fix(sandbox): spawn confined argv directly (round 1)

This commit is contained in:
Hypatia May
2026-08-04 12:04:48 +08:00
parent 2eedb54849
commit e36d040d0a
34 changed files with 392 additions and 282 deletions

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
* the Unix denial signature used by the classifier without requiring a real sandbox runner.
*/
import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync } from 'node:fs'
import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { join, resolve } from 'node:path'
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import type { ConfinedArgv, SandboxExecutionPolicy, SandboxMode, SandboxPolicy }
import { SandboxPolicyService } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy'
import { SandboxBashExecutor } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox'
import LocalSubprocessService from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-subprocess-local'
import { classifyDenial, classifyRunnerFailure, shellQuote } from '../src/helpers.ts'
import { classifyDenial, classifyRunnerFailure } from '../src/helpers.ts'
import type { Config } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox'
const spillDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-bash-sandbox-spec-'))
@@ -90,15 +90,49 @@ describe('the provider hand-off', () => {
}])
})
it('a wrapped argv from the provider is what actually spawns (prefix survives, quoting round-trips)', async () => {
// The fake wraps with `env MARKER=...` — a real (if tiny) runner prefix:
// the sentinel only prints if the executor spawned the WRAPPED argv.
const { bash } = await setup({}, argv => ({ argv: ['env', 'DSH_WRAP=1', ...argv], enforcement: 'full', denialSignatures: UNIX_SIGNATURES, runnerFailureRules: RUNNER_FAILURE }))
it('hands the provider\'s returned argv directly to ctx.subprocess.spawn', async () => {
const returnedArgv = ['env', 'DSH_WRAP=1', 'bash', '-c', 'printf "%s" "$DSH_WRAP"']
const { ctx, bash } = await setup({}, () => ({ argv: returnedArgv, enforcement: 'full', denialSignatures: UNIX_SIGNATURES, runnerFailureRules: RUNNER_FAILURE }))
const spawn = vi.spyOn(ctx.subprocess, 'spawn')
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'printf "%s" "$DSH_WRAP"' }))
expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('1')
expect(spawn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
expect(spawn.mock.calls[0]?.[0].argv).toEqual(returnedArgv)
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
})
it('starts a non-Bash runner before the confined inner Bash evaluates BASH_ENV', async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-bash-env-order-'))
const hook = join(dir, 'hook.sh')
const order = join(dir, 'order.txt')
writeFileSync(hook, 'printf "hook\\n" >> "$DSH_ORDER_FILE"\n')
const runnerScript = [
'const { appendFileSync } = require("node:fs");',
'const { spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");',
'appendFileSync(process.env.DSH_ORDER_FILE, "runner\\n");',
'const child = spawnSync(process.argv[1], process.argv.slice(2), { env: process.env, stdio: "inherit" });',
'process.exit(child.status ?? 125);',
].join('')
const { bash } = await setup({}, argv => ({
argv: [process.execPath, '-e', runnerScript, ...argv],
enforcement: 'full',
denialSignatures: UNIX_SIGNATURES,
runnerFailureRules: RUNNER_FAILURE,
}))
try {
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({
command: 'true',
env: { BASH_ENV: hook },
dshEnv: { DSH_ORDER_FILE: order },
}))
expect(result.exitCode).toBe(0)
expect(readFileSync(order, 'utf8')).toBe('runner\nhook\n')
} finally {
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
}
})
it('workspace-write rides the policy, workspaceRoot falling back to process.cwd() when not configured', async () => {
const { bash, calls } = await setup({ mode: 'workspace-write' })
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'true' }))
@@ -120,9 +154,6 @@ describe('the provider hand-off', () => {
expect(calls).toHaveLength(2)
})
it('shellQuote survives embedded single quotes (the argv re-assembly primitive)', () => {
expect(shellQuote('a\'b')).toBe(String.raw`'a'\''b'`)
})
})
describe('fail closed', () => {
@@ -132,6 +163,14 @@ describe('fail closed', () => {
await expect(bash.run(spec)).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: 'SandboxUnavailableError', code: SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE })
expect(() => bash.start(spec)).toThrow(SandboxUnavailableError)
})
it('preserves an already-aborted foreground call as cancellation', async () => {
const { bash } = await setup()
const controller = new AbortController()
const reason = new Error('caller cancelled before spawn')
controller.abort(reason)
await expect(bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'true', signal: controller.signal }))).rejects.toBe(reason)
})
})
describe('danger-full-access', () => {
@@ -252,19 +291,6 @@ describe('classifyRunnerFailure', () => {
expect(classifyRunnerFailure(125, `${notice}\nchild diagnostic\n${fatal}`, rules)).toEqual({ detail: fatal })
})
it('matches an outer-shell rule case-insensitively only at its exit codes and configured argv0', () => {
const rules = [{
allowedExitCodes: [126, 127],
fatalSignatures: ['exec: /Opt/Runners/bwrap: not found', '/Opt/Runners/bwrap: No such file or directory'],
}]
expect(classifyRunnerFailure(127, 'bash: /Opt/Runners/bwrap: No such file or directory', rules)?.detail)
.toBe('bash: /Opt/Runners/bwrap: No such file or directory')
expect(classifyRunnerFailure(126, 'BASH: LINE 1: EXEC: /OPT/RUNNERS/BWRAP: NOT FOUND', rules)?.detail)
.toBe('BASH: LINE 1: EXEC: /OPT/RUNNERS/BWRAP: NOT FOUND')
expect(classifyRunnerFailure(125, 'bash: /Opt/Runners/bwrap: No such file or directory', rules)).toBeUndefined()
expect(classifyRunnerFailure(127, 'bash: /other/bwrap: No such file or directory', rules)).toBeUndefined()
})
it('requires Landlock exit 125 plus a non-notice fatal line and returns that original line', () => {
const notice = 'landlock-run: partial enforcement (older Landlock ABI)'
const rules = [{ allowedExitCodes: [125], fatalSignatures: ['landlock-run: '], informationalLines: [notice] }]
@@ -297,6 +323,18 @@ describe('classifyRunnerFailure', () => {
})
describe('result facts', () => {
it.each([126, 127])('keeps a successfully launched wrapped child exit %i as an ordinary outcome', async (exitCode) => {
const { bash } = await setup({}, argv => ({
argv: ['env', ...argv],
enforcement: 'full',
denialSignatures: UNIX_SIGNATURES,
runnerFailureRules: RUNNER_FAILURE,
}))
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `exit ${exitCode}` }))
expect(result.exitCode).toBe(exitCode)
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
})
it('reports a real permission failure as a sandbox denial with the mode it ran under', async () => {
const { bash } = await setup()
const lockedDir = join(mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-sandbox-denied-')), 'locked')
@@ -324,7 +362,12 @@ describe('background sandbox facts', () => {
expect(task.status).toBe('killed')
expect(task.readOutput().delta).toContain('spawn failed:')
expect(task.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
expect(task.sandbox).toEqual({
mode: 'read-only',
denied: false,
enforcement: 'full',
runnerFailed: true,
})
const accounting = (bash as unknown as { processFacts: Map<unknown, unknown> }).processFacts
expect(accounting.size).toBe(0)
})