模式执行:
|
||||
|
||||
- `read-only` 直接拒绝 `writeText`/`editText`。
|
||||
- `workspace-write` 把规范化后的目标围栏于可写根集合——`dsh-sandbox` 中的 `writableRoots(policy)`:工作区根加上平台临时目录(`/tmp`、`os.tmpdir()`),各自 realpath——与 Seatbelt profile 授予的是同一个集合,所以 fs 围栏是这一个模式含义在 bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt profile 之外的第四种方言,因此不会出现「write 工具不能写 `/tmp` 而 bash 能」的不对称。包含判定是对真实路径的前缀包含;目标在委托前被立即重新规范化(`resolve` 对最深的既有祖先做 realpath),因此自工具解析该目标以来被换出的祖先符号链接会被捕获。
|
||||
- `danger-full-access` 不加围栏地委托。
|
||||
|
||||
拒绝是结构化的 `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED`,携带生效模式——区别于 `FS_PERMISSION_DENIED`(宿主 EACCES 是世界在拒绝;这里是策略在拒绝)。无文本推断:进程内围栏确切知道它拒绝了什么。per-call 载体是 `writeText`/`editText` 上一个末尾可选的 `sandboxMode`(文件系统侧对应 `BashExecRequest.sandboxMode`);该 seam 保持无会话依赖(由调用方盖章,正如 `resolve` 接收一个 cwd),而裸的本地后端携带并忽略它。`FileSystem.sandboxMode` 是能力事实(在基类与 `fs-local` 上为 `undefined`,在 `SandboxedFileSystem` 上为默认值),所以工具层按组合真相来宣告升级。
|
||||
|
||||
威胁模型写在包 README 里:一道位于可信代码中、针对模型可控路径的策略围栏,而非内核边界——操作是 seam 自身的,只有目标路径不可信,所以「先规范化再判包含」是对这个面的完整答案(`code-runtime` 的「containment, not a security boundary」先例)。对不可信代码的内核级隔离仍是 `ctx.bash` 的职责。resolve 到系统调用之间残留的竞态被就地重新规范化收窄,只有平台原语(`openat2` `RESOLVE_BENEATH`)能彻底消除它,而那在此不值其可移植性代价。
|
||||
|
||||
### 工具对等——一个拒绝标记、一条升级流程
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-tool-fs` 把生效模式盖章到每次变更上,并将 `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED` 映射为模型已从 bash 认识的标记:`[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]`。当 `ctx.fs.sandboxMode` 在注册时报告一个受限模式,`write` 与 `edit` 宣告相同的 `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` 字段,教授相同的同回合重试,并在执行前解析相同的 `ctx.approval` 请求——四种结果及其逐字的 fail-closed 文案沿用自[沙箱 RFC](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) § Escalation(严格加宽在执行时针对调用的生效模式检查;授权由发起它的那一次调用消费;无任何新会话事件)。
|
||||
|
||||
共享部分住在 `dsh-sandbox`,它拥有模式类型:`WIDER_MODES`、升级目标枚举、参数配对校验、拒绝/提示标记构造器,以及 `approveEscalation`——有序的 fail-closed 编排。`approveEscalation` 接收一个最小的结构化 approver(`EscalationApprover`,对 agent 与 call-id 类型泛型化),而非审批服务类型,所以 `dsh-sandbox` 不获得对 approval 或 agent 包的依赖:每个工具把自己的 `ctx.approval`、agent、call id 与工具名作为原料传入。`dsh-tool-bash` 与 `dsh-tool-fs` 都使用它们;跨文件重复检测门禁确保单一来源不走样。
|
||||
|
||||
[`examples/acp-agent`](../../../../examples/acp-agent/cordis.yml) 组合加载 `dsh-sandbox-policy` 与 `dsh-fs-sandbox`,把 `mode`/`workspaceRoot` 配置移到策略条目,并去掉在受限模式下禁用整个 fs 栈的旧门控;`fs-policy`(read-before-edit)正交地叠加其上。系统提示仍然不陈述沙箱模式——标记会在真正重要的那一刻教会模型边界,依据沙箱 RFC 的线上证据。
|
||||
|
||||
### 执行点:提供方,而非 intent gate
|
||||
|
||||
沙箱 RFC 最初的跨家族草图把 fs 执行放在 `fs/write-intent`/`fs/edit-intent` 事件上。本 Agent Note 改为在提供方中执行,基于两个机制性事实:intent 槽是单决策、先到先得(已被 `dsh-fs-policy` 占据,其契约称第二个决策者为配置错误),且 intent 事件只由 `dsh-tool-fs` 派发——一个直连 `ctx.fs` 的调用方(一个 cordis 挂载插件、一个自定义工具)会绕过它们,而提供方级执行按构造覆盖每一个调用方。沙箱 RFC 的延后阶段措辞在同一变更中被更新以匹配。
|
||||
|
||||
### 范围之外
|
||||
|
||||
- **`ctx.web` 的网络策略**——`SandboxMode` 只声明文件效果;在 bash `curl` 畅通时给一个仅限 web 的网络旋钮会是一道假边界。待某个 bash 后端能执行网络(bwrap `--unshare-net`、Landlock ABI v4+)时再议。
|
||||
- **`subagent-acp` 消费者** 与 **per-session 工作区根**——沙箱 RFC 未变的延后阶段;把根集中到 `ctx.sandboxPolicy` 是后者的铺垫,而非其设计。
|
||||
- **统一的 per-tool 沙箱运行时**——因沙箱 RFC 中的理由继续否决。
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
- **在 `fs/*` intent 事件上执行(沙箱 RFC 的原始草图)**——因 § 执行点 中的两个机制性事实被否决:单槽先到先得且已被占据,以及对直连 `ctx.fs` 调用方的绕过。提供方级执行覆盖每一个调用方,并镜像 bash 的换实现形态。
|
||||
- **在 `tools/pre-execute` 中执行**——否决:监听器在 `resolve()` 之前看到模型的原始路径字符串,因此它会重新实现 cwd 默认化与符号链接规范化,并且仍与真正的 resolve 竞态。对 `workspace-write`(一个对规范路径的判定)而言是取消资格级的。
|
||||
- **在 `dsh-tool-fs` 中做内联检查**——否决:只覆盖工具路径(与 intent 事件同样的绕过),并在规范目标已存在之上重复了一层 resolve 知识。
|
||||
- **在 `dsh-fs-local` 上加一个 `mode` 标志而非同级后端**——否决:能力事实必须是组合真相,正如 `dsh-bash-local` 对 `dsh-bash-sandbox`;一个配置标志会让工具的宣告取决于配置,而 bash 家族已经确立了同级包形态。
|
||||
- **经受限 helper 子进程做内核级 fs 变更**——否决:每次写一个进程;`editText` 的读-匹配-写临界区不得不整体搬进子进程才能保持原子;而威胁面(可信操作、不可信路径参数)不需要内核——可信代码中的围栏就是完整答案,而不可信代码隔离仍在 `ctx.bash`。
|
||||
- **带加载期一致性校验的 per-family 策略配置**——否决:一个事实两个归属,靠一个必须枚举每个未来执行家族的校验来打补丁;策略服务让漂移不可表达,而非被检测到。
|
||||
- **把覆盖事件留在 `dsh-bash` 里作 `bash/sandbox-mode`**——否决:该事件是被两个家族消费的策略状态;保留 bash 命名会迫使 `dsh-fs-sandbox` 依赖 bash 词汇。预发布阶段,该改名是同一变更内的迁移,附带快照重录,无任何 shim。
|
||||
- **把升级编排从 approval/agent 包导入 `dsh-sandbox`**——否决:那会倒置分层(一个基础词汇包依赖 UI/agent 包)。结构化 approver 让逻辑单一来源于 `dsh-sandbox`,而依赖留在本就持有它们的工具层。
|
||||
- **fs seam 上一个合并的 mutation-options 对象**(per-call 载体最初草拟的形状)——因摩擦被否决:它会搅动每一个 `writeText`/`editText` 调用方,并把 `signal` 拆进变更专用的选项包,而读取仍保持位置参数。一个末尾可选的 `sandboxMode` 匹配 bash 的携带并忽略模式,并使 `signal` 在整个 seam 上保持对称。
|
||||
- **现在就在 `SandboxPolicy` 上加额外的可写根授权**——照旧延后:`writableRoots()` 如今由模式含义推导;临时授权是沙箱 RFC 留下的升级作用域问题。
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
已交付的部分——§ Testing 的各层各自钉住:
|
||||
|
||||
- 在 `read-only` 下,`write`/`edit` 返回 `[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]` 标记,磁盘不受触动;`read`/`listDir` 与 `dsh-fs-local` 行为一致。
|
||||
- 在 `workspace-write` 下,变更落在工作区根与临时目录下,其外被拒;包含矩阵——`..` 穿越、指向外部的绝对路径、一个既有的、指向外部的工作区内符号链接目录,以及在这样一个符号链接下新建的文件——在真实磁盘上拒绝每一种逃逸。
|
||||
- 一个被拒的 fs 变更,携带 `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` 重试一次,会经组合的审批链提示;一次授权让恰好那一次调用在更宽的模式下运行且写入落盘;rejected/cancelled/unavailable 各自产生其逐字的 fail-closed 文案且不做任何变更。
|
||||
- 一次 `permission` 预设切换同时管辖两个家族:会话切换模式后,下一次 bash 调用与下一次 fs 变更都从同一个 `sandbox/mode` 折叠遵循新模式。
|
||||
- 一次无 per-call 盖章的直连 `ctx.fs.writeText` 会被围栏于部署默认值。
|
||||
- `write`/`edit` 上的升级字段恰好在被挂载的 `ctx.fs` 受限时存在,在 `dsh-fs-local` 下不存在。
|
||||
- `agent-loop` 未被触动——一切都骑在 `ctx.sandboxPolicy`、`ctx.fs` seam、`SessionEventMap` 合并,以及工具执行管线之上。
|
||||
|
||||
代价与接受的限制:
|
||||
|
||||
- **fs 围栏是策略边界,而非内核边界。** 它的威胁面是模型选定的路径,而非对抗性宿主进程;resolve 到系统调用之间残留的 TOCTOU 被收窄而非消除,README 已如实声明。内核边界仍属 bash。
|
||||
- **`dsh-bash-sandbox` 获得对 `ctx.sandboxPolicy` 的硬依赖。** 每个沙箱化组合要么加一个 `cordis.yml` 条目,要么在加载时高声失败——这是有意的预发布奠基之举;示例在同一变更内更新。
|
||||
- **围栏与 runner 的对等是推导出来的,而非断言的。** fs 围栏与 Seatbelt profile 都从 `writableRoots` 取其可写集合,一个对等单元测试钉住这些集合;一个 runner profile 若在不经该函数的情况下改变其可写集合便会漂移。
|
||||
- **标记与升级教学如今服务于两个家族。** 措辞改动是 `dsh-sandbox` 中一个构造器背后的协调编辑;重复检测门禁与钉住的快照维持单一来源,代价是 fs 与 bash 无法在不拆分该构造器的情况下有意地在措辞上分道。
|
||||
|
||||
## Testing
|
||||
|
||||
- 单元:`dsh-sandbox` 钉住升级阶梯、标记构造器、参数配对校验,以及 `approveEscalation` 的有序 fail-closed 序列(非加宽、无 approval、无 agent、各结果),外加 `writableRoots`/`canonicalPath`。`dsh-sandbox-policy` 钉住默认访问器、折叠/setter、加载期模式拒绝,以及 HMR 安全。`dsh-fs-sandbox` 在真实文件系统上钉住 per-mode 围栏与包含矩阵(内部、临时目录、绝对路径-外部、`..`、指向外部的符号链接目录、其下的新建文件、路径等于根、以分隔符结尾的根),外加 per-call 覆盖与 HMR 安全。`dsh-tool-fs` 钉住宣告门控、模式盖章、折叠、拒绝标记映射,以及完整的升级矩阵(授权、拒绝、无服务、无 agent、配对、非受限守卫)。`dsh-tool-bash`、`dsh-bash-sandbox` 与 `dsh-permission` 迁移到迁移后的策略/工具集。
|
||||
- 快照:acp-agent 示例组合 `dsh-sandbox-policy` + `dsh-fs-sandbox`;被钉住的 header 携带 fs 升级字段与 `sandbox/mode` 事件名,一次性重录。
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
|
||||
2026-07-20-unwrap-injected-content-envelopes.md: 32642660f7bcea748c349933b99552b1974922c5
|
||||
2026-07-20-unwrap-injected-content-envelopes.zh.md: a01a51e12cecca5bc46526ccca61dbe90eb3136f
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Project injected content verbatim, dropping the XML envelopes
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
English | [中文](2026-07-20-unwrap-injected-content-envelopes.zh.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
Two families of injected session content rendered into the model transcript wrapped in XML envelopes: `steering/message` as `<steering source="…">…</steering>` and `context/message` as `<context source="…">…</context>` (the latter with a `'raw'` opt-out that skipped the wrapper). The envelopes aimed to tell the model "this is injected, not the user speaking."
|
||||
|
||||
Two problems:
|
||||
|
||||
- **No model is trained on these tags.** `<steering>` and `<context>` are arbitrary markup no model was taught to read, so the framing adds tokens without a reliable effect and can actively mislead — recorded transcripts show a model treating a `<steering>` instruction as third-party metadata and refusing it while answering only the original prompt.
|
||||
- **The session surface is the wrong layer for framing.** The surface projects the durable log into the model transcript; deciding how content is worded is not its job. A caller that wants a particular frame formats its own content before injecting it — which the one heavy producer (`workspace-context`) already does, owning its complete `<system-reminder>` frame and opting out of the `<context>` wrapper with `envelope: 'raw'`. The remaining tag machinery (`ContextEnvelope`, an `envelope` field threaded through `InjectOptions`, `HookContext`, the `context/message` event, and the loop) served a distinction that belongs to the caller.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
Injected session content projects verbatim; the caller owns any framing. `deriveEventMessage` renders `user/message`, `context/message`, and `steering/message` through one shared case returning `{ role: 'user', content: event.data.content }`; their content blocks reach the model unchanged. `context/message`'s `source`/`meta` and `steering/message`'s `turn` stay in the durable event log but do not render.
|
||||
|
||||
The `ContextEnvelope` type and every `envelope` field are removed — `context/message` in `SessionEventMap`, `InjectOptions`, `HookContext`, and the `inject()`/`additionalContexts` plumbing in `dsh-agent-loop`. `workspace-context` no longer requests `'raw'`; its self-framed content renders as before. The `renderTagged`/`renderContextEnvelope` helpers are deleted. `context/message.meta` still carries durable, model-hidden JSON state.
|
||||
|
||||
The `source` attribution the envelopes carried is not lost — it remains on the durable events; it simply no longer renders into the transcript.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
- **Keep the `<context>` envelope, unwrap only steering** — leaves the `ContextEnvelope`/`envelope` machinery alive for a framing bit no model reads, and keeps the inconsistency that the main producer already opts out of.
|
||||
- **Keep the envelope field for plugin-sourced content only** — splits one projection into two on `source.kind` for no observed benefit; a plugin steering the agent (hook-bridge continuation reasons) also wants the instruction followed, not labeled.
|
||||
- **Move the unwrapping into adapters** — the canonical projection is the model-visible contract ("model-visible ⟺ logged"); per-adapter divergence on framing would make the derived transcript adapter-dependent. Framing that a caller genuinely wants belongs in the caller's content, not in an adapter.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
- Mid-turn steering and injected context reach the model with the same weight as an ordinary user prompt.
|
||||
- The transcript no longer distinguishes injected content from a user message; consumers that need the distinction read the durable event log, which keeps the event types, `source`, and `meta` intact.
|
||||
- The `hook-{cc,codex}-stop-continue` ACP snapshots were re-recorded: the old recordings captured the model refusing steering as third-party metadata, the fix's exact failure mode.
|
||||
- The [content-block-vocabulary Agent Note](../architecture/2026-06-11-content-block-vocabulary.md)'s tagged-envelope clause is amended to point here.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deferred
|
||||
|
||||
`workspace-context` already frames its own content: it emits a complete `<system-reminder>…</system-reminder>` block as the message content instead of leaning on a surface-level wrapper. That caller-owned pattern is the one to keep — the surface passes content through verbatim, and any framing lives in the producer's own content.
|
||||
|
||||
Two framing paths existed — caller-baked framing (`workspace-context`'s `<system-reminder>`) and surface-level wrapping (`<context>`/`<steering>` added by `deriveEventMessage`). This change removes the second, leaving only caller-owned framing. If labeled framing is wanted again, unify it through the event's `meta` map — the producer-attached, model-hidden metadata field — consumed by a dedicated renderer or adapter, rather than re-hardcoding a tag in `deriveEventMessage`. A producer declares the frame it wants in `meta`; one renderer applies it; the session-surface projection stays a verbatim pass-through.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: 注入内容逐字投影，去除 XML 封套
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
[English](2026-07-20-unwrap-injected-content-envelopes.md) | 中文
|
||||
|
||||
## 问题
|
||||
|
||||
两类注入的会话内容在渲染进模型 transcript（文本记录）时被包在 XML 封套里：`steering/message` 包成 `<steering source="…">…</steering>`，`context/message` 包成 `<context source="…">…</context>`（后者有一个 `'raw'` 退出选项可跳过封套）。这些封套意在告诉模型「这是注入内容，不是用户在说话」。
|
||||
|
||||
两个问题：
|
||||
|
||||
- **没有模型在这些标签上训练过。** `<steering>` 和 `<context>` 是任何模型都未被教会去读的任意标记，因此这层框架只是徒增 token 而没有可靠效果，还可能起反作用——已录制的 transcript 显示，模型会把 `<steering>` 指令当成第三方元数据而拒绝服从，只回答原始提示。
|
||||
- **session 表层是承载框架的错误层次。** 表层的职责是把持久日志投影为模型 transcript；决定内容如何措辞并不是它的事。想要特定框架的调用方可以在注入前自行格式化内容——唯一的重度生产方（`workspace-context`）本就这样做，它自带完整的 `<system-reminder>` 框架，并用 `envelope: 'raw'` 退出 `<context>` 封套。剩下的标签机制（`ContextEnvelope` 类型，以及贯穿 `InjectOptions`、`HookContext`、`context/message` 事件和 agent loop 的 `envelope` 字段）所服务的区分，本应归属调用方。
|
||||
|
||||
## 决策
|
||||
|
||||
注入的会话内容逐字投影，框架由调用方自行负责。`deriveEventMessage` 通过一个共享分支渲染 `user/message`、`context/message` 和 `steering/message`，都返回 `{ role: 'user', content: event.data.content }`；它们的内容块原样到达模型。`context/message` 的 `source`/`meta` 和 `steering/message` 的 `turn` 保留在持久事件日志中，但不渲染。
|
||||
|
||||
`ContextEnvelope` 类型和所有 `envelope` 字段都被移除——包括 `SessionEventMap` 中的 `context/message`、`InjectOptions`、`HookContext`，以及 `dsh-agent-loop` 中 `inject()`/`additionalContexts` 的相关管线。`workspace-context` 不再请求 `'raw'`；它自带框架的内容渲染方式不变。`renderTagged`/`renderContextEnvelope` 辅助函数被删除。`context/message.meta` 仍携带持久的、对模型隐藏的 JSON 状态。
|
||||
|
||||
封套曾携带的 `source` 归属并未丢失——它仍保留在持久事件上；只是不再渲染进 transcript。
|
||||
|
||||
## 权衡的替代方案
|
||||
|
||||
- **保留 `<context>` 封套，只对 steering 去封套** —— 会为一个没有模型会读的框架位保留 `ContextEnvelope`/`envelope` 机制，并保留主要生产方本就退出的那种不一致。
|
||||
- **仅对插件来源的内容保留 envelope 字段** —— 会按 `source.kind` 把一条投影拆成两条，却没有观察到任何收益；插件引导 agent（智能体）时（钩子桥接器的轮次续行原因）同样希望指令被遵从，而不是被贴标签。
|
||||
- **把去封套的逻辑移入适配器** —— 规范投影就是模型可见契约（「模型可见 ⟺ 已记录」）；让各适配器在框架上各行其是，会使派生的 transcript 依赖于适配器。调用方确实想要的框架应放进调用方自己的内容里，而不是适配器。
|
||||
|
||||
## 结果
|
||||
|
||||
- 中途引导与注入的 context 以与普通用户提示相同的权重到达模型。
|
||||
- transcript 不再区分注入内容与用户消息；需要这一区分的消费方读取持久事件日志，其中事件类型、`source` 和 `meta` 完整保留。
|
||||
- `hook-{cc,codex}-stop-continue` ACP 快照已重新录制：旧录制捕获的是模型把 steering 当作第三方元数据而拒绝服从，正是本次修复针对的失败模式。
|
||||
- [内容块词汇表 Agent Note](../architecture/2026-06-11-content-block-vocabulary.md) 中关于带标签封套的条款已修订为指向本文。
|
||||
|
||||
## 推迟事项
|
||||
|
||||
`workspace-context` 已经自行为内容加框架：它把一个完整的 `<system-reminder>…</system-reminder>` 块作为消息内容发出，而不依赖表层封套。这种调用方自有的模式才是应保留的——表层逐字透传内容，任何框架都住在生产方自己的内容里。
|
||||
|
||||
曾经存在两条框架路径——调用方自行加框架（`workspace-context` 的 `<system-reminder>`），以及表层封套（`deriveEventMessage` 加上的 `<context>`/`<steering>`）。本次变更移除了后者，只留下调用方自有的框架。如果未来又需要带标签的框架，应由事件的 `meta` map（生产方附加、对模型隐藏的元数据字段）来统一它，交给专门的渲染器或适配器消费，而不是在 `deriveEventMessage` 中重新硬编码标签。生产方在 `meta` 中声明所需的框架，由一个渲染器统一施加；session 表层的投影始终保持逐字透传。
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user