docs(rfc): define and enforce a uniform RFC format; adopt it across the corpus

Define the in-file RFC contract in docs/rfc/README.md § The file format:
the header block (`# RFC: <title>` plus a dateless Status enum
cross-checked against the lifecycle folder), the per-lifecycle body
skeleton (a Problem opener everywhere; Proposal/Alternatives considered/
Acceptance criteria/Risks in proposed/; present-tense Decision/
Consequences with proposal-era headings banned in implemented/; the
frozen proposal shape in rejected/), and a mandatory Alternatives
considered section with a date-fenced grandfather comment for pre-format
RFCs whose alternatives are not reconstructible from the record.

Enforce it with a new doc-sync gate, scripts/verify-rfc-format.ts, and
normalize all 112 RFCs to it: ~15 Status-line spellings collapse to the
enum, 29 Context openers become Problem, the 39 legacy-format XXX debt
markers are resolved and banned from reappearing, proposal-era sections
in implemented RFCs are rewritten to shipped reality (including the
web/fs/subagent seam RFCs' migration plans and test checklists, closing
the doc-tiers deferred-work item on the web seam), every RFC gains an
Alternatives considered section or the grandfather comment, and the
bilingual pair is re-mirrored and re-recorded.

Move the generated index tables out of README.md into a fully generated
docs/rfc/INDEX.md — gen-rfc-index now writes the whole file, and
verify-rfc-classification checks its freshness and rejects index-shaped
rows in the curated README — which makes room for the format contract to
live in the README front door instead of a separate FORMAT.md.

The decision record, and the first RFC written in the new format, is
docs/rfc/implemented/process/2026-07-05-uniform-rfc-format.md.

docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 
 Status: proposed
 
-<!-- XXX: legacy ADR/RFC body format, not yet normalized to a unified RFC template. -->
 > **Implementation status (MVP landed):** steps 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 are implemented in `packages/ui/acp` + `examples/acp-agent`. **Step 5 (the `session/request_permission` permission gate) is deferred** — the bridge ships a pass-through (tools run with the executor's full authority) marked `TODO(rfc010-permission-gate)`, and lays down only the `WeakMap<Agent, sessionId>` ownership seam the gate will build on. Status stays `proposed` until the gate lands. `session/cancel` is the queue-aware `agent.cancel()`: it aborts a running step, clears queued + steering work, and drops a turn that is about to start, so a queued-but-not-yet-started prompt never runs and a later prompt cannot be batched into the cancelled turn. **Per-session `cwd` is now honored** (lifting the original "launch the server in the workspace root" restriction — see § Deferred): `session/new` accepts any absolute `cwd`, and `session/load` requires the request `cwd` to match the persisted session `cwd` so the editor and bash executor agree on the workspace.
 
 ## Problem
@@ -59,6 +58,17 @@ Deferred (each names its owning future work):
 - Client `terminal/*` proxying (a live editor terminal) and `fs/*` (editor-rendered diffs) — a future `BashExecutor` over the [capability seams](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md) bash seam, gated on `clientCapabilities.terminal`.
 - Image/audio prompts (blocked on the DeepSeek adapter, which skips `image` blocks today), modes, auth, `available_commands`/slash-commands, `plan`, and `usage_update`.
 
+## Alternatives considered
+
+- **A process-wide stdout hijack inside `dsh-acp`** (defensively monkey-patching `console.log` / `process.stdout.write`) — rejected: it lives outside Cordis' effect-scoped, HMR-friendly plugin model, races the connection's own stdout handoff, and fights the logger. The stdout guarantee is config-only.
+- **Injecting `agentLoop` directly instead of the abstract create/resume factory** — the recorded fallback, taken only if the factory seam is judged not worth it, with the architecture-rule exception recorded in `docs/architecture.md`.
+
+## Acceptance criteria
+
+- The `acp-agent` example speaks ACP over stdio end-to-end: `initialize`, `session/new` with a validated absolute `cwd` honored as the session workspace, streamed `session/update` frames per prompt turn, `session/load` re-deriving identical history, and `session/prompt` resolving with the correct wire `stopReason`.
+- stdout carries only framed JSON-RPC (asserted by test); the permission gate settles every `session/request_permission` exactly once — on outcome, cancel, or connection close.
+- The plan's test set runs green: the property-based protocol invariants, the codec unit tests over an in-memory duplex pair, the HMR-safety test, the failure-path matrix, and the self-skipping real-API e2e that verifies the world.
+
 ## Risks
 
 stdout is the protocol — guaranteed by config, not by monkey-patching. The console logger writes through `console.log` to stdout, so any stdout UI/logger plugin corrupts JSON-RPC. The guarantee is config-only: the `acp-agent` example loads no stdout plugin (no console logger, no `stdio-chat`) and, if logging is wanted, uses a stderr exporter. A defensive process-wide `process.stdout.write`/`console.log` hijack inside `dsh-acp` is explicitly rejected — it lives outside Cordis' effect-scoped, HMR-friendly plugin model, races the connection's own stdout handoff, and fights the logger. A test asserts the example emits only framed JSON-RPC on stdout.

docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 
 Status: proposed
 
-<!-- XXX: legacy ADR/RFC body format, not yet normalized to a unified RFC template. -->
 > **Implementation status:** the multi-session bridge (steps 1, 3, 4) and the bash task-ownership isolation are implemented in `packages/ui/acp` + `packages/bash/tool-bash`. **Per-session *permission* ownership is deferred** — it depends on [the ACP support permission gate](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md) (`TODO(rfc010-permission-gate)`), which is itself deferred; the `agent→sessionId` reverse map the gate will route through is in place. Step 2's per-session disposer scope is now implemented (see [agent lifecycle & ownership seams](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-18-agent-lifecycle-and-ownership-seams.md)): the factory returns a per-agent `AgentHandle` whose `dispose()` stops the loop, awaits quiescence, unregisters the agent, and removes its session, so a bare client disconnect leaves no registered agent or session-store entry. Status stays `proposed` until per-session permission ownership lands.
 
 > **Target-client note:** Zed is the current target ACP client, and its ACP client maintains a `HashMap<SessionId, AcpSession>` plus `pending_sessions` for concurrent `session/load` calls. The competing simplification to return to one live session per connection was rejected after checking that target-client shape; this RFC remains the path for finishing multiplexing and per-session permission ownership. See [the rejected simplification](../../rejected/simplification/2026-06-20-single-session-acp-bridge.md).
@@ -30,6 +29,16 @@ The harness core already supports many agents (`AgentRegistry.list()` and `Agent
 3. Lift the `session/new` guard; keep `session/load` ([from ACP support](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)) working per session.
 4. Tests for cross-session isolation: two sessions streaming and permission-prompting concurrently never interleave; a cancel/abort in one session leaves the other's stream and pending permission untouched; per-session in-flight-prompt enforcement holds independently; disposing one session leaves the others running.
 
+## Alternatives considered
+
+**A per-session `ctx.extend()` scope** — rejected: in Cordis, `ctx.extend()` only creates a child context/prototype, and `ctx.on()` registered on it is still owned by the current plugin fiber, so disposing it would not remove that session's listeners. A genuine child fiber (or a per-session collection of disposers) is required.
+
+## Acceptance criteria
+
+- N concurrent sessions stream and permission-prompt without interleaving their `session/update` notifications; a cancel in one session leaves every other session's stream, queued prompts, and pending permissions untouched.
+- Disposing one session removes exactly its own listeners; connection teardown reaches quiescence across all sessions.
+- One session's agent cannot read or kill another session's background bash task.
+
 ## Risks
 
 Listener fan-out cost: each session adds listeners; ensure disposal of one session removes exactly its own and the connection teardown ([from ACP support](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)) still reaches quiescence across all sessions.

docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-06-15-optional-code-mode.md

@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@
 
 Status: proposed
 
-<!-- XXX: legacy ADR/RFC body format, not yet normalized to a unified RFC template. -->
-
 ## Problem
 
 Today the agent loop advertises every registered tool to the model as a native JSON-schema function definition. `ToolRegistry` feeds its schemas into `ctx.systemPrompt`, the loop puts them on `GenerateOptions.tools`, and the adapter serializes them to the provider's function-calling wire format. The model then invokes one `tool-call` block per step, the loop dispatches each call through `ctx.tools.execute()` **sequentially** (parallel tool execution is an explicit open TODO in `dsh-tools` and [docs/architecture.md](../../../architecture.md)), and **every** intermediate `tool-result` re-enters the model's context on the next request.
@@ -73,7 +71,7 @@ These are illustrations of the seam's reach, **not commitments** — the MVP shi
 
 **Optionality / toggle.** Loading the `code-mode` plugin enables Code Mode for that context; not loading it leaves today's native tool-calling untouched. The two are mutually exclusive within one ctx, because Code Mode rewrites the wire tool list down to `[run_code]`. Per-agent selection via ctx forks, and the visibility tiers above, are future work; the MVP toggle is plugin presence.
 
-## Alternatives
+## Alternatives considered
 
 **Result elision / summarization over native tool-calling (the narrower route).** The Problem has two halves — context bloat (every intermediate `tool-result` re-enters context) and serial composition (one tool call per round-trip). The context-bloat half can be addressed *without* any code-execution runtime: keep provider tool-calling exactly as it is, and add a plugin on the `agent/request` waterfall (or a compaction pass akin to [the session-persistence work](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-14-session-persistence.md)) that elides or summarizes older `tool-result` blocks before they re-enter the model's context — drop them past a window, replace large payloads with a digest, or keep only the blocks the model still references. This is strictly less invasive than Code Mode: no new runtime seam, no model-written programs, no new safety surface. It is the right tool if context growth is the only pain.
 
@@ -90,6 +88,14 @@ It is insufficient for the **composition / round-trip** half, which is the decis
 5. Wire an example: `examples/coding-agent-code-mode` (or a config flag on the existing example) loading the trio. Running it against the node:vm stub requires both opt-ins (`VmCodeRuntime({ unsafe: true })` and `code-mode`'s `allowUnsafeRuntime`); the example sets them explicitly and comments why, or uses a mock model — a real model never reaches the unsandboxed stub without those deliberate flags. Add a `pnpm run demo:*` entry.
 6. Docs: update [docs/architecture.md](../../../architecture.md) (a `ctx.codeRuntime` row in the service map, a Code Mode note under the tool pipeline / capability seams sections); add a [cookbook](../../../cookbook) note on writing a `CodeRuntime` backend; and **file the follow-up RFC for the hardened execution substrate** (the isolate/sandboxed-process design, the additional-language backends sketched in §1 — AssemblyScript/WASM, Python — with their per-language SDK generators, plus the tool-visibility-tier design skipped here). On landing, move this file to `implemented/` and update its row in [the RFC index](../../README.md).
 
+## Acceptance criteria
+
+- The three packages exist and pass their suites: `dsh-code-runtime` (the abstract seam), `dsh-code-runtime-vm` (the reference stub whose constructor throws without `{ unsafe: true }`), and `dsh-code-mode` (SDK codegen, the lazy prompt section, the `agent/request` collapse, the `run_code` tool).
+- The wire tool list is exactly `[run_code]` under the plugin (spy-adapter test); the generated SDK covers every registered tool, with non-identifier names reachable via quoted access.
+- A program calling two tools returns only its curated output; `code/dispatch` events land in the session log and never enter derived history.
+- `Promise.all` over SDK calls does not overlap the underlying `ctx.tools.execute` invocations (the per-run serialization queue holds); an abort stops further dispatches.
+- With `allowUnsafeRuntime` unset over an unsafe runtime, `run_code` is not registered and the wire tool list is unchanged from native.
+
 ## Risks
 
 node:vm is not a sandbox. This is the single biggest caveat. Withholding `require`/`process` is not a boundary; the MVP runs at harness trust only; the hardened substrate is a hard prerequisite before any untrusted use and is the explicit subject of a follow-up RFC. The guard is enforceable, not just documented: the runtime exposes `safe: boolean`, the VM stub throws unless constructed with `{ unsafe: true }`, and `code-mode` refuses to register `run_code` over an unsafe runtime unless separately acknowledged (`allowUnsafeRuntime`) — production misuse requires two deliberate, greppable flags, and the refusal path is tested.

docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-06-30-pre-tool-input-rewrite.md

@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
 # RFC: Pre-tool input rewrite — a consistent design
 
-Status: proposed (2026-06-30)
+Status: proposed
 
-<!-- XXX: legacy ADR/RFC body format, not yet normalized to a unified RFC template. -->
-
-## Context
+## Problem
 
 The [interception-seams RFC](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-30-interception-seams.md) added `tools/pre-execute` returning a `PreToolDecision` (allow/deny/ask) — but deliberately NOT input rewrite (a hook changing a tool call's `arguments` before it runs). Claude Code's `PreToolUse` hook offers an `updatedInput`, so a faithful CC bridge wants the same. This RFC designs that, separately, because doing it consistently is a real problem — not a field to bolt onto the allow decision.
 
@@ -18,9 +16,9 @@ In the loop, a tool call's arguments are committed to the log and read by live c
 
 So an "input rewrite" that changes ONLY what executes would make the UI show one command while another RAN, and render result state against the wrong arguments — a real inconsistency, not a documentable gap. (The existing low-level capability to mutate `exec.arguments` in a listener has exactly this latent inconsistency; it is unadvertised precisely because of this — yet not unused: a tool-bash integration test rewrites a scripted call's arguments through it (`packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/integration.spec.ts`), so this design must either sanction that path with the consistency unit below or seal it — `readonly` arguments at the seam, with the test shim moved onto a behavior-level helper.)
 
-## Proposed design (sketch — to validate against the code when built)
+## Proposal
 
-Treat input rewrite as a consistency unit: when a `pre-execute` hook supplies `updatedInput`, the rewrite must be reflected in ALL three readers, atomically, before execution:
+A sketch, to validate against the code when built. Treat input rewrite as a consistency unit: when a `pre-execute` hook supplies `updatedInput`, the rewrite must be reflected in ALL three readers, atomically, before execution:
 
 - The `tool/call` audit event records the REWRITTEN arguments (with the original retained in a sidecar field for the audit trail — a hook changed the call, and both the original and the effective arguments are facts worth keeping).
 - The `assistant/message` in derived history must agree with what executed — options to evaluate: rewrite the assistant message's tool-call block in place (changes what the model "sees it said"), or record a separate correction the next request carries. The CC model is that the model sees the rewrite took effect.
@@ -28,10 +26,23 @@ Treat input rewrite as a consistency unit: when a `pre-execute` hook supplies `u
 
 The shape would extend `PreToolDecision` with an allow-variant `arguments` (or a dedicated `{kind:'rewrite', arguments}`), and the loop would thread the rewrite through the three readers above rather than only into `ctx.tools.execute()`.
 
-## Why not now
+## Alternatives considered
+
+### Why not now
 
 The interception-seams RFC notes input rewrite "fought the code across two review rounds" — the signal AGENTS.md names for an over-reaching change. Shipping allow/deny/ask first keeps the seam honest (no advertised contract that silently desyncs the UI), and a CC/Codex bridge that receives an `updatedInput` logs it and surfaces a faithful-but-degraded warning (like `ask`→deny) until this lands. This RFC is the home for the consistent design; `TODO(pre-tool-input-rewrite)` in the loop's pre-execute call site anchors it.
 
+## Acceptance criteria
+
+- A `pre-execute` rewrite is reflected in all three readers atomically before execution: the `tool/call` audit records the rewritten arguments (the original retained in a sidecar field), derived history agrees with what executed, and presentation renders the rewritten arguments.
+- The unadvertised `exec.arguments` mutation path is either sanctioned by this consistency unit or sealed (`readonly` arguments at the seam, the test shim moved onto a behavior-level helper).
+- The CC/Codex bridges honor `updatedInput` instead of logging the faithful-but-degraded warning.
+
+## Risks
+
+- Rewriting the `assistant/message` tool-call block changes what the model "sees it said"; whether any provider rejects that on replay is the open question that must be settled empirically before the decision shape freezes.
+- Until this lands, the unadvertised mutation path keeps its latent UI-desync inconsistency.
+
 ## Open questions
 
 - Does rewriting the `assistant/message` tool-call block corrupt any provider's expectation on replay, or is a separate correction safer?