fix(scope): align trust and input boundaries
Rewrite the agent-scope RFC with executable examples and an explicit security non-goal. Harden subagent scalar and depth validation, and pin live tool-filter semantics across code, tests, and generated docs.
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@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ The model-facing `subagent` tool: delegate a self-contained task to a child agen
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This plugin binds to **exactly one** provider (`Config.provider`). The model sees only `{ description, prompt }` — there is no provider/type parameter in the schema. To expose more than one transport, load the plugin more than once, each bound to a different provider **and a distinct `toolName`** (the tool registry rejects a duplicate name, so a second load that kept the default `subagent` name would throw). Keeping selection in config (not the schema) is the deliberate split: the *service* holds a multi-provider registry; the *tool* picks one.
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## The description states the provider's context contract
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## The description states the provider's conversation-history descriptor
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The tool description and the `prompt` parameter description are DERIVED from the bound provider's `inheritsParentContext` (`providerWording`): a fresh-context provider (spawn, ACP) gets the standalone-prompt wording ("it does not see this conversation"), an inheriting provider (fork) tells the model the child already sees the conversation's completed turns and its prompt should state only what is new. Because the description is fixed at tool registration, the tool **mirrors the provider's lifecycle** (`subagent/provider-added`/`-removed`): it registers when the bound provider is (or becomes) available and unregisters when the provider goes away — no load-order requirement (the cordis Loader starts sibling entries concurrently, so "listed first" never guaranteed "registered first"), and an HMR reload of the backend re-derives the wording from the fresh provider. While the provider is absent the tool simply does not exist (a `ctx.logger` note records the wait; a typo'd provider name shows up as a tool that never materializes).
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The tool description and the `prompt` parameter description are DERIVED from the bound provider's `inheritsParentContext` (`providerWording`): a fresh-conversation provider (spawn, ACP) gets the standalone-prompt wording ("it does not see this conversation"), while fork tells the model the child is seeded with the conversation's completed turns and its prompt should state only what is new. The descriptor concerns conversation history only, not tool or authority inheritance. Because the description is fixed at tool registration, the tool **mirrors the provider's lifecycle** (`subagent/provider-added`/`-removed`): it registers when the bound provider is (or becomes) available and unregisters when the provider goes away — no load-order requirement (the cordis Loader starts sibling plugins concurrently, so "listed first" never guaranteed "registered first"), and an HMR reload of the backend re-derives the wording from the fresh provider. While the provider is absent the tool simply does not exist (a `ctx.logger` note records the wait; a typo'd provider name shows up as a tool that never materializes).
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| Config key | Meaning |
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|---|---|
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@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ The tool description and the `prompt` parameter description are DERIVED from the
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| `agentOptions` | Default per-child `{ model? }` applied to every spawned child. |
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| `persona` | Per-child persona that shadows the deployment persona; requires the provider's `persona` capability. |
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| `toolFilter` | Per-child `{ allow?, deny? }` restriction over global tools; requires the provider's `toolFilter` capability. |
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| `maxDepth` | Maximum delegation depth; a non-negative safe integer validated when this plugin loads. Requires the provider's `depthLimit` capability. |
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| `maxDepth` | Maximum absolute delegation-tree depth for every child this tool starts; a non-negative safe integer validated when this plugin loads. Requires the provider's `depthLimit` capability. |
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`toolFilter` uses [`ToolRegistry.restrict()`](../../core/tools/README.md)'s live global-view semantics and is not a parent-derived authority ceiling; see the [agent-scope security non-goal](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-07-08-agent-scope-contexts.md#security-and-authority-are-explicit-non-goals).
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## Lifecycle (synchronous collect)
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