feat(example): sandbox-acp-agent — the live composition; RFCs to implemented
The three-entry cordis.yml (dsh-sandbox-local + dsh-bash-sandbox at a read-only default + dsh-approval) served over ACP: the first live approval composition. Recorded snapshot scenarios pin the wire end to end — config-options advertisement, the mode-switching arc as the suite pinned header (both switches, the prompt-section delta, one changed-by-the-user notice per knob, a confined write landing under the switched mode), and both escalation branches over scripted permissionAnswers (a grant runs confined under workspace-write; a rejection executes nothing and pins the fail-closed text). The with-key escalation e2e drives a real model + real runner + the real bridge answerer, world-verified; ci.yml snapshot lane and e2e.yml install bubblewrap so the confined replays actually execute. Both RFCs move to implemented/ (Decision/Consequences form, deferred phases tracked in their own sections), with every cross-reference flipped.
This commit is contained in:
kingwl
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
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# approval/ — approval family
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The asking half of permission handling: one seam through which the harness puts a one-shot question — "may this specific action proceed?" — to whatever answerers a deployment composes, with a closed outcome vocabulary and a fail-closed default. The full design: [the approval-seam RFC](../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md). All **product** packages.
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The asking half of permission handling: one seam through which the harness puts a one-shot question — "may this specific action proceed?" — to whatever answerers a deployment composes, with a closed outcome vocabulary and a fail-closed default. The full design: [the approval-seam RFC](../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md). All **product** packages.
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| Package | Role | ctx key |
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|---|---|---|
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| `approval/` | The `ApprovalService` mechanism (waterfall dispatch, cancellation, audit events) + the vocabulary (`ApprovalRequest`, `ApprovalOutcome`, `ApprovalRequestId`) + the per-session policy tier (`ApprovalPolicy` `'ask'`/`'never'`, the `'approval/policy'` event fold, the prepend gate — [sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)) | `ctx.approval` |
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| `approval/` | The `ApprovalService` mechanism (waterfall dispatch, cancellation, audit events) + the vocabulary (`ApprovalRequest`, `ApprovalOutcome`, `ApprovalRequestId`) + the per-session policy tier (`ApprovalPolicy` `'ask'`/`'never'`, the `'approval/policy'` event fold, the prepend gate — [sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)) | `ctx.approval` |
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Answerers live with their owners, not here: the ACP bridge ([`ui/acp`](../ui/acp/)) answers for the editor sessions it owns (and switches each session's policy over ACP config options); tests answer with inline scripted listeners. Consumers today: [`core/tools`](../core/tools/) routes `tools/pre-execute`'s `ask` through the seam (degrading to deny when it is not mounted), and the bash tool's sandbox escalation gate ([`bash/tool-bash`](../bash/tool-bash/), [sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)).
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Answerers live with their owners, not here: the ACP bridge ([`ui/acp`](../ui/acp/)) answers for the editor sessions it owns (and switches each session's policy over ACP config options); tests answer with inline scripted listeners. Consumers today: [`core/tools`](../core/tools/) routes `tools/pre-execute`'s `ask` through the seam (degrading to deny when it is not mounted), and the bash tool's sandbox escalation gate ([`bash/tool-bash`](../bash/tool-bash/), [sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)).
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@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ The contract in one line: `ctx.approval.request(req)` puts exactly one question
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The service is the mechanism, answerers are the policy. Answerers are `approval/request` waterfall listeners occupying a single decision slot: answer for an agent you own by returning an outcome without calling `next()`, or delegate an agent you don't recognize by calling `next()` — the chain's built-in default is `unavailable`, so a deployment with no answerer (headless, CI) fails closed with zero configuration. Registration order across sibling plugins is not load-order deterministic; compose one terminal answerer per deployment and use `prepend` listeners only for decide-or-delegate gates.
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The seam also owns the per-session POLICY tier ([the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)): `ApprovalPolicy` is `'ask'` (delegate to the answerers — the prior behavior exactly) or `'never'` (deterministically reject without prompting anyone; the strict CI/unattended stance), with `effective = fold(the session's 'approval/policy' events, last one wins) ?? Config.policy` — the session log is the store, written only through `setApprovalPolicy(session, policy)`. The service decides `'never'` inside `request()` itself, before dispatching the waterfall (`'never'` → `'rejected'` with the audit pair still landing; no listener registration, including a later `prepend`, can precede it), states `'never'` — and only `'never'` — in a per-agent prompt section (a "you will be prompted" promise under `'ask'` would overclaim what a headless composition can do; the section scope activates only when `systemPrompt` is composed), and narrates a policy switch to the model in at most one coalesced `agent/pre-step` notice, attributed positionally (an override event after the log's last `request/header*` reads `changed by the user`; a config drift reads `changed by the operator/config`).
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The seam also owns the per-session POLICY tier ([the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)): `ApprovalPolicy` is `'ask'` (delegate to the answerers — the prior behavior exactly) or `'never'` (deterministically reject without prompting anyone; the strict CI/unattended stance), with `effective = fold(the session's 'approval/policy' events, last one wins) ?? Config.policy` — the session log is the store, written only through `setApprovalPolicy(session, policy)`. The service decides `'never'` inside `request()` itself, before dispatching the waterfall (`'never'` → `'rejected'` with the audit pair still landing; no listener registration, including a later `prepend`, can precede it), states `'never'` — and only `'never'` — in a per-agent prompt section (a "you will be prompted" promise under `'ask'` would overclaim what a headless composition can do; the section scope activates only when `systemPrompt` is composed), and narrates a policy switch to the model in at most one coalesced `agent/pre-step` notice, attributed positionally (an override event after the log's last `request/header*` reads `changed by the user`; a config drift reads `changed by the operator/config`).
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One seam serves both ask paths of [the sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md): the `tools/pre-execute` `ask` decision (routed by [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools`](../../core/tools/) when this service is mounted; degrading to deny when it is not), and the sandbox post-denial escalated retry (the bash tool's `sandbox_permissions` gate in [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash`](../../bash/tool-bash/) — [the sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)). The full design: [the approval-seam RFC](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md).
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One seam serves both ask paths of [the sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md): the `tools/pre-execute` `ask` decision (routed by [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools`](../../core/tools/) when this service is mounted; degrading to deny when it is not), and the sandbox post-denial escalated retry (the bash tool's `sandbox_permissions` gate in [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash`](../../bash/tool-bash/) — [the sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)). The full design: [the approval-seam RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md).
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Answerers today: the ACP bridge ([`@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp`](../../ui/acp/)) forwards to the editor's `session/request_permission` prompt for agents it owns. The audit events are log-only session records — the model only ever sees the tool result the asker derives from the outcome.
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@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ Design surveyed against the bash tools of Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, and pi;
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## Sandboxing
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Execution policy does NOT belong in this package: this executor always runs commands unconfined. Confinement is [`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../bash-sandbox/README.md), which extends this executor verbatim and confines commands under the `ctx.sandbox` seam's bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt backends ([sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)); per-call allow/deny/ask policy belongs on the `tools/pre-execute` gate.
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Execution policy does NOT belong in this package: this executor always runs commands unconfined. Confinement is [`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../bash-sandbox/README.md), which extends this executor verbatim and confines commands under the `ctx.sandbox` seam's bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt backends ([sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)); per-call allow/deny/ask policy belongs on the `tools/pre-execute` gate.
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@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Semantics:
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- **Denials are result facts.** A failed run whose stderr carries the selected backend's own denial dialect — the signatures the provider stamps on every wrap (EROFS text under bwrap, EACCES under Landlock, EPERM under Seatbelt) — is reported as `BashRunResult.sandbox.denied: true` (conservative classification, read from the collected stderr tail); every CONFINED run also carries the mode it executed under (`result.sandbox.mode`) and the provider's enforcement completeness (`result.sandbox.enforcement`: `full`, or `partial` on an older Landlock ABI).
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- **Runner failures are sandbox failures, never task failures.** A failed run matching the wrap's `runnerFailureSignatures` (the runner's own error prefix — also what the shell prints for a missing runner) means the sandbox itself broke and the command NEVER RAN; the check outranks denial classification because a runner's error text can contain denial words. The foreground path re-throws it as the structured fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error, with the runner's first stderr line as the cause; a settled background task stamps `task.sandbox.runnerFailed` instead (no error channel remains after settle), which `bash_output` renders as its own marker.
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- **Config-time default, per-call policy.** The DEFAULT mode is fixed by this entry's config for the executor's lifetime; `resolve()` stamps it onto every spec, and an explicit request-level `sandboxMode` override — set by the tool layer only for a call whose wider mode a human granted through `ctx.approval` ([the sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)) — makes THAT call run, classify, and report under its own mode while every neighbor keeps the default (background facts are stamped per task at settle). The capability fact `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` reports the configured default so the tool layer advertises escalation only when this executor is mounted. The model learns of the sandbox only through result facts — the static bash tool description explains the denial marker; there is no current-mode statement in the system prompt.
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- **Config-time default, per-call policy.** The DEFAULT mode is fixed by this entry's config for the executor's lifetime; `resolve()` stamps it onto every spec, and an explicit request-level `sandboxMode` override — set by the tool layer only for a call whose wider mode a human granted through `ctx.approval` ([the sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)) — makes THAT call run, classify, and report under its own mode while every neighbor keeps the default (background facts are stamped per task at settle). The capability fact `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` reports the configured default so the tool layer advertises escalation only when this executor is mounted. The model learns of the sandbox only through result facts — the static bash tool description explains the denial marker; there is no current-mode statement in the system prompt.
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- **File effects only.** Network and process visibility are deliberately not restricted — the mode vocabulary does not pretend to cover what the backend does not enforce.
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- Process mechanics (spawn, process-group kills, output collection/spill, background tasks, credential scrub) are inherited verbatim from [`dsh-bash-local`](../bash-local/); the runner ladder, probes, and the per-platform Landlock launcher packages live with [`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../sandbox/sandbox-local/).
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@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
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*
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* Deny-only at the seam, escalation at the tool: a denial is a reported FACT
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* here, and the one-shot user-approved escalated retry of a denied action
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* (docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) is driven by
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* (docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) is driven by
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* `dsh-tool-bash` through `ctx.approval` — this executor's contribution is the
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* per-call `sandboxMode` override it honors in {@link resolve}: an escalated
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* call runs (and classifies, and reports) under ITS granted mode while every
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@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Implementations subclass `BashExecutor`, implement the abstract methods, and cal
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## Vocabulary
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`BashExecRequest` (command, workdir?, timeoutMs?, signal?, stdin?, env?, owner?, sandboxMode?) resolves to `BashExecSpec` (command, workdir, timeoutMs, signal?, stdin?, env?, owner, sandboxMode) before execution; `owner` and `sandboxMode` are optional on the request and **required-but-nullable** on the resolved spec, so a forgotten one is a visible `undefined` rather than a silently-absent property. `sandboxMode` is the explicit per-call sandbox-policy input: an escalation grant a human just issued ([the sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md), which outranks) or the session's standing override ([the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)); a sandboxing executor's `resolve()` stamps its configured default when the request carries none, and a non-sandboxing executor carries the field verbatim and confines nothing.
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`BashExecRequest` (command, workdir?, timeoutMs?, signal?, stdin?, env?, owner?, sandboxMode?) resolves to `BashExecSpec` (command, workdir, timeoutMs, signal?, stdin?, env?, owner, sandboxMode) before execution; `owner` and `sandboxMode` are optional on the request and **required-but-nullable** on the resolved spec, so a forgotten one is a visible `undefined` rather than a silently-absent property. `sandboxMode` is the explicit per-call sandbox-policy input: an escalation grant a human just issued ([the sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md), which outranks) or the session's standing override ([the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)); a sandboxing executor's `resolve()` stamps its configured default when the request carries none, and a non-sandboxing executor carries the field verbatim and confines nothing.
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The seam also owns the per-session mode override vocabulary (the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching): the log-only `'bash/sandbox-mode'` session event, the pure fold `effectiveSandboxMode(events)` (last event wins; `undefined` means "apply the executor default"), and THE write path `setSandboxMode(session, mode)` — the session log is the store, so an override survives restart by replay and two sessions can never see each other's mode. Writers must respect turn-enclosure: the ACP bridge anchors an idle switch at the next turn rather than appending between turns. The task id (`BashTaskId`) and the `owner` token (`OwnerToken`) are [branded](../../util/brand) — `OwnerToken` is a DISTINCT brand from `SessionId` (the seam never imports `dsh-session`; the `dsh-tool-bash` consumer is the single boundary that casts its `SessionId` into one). `run()` returns `BashRunResult` (exitCode, signal, timedOut, aborted, timeoutMs, stdout/stderr as `CollectedOutput`) and `start()`/`readOutput()` use `BashTask`/`BashTaskRead` for the background side. A sandboxing executor additionally stamps `sandbox` result facts on results and settled tasks (`BashSandboxInfo`: the mode it executed under, the conservative `denied` classification, and — for confined modes — the backend's `enforcement` completeness); the mode/enforcement vocabulary is owned by the [`dsh-sandbox`](../../sandbox/sandbox/) seam, and the facts are documented in [core-data-structures/bash.md](../../../docs/core-data-structures/bash.md). See `src/types.ts` for the full contracts.
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@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ The `BashExecRequest` seam carries optional `stdin` and `env`, used by the hooks
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Commands run with the executor's full authority unless a sandboxing executor ([`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../bash-sandbox/)) confines them — the deny-only sandbox reports denials as result facts, rendered here as the denial marker; per-call allow/deny/ask policy is the `tools/pre-execute` waterfall (see docs/architecture.md).
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On top of a denial sits the escalation gate ([the sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)): an escalating call (`sandbox_permissions` + `justification`) resolves [`ctx.approval`](../../approval/approval/README.md) BEFORE anything executes — `allowed-once` stamps the granted mode onto the bash request as the seam-level `sandboxMode` override (that one call runs, classifies, and reports under the wider mode; its neighbors keep the session's effective mode), while `rejected`/`cancelled`/`unavailable` and the no-service / no-agent paths each fail closed with their own error text and execute nothing. The seam is consumed opportunistically (`ctx.get('approval')`, the dsh-tools ask-routing pattern); the grant is consumed by the very call that asked, and nothing is stored. The static description teaches — and a denied result itself prompts, via the escalation-available marker appended exactly when the fields are advertised — the SAME-TURN flow: on a denial a wider mode would cure, retry the exact command once with `sandbox_permissions` (the narrowest mode that suffices) + `justification` immediately, without detouring through chat (the approval prompt IS the user's consent); never speculatively — an escalation is grounded in a real denial (up-front only when the session already denied the same access), a prompt-stated approvals-disabled policy turns the exception off entirely, and a rejected escalation is final for that command.
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On top of a denial sits the escalation gate ([the sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)): an escalating call (`sandbox_permissions` + `justification`) resolves [`ctx.approval`](../../approval/approval/README.md) BEFORE anything executes — `allowed-once` stamps the granted mode onto the bash request as the seam-level `sandboxMode` override (that one call runs, classifies, and reports under the wider mode; its neighbors keep the session's effective mode), while `rejected`/`cancelled`/`unavailable` and the no-service / no-agent paths each fail closed with their own error text and execute nothing. The seam is consumed opportunistically (`ctx.get('approval')`, the dsh-tools ask-routing pattern); the grant is consumed by the very call that asked, and nothing is stored. The static description teaches — and a denied result itself prompts, via the escalation-available marker appended exactly when the fields are advertised — the SAME-TURN flow: on a denial a wider mode would cure, retry the exact command once with `sandbox_permissions` (the narrowest mode that suffices) + `justification` immediately, without detouring through chat (the approval prompt IS the user's consent); never speculatively — an escalation is grounded in a real denial (up-front only when the session already denied the same access), a prompt-stated approvals-disabled policy turns the exception off entirely, and a rejected escalation is final for that command.
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## Per-session mode switching
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Under a sandboxing executor this plugin makes the session's standing mode override ([the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md); the `bash/sandbox-mode` fold owned by [`dsh-bash`](../bash/README.md)) real at EXECUTION: every call is stamped `escalation grant > session override > undefined` onto `BashExecRequest.sandboxMode`; without either, the executor's `resolve()` applies its configured default. Nothing is stamped under a non-sandboxing executor (nothing would honor it) or for an agent-less caller (no session to fold). The prompt deliberately does NOT state the mode and a switch is not narrated: a standing declaration teaches the model to refuse preemptively, while the denial marker already names the mode the command ran under exactly when the boundary is hit — behavior, not belief, carries the state.
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Under a sandboxing executor this plugin makes the session's standing mode override ([the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md); the `bash/sandbox-mode` fold owned by [`dsh-bash`](../bash/README.md)) real at EXECUTION: every call is stamped `escalation grant > session override > undefined` onto `BashExecRequest.sandboxMode`; without either, the executor's `resolve()` applies its configured default. Nothing is stamped under a non-sandboxing executor (nothing would honor it) or for an agent-less caller (no session to fold). The prompt deliberately does NOT state the mode and a switch is not narrated: a standing declaration teaches the model to refuse preemptively, while the denial marker already names the mode the command ran under exactly when the boundary is hit — behavior, not belief, carries the state.
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@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
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* docs/architecture.md § Extension And Composition. Under a sandboxing
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* executor this plugin also advertises the ESCALATION surface
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* (`sandbox_permissions`/`justification` — the sandbox RFC § Escalation,
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* docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md): a command the
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* docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md): a command the
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* sandbox denied may be retried once under a strictly wider mode, resolved
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* through `ctx.approval` BEFORE anything executes and failing closed on every
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* unanswerable path. The fields exist only when the mounted executor reports
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@@ -73,6 +73,13 @@ export const SERVICE_API: readonly ServiceApiEntry[] = [
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'list(): Agent[]',
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],
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},
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{
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key: 'approval',
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summary: 'The `ctx.approval` service: dispatches ApprovalRequests to the `approval/request` waterfall and audits every ask/outcome pair to the requesting agent\'s session log.',
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methods: [
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'async request(req: ApprovalRequest): Promise<ApprovalOutcome>',
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],
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},
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{
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key: 'bash',
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summary: 'Abstract bash execution service.',
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@@ -125,6 +132,13 @@ export const SERVICE_API: readonly ServiceApiEntry[] = [
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'stream(options: GenerateOptions): AsyncIterable<StreamChunk>',
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],
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},
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{
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key: 'sandbox',
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summary: 'Abstract process-sandbox service.',
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methods: [
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'abstract confine(argv: readonly string[], policy: SandboxPolicy): ConfinedArgv',
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],
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},
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{
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key: 'sessionPersistence',
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summary: 'Abstract durable session-persistence service.',
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@@ -279,6 +293,12 @@ export const EVENT_API: readonly EventApiEntry[] = [
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signature: '\'agent/turn-continuation\'(agent: Agent, turn: number, defaultDecision: ContinuationDecision, next: () => Promise<ContinuationDecision>): Promise<ContinuationDecision>',
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summary: 'Waterfall: override the turn-continuation decision via a typed ContinuationDecision.',
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},
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{
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name: 'approval/request',
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mode: 'waterfall',
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signature: '\'approval/request\'(this: ApprovalService, req: ApprovalRequest, next: () => Promise<ApprovalOutcome>): Promise<ApprovalOutcome>',
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summary: 'Waterfall asking the composed answerers to decide one approval request.',
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},
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{
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name: 'fs/edit-intent',
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mode: 'waterfall',
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@@ -445,6 +465,14 @@ export const TYPE_API: readonly TypeApiEntry[] = [
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name: 'AgentStatus',
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declaration: 'export type AgentStatus = \'idle\' | \'running\' | \'disposed\';',
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},
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{
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name: 'ApprovalOutcome',
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declaration: 'export type ApprovalOutcome = \'allowed-once\' | \'rejected\' | \'cancelled\' | \'unavailable\';',
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},
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{
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name: 'ApprovalRequest',
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declaration: 'export interface ApprovalRequest {\n agent: Agent;\n toolName: string;\n callId?: CallId;\n reason?: string;\n signal?: AbortSignal;\n}',
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},
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{
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name: 'AskUserQuestionAnswer',
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declaration: 'export interface AskUserQuestionAnswer {\n answers: AskUserQuestionAnswerItem[];\n}',
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@@ -475,19 +503,23 @@ export const TYPE_API: readonly TypeApiEntry[] = [
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},
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{
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name: 'BashExecRequest',
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declaration: 'export interface BashExecRequest {\n command: string;\n workdir?: string | undefined;\n timeoutMs?: number | undefined;\n signal?: AbortSignal | undefined;\n stdin?: string | undefined;\n env?: Record<string, string> | undefined;\n owner?: OwnerToken | undefined;\n}',
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declaration: 'export interface BashExecRequest {\n command: string;\n workdir?: string | undefined;\n timeoutMs?: number | undefined;\n signal?: AbortSignal | undefined;\n stdin?: string | undefined;\n env?: Record<string, string> | undefined;\n owner?: OwnerToken | undefined;\n sandboxMode?: SandboxMode | undefined;\n}',
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},
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{
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name: 'BashExecSpec',
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declaration: 'export interface BashExecSpec {\n command: string;\n workdir: string;\n timeoutMs: number;\n signal?: AbortSignal | undefined;\n stdin?: string | undefined;\n env?: Record<string, string> | undefined;\n owner: OwnerToken | undefined;\n}',
|
||||
declaration: 'export interface BashExecSpec {\n command: string;\n workdir: string;\n timeoutMs: number;\n signal?: AbortSignal | undefined;\n stdin?: string | undefined;\n env?: Record<string, string> | undefined;\n owner: OwnerToken | undefined;\n sandboxMode: SandboxMode | undefined;\n}',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'BashRunResult',
|
||||
declaration: 'export interface BashRunResult {\n exitCode: number | null;\n signal: NodeJS.Signals | null;\n timedOut: boolean;\n aborted: boolean;\n timeoutMs: number;\n stdout: CollectedOutput;\n stderr: CollectedOutput;\n}',
|
||||
declaration: 'export interface BashRunResult {\n exitCode: number | null;\n signal: NodeJS.Signals | null;\n timedOut: boolean;\n aborted: boolean;\n timeoutMs: number;\n stdout: CollectedOutput;\n stderr: CollectedOutput;\n sandbox?: BashSandboxInfo;\n}',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'BashSandboxInfo',
|
||||
declaration: 'export interface BashSandboxInfo {\n mode: SandboxMode;\n denied: boolean;\n enforcement?: SandboxEnforcement;\n runnerFailed?: boolean;\n}',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'BashTask',
|
||||
declaration: 'export interface BashTask {\n readonly id: BashTaskId;\n readonly command: string;\n status: BashTaskStatus;\n exitCode: number | null;\n signal: NodeJS.Signals | null;\n readonly done: Promise<void>;\n}',
|
||||
declaration: 'export interface BashTask {\n readonly id: BashTaskId;\n readonly command: string;\n status: BashTaskStatus;\n exitCode: number | null;\n signal: NodeJS.Signals | null;\n readonly done: Promise<void>;\n sandbox?: BashSandboxInfo;\n}',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'BashTaskId',
|
||||
@@ -549,6 +581,14 @@ export const TYPE_API: readonly TypeApiEntry[] = [
|
||||
name: 'CompactionResult',
|
||||
declaration: 'export interface CompactionResult {\n startSeq: number;\n summarySeq: number;\n endSeq: number;\n summary: ContentBlock[];\n shadowedRange: {\n start: number;\n end: number;\n };\n shadowedSeqs: number[];\n shadowedTokenCount: number;\n}',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'ConfinedArgv',
|
||||
declaration: 'export interface ConfinedArgv {\n argv: string[];\n enforcement: SandboxEnforcement;\n denialSignatures: readonly string[];\n runnerFailureSignatures: readonly string[];\n}',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'ConfinedSandboxMode',
|
||||
declaration: 'export type ConfinedSandboxMode = Exclude<SandboxMode, \'danger-full-access\'>;',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'ContentBlockMap',
|
||||
declaration: 'export interface ContentBlockMap {\n \'text\': TextBlock;\n \'reasoning\': ReasoningBlock;\n \'tool-call\': ToolCallBlock;\n \'tool-result\': ToolResultBlock;\n}',
|
||||
@@ -673,6 +713,18 @@ export const TYPE_API: readonly TypeApiEntry[] = [
|
||||
name: 'ResumeAgentOptions',
|
||||
declaration: 'export interface ResumeAgentOptions {\n agentId: AgentId;\n resumeSessionId: SessionId;\n agentOptions?: AgentOptions;\n}',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'SandboxEnforcement',
|
||||
declaration: 'export type SandboxEnforcement = \'full\' | \'partial\';',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'SandboxMode',
|
||||
declaration: 'export type SandboxMode = \'read-only\' | \'workspace-write\' | \'danger-full-access\';',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'SandboxPolicy',
|
||||
declaration: 'export interface SandboxPolicy {\n mode: ConfinedSandboxMode;\n workspaceRoot: string;\n}',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'SendOptions',
|
||||
declaration: 'export interface SendOptions {\n source?: MessageSource;\n}',
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,6 +7,6 @@ The confinement half of the [capability-seam split](../../docs/rfc/implemented/a
|
||||
| `sandbox/` | Abstract process-sandbox seam (the `SandboxProvider` contract + the mode/enforcement/policy vocabulary) | `ctx.sandbox` |
|
||||
| `sandbox-local/` | Local backends by platform chain: Linux `bwrap` else the `landlock-run` launcher (the npm-distributed [`node-addon-landlock-run`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/node-addon-landlock-run) family, built and released from its own repository), darwin `sandbox-exec`/Seatbelt — multi-candidate chains functionally probed, sole candidates selected directly, verdict cached, fail-closed | (registers `ctx.sandbox`) |
|
||||
|
||||
The seam confines SAME-WORLD subprocesses only (shared filesystem and kernel). Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends here — they replace whole capability implementations (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`) as environment-coherent groups; the boundary is recorded in [the sandbox RFC](../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
|
||||
The seam confines SAME-WORLD subprocesses only (shared filesystem and kernel). Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends here — they replace whole capability implementations (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`) as environment-coherent groups; the boundary is recorded in [the sandbox RFC](../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
|
||||
|
||||
The staged first consumer is the sandboxed bash executor (it hands over the exact `['bash', '-c', command]` argv it is about to spawn). In-process tools (fs/web) cannot be confined by an OS wrapper — their sandbox semantics are policy at their own seams (the sandbox RFC's cross-family phase).
|
||||
Consumers today: [`bash/bash-sandbox`](../bash/bash-sandbox/) (wraps `['bash', '-c', command]`; see [examples/sandbox-acp-agent](../../examples/sandbox-acp-agent/) for the composed leaf). In-process tools (fs/web) cannot be confined by an OS wrapper — their sandbox semantics are policy at their own seams (the sandbox RFC's cross-family phase).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local
|
||||
|
||||
Local implementation of the [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox`](../sandbox/) seam: wraps a caller's argv in a platform confinement runner. Selection is BY PLATFORM, resolved once and cached: each platform names its runner chain, a chain of one is selected directly (probing arbitrates between candidates — a sole candidate leaves nothing to arbitrate), and a chain of several is probed functionally in preference order. Linux: [`bwrap`](https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap) when its probe passes, else the [`landlock-run`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/node-addon-landlock-run) Landlock launcher (kernel confinement that needs no userns/mount privileges — see the [sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) for the prebuilt-binary decision and profile-parity notes); darwin: `sandbox-exec` speaking a Seatbelt (SBPL) profile, unprobed. A platform with no chain means `confine()` FAILS CLOSED with the seam's structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error (win32 today: a reserved, deliberately empty chain awaiting an AppContainer-family runner); an unprobed runner that turns out unusable fails closed at EXECUTION instead — it refuses to run the command, and every wrap's `runnerFailureSignatures` let the consumer classify that as a sandbox failure rather than a task failure. Never a silent unconfined passthrough on any path.
|
||||
Local implementation of the [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox`](../sandbox/) seam: wraps a caller's argv in a platform confinement runner. Selection is BY PLATFORM, resolved once and cached: each platform names its runner chain, a chain of one is selected directly (probing arbitrates between candidates — a sole candidate leaves nothing to arbitrate), and a chain of several is probed functionally in preference order. Linux: [`bwrap`](https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap) when its probe passes, else the [`landlock-run`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/node-addon-landlock-run) Landlock launcher (kernel confinement that needs no userns/mount privileges — see the [sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) for the prebuilt-binary decision and profile-parity notes); darwin: `sandbox-exec` speaking a Seatbelt (SBPL) profile, unprobed. A platform with no chain means `confine()` FAILS CLOSED with the seam's structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error (win32 today: a reserved, deliberately empty chain awaiting an AppContainer-family runner); an unprobed runner that turns out unusable fails closed at EXECUTION instead — it refuses to run the command, and every wrap's `runnerFailureSignatures` let the consumer classify that as a sandbox failure rather than a task failure. Never a silent unconfined passthrough on any path.
|
||||
|
||||
Policy is per call (`SandboxPolicy`: mode + workspace root); the provider holds only the mechanism and the cached ladder verdict. Every wrap reports the selected runner's `enforcement` (`full`, or `partial` on an older Landlock ABI that governs only a subset of accesses — read from the launcher's `--probe` report line) and its `denialSignatures` — the stderr dialect that rung's kernel speaks on a denied file effect (EROFS text under bwrap, EACCES under Landlock, EPERM under Seatbelt), which stderr-inferring consumers match instead of a cross-runner union. A non-empty `runnerCommand` config is the operator's assertion of a runner that fully enforces the bwrap-shaped profile: the ladder and probes are skipped (the wrap carries both Linux denial dialects, the mechanism being unknown) — also the deterministic fake-runner seam for keyless test tiers. Its runner-failure dialect is the OUTER shell's argv0-scoped failure shapes (`exec: <argv0>: not found`, `<argv0>: No such file or directory`, `<argv0>: Permission denied`) — the consumer re-joins the wrap through `bash -c 'exec …'`, so a missing or unexecutable configured runner classifies as a sandbox failure (fail closed at execution), never as a failing command or a denial. `probeTimeoutMs` (default 5000) bounds each functional probe, the escape hatch for hosts slow enough that a timed-out probe would otherwise misread as `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,4 +15,4 @@ Every rung has its keyless world-proof (`tests/bwrap.e2e.ts`, `tests/landlock.e2
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The staged first consumer is the sandboxed bash executor.
|
||||
Consumers: [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/); see [`examples/sandbox-acp-agent`](../../../examples/sandbox-acp-agent/) for the runnable composition.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
|
||||
* `bwrap`, else the `landlock-run` Landlock launcher (kernel confinement
|
||||
* that needs no userns/mount privileges; distributed as the npm package
|
||||
* family `node-addon-landlock-run` — the decision recorded in
|
||||
* docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md); darwin: macOS
|
||||
* docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md); darwin: macOS
|
||||
* `sandbox-exec` speaking a Seatbelt (SBPL) profile, unprobed.
|
||||
* When the platform has no chain or no candidate passes,
|
||||
* {@link LocalSandboxProvider.confine} FAILS CLOSED with the seam's
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,6 +6,6 @@ The contract in one line: `ctx.sandbox.confine(argv, policy)` returns the argv t
|
||||
|
||||
Policy rides the call, not the provider: two consumers may confine under different policies at the same instant (bash under `read-only` while a confined child agent keeps its state directory writable), and an approved escalated retry is just a new call with a wider policy.
|
||||
|
||||
**Same-world confinement only.** A backend shares the host's filesystem and kernel (`bwrap`, Landlock, Seatbelt); `workspaceRoot` names a real host path. Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends of this seam — they replace whole capability implementations (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`) as environment-coherent groups. The boundary and its rationale: [the sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
|
||||
**Same-world confinement only.** A backend shares the host's filesystem and kernel (`bwrap`, Landlock, Seatbelt); `workspaceRoot` names a real host path. Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends of this seam — they replace whole capability implementations (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`) as environment-coherent groups. The boundary and its rationale: [the sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Implementations: [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`](../sandbox-local/) (Linux: `bwrap`, else the per-platform Landlock launcher; macOS: `sandbox-exec`/Seatbelt). The staged first consumer is the sandboxed bash executor (wrapping `['bash', '-c', command]`).
|
||||
Implementations: [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`](../sandbox-local/) (Linux: `bwrap`, else the per-platform Landlock launcher; macOS: `sandbox-exec`/Seatbelt). Consumers: [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/) (wraps `['bash', '-c', command]`).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
|
||||
* npm-distributed `landlock-run` launcher, macOS `sandbox-exec`/Seatbelt) is
|
||||
* the first.
|
||||
* Consumers hand over the exact argv they are about to spawn
|
||||
* (the staged bash executor wraps `['bash', '-c', command]`; a
|
||||
* (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox` wraps `['bash', '-c', command]`; a
|
||||
* subagent backend wraps its child-agent argv) and spawn the returned argv
|
||||
* instead.
|
||||
*
|
||||
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
|
||||
* backends of this seam — they are sibling implementations of whole
|
||||
* capability seams (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`), deployed as environment-coherent
|
||||
* groups; the boundary is recorded in
|
||||
* docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md.
|
||||
* docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -95,6 +95,15 @@ export interface Scenario {
|
||||
* Defaults to false.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
pinsHeader?: boolean
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* How many `request/header-delta` events this PINNING scenario's fixture
|
||||
* legitimately carries (default 0). A recorded mid-run header change — a
|
||||
* config-option switch rewriting a prompt section — is part of the pinned
|
||||
* surface, committed verbatim like the header itself; any OTHER count
|
||||
* still fails, so fixture rot stays caught. Meaningless off the pin (the
|
||||
* live uniformity guard keeps non-pinning scenarios delta-free).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
expectedHeaderDeltas?: number
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Which header-composition class this scenario belongs to. Scenarios that
|
||||
* boot the same config compose the same header; each class has exactly one
|
||||
@@ -406,17 +415,19 @@ export function defineAcpSnapshotSuite(options: SnapshotSuiteOptions): void {
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('every pinning fixture carries exactly one request/header and no deltas', async () => {
|
||||
it('every pinning fixture carries exactly one request/header and its declared deltas', async () => {
|
||||
// The live uniformity guard runs only in NON-pinning scenarios, so a
|
||||
// class made of just its pinning scenario would otherwise accept a
|
||||
// re-recorded pin with several headers or a mid-run header-delta —
|
||||
// shapes the pin design cannot represent. Assert the committed pins
|
||||
// directly.
|
||||
// re-recorded pin with several headers or an undeclared mid-run
|
||||
// header-delta — shapes the pin design cannot represent. Assert the
|
||||
// committed pins directly; a scenario whose arc legitimately rewrites
|
||||
// a prompt section declares the exact count via expectedHeaderDeltas.
|
||||
for (const scenario of pinningByClass.values()) {
|
||||
const fixture = await readFile(join(snapshotsDir, scenario.name, 'session.jsonl'), 'utf8')
|
||||
const headers = normalizedHeaders(fixture, fixtureContext(fixture))
|
||||
expect(headers.length, `${scenario.name}: a pinning fixture must carry exactly one request/header`).toBe(1)
|
||||
expect(headerDeltaCount(fixture), `${scenario.name}: a pinning fixture must carry no request/header-delta`).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(headerDeltaCount(fixture), `${scenario.name}: a pinning fixture must carry exactly its declared request/header-deltas`)
|
||||
.toBe(scenario.expectedHeaderDeltas ?? 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ The bridge multiplexes N sessions over one connection. Live sessions are held in
|
||||
|
||||
## Session config options
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge advertises one independent `select` per composable knob in the `session/new`/`session/load` responses — `sandbox-mode` (`read-only`/`workspace-write`/`danger-full-access`, category `mode`) iff the mounted executor confines (`ctx.get('bash')?.sandboxMode` defined), `approval-policy` (`ask`/`never`) iff the approval seam is composed — with each session's `currentValue` folded from its OWN log (`effectiveSandboxMode`/`effectiveApprovalPolicy` ?? the composition default), so `session/load` reports a resumed session's overrides with no catch-up machinery. `session/set_config_option` validates the value against the same closed vocabulary, routes to the domain's write path (`setSandboxMode`/`setApprovalPolicy` — ONE log-only event on that session's log), and returns the complete refreshed state per the spec. Anchoring honors turn-enclosure: a switch while a turn is open appends immediately (openness read from the LOG — `agent.status` stays `running` between queued turns); an idle switch is held on the session record and anchored at the next turn's `agent/prompt-submit` (inside the turn, before anything assembles, last write per knob — an idle flip-flop anchors as one event), because appending from inside a `session/event` listener would reorder events for later-registered peers. Until anchored the switch lives in bridge memory only: responses overlay it truthfully, and a crash before the next turn reverts it — `session/load` then reports the fold's truth. Design: [the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md); protocol matrix: [acp-feature-support.md](acp-feature-support.md) § 6.
|
||||
The bridge advertises one independent `select` per composable knob in the `session/new`/`session/load` responses — `sandbox-mode` (`read-only`/`workspace-write`/`danger-full-access`, category `mode`) iff the mounted executor confines (`ctx.get('bash')?.sandboxMode` defined), `approval-policy` (`ask`/`never`) iff the approval seam is composed — with each session's `currentValue` folded from its OWN log (`effectiveSandboxMode`/`effectiveApprovalPolicy` ?? the composition default), so `session/load` reports a resumed session's overrides with no catch-up machinery. `session/set_config_option` validates the value against the same closed vocabulary, routes to the domain's write path (`setSandboxMode`/`setApprovalPolicy` — ONE log-only event on that session's log), and returns the complete refreshed state per the spec. Anchoring honors turn-enclosure: a switch while a turn is open appends immediately (openness read from the LOG — `agent.status` stays `running` between queued turns); an idle switch is held on the session record and anchored at the next turn's `agent/prompt-submit` (inside the turn, before anything assembles, last write per knob — an idle flip-flop anchors as one event), because appending from inside a `session/event` listener would reorder events for later-registered peers. Until anchored the switch lives in bridge memory only: responses overlay it truthfully, and a crash before the next turn reverts it — `session/load` then reports the fold's truth. Design: [the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md); protocol matrix: [acp-feature-support.md](acp-feature-support.md) § 6.
|
||||
|
||||
Background-task isolation rides on `dsh-tool-bash`: bash task ids are global and predictable, so each task carries an opaque owner token — the owning agent's `session.header.id` — stored on the task inside the executor (`dsh-bash`'s `ownerOf(id)` seam). `bash_output`/`bash_kill` reject a task whose token differs from the caller's session token, so one session's agent can't read or kill another's task. Ownership is by session TOKEN, not `Agent` object identity — a different `Agent` object on the same session may access the task — and because the token lives on the executor's task it survives a `tool-bash` HMR reload.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ The bridge implements the **core prompt-turn loop** for N concurrent sessions: i
|
||||
| `session/prompt` | S | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | Maps to `agent.send`; one in-flight prompt per session; settles on the owning turn's end. |
|
||||
| `session/cancel` | S | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | Queue-aware `agent.cancel`; settles the in-flight prompt `cancelled`, scoped to the one session. |
|
||||
| `session/set_mode` | S | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | Session modes deliberately skipped: config options are the spec's replacement (modes are slated for removal in ACP v2), and one mode list cannot carry the two orthogonal knobs (see [§6](#6-session-modes--config-options--models)). |
|
||||
| `session/set_config_option` | S | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | Two capability-gated selects — `sandbox-mode` (confining executor mounted) and `approval-policy` (approval seam composed); values validated against the domain vocabularies, one log-only event per switch on the session's own log, complete refreshed state in the response ([sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)). |
|
||||
| `session/set_config_option` | S | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | Two capability-gated selects — `sandbox-mode` (confining executor mounted) and `approval-policy` (approval seam composed); values validated against the domain vocabularies, one log-only event per switch on the session's own log, complete refreshed state in the response ([sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)). |
|
||||
| model selection | S | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | No distinct stable `session/set_model` — model is the `model`-category `session/set_config_option`. The bridge fixes the model per-bridge via config; no runtime switch. Codex still uses the legacy `unstable_setSessionModel` ext method. |
|
||||
| `session/list` | S | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | Gated by `sessionCapabilities.list`. The harness HAS `sessionPersistence.list()` (used internally for load-cwd validation) but does not expose it over ACP. |
|
||||
| `session/delete` | S | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | Gated by `sessionCapabilities.delete`. |
|
||||
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ These are capabilities the bridge would *drive* on the editor. The harness runs
|
||||
| `plan` | S | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | No agent plan emitted. Both adapters emit real plan entries (Codex's `CodexEventHandler.updatePlan` maps `turn/plan/updated` → `{ sessionUpdate: 'plan', entries }`). |
|
||||
| `available_commands_update` | S | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | No slash commands advertised. |
|
||||
| `current_mode_update` | S | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | No session modes. |
|
||||
| `config_option_update` | S | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | Config options exist (advertised in `session/new`/`session/load`, switched via `session/set_config_option`), but the bridge never pushes agent-initiated changes — an operator default drift is narrated to the MODEL, not echoed to the editor. Future work in the [sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md). |
|
||||
| `config_option_update` | S | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | Config options exist (advertised in `session/new`/`session/load`, switched via `session/set_config_option`), but the bridge never pushes agent-initiated changes — an operator default drift is narrated to the MODEL, not echoed to the editor. Future work in the [sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md). |
|
||||
| `usage_update` | S | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | Token/cost reporting not surfaced (the harness records token usage internally on `assistant/message`). |
|
||||
| `session_info_update` | S | ❌ | ⚠️ | ⚠️ | Session title/metadata not pushed. |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Tool-call presentation is **owned by each tool** (`presentCall` / `presentResult
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Session modes / config options / models
|
||||
|
||||
Config options ✅ (the [sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)): the bridge advertises one independent `select` per composable knob — `sandbox-mode` iff the mounted executor confines, `approval-policy` iff the approval seam is composed — with per-session current values folded from each session's own log, and honors `session/set_config_option` end to end (idle switches anchor at the next turn under the turn-enclosure contract). Session MODES stay deliberately unmodeled: config options are the spec's replacement (modes are slated for removal in ACP v2), and one mode list cannot carry two orthogonal knobs. Runtime model selection is still not modeled — the harness fixes the model per-bridge via `AcpConfig.model` (both reference adapters ship a model selector).
|
||||
Config options ✅ (the [sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)): the bridge advertises one independent `select` per composable knob — `sandbox-mode` iff the mounted executor confines, `approval-policy` iff the approval seam is composed — with per-session current values folded from each session's own log, and honors `session/set_config_option` end to end (idle switches anchor at the next turn under the turn-enclosure contract). Session MODES stay deliberately unmodeled: config options are the spec's replacement (modes are slated for removal in ACP v2), and one mode list cannot carry two orthogonal knobs. Runtime model selection is still not modeled — the harness fixes the model per-bridge via `AcpConfig.model` (both reference adapters ship a model selector).
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## 7. Content blocks
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user