Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into session-query-tool
# Conflicts: # docs/architecture.i18n.yaml # docs/capability-seams.md # examples/acp-agent/composition.md # examples/acp-agent/cordis.yml # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/model-switching/system-prompt.expected.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/model-switching/tool-schemas.expected.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/system-prompt.expected.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/tool-schemas.expected.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/plan-mode/system-prompt.expected.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/plan-mode/tool-schemas.expected.json # packages/examples/acp-demo/README.md # packages/host/runtime/README.md # packages/support/acp-snapshot/src/normalize.ts # packages/support/acp-snapshot/tests/normalize.spec.ts # packages/ui/acp/tests/harness.ts # scripts/type-equiv.manifest.json # tsconfig.host.json
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Hypatia May
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# acp-agent example
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The DeepSeek Harness SDK agent demo exposed as an **Agent Client Protocol (ACP)** server over JSON-RPC stdio — drive it from Zed or any other ACP client.
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Automation-oriented [Agent Client Protocol](https://agentclientprotocol.com) server over JSON-RPC stdio. It is intended for parent agents, subagent providers, and other programmatic clients, not as the product UI.
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```sh
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pnpm run demo:acp # needs DEEPSEEK_API_KEY (repo-root .env or env)
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pnpm run demo:code-mode acp # the same server in Code Mode: one wire tool, run_code
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pnpm run demo:acp # needs DEEPSEEK_API_KEY (repo-root .env or env)
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pnpm run demo:code-mode acp # same protocol with the Code Mode tool transport
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```
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The leaf config loads the ACP app, DeepSeek adapter, plan mode, sandboxed bash, the sandboxed filesystem stack, approval and permission services, model-facing tools, and repeat guard. The app bundles the agent spine, JSONL persistence, and bridge, creates agents on `session/new`, and keeps stdout logger-free. [`fs.cordis.yml`](fs.cordis.yml) adds local tool-result spill storage for its dedicated scenarios; [`code-mode.cordis.yml`](code-mode.cordis.yml) adds `run_code` and its generated TypeScript SDK. See [Code Mode](../../packages/core/tools/README.md#code-mode).
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The leaf loads the ACP app, DeepSeek adapter, sandboxed bash and filesystem stacks, one-shot approval policy, compaction, subagents, workflows, hooks, a derived session-query index, workspace-authorized session-query tools, generic timeout and local spill policies, and repeat guard. The app creates one fresh agent per `session/new`, persists sessions to JSONL, and keeps stdout protocol-pure. [`fs.cordis.yml`](fs.cordis.yml) redirects spill storage and lowers the inline threshold for dedicated filesystem scenarios; [`code-mode.cordis.yml`](code-mode.cordis.yml) adds `run_code` and its generated TypeScript SDK.
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## stdout is the protocol
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## Protocol channel
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This example loads **no stdout logger** — `stdout` carries the JSON-RPC frames, and any other write corrupts them. `@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-demo` includes no logger entry, so this leaf has none to get wrong by default; do not add one (use a stderr exporter if you need logs).
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Stdout carries only newline-delimited ACP JSON-RPC. `@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-demo` installs no stdout logger; leaf additions must use stderr for diagnostics.
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## Zed configuration
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The automation contract — supported methods, baseline prompt content, committed-text output, and the intentionally absent UI surfaces — lives in [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp`](../../packages/acp/acp/README.md).
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Add to your Zed `settings.json` under `agent_servers`:
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## Session workspaces and permissions
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```json
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{
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"agent_servers": {
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"DeepSeek Harness": {
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"command": "pnpm",
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"args": ["--dir", "/path/to/deepseek-harness", "run", "demo:acp"],
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"env": { "DEEPSEEK_API_KEY": "sk-…" }
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}
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}
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}
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```
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Each `session/new` supplies an absolute `cwd`. Sandboxed bash and filesystem mutations resolve `workspace-write` against that session cwd, so concurrent sessions can use separate project roots; platform temporary roots remain shared writable scratch space ([sandbox contract](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox/README.md)). `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` selects `workspace-write` or `danger-full-access` for deployment and tests.
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The editor sets each session's `cwd` to the project it opens. That directory is both bash's default workdir and the session's primary `workspace-write` boundary: every bash or filesystem mutation carries one policy resolved from the calling session, so a single server process may serve concurrent projects. Projects outside the platform temporary areas do not grant either session writes into the other; `/tmp` and `os.tmpdir()` remain shared writable scratch roots under `workspace-write`, so projects placed there are not mutually isolated ([writable-root contract](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox/README.md)). The configured `workspaceRoot: process.cwd()` remains the fallback for calls without a session cwd. The filesystem tools ride the same policy through [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox`](../../packages/fs/fs-sandbox/), so `read`/`write`/`edit` are available under every mode and confined to the same policy.
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Under `workspace-write`, a model retry requesting wider sandbox access triggers `session/request_permission` with `allow_once` and `reject_once`. The client decides programmatically; dismissal or an unavailable answer fails closed. The selected outcome applies only to that retry and is recorded through the normal tool-result/audit path. The server never exposes a permission picker or persists client policy.
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## Plan mode
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## Snapshot tests
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The same `demo:acp` server composes [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-plan-mode`](../../packages/plan/plan-mode/), so a capable client advertises `default` and `plan` in its mode picker. ACP owns those protocol ids and projects them onto the plugin's boolean plan state. This composition owns the complete plan instructions in [`cordis.yml`](cordis.yml): remain in plan mode, inspect before asking, avoid mutations, resolve discoverable repository facts, and submit a decision-complete plan through `exit_plan_mode`. Those are the instrumental behaviors shared by the local Codex and Claude Code references; product-specific plan files, phase machinery, and protocol tags stay out of the plugin contract.
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This example owns the ACP snapshot suite. It boots the real automation server, replays committed model streams through `dsh-llm-replay`, and compares both normalized protocol output and re-persisted session logs. Recording uses the real model; refresh reuses committed replay input. Overrides cover throw/hang behavior, and optional `workspace/` fixtures seed world-state checks.
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Plan mode adds only that configured guidance section. Every tool, including `exit_plan_mode`, keeps the same schema while plan mode is inactive or active; the exit tool describes itself as plan-only and rejects if called while inactive. Stable native schemas and Code Mode SDK bindings avoid tool-catalog churn at the transition. `ask_user_question` carries blocking user-owned choices through ACP elicitation, while `exit_plan_mode` renders the exact logged plan for approval and returns keep-planning feedback to the model. The mode picker and permission select remain independent: switching plan state never changes sandbox or approval state, and deployments that need a hard read-only planning floor configure that policy separately. The [plan-mode Agent Note](../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-07-plan-mode.md) owns the state and review contract.
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## Snapshot tests (record-once / replay-deterministic)
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This example hosts the ACP snapshot suite, including the picker advertisement and both plan-review branches. It replays through `dsh-llm-replay`, which reconstructs model streams from `assistant/chunk` events in each scenario's session JSONL. Recording runs the real ACP agent and harvests its logs; refresh keeps the committed transcript as mock input and rewrites current replay outputs. `replay.override.json` covers throw and hang cases that chunks cannot express, and an optional `workspace/` seeds files. The [snapshot Agent Note](../../.agents/notes/implemented/testing/2026-06-19-acp-snapshot-tests.md) owns the ACP harness design.
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## Permissions and sandboxing
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The default tree composes [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/), [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy`](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/), [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../packages/bash/bash-sandbox/), [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox`](../../packages/fs/fs-sandbox/), [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval`](../../packages/ui/user-approval/), and [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-permission`](../../packages/ui/permission/). Bash and the `read`/`write`/`edit` tools start in `workspace-write`; a denied operation returns a structured marker, and a retry with `sandbox_permissions` plus `justification` becomes a one-shot `session/request_permission` prompt in the editor. "Allow once" runs exactly that retry under the wider mode ([sandbox Agent Note § Escalation](../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)).
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- **One session config option is live**: a capable client shows one `Permissions` select. `workspace-write` means workspace-confined bash plus `ask`; `danger-full-access` means unconfined bash plus `never`. Switching writes one `permission/preset` event through to the sandbox-mode and approval-policy events, and `session/load` reports the resumed value.
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- **Every approval is one-shot**: the choices are `Allow once` and `Reject`; a dismissal, rejection, missing editor, or unavailable runner fails closed.
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- **The boundary spans bash and the filesystem tools per session**: bash confines through the OS runner and the `read`/`write`/`edit` tools through an in-process path fence ([`dsh-fs-sandbox`](../../packages/fs/fs-sandbox/)); both receive the calling session's cwd as `workspaceRoot`.
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`tests/escalation.e2e.ts` boots this default tree keyless, drives the permission select, and—with a key and usable runner—proves both approval outcomes against the filesystem. The agent-spine e2e independently boots one context with two home-directory project sessions and world-verifies concurrent own-root success plus sibling-root denial through both shipped tool families. The keyless `session-sandbox-root` ACP snapshot places its generated project under the user home while an overlay points the deployment fallback at `/tmp`; its successful `workspace-write` call proves the assembled app used the session cwd. Most snapshots start at `danger-full-access` so bash fixtures remain runner-independent. No fixture pins real runner denial text because its dialect is platform-specific.
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## MVP limitations
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The bridge supports N concurrent sessions per connection, each with its own `cwd` (RFC 011). Prompts support ACP's baseline `text` and `resource_link` blocks only; `additionalDirectories` and `mcpServers` are rejected. See [`packages/ui/acp/README.md`](../../packages/ui/acp/README.md) for the full contract.
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Most scenarios pin backend behavior rather than ACP-specific behavior; the [automation-only ACP decision](../../.agents/notes/implemented/simplification/2026-07-23-acp-automation-only-protocol.md#snapshot-boundary) owns why that coverage remains transport-coupled.
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