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fix(scope): align trust and input boundaries

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Rewrite the agent-scope RFC with executable examples and an explicit security non-goal. Harden subagent scalar and depth validation, and pin live tool-filter semantics across code, tests, and generated docs.
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Tianyi Cui
2026-07-12 11:17:57 +08:00
parent d427478c44
commit cb03c8c284
29 changed files with 545 additions and 105 deletions
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docs/core-data-structures/tools.md
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@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ interface ToolExecution extends ToolExecutionInput {
}
```
`ToolExecutionToken` is a compile-time opaque type and a frozen, property-free object at runtime; identity comparison is its only operation. Before policy runs, `ctx.tools.execute()` reads each caller-owned field once, materializes `arguments` as detached lossless JSON in one recursive pass, assigns a fresh token, and deep-freezes the accepted arguments. A mutable exotic such as `Map` is rejected and normalized to an error before policy; one-pass materialization prevents a stateful getter from supplying different values to validation and storage. `token`, `callId`, `name`, `arguments`, `agent`, and the optional `parent` token are non-writable throughout all waterfalls, so a listener cannot change which capability or scope was authorized or reach a live enclosing execution; an around-dispatch wrapper may add, replace, or remove only optional `signal`. After the complete pipeline the registry freezes the execution and exposes its stable identity to `tools/result` observers, where the execution remains usable as a `WeakMap` key without mutation races.
`ToolExecutionToken` is a compile-time opaque type and a frozen, property-free object at runtime; identity comparison is its only operation. Before policy runs, `ctx.tools.execute()` reads each caller-owned field once, materializes `arguments` as detached lossless JSON in one recursive pass, assigns a fresh token, and deep-freezes the accepted arguments. A mutable exotic such as `Map` is rejected and normalized to an error before policy; one-pass materialization prevents a stateful getter from supplying different values to validation and storage. `token`, `callId`, `name`, `arguments`, `agent`, and the optional `parent` token are non-writable throughout all waterfalls, so a listener cannot change which tool or scope the pipeline accepted or reach a live enclosing execution; an around-dispatch wrapper may add, replace, or remove only optional `signal`. After the complete pipeline the registry freezes the execution and exposes its stable identity to `tools/result` observers, where the execution remains usable as a `WeakMap` key without mutation races.
A `ToolGuard` is scope-aware final pre-dispatch policy. Its shape deliberately has no allow result: `undefined` preserves the waterfall decision, while a returned reason can only reduce permission, so a later listener cannot undo it.