feat(events): interception seams — the typed-Decision surface for hooks

Reshape the agent's interception surface so every seam returns a small, typed
Decision union, and the set covers the hook points a CC/Codex bridge (and a
native plugin) needs. "Native hooks" are not a package — a native hook is just a
cordis plugin on these canonical events; the bridges (a later PR) only translate
an external protocol onto the same surface.

dsh-agent:
- NEW agent/session-start(agent, source) emit (once before turn 1; SessionStartSource
  startup|resume|clear|compact) — a pure notification, seeds context via inject().
- NEW agent/prompt-submit waterfall → PromptDecision (allow, optionally rewriting the
  prompt or attaching additionalContext, or block).
- RESHAPE agent/turn-continuation boolean → ContinuationDecision ({action:'stop'} |
  {action:'continue', reason?}; a continue reason is recorded as next-step steering).
- New HookContext envelope (required source — inject() would mislabel a missing one).

dsh-tools: split the single tools/execute waterfall into tools/pre-execute
(PreToolDecision allow/deny/ask gate) and tools/post-execute (PostToolDecision
accept/block, optionally replacing content or attaching additionalContext). Core
dispatch sits between as plain code; the tool body keeps its inner try/catch so a
thrown tool still reaches post-execute as an isError. ToolExecutionResult gains
additionalContext (ferried to the loop's per-step buffer). Input rewrite is
deliberately NOT offered (a proposed RFC designs it consistently).

dsh-session: new `rejected` TurnEndReason — a turn whose whole prompt batch was
blocked by prompt-submit.

agent-loop firing points: session-start emitted at create (source threaded —
startup for create/fork, resume for resume()); prompt-submit per drained message
with the always-open-turn rule (a fully-blocked batch is a zero-step rejected
turn); the continuation reshape; post-tool additionalContext buffered and appended
after all tool/results (adjacency). ACP codec maps rejected→cancelled.

A worked native-plugin example (interception.spec.ts) proves all four seams compose
end-to-end through the real loop with NO hook/* events (those belong to the bridge
lib). All existing tools/execute + turn-continuation tests migrated. The
tool-subagent abort test now aborts after a microtask so it still exercises the
live onAbort bridge (execute() awaits pre-execute before the body runs).

RFCs: implemented/feature/2026-06-30-interception-seams.md (the reshape) +
proposed/feature/2026-06-30-pre-tool-input-rewrite.md (the deferred rewrite design).

docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-06-30-pre-tool-input-rewrite.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# RFC: Pre-tool input rewrite — a consistent design (proposed)
+
+Status: proposed (2026-06-30)
+
+<!-- XXX: legacy ADR/RFC body format, not yet normalized to a unified RFC template. -->
+
+## Context
+
+The [interception-seams RFC](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-30-interception-seams.md) added `tools/pre-execute` returning a `PreToolDecision` (allow/deny/ask) — but deliberately NOT input rewrite (a hook changing a tool call's `arguments` before it runs). Claude Code's `PreToolUse` hook offers an `updatedInput`, so a faithful CC bridge wants the same. This RFC designs that, separately, because doing it consistently is a real problem — not a field to bolt onto the allow decision.
+
+## The problem: three readers of pre-execution arguments
+
+In the loop, a tool call's arguments are committed to the log and read by live consumers BEFORE the tool executes:
+
+1. **`assistant/message`** is appended before tool dispatch — it is the model-history source `deriveMessages()` replays, so it carries the tool-call arguments the model itself emitted.
+2. **`tool/call`** is the durable AUDIT record, appended before `ctx.tools.execute()`.
+3. **Live presentation reads `tool/call.arguments`**: the ACP bridge remembers them and passes them to `presentResult`; `dsh-tool-bash` derives the card title, the rawInput, the cwd, and the terminal-vs-background treatment from them.
+
+So an "input rewrite" that changes ONLY what executes would make the UI show one command while another RAN, and render result state against the wrong arguments — a real inconsistency, not a documentable gap. (The existing low-level capability to mutate `exec.arguments` in a listener has exactly this latent inconsistency; it is unadvertised precisely because of this.)
+
+## Proposed design (sketch — to validate against the code when built)
+
+Treat input rewrite as a consistency unit: when a `pre-execute` hook supplies `updatedInput`, the rewrite must be reflected in ALL three readers, atomically, before execution:
+
+- The `tool/call` audit event records the REWRITTEN arguments (with the original retained in a sidecar field for the audit trail — a hook changed the call, and both the original and the effective arguments are facts worth keeping).
+- The `assistant/message` in derived history must agree with what executed — options to evaluate: rewrite the assistant message's tool-call block in place (changes what the model "sees it said"), or record a separate correction the next request carries. The CC model is that the model sees the rewrite took effect.
+- Presentation (`presentCall`/`presentResult`) reads the rewritten arguments, so the UI shows what actually ran.
+
+The shape would extend `PreToolDecision` with an allow-variant `arguments` (or a dedicated `{kind:'rewrite', arguments}`), and the loop would thread the rewrite through the three readers above rather than only into `ctx.tools.execute()`.
+
+## Why not now
+
+The interception-seams RFC notes input rewrite "fought the code across two review rounds" — the signal AGENTS.md names for an over-reaching change. Shipping allow/deny/ask first keeps the seam honest (no advertised contract that silently desyncs the UI), and a CC/Codex bridge that receives an `updatedInput` logs it and surfaces a faithful-but-degraded warning (like `ask`→deny) until this lands. This RFC is the home for the consistent design; `TODO(pre-tool-input-rewrite)` in the loop's pre-execute call site anchors it.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- Does rewriting the `assistant/message` tool-call block corrupt any provider's expectation on replay, or is a separate correction safer?
+- Should the original arguments be preserved on the `tool/call` event (audit) and, if so, under what field?
+- How does this interact with a future permission `ask` flow (a user approving a rewritten call)?