fix(permission): address human review feedback
This commit is contained in:
@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ import {
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} from '@agentclientprotocol/sdk'
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/**
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* The sandbox variant (`sandbox.cordis.yml`) end to end.
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* The default ACP composition (`cordis.yml`) end to end.
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*
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* Keyless smoke: boot the REAL `sandbox.cordis.yml` through the `dsh-acp-agent` bin as
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* Keyless smoke: boot the REAL `cordis.yml` through the `dsh-acp-agent` bin as
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* an ACP subprocess and drive initialize + session/new — the real-Loader-path
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* guard (postmortem 0001) for THIS tree's export shapes, which now include the
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* sandbox executor AND the approval service. No prompt is sent, so neither the
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@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ import {
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*/
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const binScript = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../packages/ui/acp-agent/src/bin.ts', import.meta.url))
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const configPath = fileURLToPath(new URL('../sandbox.cordis.yml', import.meta.url))
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const configPath = fileURLToPath(new URL('../cordis.yml', import.meta.url))
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const tsxLoader = fileURLToPath(import.meta.resolve('tsx'))
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// The subprocess runs from a temp cwd OUTSIDE the repo; point tsx at the repo
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// tsconfig so the unbuilt `paths` map resolves (see examples/AGENTS.md).
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@@ -65,10 +65,10 @@ interface Spawned {
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}
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/** Boot the example as an ACP subprocess; the scripted client answers every permission prompt with `answer`. */
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function spawnSandboxAcpAgent(cwd: string, answer: 'allow-once' | 'reject-once'): Spawned {
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function spawnAcpAgent(cwd: string, answer: 'allow-once' | 'reject-once'): Spawned {
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const child = spawn(
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process.execPath,
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['--import', tsxLoader, binScript, configPath],
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['--import', tsxLoader, binScript, '--config', configPath],
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{
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cwd,
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// A dummy key lets the deepseek adapter boot keyless (presence-checked at
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@@ -116,10 +116,10 @@ afterEach(async () => {
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workdir = undefined
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})
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describe('sandbox variant keyless smoke (real sandbox.cordis.yml via the Loader)', () => {
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describe('default sandbox composition keyless smoke (real cordis.yml via the Loader)', () => {
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it('boots the tree — sandbox executor + approval service + bridge — and opens a session', async () => {
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workdir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'sandbox-acp-smoke-'))
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spawned = spawnSandboxAcpAgent(workdir, 'reject-once')
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spawned = spawnAcpAgent(workdir, 'reject-once')
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const { client } = spawned
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// A dummy key boots the adapter; no prompt is ever sent, so no model call
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// and no sandbox runner probe happen. This drives the fiber tree the same
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@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ describe('sandbox variant keyless smoke (real sandbox.cordis.yml via the Loader)
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it('advertises the Permissions select and honors a switch end to end (no key, no model)', async () => {
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workdir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'sandbox-acp-config-'))
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spawned = spawnSandboxAcpAgent(workdir, 'reject-once')
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spawned = spawnAcpAgent(workdir, 'reject-once')
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const { client } = spawned
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await client.initialize({ protocolVersion: PROTOCOL_VERSION, clientCapabilities: {} })
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// This tree composes the permission presets over bash-sandbox + approval →
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@@ -140,19 +140,19 @@ describe('sandbox variant keyless smoke (real sandbox.cordis.yml via the Loader)
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const created = await client.newSession({ cwd: workdir, mcpServers: [] })
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const advertised = created.configOptions ?? []
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expect(advertised.map(option => [option.id, 'currentValue' in option ? option.currentValue : undefined]))
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.toEqual([['permission', 'request']])
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.toEqual([['permission', 'workspace-write']])
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// A switch responds with the COMPLETE refreshed state (the spec contract),
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// and the new current survives in the response of a second switch.
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const afterYolo = await client.setSessionConfigOption({
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sessionId: created.sessionId, configId: 'permission', value: 'yolo',
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const afterFullAccess = await client.setSessionConfigOption({
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sessionId: created.sessionId, configId: 'permission', value: 'danger-full-access',
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})
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expect(afterYolo.configOptions?.find(option => option.id === 'permission'))
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.toMatchObject({ currentValue: 'yolo' })
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expect(afterFullAccess.configOptions?.find(option => option.id === 'permission'))
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.toMatchObject({ currentValue: 'danger-full-access' })
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const again = await client.setSessionConfigOption({
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sessionId: created.sessionId, configId: 'permission', value: 'yolo',
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sessionId: created.sessionId, configId: 'permission', value: 'danger-full-access',
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})
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expect((again.configOptions ?? []).map(option => [option.id, 'currentValue' in option ? option.currentValue : undefined]))
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.toEqual([['permission', 'yolo']])
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.toEqual([['permission', 'danger-full-access']])
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// An out-of-vocabulary value is a protocol error, never a silent default.
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await expect(client.setSessionConfigOption({
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sessionId: created.sessionId, configId: 'permission', value: 'plan',
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@@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ describe('sandbox variant keyless smoke (real sandbox.cordis.yml via the Loader)
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}, 30_000)
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})
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describe.skipIf(!process.env.DEEPSEEK_API_KEY || !hasRunner)('sandbox variant e2e: the live approval loop', () => {
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describe.skipIf(!process.env.DEEPSEEK_API_KEY || !hasRunner)('default sandbox composition e2e: the live approval loop', () => {
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it('denial → model escalation → editor prompt → allow-once → the retried write lands on disk', async () => {
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workdir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'sandbox-acp-e2e-'))
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spawned = spawnSandboxAcpAgent(workdir, 'allow-once')
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spawned = spawnAcpAgent(workdir, 'allow-once')
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const { client, permissionRequests } = spawned
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await client.initialize({ protocolVersion: PROTOCOL_VERSION, clientCapabilities: {} })
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@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ describe.skipIf(!process.env.DEEPSEEK_API_KEY || !hasRunner)('sandbox variant e2
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it('a rejected escalation stays denied: no write lands, the turn still ends', async () => {
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workdir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'sandbox-acp-e2e-'))
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spawned = spawnSandboxAcpAgent(workdir, 'reject-once')
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spawned = spawnAcpAgent(workdir, 'reject-once')
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const { client, permissionRequests } = spawned
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await client.initialize({ protocolVersion: PROTOCOL_VERSION, clientCapabilities: {} })
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