Merge branch 'master' into docs/third-party-notices

.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-session-end-seed-log-boundary.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-session-end-seed-log-boundary.md
-2026-07-30-session-end-seed-log-boundary.md: 837531ba0bd3ecf404eb47ee933438546c682a54
-2026-07-30-session-end-seed-log-boundary.zh.md: 33680c1845364de62e5b53ead13de418a389f908
+2026-07-30-session-end-seed-log-boundary.md: 268646e192d0b8e0a5dde03957a18ef155b7038e
+2026-07-30-session-end-seed-log-boundary.zh.md: dca87e16de5e567ff85d2b32b8243f76ebed1c4a

.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-session-end-seed-log-boundary.md

@@ -14,13 +14,13 @@ Crash repair does not close the gap and must not: `interruptedTurnClosers` synth
 
 ## Decision
 
-`Session`'s constructor appends the log-only `session/end-seed` event immediately after a non-empty constructor seed, as the seeded session's first live write at the seq `firstLiveSeq` names. The event is the durable projection of that field: `firstLiveSeq` answers where this lifecycle's writes start for a consumer holding the object, while `session/end-seed` answers the same question for one holding only stored bytes. Its payload is empty — position and `time` carry the whole meaning — and it is not a `SurfaceEventType`, so it produces no message and cannot perturb derived history.
+`Session`'s constructor appends the log-only `session/end-seed` event immediately after an explicitly supplied constructor seed, including an empty one, as the seeded session's first live write at the seq `firstLiveSeq` names. The event is the durable projection of that field: `firstLiveSeq` answers where this lifecycle's writes start for a consumer holding the object, while `session/end-seed` answers the same question for one holding only stored bytes. Its payload is empty — position and `time` carry the whole meaning — and it is not a `SurfaceEventType`, so it produces no message and cannot perturb derived history. The seq-0 marker distinguishes an empty resumed session from a genuinely fresh session, preventing new-session defaults from being applied during resume.
 
 A bracket owner reads it positionally: an unmatched opening marker before `session/end-seed` has a smaller seq, came from the constructor seed, and belongs to a lifecycle that has ended. Core writes the boundary and reads nothing from it; each bracket's vocabulary stays with its owning plugin, so no core predicate helper ships without a consumer to shape it.
 
 The constructor is the placement because it is the single waist every seeded session passes through. All six entry points reach it: `agents.resume()`, config-driven startup on a persisted id (`restoreOrCreateConfigured`), `sessions.fork()`, a subagent fork child, `coordinator.adopt()`'s live-prefix path, and a bare `sessions.create(id, {seed})`. A boundary written at persistence load would miss both fork paths — and a forked child inheriting a still-running parent's open `compact/start` is precisely the case that must be classifiable. A boundary written at loop start would miss `fork()` and `adopt()`, and would have to fire on `SessionStartSource: 'startup'`, which is what a fork child publishes, so that field would stop discriminating.
 
-Two guards keep the marker from becoming noise. An empty seed writes nothing because there is no seed to end. A seed already ending in one is not re-marked, which makes the write idempotent. Idempotence is load-bearing rather than tidiness — `agentFor()` resumes a cold session on first touch, so merely opening one in a client is a pickup, and without the guard browsing would grow a log by one event per visit.
+Two guards keep the marker precise. An omitted seed writes nothing because the session is fresh. A seed already ending in one is not re-marked, which makes the write idempotent. Idempotence is load-bearing rather than tidiness — `agentFor()` resumes a cold session on first touch, so merely opening one in a client is a pickup, and without the guard browsing would grow a log by one event per visit.
 
 ## Persistence needs no changes
 
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ The predicate holds for a bracket *this* session inherited, not as a liveness si
 
 Bought: one boundary, written in one place, correct for all six seeded-start paths — including the fork gap the persistence-layer version could not reach. The persistence packages keep a pure read path. `firstLiveSeq` gains a durable twin rather than a second, competing notion of the same boundary.
 
-Cost: a seeded session's log is one event longer, which moved seq expectations in tests across nine packages (session, agent-loop, persistence contract, jsonl, session-query, session-title, subagent-inprocess, telemetry, token-meter). Two of those updates are load-bearing rather than mechanical: telemetry's adoption tests now assert the boundary IS exported, because it is this lifecycle's own write, and the property suite's replay invariant is restated as "seed reproduced verbatim, plus one log-only boundary" with idempotence added as its own property.
+Cost: a seeded session's log is one event longer, including an empty resumed log. Seq expectations move with that boundary. Two updates are load-bearing rather than mechanical: telemetry's adoption tests assert the boundary IS exported, because it is this lifecycle's own write, and the property suite's replay invariant is "seed reproduced verbatim, plus one log-only boundary" with idempotence as its own property.
 
 `session/end-seed` joins the on-disk vocabulary. Under the pre-release stance (`SESSION_FORMAT_VERSION` pinned at `0`, no compatibility promise) older logs simply lack it, and a log without a boundary correctly classifies nothing as constructor-seed history.
 

.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-session-end-seed-log-boundary.zh.md

@@ -14,13 +14,13 @@ Status: implemented
 
 ## Decision
 
-`Session` 的构造函数紧接非空构造种子之后追加仅日志事件 `session/end-seed`，作为带种子会话的第一次实时写入，位置正是 `firstLiveSeq` 指出的 seq。该事件是那个字段的持久投影：`firstLiveSeq` 为持有对象的消费方回答本生命周期的写入从哪里开始，`session/end-seed` 则为只持有存储字节的消费方回答同一问题。它的 payload 为空——位置与 `time` 承载全部含义——并且不是 `SurfaceEventType`，因此不产生消息，也无法扰动派生历史。
+`Session` 的构造函数紧接显式传入的构造种子（包括空种子）之后追加仅日志事件 `session/end-seed`，作为带种子会话的第一次实时写入，位置正是 `firstLiveSeq` 指出的 seq。该事件是那个字段的持久投影：`firstLiveSeq` 为持有对象的消费方回答本生命周期的写入从哪里开始，`session/end-seed` 则为只持有存储字节的消费方回答同一问题。它的 payload 为空——位置与 `time` 承载全部含义——并且不是 `SurfaceEventType`，因此不产生消息，也无法扰动派生历史。这个 seq-0 标记把从空日志恢复的会话与真正的全新会话区分开来，从而防止恢复期间应用新会话默认值。
 
 括号所有方按位置读取它：在 `session/end-seed` 之前的未配对开启标记具有更小的 seq，来自构造种子，并且属于一个已结束的生命周期。核心写入该边界但不从中读取任何内容；每个括号的词汇表仍归其所属插件，因此在没有消费方来塑形之前，核心不会先发布谓词辅助函数。
 
 选择构造函数，是因为它是每一个带种子会话都必经的唯一收窄处。全部六个入口都会到达它：`agents.resume()`、在已持久化 id 上的配置驱动启动（`restoreOrCreateConfigured`）、`sessions.fork()`、子代理 fork 子会话、`coordinator.adopt()` 的实时前缀路径，以及裸的 `sessions.create(id, {seed})`。在持久化加载时写入的边界会漏掉两条 fork 路径——而一个继承了仍在运行的父会话开放 `compact/start` 的 fork 子会话，恰恰是必须可判定的场景。在 loop 启动时写入的边界会漏掉 `fork()` 与 `adopt()`，并且不得不在 `SessionStartSource: 'startup'` 上触发——那正是 fork 子会话发布的取值，于是该字段将不再具有区分力。
 
-两条守卫让这个标记不至于变成噪声。空种子不写入任何内容，因为没有种子需要结束。种子本身已以该事件结尾时不会重复标记，这让写入具备幂等性。幂等性是承重的，而不是为了整洁——`agentFor()` 会在首次触碰时恢复一个冷会话，因此在客户端里仅仅打开一个会话就是一次接手；没有这条守卫，浏览会让日志每访问一次就增长一个事件。
+两条守卫让这个标记保持精确。省略种子时不写入任何内容，因为这是全新会话。种子本身已以该事件结尾时不会重复标记，这让写入具备幂等性。幂等性是承重的，而不是为了整洁——`agentFor()` 会在首次触碰时恢复一个冷会话，因此在客户端里仅仅打开一个会话就是一次接手；没有这条守卫，浏览会让日志每访问一次就增长一个事件。
 
 ## 持久化无需任何改动
 
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Status: implemented
 
 买到的：一条边界，在一处写入，对全部六条带种子启动路径都正确——包括持久化层方案触及不到的 fork 缺口。持久化各包保留纯读取路径。`firstLiveSeq` 获得一个持久孪生体，而不是关于同一边界的第二套彼此竞争的概念。
 
-代价：带种子会话的日志长了一个事件，这在九个包（session、agent-loop、持久化契约、jsonl、session-query、session-title、subagent-inprocess、telemetry、token-meter）里挪动了 seq 期望。其中两处更新是承重的而非机械的：telemetry 的收养测试现在断言该边界*会*被导出，因为它是本生命周期的自有写入；而属性测试套件的重放不变式被重述为"种子逐字节复现，外加一个仅日志边界"，并把幂等性补成一条独立属性。
+代价：带种子会话的日志长了一个事件，空日志恢复也包括在内。seq 期望会随这条边界移动。两处更新是承重的而非机械的：telemetry 的收养测试断言该边界*会*被导出，因为它是本生命周期的自有写入；属性测试套件的回放不变式则是"种子逐字节复现，外加一个仅日志边界"，并把幂等性作为独立属性。
 
 `session/end-seed` 加入了落盘词汇表。在预发布立场下（`SESSION_FORMAT_VERSION` 固定为 `0`，不作兼容承诺），更旧的日志只是没有它，而没有边界的日志会正确地判定没有任何内容属于构造种子历史。
 

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-31-gui-full-access-confirmation.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-31-gui-full-access-confirmation.md
-2026-07-31-gui-full-access-confirmation.md: 8208a20bee9b9ab8f1e73720790e3e5be4c27306
-2026-07-31-gui-full-access-confirmation.zh.md: 8ac115034f562fe96d53bdba010b05648d4d5947
+2026-07-31-gui-full-access-confirmation.md: ca89ed23fb1b5c6ea438dd22fdf20d2b82af754c
+2026-07-31-gui-full-access-confirmation.zh.md: 0f487e41b544718bdf38de611a1ab2d59c44b063

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-31-gui-full-access-confirmation.md

@@ -6,25 +6,26 @@ English | [中文](2026-07-31-gui-full-access-confirmation.zh.md)
 
 ## Problem
 
-Switching the web client to `danger-full-access` was a single click on either permission surface (the composer's Access chip and the `/permission` popup picker), with the preset shown as the title-cased machine name `Danger Full Access`. Full access reduces confirmation steps and lets the agent run sensitive operations, modify files, or execute external commands, so an accidental pick armed the most dangerous preset with no deliberate acknowledgement step.
+Switching the web client to `danger-full-access` was a single click on a permission picker, with the preset shown as the title-cased machine name `Danger Full Access`. Full access reduces confirmation steps and lets the agent run sensitive operations, modify files, or execute external commands, so an accidental pick armed the most dangerous preset with no deliberate acknowledgement step.
 
 ## Decision
 
-**Both permission surfaces gate `danger-full-access` behind one shared in-page `RiskConfirmation` dialog whose enabling action stays disabled until an explicit acknowledgement checkbox is checked; the preset renders under the product label `Full access`; every dismissal path submits nothing.**
+**Every permission picker gates `danger-full-access` behind the shared in-page `RiskConfirmation` dialog whose enabling action stays disabled until an explicit acknowledgement checkbox is checked; the preset renders under the product label `Full access`; every dismissal path submits nothing.**
 
 - `RiskConfirmation` (ui-primitives) is a controlled Modal composition: title, description, acknowledgement checkbox, cancel, and a confirm button disabled until `acknowledged`. It stays an in-page dialog — the Modal portals to this document's body and never opens a native or separate browser window that could land on another display. `Modal` gains a `contentClassName` seat so the warning body scrolls inside constrained mobile/landscape viewports while the action row stays fixed.
 - The composer chip (`PermissionSelect`, ui-conversation) intercepts a Full-access pick before the `/permission` submit: `confirmation`/`acknowledged` component state opens the dialog, confirm submits `/permission danger-full-access` through the same injected `command` path as every other pick, and cancel/Escape/close/mask leave the current preset untouched with the checkbox reset. The confirmation revokes itself when the session locks (`locked`/value-absent effect) and resets across task switches (`key={sessionId}` remount). Copy rides the standard `conversation` locale seat as `access.confirm.*` keys.
 - The `/permission` popup (ui-permission over the ui-command shell) gates through data, not a second dialog implementation: `SelectOption` grows an optional `confirmation` payload, the popup controller owns the `confirming`/`acknowledged` state transitions, and `PopupSelectView` swaps the picker card for the same `RiskConfirmation` while a gated option is pending.
-- `Full access` intentionally overrides the kebab-to-title display transform on both surfaces (option rows, trigger label, settled command rows keep the machine name on the wire); the warning body remains locale-aware in Chinese and English.
+- The General-settings Permission row uses the same controlled `RiskConfirmation` before persisting Full access as the default for later sessions. Its warning names that future-session lifetime; cancel, Escape, close, and mask dismissal leave the stored default untouched.
+- `Full access` intentionally overrides the kebab-to-title display transform in every picker; command and Settings writes keep the machine name on the wire, and each warning body remains locale-aware in Chinese and English.
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 
 **A native/OS or separate-window confirmation.** Rejected: the dialog must stay inside the current WebUI window; a second window can appear on another display and detaches the decision from the page state it guards.
 
-**One shared locale namespace for both surfaces' safety copy.** Rejected: the ui-permission bundle and ui-conversation load independently, so each registers the same copy under its own namespace (`permission.access` beside the conversation dictionary); the duplication is fenced with an explanatory `jscpd:ignore` block rather than a cross-bundle import.
+**One shared locale namespace for every surface's safety copy.** Rejected: the ui-permission bundle and ui-conversation load independently, while the Settings warning names a different future-session lifetime. Each bundle owns its copy, and ui-permission keeps the popup and Settings dictionaries separate rather than importing across bundle boundaries.
 
 **Gating in the host/permission backend.** Out of scope by design: the change is browser-client confirmation flow only; backend permission semantics, defaults, and the safer presets' one-click behavior are unchanged.
 
 ## Consequences
 
-Every visible GUI path into Full access now requires a deliberate, informed acknowledgement, at the cost of one extra dialog step for users who genuinely want the preset. New pickers reuse the gate by attaching a `confirmation` payload (popup path) or the chip's state machine (composer path) instead of inventing bespoke dialogs. Acceptance: the composer flow's four gated cases in `input-bar.spec.tsx`, the popup gate in `popup-view.spec.tsx` and `popup.spec.ts`, the Modal/RiskConfirmation contract in `atoms.spec.tsx`, and the assembled `access-confirmation` web e2e whose golden pins the product-default Chinese dictionary copy.
+Every visible GUI path into Full access requires a deliberate, informed acknowledgement, at the cost of one extra dialog step for users who genuinely want the preset. New pickers reuse the shared dialog through their owning state machine or attach a `confirmation` payload to the popup path. Acceptance: the composer flow's gated cases in `input-bar.spec.tsx`, the popup gate in `popup-view.spec.tsx` and `popup.spec.ts`, the default-setting gate in `permission-row.spec.tsx`, the Modal/RiskConfirmation contract in `atoms.spec.tsx`, and the assembled Web replays.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-31-gui-full-access-confirmation.zh.md

@@ -6,25 +6,26 @@ Status: implemented
 
 ## Problem
 
-Web 客户端切换到 `danger-full-access` 在两个权限面（编辑器的 Access chip 与 `/permission` popup 选择器）上都只需一次点击，且预设以 Title Case 机器名 `Danger Full Access` 展示。Full access 会减少确认步骤，允许智能体执行敏感操作、修改文件或运行外部命令，误点即在毫无刻意确认环节的情况下启用了最危险的预设。
+在 Web 客户端的权限选择器中切换到 `danger-full-access` 只需一次点击，且预设以 Title Case 机器名 `Danger Full Access` 展示。Full access 会减少确认步骤，允许智能体执行敏感操作、修改文件或运行外部命令，误点即在毫无刻意确认环节的情况下启用了最危险的预设。
 
 ## Decision
 
-**两个权限面都把 `danger-full-access` 关进同一个共享的页面内 `RiskConfirmation` 对话框：启用按钮在用户勾选明确的风险确认复选框前保持禁用；预设以产品标签 `Full access` 展示；所有取消路径都不提交任何命令。**
+**每个权限选择器都把 `danger-full-access` 关进共享的页面内 `RiskConfirmation` 对话框：启用按钮在用户勾选明确的风险确认复选框前保持禁用；预设以产品标签 `Full access` 展示；所有取消路径都不作任何提交。**
 
 - `RiskConfirmation`（ui-primitives）是受控的 Modal 组合：标题、说明、确认复选框、取消，以及 `acknowledged` 勾选前禁用的确认按钮。它始终是页面内对话框——Modal portal 到本文档 body，绝不打开可能落在另一块显示器上的原生或独立浏览器窗口。`Modal` 新增 `contentClassName` 座位，令警示正文在受限的移动端／横屏视口内滚动，动作行保持固定。
 - 编辑器 chip（ui-conversation 的 `PermissionSelect`）在 `/permission` 提交前拦截 Full-access 选择：`confirmation`/`acknowledged` 组件状态打开对话框，确认后经与其他选择完全相同的注入 `command` 通道提交 `/permission danger-full-access`；取消、Escape、关闭与遮罩点击均保持当前预设不变并重置复选框。会话锁定时确认自行撤销（`locked`／值缺席 effect），切换任务时随 `key={sessionId}` 重挂载而重置。文案经标准 `conversation` locale 座位以 `access.confirm.*` 键供给。
 - `/permission` popup（ui-permission 骑在 ui-command 外壳上）以数据而非第二套对话框实现完成把关：`SelectOption` 新增可选的 `confirmation` 载荷，popup 控制器拥有 `confirming`/`acknowledged` 状态迁移，`PopupSelectView` 在门控选项未决期间把选择卡换成同一个 `RiskConfirmation`。
-- `Full access` 在两个面上有意覆盖 kebab 转 Title Case 的显示变换（选项行、触发器标签；落定的命令行仍在 wire 上保留机器名）；警示正文保持中英文 locale 感知。
+- 「通用」设置中的「权限」行在把 Full access 持久化为后续会话的默认值前，也使用同一个受控 `RiskConfirmation`。警示会明确说明该设置只影响后续会话；取消、Escape、关闭与点击遮罩均不会改动已存默认值。
+- `Full access` 在每个选择器中都有意覆盖 kebab 转 Title Case 的显示变换；命令与 Settings 写入在 wire 上保留机器名，每份警示正文都保持中英文 locale 感知。
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 
 **原生／操作系统或独立窗口确认。** 已拒：对话框必须留在当前 WebUI 窗口内；第二个窗口可能出现在另一块显示器上，使决策脱离其守护的页面状态。
 
-**两个面共享一个安全文案 locale namespace。** 已拒：ui-permission bundle 与 ui-conversation 可独立加载，故各自在自己的 namespace 下注册同一份文案（`permission.access` 与 conversation 词典并立）；这处重复以带说明的 `jscpd:ignore` 块圈护，而非跨 bundle import。
+**每个面的安全文案共享一个 locale namespace。** 已拒：ui-permission bundle 与 ui-conversation 可独立加载，而 Settings 警示说明的是另一种只影响后续会话的生效周期。每个 bundle 各自拥有文案，ui-permission 也将 popup 与 Settings 词典分开，而非跨 bundle 边界 import。
 
 **在 host／权限后端把关。** 设计上即出界：本变更只涉浏览器客户端确认流；后端权限语义、默认值与更安全预设的一键行为均不变。
 
 ## Consequences
 
-进入 Full access 的每条可见 GUI 路径现在都要求刻意且知情的确认，代价是真想启用该预设的用户多一步对话框。新的选择器复用此门：popup 路径挂 `confirmation` 载荷、编辑器路径走 chip 的状态机，而不是各造对话框。验收：`input-bar.spec.tsx` 中编辑器流的四个门控用例、`popup-view.spec.tsx` 与 `popup.spec.ts` 的 popup 门、`atoms.spec.tsx` 的 Modal/RiskConfirmation 契约，以及组装态 `access-confirmation` web e2e——其 golden 钉住产品默认中文词典文案。
+进入 Full access 的每条可见 GUI 路径现在都要求刻意且知情的确认，代价是真想启用该预设的用户多一步对话框。新的选择器通过各自拥有的状态机复用共享对话框，或在 popup 路径挂 `confirmation` 载荷。验收：`input-bar.spec.tsx` 中编辑器流的门控用例、`popup-view.spec.tsx` 与 `popup.spec.ts` 的 popup 门、`permission-row.spec.tsx` 的默认设置门控、`atoms.spec.tsx` 的 Modal/RiskConfirmation 契约，以及组装态 Web 回放。

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-31-permission-default-for-new-sessions.i18n.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
+# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
+# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
+#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-31-permission-default-for-new-sessions.md
+2026-07-31-permission-default-for-new-sessions.md: 35812b53d0c1448afd95b9a063eda6658fb1bef3
+2026-07-31-permission-default-for-new-sessions.zh.md: a75deaec323b57f2bc88e84dd4d5c7d7d98cd177

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-31-permission-default-for-new-sessions.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# Agent Note: Permission Settings default for new sessions
+
+Status: implemented
+
+English | [中文](2026-07-31-permission-default-for-new-sessions.zh.md)
+
+## Problem
+
+The Web General-settings page displayed Permission as a disabled skeleton even though `dsh-permission` already owned the preset table and current-session switch path. The Settings seam could persist a plugin-owned value, but the Web settings API exposed only configurable LLM-provider namespaces. More importantly, treating a user preference as a live global permission would make an existing session's execution policy change outside its durable log.
+
+## Decision
+
+`dsh-permission` owns a `permission` Settings namespace with one `defaultPreset` field. Its base value is `Config.defaultPreset`, or the preset matching the composed sandbox and approval defaults when the config omits it. The schema derives its enum from the configured preset table, so Settings validates stored values and the Web client discovers the deployment's actual choices without duplicating them.
+
+The service reads the current Settings value synchronously at `session/created`. A genuinely fresh session receives three explicit events: `permission/preset`, `sandbox/mode`, and `approval/policy`. Those facts pin the permission selected at creation, so a later Settings change affects only later sessions. A seeded or partially initialized session preserves its effective knobs and receives only missing facts; it never adopts the latest user default while resuming. `Session` marks even an explicitly empty constructor seed with `session/end-seed`, so an empty persisted log cannot be mistaken for a fresh session.
+
+The existing `/permission` command and `permissions` projection remain the current-session path. The browser plugin now contributes the Permission row to `settings.general.item`, reads the dynamic enum from the redacted Settings descriptor, and writes only `defaultPreset` through a revision-checked `settings.mutate`. The row injects its observable through the slot `hooks` compartment instead of binding a renderer-specific hook, and the Permission service sweeps already-live sessions when it mounts so HMR cannot leave an unpinned session. The ownerless General-settings package contributes no placeholder rows.
+
+ApiProxy explicitly adds `permission` to its Web settings allowlist beside the configurable-provider namespaces. This is a local boundary decision, not a general registration flag or a `local-client` access model: registering another Settings namespace still does not expose it. Permission changes emit `host/settings-changed` but not `host/models-changed`.
+
+## Consequences
+
+Changing Permission in Settings updates `settings.yaml` and the selector immediately, but does not alter the open session. Every later session is reconstructable from its three pinned permission facts, including after the user changes the default again or the process restarts. Deployments whose composed sandbox and approval defaults match no preset must configure `defaultPreset` explicitly.
+
+The assembled Web snapshot now contains a functional Permission selector. Its keyless browser scenario writes `read-only`, verifies an existing `danger-full-access` session is unchanged, and verifies a subsequently created session starts with the read-only event triplet.
+
+## Alternatives considered
+
+**Apply the Settings value live to every session.** Rejected because execution policy would change without a session event and replay could not reconstruct which permission governed an earlier tool call.
+
+**Record only `permission/preset` on creation.** Rejected because sandbox and approval are independently owned whole-value knobs; pinning all three facts keeps their consumers independent of future composition-default changes.
+
+**Expose all Settings registrations, or add a generic `local-client` declaration.** Rejected for this change because it expands a security boundary and the Settings contract beyond the one requested preference. The explicit `permission` allowlist entry is sufficient and leaves future namespaces to make their own exposure decision.
+
+**Apply the latest default while resuming a seeded session.** Rejected because resume must preserve the session's prior effective execution policy; missing legacy facts are materialized from that policy instead.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-31-permission-default-for-new-sessions.zh.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# Agent Note: 新会话的权限 Settings 默认值
+
+Status: implemented
+
+[English](2026-07-31-permission-default-for-new-sessions.md) | 中文
+
+## 问题
+
+Web「通用」设置页将「权限」显示为禁用的骨架控件，尽管 `dsh-permission` 已经拥有 preset 表和当前会话的切换路径。Settings seam 可以持久化由插件拥有的值，但 Web Settings API 只暴露可配置 LLM 提供方的 namespace。更重要的是，如果把用户偏好当成实时生效的全局权限，现有会话的执行策略就会在其持久日志之外发生变化。
+
+## 决策
+
+`dsh-permission` 拥有一个 `permission` Settings namespace，其中只有 `defaultPreset` 字段。它的基础值是 `Config.defaultPreset`；省略该配置时，则使用与组合后的沙箱和审批默认值匹配的 preset。schema 的 enum 从已配置的 preset 表派生，因此 Settings 既能校验已存储的值，Web 客户端也能发现部署中的实际选项，而无需重复定义。
+
+服务会在 `session/created` 时同步读取当前 Settings 值。真正的新会话会收到三个显式事件：`permission/preset`、`sandbox/mode` 和 `approval/policy`。这些事实将创建时选中的权限固定下来，因此后续 Settings 变更只影响之后的会话。带 seed 或只完成部分初始化的会话会保留其有效调节项，只补齐缺失的事实；恢复时绝不会采用最新的用户默认值。`Session` 甚至会用 `session/end-seed` 标记显式为空的构造器 seed，因此不能把空的持久化日志误认为新会话。
+
+现有 `/permission` 命令和 `permissions` 投影仍是当前会话的操作路径。浏览器插件现在向 `settings.general.item` 贡献「权限」行，从脱敏后的 Settings 描述符读取动态 enum，并只通过经过 revision 校验的 `settings.mutate` 写入 `defaultPreset`。该行通过 slot 的 `hooks` 格注入 observable，而不是绑定渲染器专用钩子；权限服务挂载时会遍历并固定所有已存活会话，因此 HMR（热模块替换）不会遗留未固定的会话。无归属的「通用」设置包不贡献任何占位行。
+
+ApiProxy 在可配置提供方 namespace 之外，将 `permission` 显式加入 Web Settings allowlist。这是局部的边界决策，而不是通用注册标志或 `local-client` 访问模型：注册其他 Settings namespace 仍不会将其暴露。权限变更会发出 `host/settings-changed`，但不会发出 `host/models-changed`。
+
+## 后果
+
+在 Settings 中更改「权限」会立即更新 `settings.yaml` 和选择器，但不会改变已打开的会话。之后的每个会话都可以从三个已固定的权限事实中重建，即使用户再次更改默认值或进程重启也不受影响。如果部署中组合后的沙箱和审批默认值与任何 preset 都不匹配，则必须显式配置 `defaultPreset`。
+
+组装后的 Web 快照现在包含功能完整的「权限」选择器。其无密钥浏览器场景会写入 `read-only`，验证现有的 `danger-full-access` 会话保持不变，并验证随后创建的会话以 read-only 事件三元组启动。
+
+## 曾考虑的替代方案
+
+**将 Settings 值实时应用于每个会话。** 不予采纳，因为执行策略会在没有会话事件的情况下改变，重放也无法重建先前工具调用采用了哪种权限。
+
+**创建时只记录 `permission/preset`。** 不予采纳，因为沙箱和审批是由不同组件独立拥有的全量值调节项；固定全部三个事实，可以让其消费方不依赖未来的组合默认值变化。
+
+**暴露所有 Settings 注册，或增加通用的 `local-client` 声明。** 本次变更不予采纳，因为这会扩大安全边界，并使 Settings 契约超出所请求的单项偏好。显式加入 `permission` allowlist 已足够，未来的 namespace 可以各自决定是否暴露。
+
+**恢复带 seed 的会话时应用最新默认值。** 不予采纳，因为恢复操作必须保留会话先前的有效执行策略；缺失的旧版事实应从该策略中补齐。