Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into worktree/remove-interjection-caption
This commit is contained in:
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
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# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-01-pwsh-tool-and-executor.md
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2026-08-01-pwsh-tool-and-executor.md: 7206f8ffe6640f8499f8453c40ab5846b23112c6
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2026-08-01-pwsh-tool-and-executor.zh.md: c59ba8e3e6c68d48d310861325c74dc6cec8e5c3
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2026-08-01-pwsh-tool-and-executor.md: 855d8e5db8a78e7e798061724d89fde31b28e975
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2026-08-01-pwsh-tool-and-executor.zh.md: dcf5c53cd6681be07adafef92d556b400c116736
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@@ -6,30 +6,30 @@ English | [中文](2026-08-01-pwsh-tool-and-executor.zh.md)
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## Problem
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||||
The harness spoke one shell dialect on every platform: `bash`. Windows hosts could run it only through WSL or Git-Bash shims, and the shipped `dsh-bash-local` executor is POSIX-only (`bash` hardcoded, process-group semantics POSIX). The Windows roadmap — defaulting hosts to `pwsh`, later pwsh TUI/GUI rendering — had no execution foundation: there was no PowerShell implementation of the bash executor seam and no model-facing tool that taught the PowerShell dialect. The bash tool itself is also far larger than a Windows-first profile needs: background tasks, sandbox escalation, and the persistent-PTY twin are all bash-shaped surface that a minimal `pwsh` tool should not carry.
|
||||
The harness spoke one shell dialect on every platform: `bash`. Windows hosts could run it only through WSL or Git-Bash shims, and the shipped `dsh-bash-local` executor is POSIX-only (`bash` hardcoded, process-group semantics POSIX). The Windows roadmap — defaulting hosts to `pwsh`, later pwsh TUI/GUI rendering — had no execution foundation: there was no PowerShell implementation of the bash executor seam and no model-facing tool that taught the PowerShell dialect. The bash tool is also larger than a Windows-first profile strictly needs — the persistent-PTY twin in particular is bash-shaped surface the `pwsh` tool still does not carry. The original minimal profile also left out background tasks and sandbox escalation: background arrived with the [parity decision](2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md), and the sandbox surface (denial rendering plus `sandbox_permissions` escalation) arrived with the [Windows ACL sandbox decision](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md) — the minimal tool was sized for the danger-full-access Windows posture, and that premise ended when the sandbox PR re-enabled confinement and approval on Windows.
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## Decision
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Two new packages under `packages/bash/`:
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||||
- **`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local`** — a local implementation of the `ctx.bash` executor seam over `ctx.subprocess`, mirroring `dsh-bash-local` call-for-call: `resolve()` defaults and caps from config, `run()` fuses the config-clamped timeout with the caller's signal through one deadline, `start()` returns a consuming background handle whose processes belong to the subprocess service. The command string rides as ONE argv element to `pwsh -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command`, so PowerShell parses it and no shell-quoting layer exists. Executable resolution (`resolvePwshPath`) is a pure function of `(configured, env, platform)`: explicit config first, then Windows probes PowerShell 7's install, PATH entries (quotes stripped), and Windows PowerShell 5.1, else a bare `pwsh` via PATH.
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- **`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`** — the model-facing tool over `ctx.bash`, PowerShell-dialect by contract, mirroring `dsh-tool-bash` call-for-call minus the sandbox surface: foreground and `run_in_background` execution through the generic task runtime, managed `DSH_*` environment through the shared [`dsh-bash-env`](../feature/2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) registry, and the bash marker/truncation rendering story (a clean exit produces no marker). The parity decision supersedes this note's minimal-profile tool description.
|
||||
- **`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`** — the model-facing tool over `ctx.bash`, PowerShell-dialect by contract, mirroring `dsh-tool-bash` call-for-call: foreground and `run_in_background` execution through the generic task runtime, managed `DSH_*` environment through the shared [`dsh-bash-env`](../feature/2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) registry, the bash marker/truncation rendering story (a clean exit produces no marker), and — since the Windows ACL sandbox decision — the sandbox denial rendering and `sandbox_permissions` escalation surface, plus the Windows-specific ConstrainedLanguage and named-pipe contracts in the tool description. The parity decision supersedes this note's minimal-profile tool description.
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Windows vitest coverage is deliberately NOT part of this change: the repo's Windows CI lane owns build/static gates, and unit coverage runs on Linux, where both packages' suites run against a real `pwsh` (preinstalled on the GitHub-hosted runners) or self-skip when absent. The vitest `windowsUnsupportedPackages` exclusion narrows from `packages/bash/*` to the bash-requiring packages so the pwsh suites can also run natively on Windows dev machines.
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|
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The roadmap beyond this decision — defaulting Windows hosts to `pwsh` (bash off), and pwsh TUI/GUI rendering — is recorded separately as [a proposal](../../proposed/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md).
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The roadmap beyond this decision — defaulting Windows hosts to `pwsh` (bash off), and pwsh TUI/GUI rendering — is recorded separately as [the Windows pwsh default decision](2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md).
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## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**Extend `dsh-bash-local` with a pwsh mode.** Rejected: the executor's identity is the shell it spawns; a second dialect inside one package doubles its config surface (`shell` switches) and its test matrix, and the two dialects' quirks (signal facts on Windows, quoting domains) belong to their own packages' documentation.
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||||
|
||||
**Extend `dsh-tool-bash` with a dialect parameter.** Rejected: the bash tool's background/sandbox surface is bash-shaped; a `pwsh` mode would either hide it (conditional schema churn) or inherit it (surface the minimal profile explicitly rejects). The minimal twin keeps the model contract honest.
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||||
**Extend `dsh-tool-bash` with a dialect parameter.** Rejected: the model-visible contract is the dialect itself (paths, variables, exit facts differ), so a dialect parameter would either churn the schema conditionally or force one tool to teach two dialects; the separate twin keeps the model contract honest — and carries the shared surfaces (background, sandbox, rendering) by mirroring rather than by sharing an implementation.
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||||
|
||||
**Wire the pwsh tool into the shipped CLI compositions now.** Rejected: mounting `tool-pwsh` + `pwsh-local` in `base.cordis.yml` would change the shipped roster before the Windows-default decision lands; this change ships the capability and its wiring points (`apps/cli` dependencies, tsconfig projects) without switching any default.
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|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
- The bash executor seam gains a second, Windows-native implementation with an identical request/spec contract, so model-facing consumers beyond `tool-pwsh` (hooks bridges, in-process plugins) can run PowerShell without dialect shims.
|
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- `tool-pwsh` is the model-visible Windows-first shell tool: behaviorally interchangeable with the bash tool for foreground and background work (minus sandbox), with prompt guidance that states the marker contract precisely.
|
||||
- `tool-pwsh` is the model-visible Windows-first shell tool: behaviorally interchangeable with the bash tool for foreground, background, and sandboxed work — including the same-turn `sandbox_permissions` escalation through `ctx.approval` — with prompt guidance that states the marker contract, the sandbox denial/escalation vocabulary, and the ConstrainedLanguage and named-pipe boundaries precisely.
|
||||
- Windows semantics differ where the platform differs: forced termination reports exit 1 with no signal (so `signal`/`killed` status facts are POSIX-only), and PowerShell writes CRLF, which tests normalize.
|
||||
- The CLI gains two workspace dependencies and two tsconfig projects without mounting either plugin — the composition decision stays with the Windows-default proposal.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,30 +6,30 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## 问题
|
||||
|
||||
harness 在每个平台只说一种 shell 方言:`bash`。Windows 主机只能通过 WSL 或 Git-Bash 垫片运行它,而交付的 `dsh-bash-local` 执行器仅限 POSIX(硬编码 `bash`,进程组语义是 POSIX 的)。Windows 路线图——让主机默认 `pwsh`,之后再做 pwsh TUI/GUI 渲染——没有执行基础:既没有 bash 执行器 seam 的 PowerShell 实现,也没有教模型 PowerShell 方言的面向模型工具。bash 工具本身也远大于 Windows 优先画像所需:后台任务、沙箱升级与持久 PTY 孪生都是 bash 形状的表面,最小化的 `pwsh` 工具不该背负。
|
||||
harness 在每个平台只说一种 shell 方言:`bash`。Windows 主机只能通过 WSL 或 Git-Bash 垫片运行它,而交付的 `dsh-bash-local` 执行器仅限 POSIX(硬编码 `bash`,进程组语义是 POSIX 的)。Windows 路线图——让主机默认 `pwsh`,之后再做 pwsh TUI/GUI 渲染——没有执行基础:既没有 bash 执行器 seam 的 PowerShell 实现,也没有教模型 PowerShell 方言的面向模型工具。bash 工具也大于 Windows 优先画像的严格所需——尤其持久 PTY 孪生是 `pwsh` 工具至今仍不背负的 bash 形状表面。最初的最小画像也没有后台任务与沙箱升级:后台随 [parity 决策](2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) 到来,沙箱面(拒绝渲染加 `sandbox_permissions` 升级)随 [Windows ACL sandbox 决策](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md) 到来——最小工具当初按 danger-full-access 的 Windows 姿态裁剪,这一前提在 sandbox PR(Pull Request)于 Windows 上重新启用隔离与审批时终结。
|
||||
|
||||
## 决策
|
||||
|
||||
在 `packages/bash/` 下新增两个包:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local`** —— `ctx.bash` 执行器 seam 的本地实现,基于 `ctx.subprocess`,逐调用镜像 `dsh-bash-local`:`resolve()` 从配置默认化并设上限,`run()` 通过一个 deadline 融合配置夹取的超时与调用方信号,`start()` 返回消费式后台句柄,其进程归属于 subprocess 服务。命令字符串作为 ONE argv 元素传给 `pwsh -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command`,由 PowerShell 解析,不存在 shell 引号层。可执行文件解析(`resolvePwshPath`)是 `(configured, env, platform)` 的纯函数:先显式配置,再在 Windows 上探测 PowerShell 7 安装位置、PATH 条目(剥离引号)与 Windows PowerShell 5.1,否则经 PATH 解析裸 `pwsh`。
|
||||
- **`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`** —— 基于 `ctx.bash` 的面向模型工具,约定是 PowerShell 方言,逐调用镜像 `dsh-tool-bash`、减去 sandbox 面:经通用任务运行时执行前台与 `run_in_background`,经共享 [`dsh-bash-env`](../feature/2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) 注册表管理 `DSH_*` 环境,以及 bash 的 marker/截断渲染故事(干净退出不产生 marker)。parity 决策取代了本 note 的最小画像工具描述。
|
||||
- **`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`** —— 基于 `ctx.bash` 的面向模型工具,约定是 PowerShell 方言,逐调用镜像 `dsh-tool-bash`:经通用任务运行时执行前台与 `run_in_background`,经共享 [`dsh-bash-env`](../feature/2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) 注册表管理 `DSH_*` 环境,bash 的 marker/截断渲染故事(干净退出不产生 marker),以及——自 Windows ACL sandbox 决策以来——沙箱拒绝渲染与 `sandbox_permissions` 升级面,外加工具描述中的 Windows 专属 ConstrainedLanguage 与 named-pipe 约定。parity 决策取代了本 note 的最小画像工具描述。
|
||||
|
||||
Windows vitest 覆盖率刻意不属本次改动:仓库的 Windows CI 通道负责构建/静态门禁,单元覆盖在 Linux 上运行,两个包的套件在那里以真实 `pwsh` 运行(GitHub 托管 runner 预装)或缺失时自行跳过。vitest 的 `windowsUnsupportedPackages` 排除从 `packages/bash/*` 收窄为真正需要 bash 的包,使 pwsh 套件也能在 Windows 开发机上原生运行。
|
||||
|
||||
本决策之后的路线图——让 Windows 主机默认 `pwsh`(关闭 bash)与 pwsh TUI/GUI 渲染——另行记录为[提案](../../proposed/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md)。
|
||||
本决策之后的路线图——让 Windows 主机默认 `pwsh`(关闭 bash)与 pwsh TUI/GUI 渲染——已落地为 [Windows 默认 pwsh 决策](2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md)。
|
||||
|
||||
## 备选方案
|
||||
|
||||
**给 `dsh-bash-local` 增加 pwsh 模式。** 否决:执行器的身份就是它 spawn 的 shell;在一个包内塞第二种方言会翻倍配置面(`shell` 开关)与测试矩阵,且两种方言的怪癖(Windows 上的信号实情、引号域)应各自归入自己包的文档。
|
||||
|
||||
**给 `dsh-tool-bash` 增加方言参数。** 否决:bash 工具的后台/沙箱表面是 bash 形状的;`pwsh` 模式要么隐藏它(条件 schema 翻动),要么继承它(把最小画像明确拒绝的表面带进来)。最小孪生让模型约定保持诚实。
|
||||
**给 `dsh-tool-bash` 增加方言参数。** 否决:模型可见约定本身就是方言(路径、变量、退出事实都不同),因此方言参数要么让 schema 按条件翻动,要么逼一个工具教两种方言;独立的孪生让模型约定保持诚实——并以镜像而非共享实现的方式携带共享表面(后台、沙箱、渲染)。
|
||||
|
||||
**现在就接入交付的 CLI 组合。** 否决:在 Windows 默认决策落地前把 `tool-pwsh` + `pwsh-local` 挂进 `base.cordis.yml` 会改变交付清单;本改动交付能力与接线点(`apps/cli` 依赖、tsconfig 工程),不切换任何默认。
|
||||
|
||||
## 后果
|
||||
|
||||
- bash 执行器 seam 有了第二个、Windows 原生的实现,请求/规范约定一致,因此 `tool-pwsh` 之外的面向模型消费方(hooks 桥、进程内插件)无需方言垫片即可运行 PowerShell。
|
||||
- `tool-pwsh` 是模型可见的 Windows 优先 shell 工具:在前台与后台工作(减 sandbox)上与 bash 工具行为可互换,提示词指导精确陈述 marker 约定。
|
||||
- `tool-pwsh` 是模型可见的 Windows 优先 shell 工具:在前台、后台与沙箱化工作上与 bash 工具行为可互换——包括经 `ctx.approval` 的同轮次 `sandbox_permissions` 升级——提示词指导精确陈述 marker 约定、沙箱拒绝/升级词汇,以及 ConstrainedLanguage 与 named-pipe 边界。
|
||||
- Windows 语义在平台差异处不同:强制终止报告退出码 1 且无信号(因此 `signal`/`killed` 状态实情仅限 POSIX),PowerShell 输出 CRLF,测试做归一化。
|
||||
- CLI 增加两个 workspace 依赖与两个 tsconfig 工程,但不挂载任一插件——组合决策留给 Windows 默认提案。
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md
|
||||
2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md: f0da86e52bcdd53a10b60164d7cc12261cfc5c49
|
||||
2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.zh.md: 41a6429eab8f86a8960ac4aa372aeacfda4661c4
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||||
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
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||||
# Agent Note: Windows defaults to pwsh
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
English | [中文](2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.zh.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
The harness's shipped execution profile is bash-first on every platform. Windows hosts must install a bash shim (WSL or Git-Bash) or fall back to the POSIX-only `dsh-bash-local` behavior (hardcoded `bash -c` argv, process-group semantics); the model-facing bash tool teaches the bash dialect. The Windows-native foundation shipped in the [pwsh executor and tool decision](2026-08-01-pwsh-tool-and-executor.md) — a PowerShell implementation of the `ctx.bash` seam and a parity `pwsh` tool — but shipped compositions still mounted the bash stack on Windows, so a Windows host without a shim could not run the shipped shell.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
Windows hosts booting a shipped profile (`dsh web`, `dsh --profile headless`, one-shot tasks) get the PowerShell stack by default; POSIX hosts are unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
- **The platform layer is a data file, not a roster rewrite.** `@deepseek-ai/dsh-base` ships [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/windows.cordis.patch.yml) alongside its universal `cordis.patch.yml`: it disables `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` (the POSIX-only executor and its dialect tool) and inserts `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh`. Windows has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the layer drops the sandbox stack entirely — `sandbox`, `sandbox-policy`, and `fs-sandbox` are disabled and the unconfined `dsh-fs-local` provides `ctx.fs` — and degrades to danger-full-access: `permission`/`ui-permission` leave the roster (dsh-permission requires a confining executor — presets bundle a sandbox mode the unconfined executor cannot honor; see its constructor guard — and the client knob would advertise a boundary that does not exist), and the `approval` service is disabled — nothing in the Windows roster asks for approval, so the model is never told approval exists or that asks are auto-rejected. Keeping fs-only path rules would be theater: the unconfined shell can bypass them with one command, so the honest Windows posture is full access rather than a boundary only the fs tools pretend to enforce.
|
||||
- **The launcher injects the layer by platform.** `apps/cli/src/windows-shell.ts` resolves it from the base bundle layer's `packageDir` between the bundle layers and the user layers on `win32` hosts, in every composition path (boot, config-only HMR recomposition, config dumps). Overriding the shipped default is a composition decision: a Windows host that prefers the bash stack — or confinement — re-enables the bash rows through its profile or home `cordis.patch.yml`. Custom profiles without the base bundle are skipped (they own their shell stack); a base bundle that ships no Windows shell patch fails loud.
|
||||
- **Module resolution is restored for cold starts.** The profiles-rework CLI dropped the pwsh packages from `apps/cli`'s dependency closure, so `healProfilesModuleFallback` never linked them into `$DSH_HOME/profiles/node_modules` and a fresh Windows host could not resolve the inserted rows. `apps/cli` and `dsh-base` re-declare `dsh-pwsh-local`/`dsh-tool-pwsh`, and `dsh-base` also declares `dsh-fs-local`; the base bundle lists every row plugin as a dependency by house style.
|
||||
|
||||
The pwsh GUI rendering shipped earlier with the [pwsh UI presentation matches bash decision](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md); the [pwsh tool bash parity decision](2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) ships the tool's surface. Nothing in this decision changes POSIX behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**Default Windows to pwsh inside `dsh-bash-local` (one executor, dialect switch).** Rejected for the same reason the executor decision rejected a mode switch: the executor's identity is the shell it spawns, and platform-gated composition is a deployment choice, not an executor config.
|
||||
|
||||
**Ship the platform layer from `apps/cli` code instead of a bundle data file.** Rejected: the patch belongs next to the rows it replaces, in the bundle that owns them, so the shipped roster stays visible as composition data and dumps carry its provenance; the launcher contributes only the win32 gate.
|
||||
|
||||
**Keep `permission`/`ui-permission` on Windows.** Rejected: `dsh-permission` hard-requires `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` and fails loud at load over an unconfined executor; making it tolerate an unconfined shell would advertise presets the shell cannot honor.
|
||||
|
||||
**Keep fs path-rule confinement on Windows (`sandbox-policy` + `fs-sandbox` without OS runners).** Rejected: the shell is the model's primary tool and unconfined on Windows, so fs-only path rules are trivially bypassable and would overstate the boundary; the honest posture is full degradation to danger-full-access.
|
||||
|
||||
**Ship a `DSH_WINDOWS_SHELL` environment escape hatch.** Rejected: decisive behavior changes belong in composition config, which already overrides the platform layer row by id; a second override channel would split the single source of truth for roster decisions.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
- A Windows host running a shipped `dsh` surface gets `pwsh` as its shell tool and PowerShell as the `ctx.bash` executor without configuration; `bash` is absent from the model-visible roster there (its tool row is disabled).
|
||||
- Windows has no sandbox at all: the fs tools run unconfined (`dsh-fs-local`), the approval service is absent (nothing asks for approval, and the model is never told approval exists), and the permission switcher is gone. The model-visible posture is honest full access rather than a boundary the shell can bypass.
|
||||
- POSIX hosts are unchanged: the platform layer never applies, and the bash stack remains the universal `cordis.patch.yml` rows.
|
||||
- Windows hosts that prefer the bash stack (e.g. with WSL/Git-Bash on PATH) override the shipped default through their profile or home `cordis.patch.yml` — disabling `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh` and re-enabling `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` (both executors register the same `bash` service, so an incomplete recipe fails loud at load) — composition config is the one override channel.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
- Unit: `apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts` pins the win32 default, the custom-profile skip, and the missing-patch failure with the platform injected, and composes the REAL shipped bundle layers (dsh-base + dsh-web-app resolved from the app installation) through the boot's patch algorithm to assert the win32 danger-full-access roster and the base-only-profile warning; `packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts` pins the shipped Windows patch file shape (disables, inserts, and the absent approval service).
|
||||
- Keyless: a win32 `dsh --profile <name> --dump-config` shows the pwsh rows with `windows.cordis.patch.yml` provenance and the bash rows disabled; the POSIX dump (CI Linux) is unchanged.
|
||||
- The real-composition smoke boots the web profile on win32 with the pwsh stack mounted (the exact roster this note describes).
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Windows 默认改用 pwsh
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
[English](2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md) | 中文
|
||||
|
||||
## 问题
|
||||
|
||||
harness 交付的执行画像在每个平台都是 bash 优先。Windows 主机必须安装 bash 垫片(WSL 或 Git-Bash),或退回到仅 POSIX 的 `dsh-bash-local` 行为(硬编码 `bash -c` argv、进程组语义);面向模型的 bash 工具教的是 bash 方言。Windows 原生基础已随 [pwsh 执行器与工具决策](2026-08-01-pwsh-tool-and-executor.md) 交付——`ctx.bash` seam 的 PowerShell 实现与对等的 `pwsh` 工具——但交付组合在 Windows 上仍然挂载 bash 栈,没有垫片的 Windows 主机跑不了交付的 shell。
|
||||
|
||||
## 决策
|
||||
|
||||
启动交付 profile(`dsh web`、`dsh --profile headless`、一次性任务)的 Windows 主机默认获得 PowerShell 栈;POSIX 主机不变。
|
||||
|
||||
- **平台层是数据文件,不是清单重写。** `@deepseek-ai/dsh-base` 随通用 `cordis.patch.yml` 一起交付 [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/windows.cordis.patch.yml):它禁用 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`(仅 POSIX 的执行器及其方言工具)并插入 `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh`。Windows 上没有 OS 级 sandbox runner(landlock/bwrap/seatbelt 均为 POSIX 专属),因此该层整体移除 sandbox 栈——`sandbox`、`sandbox-policy`、`fs-sandbox` 被禁用,由不限权的 `dsh-fs-local` 提供 `ctx.fs`——并完全退化为 danger-full-access:`permission`/`ui-permission` 离开清单(dsh-permission 要求有限权能力的执行器——preset 捆绑的是无限制执行器无法兑现的 sandbox 模式;见其构造函数守卫——客户端旋钮会宣传一个并不存在的边界),`approval` 服务也被禁用——Windows 清单里没有任何动作需要审批,模型也不会被告知"审批存在"或"请求会被自动拒绝"。保留仅限 fs 的路径规则是摆设:不限权的 shell 一条命令即可绕过,因此诚实的 Windows 姿态是全权访问,而不是一个只有 fs 工具假装执行的边界。
|
||||
- **启动器按平台注入该层。** `apps/cli/src/windows-shell.ts` 在 `win32` 主机上从 base bundle 层的 `packageDir` 解析它,置于 bundle 层与用户层之间,覆盖所有组合路径(启动、config-only HMR 重组合、配置转储)。覆盖交付默认是组合决策:偏好 bash 栈(或偏好有限权)的 Windows 主机通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 重新启用 bash 行。未挂 base bundle 的自定义 profile 被跳过(它们自己拥有 shell 栈);base bundle 缺 `windows.cordis.patch.yml` 时 fail loud。
|
||||
- **冷启动的模块解析已恢复。** profiles 重构把 pwsh 包从 `apps/cli` 的依赖闭包中删掉了,`healProfilesModuleFallback` 因此从未把它们链接进 `$DSH_HOME/profiles/node_modules`,新 Windows 主机解析不到插入的行。`apps/cli` 与 `dsh-base` 重新声明 `dsh-pwsh-local`/`dsh-tool-pwsh`,`dsh-base` 还声明 `dsh-fs-local`;按仓库惯例,base bundle 把每个行插件都列为依赖。
|
||||
|
||||
pwsh GUI 渲染已随 [pwsh UI 呈现与 bash 对齐决策](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md) 先行交付;[pwsh 工具与 bash 对齐决策](2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) 交付了工具表面。本决策不改变任何 POSIX 行为。
|
||||
|
||||
## 备选方案
|
||||
|
||||
**在 `dsh-bash-local` 内部让 Windows 默认 pwsh(一个执行器,方言开关)。** 否决,理由与执行器决策否决模式开关相同:执行器的身份就是它 spawn 的 shell,而按平台门控的组合是部署选择,不是执行器配置。
|
||||
|
||||
**从 `apps/cli` 代码而非 bundle 数据文件交付平台层。** 否决:patch 应放在它替换的行旁边、属于拥有这些行的 bundle,让交付清单作为组合数据保持可见、转储带有出处;启动器只贡献 win32 门控。
|
||||
|
||||
**在 Windows 上保留 `permission`/`ui-permission`。** 否决:`dsh-permission` 硬性要求 `ctx.bash.sandboxMode`,在无限制执行器上加载即 fail loud;让它容忍无限制 shell 会宣传 shell 无法兑现的 preset。
|
||||
|
||||
**在 Windows 上保留 fs 路径规则限制(无 OS runner 的 `sandbox-policy` + `fs-sandbox`)。** 否决:shell 是模型的主工具且在 Windows 上不限权,仅限 fs 的路径规则一行命令即可绕过,会夸大边界;诚实的姿态是完全退化到 danger-full-access。
|
||||
|
||||
**交付 `DSH_WINDOWS_SHELL` 环境变量逃生门。** 否决:决定性的行为变更应集中在组合配置中,而组合配置已能按行 id 覆盖平台层;第二条覆盖通道会分裂清单决策的单一事实来源。
|
||||
|
||||
## 后果
|
||||
|
||||
- 运行交付版 `dsh` 表面的 Windows 主机无需配置即获得 `pwsh` 作为 shell 工具、PowerShell 作为 `ctx.bash` 执行器;那里的模型可见清单中没有 `bash`(其工具行被禁用)。
|
||||
- Windows 上没有任何沙箱:fs 工具不限权运行(`dsh-fs-local`)、`approval` 服务不存在(没有任何动作需要审批,模型也不会被告知审批存在)、权限切换器消失。模型可见的姿态是诚实的全权访问,而不是一个 shell 可以绕过的边界。
|
||||
- POSIX 主机不变:平台层永不生效,bash 栈仍是通用 `cordis.patch.yml` 的行。
|
||||
- 偏好 bash 栈的 Windows 主机(例如 PATH 上有 WSL/Git-Bash 时)通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 覆盖交付默认——禁用 `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh` 并重新启用 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`(两个执行器注册同一个 `bash` 服务,配方不完整会在加载时 fail loud)——组合配置是唯一的覆盖通道。
|
||||
|
||||
## 验证
|
||||
|
||||
- 单元:`apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts` 以平台注入固定 win32 默认、自定义 profile 跳过与缺文件失败,并通过启动所用的 patch 算法组合真实交付的 bundle 层(从应用安装解析的 dsh-base + dsh-web-app)断言 win32 danger-full-access 清单与 base-only profile 警告;`packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts` 固定交付的 Windows patch 文件形状(禁用、插入与缺席的 approval 服务)。
|
||||
- Keyless:win32 上的 `dsh --profile <name> --dump-config` 显示带 `windows.cordis.patch.yml` 出处的 pwsh 行、被禁用的 bash 行;POSIX 转储(CI Linux)不变。
|
||||
- 真实组合冒烟在 win32 上启动 web profile,pwsh 栈挂载成功(即本笔记描述的确切清单)。
|
||||
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md
|
||||
2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md: d61dd6f21223121973520014c44e2e5846e7387a
|
||||
2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.zh.md: 120f66b1d9c713d5e3b71575186fc2194b0718a5
|
||||
2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md: 79a09cb4c9698660faff18cf9ae016bec0bce227
|
||||
2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.zh.md: 3e01fd4447fbf047b7cbb3949e708094a6c06c09
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ The first Windows-native foundation shipped `dsh-tool-pwsh` as a deliberately mi
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-tool-pwsh` now mirrors `dsh-tool-bash` call-for-call, minus the sandbox surface, and its model-visible text describes exactly that behavior:
|
||||
`dsh-tool-pwsh` now mirrors `dsh-tool-bash` call-for-call, and its model-visible text describes exactly that behavior:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Rendering adopts the bash story verbatim**: stdout, a marked `[stderr]` section, truncation notices with spill paths, `(no output)` for an empty body, and exit markers only for non-zero exits — a clean exit produces no marker. The description and the `tool:pwsh` prompt section state this precisely ("Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]` markers"), deliberately not copying the bash prompt's "every result" phrasing, which its own renderer contradicts.
|
||||
- **`run_in_background` is wired through the generic task runtime** exactly like the bash tool: preflight, owner registration, `task_output`/`task_kill` control, and the same outcome mapping. `pwsh-local`'s already-mirrored `start()` handle backs it.
|
||||
- **The `DSH_*` environment is shared, not duplicated**: `BashEnvRegistry` moved out of `dsh-tool-bash` into a new tool-independent `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-env` package (`ctx.bashEnv` + built-ins + the session-persistence contributor), and both shell tools inject it. Contributors apply to pwsh calls exactly as they do to bash calls; shared environment ownership therefore sits outside either model-facing shell tool.
|
||||
- **Windows reality is pinned where bash has no analog**: every command runs under a UTF-8 output preamble so the Windows PowerShell 5.1 fallback cannot garble non-ASCII output through the UTF-8-decoding collector, and the prompts teach that Windows forced termination settles as exit 1 without a signal marker.
|
||||
- **Out of scope, unchanged**: sandbox escalation (waits for a Windows-confining executor) and persistent PTY shells (backends are Linux/macOS-only; ConPTY is roadmap work). The pwsh-specific terminal card with an exit pill shipped separately in the [pwsh UI presentation matches bash](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md) decision.
|
||||
- **Out of scope, unchanged**: persistent PTY shells (backends are Linux/macOS-only; ConPTY is roadmap work). Sandbox escalation shipped later with the [Windows ACL sandbox decision](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md) — the pwsh tool now carries the sandbox denial rendering and the same-turn `sandbox_permissions` escalation surface, plus the Windows ConstrainedLanguage contract in its description. The pwsh-specific terminal card with an exit pill shipped separately in the [pwsh UI presentation matches bash](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md) decision.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ The first Windows-native foundation shipped `dsh-tool-pwsh` as a deliberately mi
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
- The bash and pwsh tools are now behaviorally interchangeable for foreground and background shell work (minus sandbox), and the pwsh prompt/description sentences are each backed by the renderer.
|
||||
- The bash and pwsh tools are now behaviorally interchangeable for foreground, background, and sandboxed shell work (the sandbox surface arrived with the Windows ACL sandbox decision), and the pwsh prompt/description sentences are each backed by the renderer — the reviewer's grep-against-code check passes.
|
||||
- Parity ran BOTH ways once: the pwsh tool's structured foreground abort (`HarnessError('tool call aborted', TOOL_ABORTED)` with name `AbortError`) was backported to the bash tool, replacing its uncoded `Error('command aborted')` — a model-visible/logged change pinned by exact-shape tests on both sides and by the cancel-tool-calls fixture.
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-env` is a new shipped package; `dsh-tool-bash`'s `dshHome` config moved there, so compositions mounting the shell tools must also mount `bash-env` (the spine bundles do).
|
||||
- Windows-only semantics (CRLF normalization, forced-termination exit-1/signal-null, POSIX-only self-signal) remain pinned by tests as before.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## 决策
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-tool-pwsh` 现在逐调用镜像 `dsh-tool-bash`,减去 sandbox 面,其模型可见文本精确描述这一行为:
|
||||
`dsh-tool-pwsh` 现在逐调用镜像 `dsh-tool-bash`,其模型可见文本精确描述这一行为:
|
||||
|
||||
- **渲染完全采用 bash 故事**:stdout、带标记的 `[stderr]` 段、带 spill 路径的截断通知、空体渲染 `(no output)`、退出 marker 仅限非零退出——干净退出不产生 marker。描述与 `tool:pwsh` prompt section 精确陈述这一点("Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]` markers"),刻意不复制 bash prompt 中与其自身渲染矛盾的 "every result" 措辞。
|
||||
- **`run_in_background` 经通用任务运行时接线**,与 bash 工具完全一致:预检、owner 注册、`task_output`/`task_kill` 控制与相同的结果映射。其背后是 `pwsh-local` 早已镜像好的 `start()` 句柄。
|
||||
- **`DSH_*` 环境共享而非复制**:`BashEnvRegistry` 从 `dsh-tool-bash` 迁入新的工具无关包 `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-env`(`ctx.bashEnv` + 内置事实 + session-persistence contributor),两个 shell 工具都注入它。contributor 对 pwsh 调用与 bash 调用一视同仁;因此,共享环境的所有权不属于任何一个面向模型的 shell 工具。
|
||||
- **Windows 现实在 bash 无对应处钉死**:每条命令都在 UTF-8 输出 preamble 下运行,使 Windows PowerShell 5.1 兜底无法经 UTF-8 解码的 collector 破坏非 ASCII 输出;prompt 教授 Windows 强制终止以无 signal 的 exit 1 结算。
|
||||
- **范围外,不变**:sandbox 升级(等待 Windows-confining 执行器)与持久 PTY shell(后端仅限 Linux/macOS;ConPTY 属路线图)。带退出 pill 的 pwsh 专属 terminal 卡已随 [pwsh UI 呈现与 bash 对齐](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md) 决策另行交付。
|
||||
- **范围外,不变**:持久 PTY shell(后端仅限 Linux/macOS;ConPTY 属路线图)。sandbox 升级随 [Windows ACL sandbox 决策](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md) 稍后交付——pwsh 工具现在携带 sandbox 拒绝渲染与同轮次 `sandbox_permissions` 升级面,外加其描述中的 Windows ConstrainedLanguage 契约。带退出 pill 的 pwsh 专属 terminal 卡已随 [pwsh UI 呈现与 bash 对齐](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md) 决策另行交付。
|
||||
|
||||
## 备选方案
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## 后果
|
||||
|
||||
- bash 与 pwsh 工具在前台与后台 shell 工作(减 sandbox)上行为可互换,pwsh 的 prompt/描述句每句都有渲染器背书。
|
||||
- bash 与 pwsh 工具在前台、后台与沙箱化 shell 工作上行为可互换(sandbox 面随 Windows ACL sandbox 决策到来),pwsh 的 prompt/描述句每句都有渲染器背书——reviewer 的“拿代码 grep 对证”检查通过。
|
||||
- 对齐也反向发生过一次:pwsh 工具的结构化前台中止(`HarnessError('tool call aborted', TOOL_ABORTED)`,name 为 `AbortError`)被回移到 bash 工具,取代其无码的 `Error('command aborted')`——这是模型可见/入日志的变更,由两侧的精确形状测试与 cancel-tool-calls fixture 钉住。
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-env` 成为新的交付包;`dsh-tool-bash` 的 `dshHome` 配置迁往那里,因此挂载 shell 工具的组合也必须挂载 `bash-env`(spine bundle 已如此)。
|
||||
- Windows 专属语义(CRLF 归一化、强制终止 exit-1/signal-null、仅 POSIX 的自信号)一如既往由测试钉住。
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md
|
||||
2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md: e81d1fb14f719331c503dba539d6a5ec0f1eed4f
|
||||
2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.zh.md: aa6d80e38c12a2808a27e93bde8aec5d71e6a509
|
||||
2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md: 2063b99a7b0ca34f434b3e56628f3ce765d90d81
|
||||
2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.zh.md: 71d4a8e9fc060f8c96483b22641fd67ee1f71c08
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ Before publication, the provider validates a non-empty text-only task, starts th
|
||||
|
||||
`turn/completed` is the authoritative remote terminal fact. The latest `agentMessage` with `phase: "final_answer"` wins, and that selected message must contain nonblank text. When the product emits no explicit final phase, the latest message with `phase: null` is the compatibility fallback and must likewise be nonblank; commentary never replaces either answer. A failed turn with `error.codexErrorInfo: "contextWindowExceeded"` becomes `max-tokens`. A completed turn without an answer, every other failed or interrupted remote turn, malformed required fields in a recognized app-server frame, protocol closure, early process exit, or unknown server request becomes `error`; this version has no native refusal terminal and therefore produces no `refusal`. Local cancellation wins its race and remains `aborted`.
|
||||
|
||||
For command and file approvals, the unattended wire selects a non-approval decision offered by the request, preferring `cancel`; the stable 0.146.0 request shape without an offered-decision list falls back to `decline`. It grants no requested permissions for the turn, answers user-input requests with no answers, and declines MCP elicitation. A request with no legal unattended response, or any unknown server request, fails the run instead of waiting for a user interface the provider does not supply.
|
||||
For command and file approvals, the unattended wire selects a non-approval decision offered by the request, preferring `cancel`; the stable 0.147.0 request shape without an offered-decision list falls back to `decline`. It grants no requested permissions for the turn, answers user-input requests with no answers, and declines MCP elicitation. A request with no legal unattended response, or any unknown server request, fails the run instead of waiting for a user interface the provider does not supply.
|
||||
|
||||
An unpublished startup failure closes the wire, terminates the acquired process tree, waits for exit, and then rejects `start()`. Published disposal best-effort interrupts a known turn, closes the wire, ends stdin, invokes the shared termination escalation, and waits for whole-tree exit. Result failure and teardown failure stay independently observable.
|
||||
|
||||
Codex 0.146.0 speaks the Responses protocol, while DeepSeek's public OpenAI-compatible endpoint speaks Chat Completions. The credentialed Codex e2e therefore uses a loopback-only, test-private bridge for one no-tool nonce request: real Codex sends Responses to the bridge, the bridge forwards the received bearer credential and extracted task to the fixed official DeepSeek endpoint, and it wraps the real text in the minimal Responses SSE lifecycle. The bridge is neither a production proxy nor evidence that Codex connects to DeepSeek Chat Completions natively.
|
||||
Codex 0.147.0 speaks the Responses protocol, while DeepSeek's public OpenAI-compatible endpoint speaks Chat Completions. The credentialed Codex e2e therefore uses a loopback-only, test-private bridge for one no-tool nonce request: real Codex sends Responses to the bridge, the bridge forwards the received bearer credential and extracted task to the fixed official DeepSeek endpoint, and it wraps the real text in the minimal Responses SSE lifecycle. The bridge is neither a production proxy nor evidence that Codex connects to DeepSeek Chat Completions natively.
|
||||
|
||||
## Claude Code provider
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ The credentialed Claude Code e2e uses the official DeepSeek Claude Code contract
|
||||
|
||||
Each product owns branch-complete package tests, a required keyless real-product spec, a Loader composition e2e, and a credentialed DeepSeek e2e. The keyless product tier uses the exact official distribution under test, a non-empty fake product key, an isolated temporary workspace and product home, and a loopback fixed-answer model. Missing product requests, wrong authentication, altered task text, a non-exact answer, a skipped real product, or a surviving managed handle fails the required test. The Loader tier boots the README-shaped user configuration, verifies both fixed foreground-only tools in one context, and starts neither product process. The credentialed tier starts the same production provider and real product with a runtime-only key, requires a unique nonce from the fixed official DeepSeek service, and proves quiescence again; it self-skips only when a local operator supplied no key, while trusted CI preflights the secret.
|
||||
|
||||
The Codex evidence pins `@openai/codex@0.146.0` and `codex-cli 0.146.0`. Its real-product spec observes the exact Bearer key, original task, byte-exact final answer, unattended command rejection with no file side effect, local cancellation, and whole-tree exit. Production still supplies `codex` on `PATH`.
|
||||
The Codex evidence pins `@openai/codex@0.147.0` and `codex-cli 0.147.0`. Its real-product spec observes the exact Bearer key, original task, byte-exact final answer, unattended command rejection with no file side effect, local cancellation, and whole-tree exit. Production still supplies `codex` on `PATH`.
|
||||
|
||||
The Codex credentialed e2e registers the production provider, starts the same real app-server, and requests one random nonce through the test-private bridge described above. It fixes the external endpoint and model, stores no credential or request payload, requires exactly one completed upstream response, compares the trimmed product answer byte-for-byte with the nonce, and waits for every managed handle to exit.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ fixed tool → shared subagent service → product provider → official product
|
||||
|
||||
`turn/completed` 是权威的远端终止事实。以最后一条带有 `phase: "final_answer"` 的 `agentMessage` 为准,且选中的消息必须包含非空白文本。若产品没有发出明确的最终阶段,则以最后一条 `phase: null` 的消息作为兼容性回退,该消息也必须包含非空白文本;过程说明绝不会取代上述任一答案。带有 `error.codexErrorInfo: "contextWindowExceeded"` 的失败轮次会成为 `max-tokens`。轮次完成却没有答案、其他任何远端失败或中断轮次、已识别的 app-server 帧中必需字段格式错误、协议关闭、进程提前退出或未知的服务器请求,都会产生 `error`;本版本没有原生的拒绝终止状态,因此不会产生 `refusal`。本地取消在竞态中胜出并保持为 `aborted`。
|
||||
|
||||
对于命令与文件审批,无人值守的协议连接会从请求给出的决策选项中选择一项不予批准的决策,并优先选择 `cancel`;稳定的 0.146.0 请求形态没有决策选项列表,因此回退到 `decline`。它不授予该轮次请求的任何权限,不向用户输入请求提供任何答案,并拒绝 MCP elicitation。若请求在无人值守模式下没有合法响应,或是未知服务器请求,此次运行就会失败,而不会等待本提供方没有提供的用户界面。
|
||||
对于命令与文件审批,无人值守的协议连接会从请求给出的决策选项中选择一项不予批准的决策,并优先选择 `cancel`;稳定的 0.147.0 请求形态没有决策选项列表,因此回退到 `decline`。它不授予该轮次请求的任何权限,不向用户输入请求提供任何答案,并拒绝 MCP elicitation。若请求在无人值守模式下没有合法响应,或是未知服务器请求,此次运行就会失败,而不会等待本提供方没有提供的用户界面。
|
||||
|
||||
若启动在发布前失败,提供方会关闭协议连接、终止已获取的进程树并等待其退出,然后拒绝 `start()`。对已发布的运行执行资源释放时,提供方会尽力中断已知轮次、关闭协议连接、结束标准输入、调用共享的逐级终止机制,并等待整棵进程树退出。结果失败与清理失败仍可彼此独立地观察。
|
||||
|
||||
Codex 0.146.0 使用 Responses 协议,而 DeepSeek 的公开 OpenAI 兼容端点使用 Chat Completions。因此,带密钥 Codex e2e 会采用一个仅限回环、仅供测试内部使用的桥接层来处理一次不使用工具的随机数请求:真实 Codex 将 Responses 发送到桥接层,桥接层把收到的 Bearer 凭据与提取出的任务转发到固定的 DeepSeek 官方端点,再将真实文本包装进最小化的 Responses SSE(Server-Sent Events)生命周期。该桥接层既不是生产代理,也不能作为 Codex 原生连接 DeepSeek Chat Completions 的证据。
|
||||
Codex 0.147.0 使用 Responses 协议,而 DeepSeek 的公开 OpenAI 兼容端点使用 Chat Completions。因此,带密钥 Codex e2e 会采用一个仅限回环、仅供测试内部使用的桥接层来处理一次不使用工具的随机数请求:真实 Codex 将 Responses 发送到桥接层,桥接层把收到的 Bearer 凭据与提取出的任务转发到固定的 DeepSeek 官方端点,再将真实文本包装进最小化的 Responses SSE(Server-Sent Events)生命周期。该桥接层既不是生产代理,也不能作为 Codex 原生连接 DeepSeek Chat Completions 的证据。
|
||||
|
||||
## Claude Code 提供方
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Codex 0.146.0 使用 Responses 协议,而 DeepSeek 的公开 OpenAI 兼容端
|
||||
|
||||
每个产品都负责覆盖所有分支的包测试、一项必跑的无密钥真实产品测试、一项 Loader 组合 e2e 和一项带密钥 DeepSeek e2e。无密钥产品层级使用被测的确切官方发行版、非空的伪产品密钥、隔离的临时工作区与产品主目录,以及能返回固定答案的回环模型。产品请求缺失、身份验证错误、任务文本被改动、答案不完全一致、真实产品被跳过或受管句柄仍存活,都会使这项必跑测试失败。Loader 层级会启动 README 所示形态的用户配置,在同一个上下文中验证两个固定且只支持前台执行的工具,并且不会启动任何产品进程。带密钥层级会使用仅在运行时提供的密钥启动同一生产提供方与真实产品,要求从固定的 DeepSeek 官方服务取得唯一随机数,并再次证明完全停稳;仅当本地操作者未提供密钥时才会自行跳过,而受信任的 CI 会预检该 secret。
|
||||
|
||||
Codex 证据锁定 `@openai/codex@0.146.0` 与 `codex-cli 0.146.0`。其真实产品测试会观测确切的 Bearer 密钥、原始任务、逐字节完全一致的最终回答、不会产生文件副作用的无人值守命令拒绝、本地取消以及整棵进程树退出。生产环境仍提供 `codex`,并通过 `PATH` 解析。
|
||||
Codex 证据锁定 `@openai/codex@0.147.0` 与 `codex-cli 0.147.0`。其真实产品测试会观测确切的 Bearer 密钥、原始任务、逐字节完全一致的最终回答、不会产生文件副作用的无人值守命令拒绝、本地取消以及整棵进程树退出。生产环境仍提供 `codex`,并通过 `PATH` 解析。
|
||||
|
||||
带密钥 Codex e2e 会注册生产提供方,启动同样的真实 app-server,并通过上述测试专用桥接层请求一个随机数。该测试固定外部端点与模型,不存储任何凭据或请求载荷,要求上游恰好完成一次响应,将去除首尾空白后的产品答案与该随机数逐字节比较,并等待所有受管句柄退出。
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.md
|
||||
2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.md: 348f7ab0a26e9b39057dbac885304e0d52e0b1fb
|
||||
2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.zh.md: 4920ee6eb061d44934bfc9f5176e244f5aac8553
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Per-agent tool presentation, and the `code` preset
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
English | [中文](2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.zh.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
Agent presets compose an agent's tools per session, but not the FORM those tools reach the model in. Code Mode — one `run_code` tool plus a generated TypeScript SDK, replacing a call sequence with one program — was a deployment-wide `mode` field on the host's `dsh-tools` row. A deployment either ran every session in Code Mode or none, so the obvious product shape ("代码模式" beside 标准/极简/创造 in the preset picker) had nothing to hang on.
|
||||
|
||||
The naive reading of "move tools down to the agent plane" does not work. `ctx.tools` has host-plane consumers that cannot follow it: `dsh-agent-loop` reads the registry's private scheduler seam, `dsh-apiproxy` reads its presenters to render tool cards, and every tool plugin registers into it. By the stack's own rule — a service moves into a preset only when ALL of its consumers move with it — the registry stays where it is.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
Split the registry from its projection. The registry stays host-plane; the **presentation** becomes per-agent state inside it, alongside the per-agent restrictions and guards that already live there.
|
||||
|
||||
`ToolRegistry.presentAs(mode)` is scoped-only and mirrors `restrict()`: it writes one cell on the calling scope's `ToolLayer` through `ScopedLayers.effect`, so it unwinds with the agent that declared it. `modeFor(scope)` resolves that cell against the config `mode`, which becomes the default for agents declaring nothing rather than a process-wide fact. The three reads that decided presentation — the wire schemas, the `run_code` entry in the visibility view, and the generated SDK section — take the scope's mode instead of the service's.
|
||||
|
||||
Two consequences fell out and are load-bearing:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`run_code` is appended per scope.** Previously the transport entered every view whenever the transport existed. Per-agent, a native agent must not find `run_code` in its dispatch table because some other agent in the process presents it — so the append is conditional on that scope's own mode, and the transport is built lazily on first need.
|
||||
- **The reserved name is now unconditional.** `run_code` was rejected as a registration only while a code mode was configured. Any agent may now select a code mode, so a name that was free to take under a native deployment would become a collision the moment a preset mounted.
|
||||
|
||||
The SDK prompt section is registered globally by a code-mode deployment (unchanged) and additionally per agent by `presentAs`, where it shadows by name. Its body renders empty for a native scope, which the prompt renderer drops — that is what keeps an agent opting OUT of a code-mode deployment free of an SDK section.
|
||||
|
||||
The preset expresses the choice through one row, `@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent-tool-mode`, whose whole body is a `presentAs` call. A code mode waits for `ctx.codeRuntime` through `ctx.inject` rather than assuming it: the runtime is host-plane, and a pending row is what `dsh-agent-presets` already reports as an unusable mount, naming the row — so a preset selecting Code Mode against a runtime-less deployment fails where an operator can act.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**A second `ToolRegistry` inside the preset's isolate realm.** Rejected: `dsh-agent-loop` resolves the registry once from the host context through a private symbol, so a per-agent registry would be invisible to the scheduler. Making the loop registry-per-agent is a far larger change than making one field scope-aware.
|
||||
|
||||
**A top-level key in the preset's own YAML.** Rejected for the reason preset display metadata went to a separate `preset.yml`: the composition is a top-level list of plugin rows and cannot carry sibling keys.
|
||||
|
||||
**Naming the package `dsh-tool-mode`.** Rejected by a gate, correctly. `gen-tool-catalog` globs `packages/*/tool-*` and requires every match to publish a model-facing tool schema, because that prefix means "ships a tool" in this repo. This row ships none.
|
||||
|
||||
**Registering the SDK section unconditionally from the constructor.** Rejected after trying it: `renderPrompt` drops empty sections but `PromptAssembly.sections` retains them, so every native deployment would carry a `tools:sdk` entry rendering nothing, and two existing assertions on that list would have had to be weakened to accommodate it.
|
||||
|
||||
**Sharing `standard`'s composition by include.** Rejected per the stack's own convention: `cordis` already duplicates `standard`, and a preset's value is that its whole composition is readable in one file. The cost — a third copy of ~240 lines that must move together — is real and is the strongest argument for a future include mechanism.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
Two sessions in one process can now present differently, so "which tools does the model see" is no longer answerable from the deployment config alone; it requires the agent. Every diagnostic that quotes a mode now quotes the scope's, not the service's.
|
||||
|
||||
`ctx.tools.schemas(agent)` remains the agent's CAPABILITY catalog and is unchanged by presentation — only the assembly's tools collapse. Tests asserting what the model receives must read the assembly; `web-agent-presets.spec.ts` asserts both sides of that distinction for the shipped `code` preset.
|
||||
|
||||
The shipped roster is four presets (标准/代码/极简/创造), so any golden listing them moves. A deployment that composes no code runtime can compose no code-mode preset; the shipped Web overlay carries one, the base composition does not.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: 按 agent 的工具呈现方式,以及 `code` 预设
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
[English](2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.md) | 中文
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
agent preset 已经能按会话组装一个 agent 的工具,却管不了这些工具以何种**形态**抵达模型。Code Mode——一个 `run_code` 工具加一份生成的 TypeScript SDK,用一段程序替代一串调用——此前是宿主 `dsh-tools` 那一行上的部署级 `mode` 字段。一个部署要么所有会话都跑 Code Mode,要么一个都不跑,于是那个显而易见的产品形态(预设选择器里「代码模式」与标准/极简/创造并列)无处安放。
|
||||
|
||||
「把 tools 下沉到 agent 平面」这个字面读法行不通。`ctx.tools` 有一批跟不下来的宿主平面消费者:`dsh-agent-loop` 读它私有的调度器 seam,`dsh-apiproxy` 读它的 presenter 来渲染工具卡,每个工具插件都往里注册。按本 stack 自己的规则——只有**所有**消费者一起下沉,服务才能下沉——注册表必须留在原地。
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
把注册表和它的投影拆开。注册表留在宿主平面;**呈现方式**变成它内部按 agent 的状态,与已经住在那里的按 agent 限制和守卫并列。
|
||||
|
||||
`ToolRegistry.presentAs(mode)` 只接受 scoped 上下文,形状照抄 `restrict()`:它通过 `ScopedLayers.effect` 在调用方 scope 的 `ToolLayer` 上写一个单元,因此会随声明它的那个 agent 一起卸载。`modeFor(scope)` 将该单元与 config 的 `mode` 一并解析,后者于是成为「未作声明的 agent」的默认值,而不再是进程级事实。原先决定呈现方式的三处读取——wire schema、可见性视图里的 `run_code` 条目、以及生成的 SDK 段——改为读取该 scope 的模式,而非服务的。
|
||||
|
||||
有两个随之而来的结果,且都是承重的:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`run_code` 按 scope 追加。** 此前只要传输存在,它就进入每一个视图。按 agent 之后,一个 native agent 不能因为进程里别的 agent 呈现了它、就在自己的分发表里看到 `run_code`——因此这次追加以该 scope 自身的模式为条件,传输也改为首次需要时才构建。
|
||||
- **保留名现在无条件生效。** `run_code` 此前只在配置了 code 模式时才被拒绝注册。如今任何 agent 都可能选择 code 模式,因此一个在 native 部署下可以随便占用的名字,会在某个 preset 挂载的那一刻变成冲突。
|
||||
|
||||
SDK 提示词段由 code 模式的部署全局注册(不变),并由 `presentAs` 额外按 agent 注册一份,后者按名字遮蔽前者。它的正文对 native scope 渲染为空,而提示词渲染器会丢弃空段——正是这一点让「在 code 模式部署下选择退出」的 agent 不带 SDK 段。
|
||||
|
||||
preset 用一行来表达这个选择:`@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent-tool-mode`,其全部内容就是一次 `presentAs` 调用。code 类模式通过 `ctx.inject` 等待 `ctx.codeRuntime` 而非假定它存在:运行时在宿主平面,而一个 pending 的行正是 `dsh-agent-presets` 已经会报告的「不可用挂载」并会指名该行——于是在无运行时的部署上选择 Code Mode 的 preset,会在操作者能够动手的地方失败。
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**在 preset 的 isolate realm 里再起一个 `ToolRegistry`。** 否决:`dsh-agent-loop` 通过一个私有 symbol 从宿主上下文一次性解析注册表,因此按 agent 的注册表对调度器不可见。把 loop 改成按 agent 解析注册表,远比把一个字段变成 scope 感知的改动大。
|
||||
|
||||
**在 preset 自己的 YAML 里加一个顶层键。** 否决,理由与 preset 展示元数据落到独立 `preset.yml` 相同:组装是一个顶层的插件行列表,装不下并列的键。
|
||||
|
||||
**把包命名为 `dsh-tool-mode`。** 被一道 gate 否决,而且它是对的。`gen-tool-catalog` 以 `packages/*/tool-*` 通配,并要求每个命中项发布一个面向模型的工具 schema——因为在本仓库里这个前缀就意味着「带工具」。而这一行不带任何工具。
|
||||
|
||||
**在构造函数里无条件注册 SDK 段。** 试过之后否决:`renderPrompt` 会丢弃空段,但 `PromptAssembly.sections` 会保留它们,于是每个 native 部署都将携带一个什么也不渲染的 `tools:sdk` 条目,而两处既有断言不得不为此放宽。
|
||||
|
||||
**用 include 共享 `standard` 的组装。** 按本 stack 自己的惯例否决:`cordis` 已经复制了一份 `standard`,而 preset 的价值恰在于整份组装能在一个文件里读完。代价——第三份约 240 行、且必须同步演进的副本——是真实的,也正是未来引入 include 机制最有力的论据。
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
同一进程内的两个会话现在可以有不同的呈现方式,因此「模型看到哪些工具」不再能只凭部署配置回答,必须给出 agent。凡是引用模式的诊断信息,现在引用的都是该 scope 的,而不是服务的。
|
||||
|
||||
`ctx.tools.schemas(agent)` 仍然是该 agent 的**能力**清单,不受呈现方式影响——坍缩的只是 assembly 里的工具。断言「模型收到什么」的测试必须读 assembly;`web-agent-presets.spec.ts` 对随附的 `code` 预设同时断言了这个区分的两侧。
|
||||
|
||||
随附的名单变成四个预设(标准/代码/极简/创造),因此任何列出它们的 golden 都会变动。未组装 code 运行时的部署无法组装任何 code 模式的 preset;随附的 Web overlay 带了一个,base 组装没有。
|
||||
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md
|
||||
2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md: ba92f482e957acd00792a2a8053716047a4da27d
|
||||
2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.zh.md: 693b3fc26e632718ea2135282d63daa32e63e1c5
|
||||
2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md: a59ae95ab64ae28babc913958a1a6ba424898210
|
||||
2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.zh.md: 8e065640e56bf6d6b92e62cb746fa9dd53f6f2b5
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ English | [中文](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.zh.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
The [pwsh tool bash parity decision](../../implemented/feature/2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) made `dsh-tool-pwsh` behaviorally interchangeable with `dsh-tool-bash` for execution, markers, and background tasks, but explicitly deferred the human-visible half: a completed pwsh foreground call presented as a generic `console`-fenced card while the bash tool's completed call presented as a terminal card with a parsed exit-status pill. The roadmap that owned this gap ([Windows defaults to pwsh](../../proposed/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md)) named "pwsh TUI/GUI rendering" as stage 2, but the TUI package was removed, leaving the Web surface as the only UI the gap affects.
|
||||
The [pwsh tool bash parity decision](../../implemented/feature/2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) made `dsh-tool-pwsh` behaviorally interchangeable with `dsh-tool-bash` for execution, markers, and background tasks, but explicitly deferred the human-visible half: a completed pwsh foreground call presented as a generic `console`-fenced card while the bash tool's completed call presented as a terminal card with a parsed exit-status pill. The roadmap that owned this gap ([Windows defaults to pwsh](../../implemented/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md)) named "pwsh TUI/GUI rendering" as stage 2, but the TUI package was removed, leaving the Web surface as the only UI the gap affects.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
[pwsh 工具与 bash 对齐决策](../../implemented/feature/2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) 让 `dsh-tool-pwsh` 在执行、marker 与后台任务上行为可互换,但明确推迟了面向人类的一半:完成的 pwsh 前台调用呈现为通用 `console` 围栏卡片,而 bash 工具的完成调用呈现为带解析退出状态 pill 的 terminal 卡。拥有此缺口的路线图([Windows 默认改用 pwsh](../../proposed/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md))把 "pwsh TUI/GUI 渲染" 列为阶段 2,但 TUI 包已被移除,使 Web 表面成为该缺口唯一影响的 UI。
|
||||
[pwsh 工具与 bash 对齐决策](../../implemented/feature/2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) 让 `dsh-tool-pwsh` 在执行、marker 与后台任务上行为可互换,但明确推迟了面向人类的一半:完成的 pwsh 前台调用呈现为通用 `console` 围栏卡片,而 bash 工具的完成调用呈现为带解析退出状态 pill 的 terminal 卡。拥有此缺口的路线图([Windows 默认改用 pwsh](../../implemented/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md))把 "pwsh TUI/GUI 渲染" 列为阶段 2,但 TUI 包已被移除,使 Web 表面成为该缺口唯一影响的 UI。
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md
|
||||
2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md: 7e8f229269233d9ac9baa65241ca02a4cf4c3f7c
|
||||
2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md: eeb346b228b3559f487448e5d4ec525b7bb89525
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Windows sandbox rung: raw ACL restricted tokens over mxc and AppContainer
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
English | [中文](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
The [sandbox decision](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) leaves `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` empty, so shipped Windows profiles degrade to danger-full-access because no confining executor exists. The win32 rung must confine the two file-effect modes the sandbox vocabulary promises — `read-only` (zero writes) and `workspace-write` (writes under the workspace root plus a backend-defined temp area) — while leaving reads, network, and process visibility alone, because every mode permits reading.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
Implement the rung directly on the raw ACL mechanism: duplicate the caller's token into a `WRITE_RESTRICTED` token (`CreateRestrictedToken` with `WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`) whose restricting SIDs include a write SID (`S-1-4-x-y`); the write SID's Write ACEs on the workspace and temp roots are the entire write allowlist, because `WRITE_RESTRICTED` intersects write accesses only and reads keep the caller's full ambient access. The mechanism is the one huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (`10e4dfb`) demonstrates; this port checks every API call and fails closed (the POC fail-opened on every ignored return value). The write SID is the PER-WORKSPACE identity, derived deterministically from the canonical workspace path (`workspaceWriteSid` — sha256 → `S-1-4-x-y`) and stored NOWHERE: the workspace-root ACE therefore materializes once per workspace per machine — the standing ACE is the cross-session reuse cache, and every later provision hits the exact-ACE skip (idempotent re-grant skips the eager full-tree re-propagation — no garbage collection) — instead of once per session, which is what the earlier per-session random SID paid a full tree propagation per session for. The seam derives the session's PRIVATE temp subdirectory from the session id + workspace (sha256, 16 hex — stored nowhere, so no tamper surface exists) and creates it exclusively; it is removed on provider dispose, and a crash leaves it as `%TEMP%` litter whose next resume fails loudly at the exclusive creation until temp hygiene reclaims it. The seam materializes the workspace ACE STANDING (never revoked — the cache) and the temp ACE REVOCABLY (revoked on provider dispose, so an inheritable ACE never outlives its session's temp directory on the ambient temp root). The token's restricting list is the keep-alive group plus the write SID only under workspace-write: read-only = [logon SID, Everyone] and workspace-write = [logon SID, Everyone, write SID]. The keep-alive invariants are logon SID + Everyone (early DLL init dies with 0xC0000142 and CNG crashes pwsh with 0xE0434352 without them). Read-only carries no write SID: a standing grant ACE from an earlier workspace-write period stays INERT (the pass-2 check grants only what the list carries, so read-only remains strictly zero-grant across a `/permission` downgrade or a crash-resumed session, while the standing ACE keeps the re-upgrade free). Authenticated Users is absent from BOTH lists — the WMI namespace security check fails (0x80041003), so CIM is unavailable in every confined mode, and the C:\-root tree-creation escape (standing `AU:(AD)` + `AU:(OI)(CI)(IO)(M)` ACEs) is closed in both; INTERACTIVE/LOCAL are likewise absent from both (the Public tree writes are denied — pinned by the runner's Public-probe regression). Workspace-write children see a PRIVATE per-session temp subdirectory (`<temp>\dsh-<16 hex>` derived from the session id + workspace — created exclusively, reparse points rejected, removed on provider dispose — TMP/TEMP rewritten by the runner — bwrap `--tmpfs /tmp` semantics). The restricted token's DEFAULT DACL is extended with a full-access write-SID ACE (`SetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl)`): new objects created without an explicit security descriptor (anonymous pipes — CreatePipe, sync objects) then carry a restricting-SID ACE and pass the write pass-2 check at creation; NAMED pipes are exempt — their default security descriptor is the Win32 layer's user-mode default SD template (built by KernelBase — owner/SYSTEM/Admins full, Everyone/ANONYMOUS read-only), which the token cannot influence, so piped stdio capture stays denied for confined grandchildren (the POC-documented boundary, pinned by the runner suite). It ships as [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md) (backend plus the `./runner` argv-prefix entry), the `win32` chain rung of [`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md), and [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) as the confining executor; the Windows platform layer re-enables the full permission surface (sandbox/sandbox-policy/permission/approval/fs-sandbox) over the confined pwsh stack.
|
||||
|
||||
## How the restriction works (why no new identity)
|
||||
|
||||
The identity routes restrict by *who* runs the child; this rung restricts by *token derivation*. An identity route (landstrip's restricted-user, AppContainer) runs the child under a fresh account or container SID that starts with zero ACEs on the host's files — everything, reads included, defaults to denied, and every path the child may touch must then be opened back up by writing ACEs for that identity: the wholesale DACL mutation that disqualified both alternatives. The restricted token keeps the caller's own SID and logon session: [`CreateRestrictedToken`](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-createrestrictedtoken) derives a token that adds the restricting SIDs and the `WRITE_RESTRICTED` flag, so Windows performs the access check twice — once against the normal SIDs, once against the restricting SIDs — and grants write-class access only where both checks pass. Reads pass on the normal check alone (the caller's SIDs already carry read access everywhere the caller can read), which is why this rung needs no read grants and no new account; writes must additionally clear the orphan-SID check, which only the workspace and temp ACEs satisfy. `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE | LUA_TOKEN` synthesize the limited-user effect of a fresh account token-side, so even an elevated caller derives a filtered token. The same primitive could restrict reads (`SidsToDisable` turning SIDs deny-only), but a read-restricted token would need per-path read grants — reintroducing exactly the cost the identity routes pay — and the sandbox vocabulary never requires read confinement.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
### Why not mxc (Microsoft xContainer)?
|
||||
|
||||
Two disqualifiers. First, the OS floor is too new: the [mxc OS-version policy](https://github.com/microsoft/mxc/blob/main/docs/process-container/os-version-support.md) sets the product floor at Windows 11 24H2 (build 26100), and the BaseContainer tier (T1, `Experimental_CreateProcessInSandbox`) exists only on 25H2+ (build 26600+) with the OS feature enabled — on every supported release at or below 25H2 the filesystem policy falls back to T3, AppContainer plus host-side DACL ACE augmentation. Second, supporting arbitrary-path reads under either tier means granting read access by writing ACLs over every path the child may read: a model that reads the whole workspace and arbitrary files would require wholesale host DACL mutation — a standing side effect and a cost a write-only restriction does not need.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why not AppContainer?
|
||||
|
||||
An AppContainer token carries no ambient read access: every readable path must be pre-granted through capabilities or explicit ACEs, so arbitrary-path reads — the harness's read model — are unsupported without the same wholesale grants. The restricted token needs no read grants at all: it intersects write access only.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why not landstrip?
|
||||
|
||||
The [landstrip evaluation](../../rejected/feature/2026-07-26-evaluate-landstrip-for-windows-sandbox-rung.md) was rejected before implementation (not battle-tested; the in-house launcher plan won), and its Windows backend is AppContainer-shaped, inheriting the same arbitrary-read problem.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
Bought: write-only confinement with no new OS floor (`CreateRestrictedToken` predates the mxc releases by two decades), reads/network/process visibility untouched exactly as the mode vocabulary requires, and fail-closed errors carrying the API name and the exact Win32 code. Cost: no read-side or network isolation; console isolation unavailable (hidden-console children die with `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED`; children share the host console); standing ACE mutations on the granted roots (caller-owned directories; workspace ACEs stand forever by design — the reuse cache, invisible residue when a workspace is renamed — temp ACEs revoked by provider dispose together with the derived private temp directory — a crash leaves both behind and the next resume fails loudly at the exclusive creation until temp hygiene reclaims the directory); grant materialization is an EAGER full-tree propagation (`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` walks every descendant immediately — tens of seconds on large workspaces), paid once per workspace per machine by the per-workspace identity; CIM is unavailable in BOTH confined modes (AuthUsers dropped from both lists — the WMI namespace security check fails, and `Get-ComputerInfo` silently returns incomplete results) as the price of closing the C:\-root tree-creation escape in both; FAT-class (non-ACL) targets outside the granted roots remain writable under both modes (no security descriptors to intersect — a legacy residue treated as unsupported, warn-only, documented in the README); NULL-DACL directories are not identity-preserving under a grant+revoke round-trip (documented edge, the POC shares it); `whoami` and token-inspection cmdlets fail under the restricted token (diagnostic noise, documented); and BOTH confined modes run `pwsh` in ConstrainedLanguage mode — the restricted token trips PowerShell's lockdown detection, so `Add-Type`, non-core .NET statics (`[System.IO.*]::`, `[math]::`), COM objects, and reflection fail with "only core types" errors while `-f` formatting, property access, and core cmdlets/types keep working, and the language mode cannot be lifted back to FullLanguage from inside — taught to the model in the pwsh tool description and documented in the package README's Known Limitations; BOTH confined modes also deny named-pipe opens — libuv's piped-stdio spawns fail with EPERM (the POC-documented "no output redirection" boundary; inherited/ignored stdio and anonymous pipes work) — documented in the package README's Known Limitations and taught to the model in the pwsh tool description.
|
||||
|
||||
## Testing
|
||||
|
||||
The product-visible Windows roster flip is win32-only, so the keyless snapshot fixtures — which must replay on macOS/Linux — cannot cover it; the bundle composition specs ([`base.spec.ts`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts), [`windows-shell.spec.ts`](../../../../apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts)) plus the win32 real-runner suites (`packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/`, `packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/tests/`) are the substitute evidence, and the CI Windows lane owns the assembled signal. The grant machinery is pinned cross-platform by `packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-grants.spec.ts` (the derived private-temp identity — deterministic per session + workspace, distinct across sessions — one-shot materialization, exclusive temp creation with reparse-point rejection and self-cleanup on failure, clean-restart re-grant of the same derived directory, the standing-vs-revocable lifecycle across dispose and the mode-switch cycle, and the derived-SID argv contract — with the Win32 surface mocked) and on win32 by `workspace-sid.spec.ts` (derivation determinism/shape/distinctness), `grant.spec.ts` (real-DACL materialization: revocable paths revoke on dispose, standing paths survive it), the `acl.spec.ts` idempotent-grant fast-path and standing-ACE-after-dispose contract, the `failure-paths.spec.ts` suspension-orphan regression (AssignProcessToJobObject failure terminates the child), and the `runner.spec.ts` `--write-sid` contract (caller-owned grants, private temp subdir through TMP/TEMP, both-mode CIM-denial probes, the mode-downgrade regression — a standing grant ACE is inert under read-only and effective again on re-upgrade — the ambient-writable Public-probe regression (a C:\Users\Public subdirectory write is denied under both modes), and the ConstrainedLanguage pins in both modes, plus the grandchild-stdio matrix pins — inherited/ignored stdio spawns succeed while piped capture is DENIED in both modes). The runner-failure classification is exit-gated on 127 (a confined command that merely prints the `windows-acl-run:` signature on a non-127 exit is never misclassified as "the command did not run" — pinned in the pwsh-sandbox helper suite).
|
||||
|
||||
## Related
|
||||
|
||||
The [pwsh executor decision](2026-08-01-pwsh-tool-and-executor.md) owns the pwsh-sandbox/tool-pwsh dialect split this rung consumes.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Windows sandbox rung: raw ACL restricted tokens over mxc and AppContainer
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
[English](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md) | 中文
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
[沙盒决策](2026-07-06-sandbox.md)把 `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` 留空,交付的 Windows profile 因为没有可用的隔离执行器而退化为 danger-full-access。win32 档必须实现沙盒词汇表承诺的两个文件效果模式——`read-only`(零写入)与 `workspace-write`(仅工作区根目录加后端定义的临时区域可写)——同时保持读、网络与进程可见性不受影响,因为所有模式都允许读取。
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
直接基于原始 ACL 机制实现该档:把调用者令牌复制为 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 受限令牌(`CreateRestrictedToken`,`WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`),其 restricting SIDs 中包含写入 SID(`S-1-4-x-y`);工作区与临时目录上写入 SID 的 Write ACE 就是全部写入白名单,因为 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 只对写访问做交集检查,读保持调用者的完整环境访问。该机制来自 huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc(`10e4dfb`)的演示;本移植检查每一个 API 调用并 fail-closed(POC 因忽略返回值而 fail-open)。写入 SID 是**按工作区**的身份,由规范工作区路径确定性派生(`workspaceWriteSid`——sha256 → `S-1-4-x-y`),且**任何地方都不存储**:工作区根目录 ACE 因此每台机器每个工作区只物化一次——常驻 ACE 就是跨会话复用缓存,此后每次供给都命中精确 ACE 跳过(幂等重授权跳过急切的全树重传播——不做垃圾回收)——而不是每会话一次,这正是先前每会话随机 SID 每个会话都要付一次全树传播的代价。seam 从会话 id + 工作区派生会话的**私有**临时子目录(sha256、16 位 hex——任何地方都不存储,因此不存在篡改面)并独占创建;它在提供方 dispose 时移除,崩溃则把它留作 `%TEMP%` 垃圾,其下一次恢复会在独占创建处大声失败,直到临时目录卫生机制将其回收。seam 把工作区 ACE **常驻**物化(绝不撤销——就是缓存),把临时 ACE **可回收**物化(提供方 dispose(资源释放)时撤销,因此可继承 ACE 不会在环境临时根目录上比其会话的临时目录活得更久)。令牌的 restricting list 是保活组加上仅 workspace-write 下的写入 SID:read-only = [登录 SID、Everyone],workspace-write = [登录 SID、Everyone、写入 SID]。保活不变式是登录 SID + Everyone(没有它们,早期 DLL init 会以 0xC0000142 死亡,CNG 会让 pwsh 以 0xE0434352 崩溃)。Read-only 不含写入 SID:先前 workspace-write 时期留下的常驻授权 ACE 保持**失效**(pass-2 检查只授予列表所携带的内容,因此 read-only 在 `/permission` 降级或崩溃后恢复的会话中始终保持严格零授权,而常驻 ACE 让重新升级保持零成本)。Authenticated Users 在**两种**列表中都缺席——WMI namespace 安全校验失败(0x80041003),因此 CIM 在每一种受限模式下都不可用,且 C:\-root 建树逃逸(驻留的 `AU:(AD)` + `AU:(OI)(CI)(IO)(M)` ACE)在两种模式下都被关闭;INTERACTIVE/LOCAL 同样在两种列表中都缺席(Public 树的写入被拒绝——由 runner 的 Public-probe 回归钉住)。Workspace-write 子进程看到的是私有的每会话临时子目录(`<temp>\dsh-<16 hex>`——由会话 id + 工作区派生、独占创建、拒绝 reparse point、提供方 dispose 时移除——TMP/TEMP 由 runner 重写——bwrap `--tmpfs /tmp` 语义)。受限令牌的**默认 DACL** 被扩展一条写入 SID 全权 ACE(`SetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl)`):此后不带显式安全描述符创建的新对象(匿名管道——CreatePipe、同步对象)自带 restricting SID ACE,创建时的写 pass-2 检查通过;**named pipe 例外**——其默认安全描述符是 Win32 层在用户态安装的默认 SD 模板(由 KernelBase 构建——owner/SYSTEM/Admins 全权、Everyone/ANONYMOUS 只读),令牌无法影响,因此受限孙进程的管道 stdio 捕获保持拒绝(POC 记载的边界,由 runner 套件钉住)。它以 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md)(后端加 `./runner` argv 前缀入口)、[`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md) 的 `win32` 链档、以及作为隔离执行器的 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) 交付;Windows 平台层在受限 pwsh 栈之上重新启用完整权限面(sandbox/sandbox-policy/permission/approval/fs-sandbox)。
|
||||
|
||||
## How the restriction works (why no new identity)
|
||||
|
||||
身份路线靠"**谁**在跑子进程"来限制,本档靠"令牌派生"来限制。身份路线(landstrip 的 restricted-user、AppContainer)用全新账户或容器 SID 运行子进程,该身份在宿主的文件上从零条 ACE 开始——一切访问(包括读)默认拒绝,子进程要碰的每条路径都必须事后为那个身份补写 ACE 才能放行:这正是让两个备选方案出局的全盘 DACL 改造。受限令牌保留调用者自己的 SID 与 logon session:[`CreateRestrictedToken`](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-createrestrictedtoken) 派生一个加入 restricting SIDs 与 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 标志的令牌,于是 Windows 做两次访问检查——一次按正常 SID,一次按 restricting SIDs——只有两次都放行,写类访问才被授予。读只凭正常检查即可通过(调用者的 SID 在其可读范围内本来就携带读权限),所以本档不需要任何读授权、也不需要新账户;写还必须额外通过孤儿 SID 检查,而只有工作区与临时目录的 ACE 能满足它。`DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE | LUA_TOKEN` 在令牌侧合成了新账户的受限用户效果,即使提升过的调用者派生的也是过滤令牌。同一原语其实也能限制读(`SidsToDisable` 把 SID 变为 deny-only),但受限读的令牌需要逐路径的读授权——恰好重新引入身份路线付出的代价——而沙盒词汇表从不要求读隔离。
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
### 为什么不选 mxc(Microsoft xContainer)?
|
||||
|
||||
两个否决理由。其一,OS 版本要求太新:[mxc 的 OS 版本支持文档](https://github.com/microsoft/mxc/blob/main/docs/process-container/os-version-support.md)把产品下限设在 Windows 11 24H2(build 26100),而 BaseContainer 档(T1,`Experimental_CreateProcessInSandbox`)只在 25H2+(build 26600+)且启用 OS feature 时存在——在 25H2 及以下的所有受支持版本上,文件系统策略都会回退到 T3,即 AppContainer 加宿主侧 DACL ACE 改造。其二,在任一档下支持任意路径读都意味着要为子进程可读的每个路径写 ACL 授予读权限:模型要读整个工作区和任意文件,就需要全盘改写宿主 DACL——对只做写限制的需求而言,这是不必要的驻留副作用与代价。
|
||||
|
||||
### 为什么不选 AppContainer?
|
||||
|
||||
AppContainer 令牌没有环境读访问:每个可读路径都必须预先通过 capability 或显式 ACE 授予,因此任意路径读——harness 的读模型——在不做同样的全盘授予时无法支持。受限令牌完全不需要读授予:它只对写访问做交集。
|
||||
|
||||
### 为什么不选 landstrip?
|
||||
|
||||
[landstrip 评估](../../rejected/feature/2026-07-26-evaluate-landstrip-for-windows-sandbox-rung.md)在实现前已被否决(未经实战检验;自建 launcher 方案胜出),且其 Windows 后端是 AppContainer 形态,继承同样的任意路径读问题。
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
所得:仅写隔离、不引入新的 OS 版本下限(`CreateRestrictedToken` 比 mxc 的版本早二十年)、读/网络/进程可见性完全不受影响(与模式词汇表一致)、fail-closed 错误携带 API 名与精确 Win32 错误码。所失:无读侧或网络隔离;控制台隔离不可用(隐藏控制台子进程以 `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED` 死亡;子进程共享宿主控制台);被授权根目录上有驻留 ACE 改动(目录须为调用者所有;工作区 ACE 按设计永久常驻——复用缓存,工作区改名时成为不可见残留——临时 ACE 由提供方 dispose 连同派生的私有临时目录一起回收——崩溃会把两者都留下,下一次恢复会在独占创建处大声失败,直到临时目录卫生回收该目录);授权物化是急切的全树传播(`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` 立即遍历每个后代——在大型工作区上耗时数十秒),因按工作区身份,每台机器每个工作区只付一次;CIM 在**两种**受限模式下都不可用(AuthUsers 从两种列表中被移除——WMI namespace 安全校验失败,`Get-ComputerInfo` 静默返回不完整结果),作为关闭两种模式下 C:\-root 建树逃逸的代价;位于被授权根目录之外的 FAT 类(无 ACL)目标在两种模式下仍可写(没有可做交集的安全描述符——作为历史残留处理:不支持、仅警告、已在 README 中记录);NULL DACL 目录在 grant+revoke 往返下不保持身份(记录在案的边角,POC 亦有此行为);`whoami` 与令牌检查 cmdlet 在受限令牌下失败(诊断噪音,已记录);且**两种**受限模式都以 ConstrainedLanguage 模式运行 `pwsh`——受限令牌触发 PowerShell 的锁定检测,因此 `Add-Type`、非核心 .NET 静态调用(`[System.IO.*]::`、`[math]::`)、COM 对象与反射都会以“only core types”错误失败,而 `-f` 格式化、属性访问与核心 cmdlet/类型继续工作,语言模式也无法从内部提升回 FullLanguage——已在 pwsh 工具描述中教给模型,并记录在包 README 的 Known Limitations 中;**两种**受限模式同样拒绝 named-pipe 打开——libuv 的管道 stdio spawn 以 EPERM 失败(POC 记载的“无法重定向输出”边界;继承/忽略的 stdio 与匿名管道可用)——记录在包 README 的 Known Limitations 中,并在 pwsh 工具描述中教给模型。
|
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|
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## Testing
|
||||
|
||||
产品可见的 Windows 阵容切换仅存在于 win32,而 keyless 快照夹具必须在 macOS/Linux 上可重放,因此无法覆盖它;替代证据是 bundle 组合 spec([`base.spec.ts`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts)、[`windows-shell.spec.ts`](../../../../apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts))加上 win32 真实 runner 套件(`packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/`、`packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/tests/`),组装态信号由 CI 的 Windows lane 负责。授权机制在跨平台侧由 `packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-grants.spec.ts` 钉住(派生的私有临时身份——按会话 + 工作区确定性、跨会话相异——一次性物化、独占临时目录创建并拒绝 reparse point、失败时自我清理、干净重启时对同一派生目录的重新授权、dispose 与模式切换循环中的常驻/可回收生命周期,以及派生 SID 的 argv 契约——mock 掉 Win32 表面),win32 侧由 `workspace-sid.spec.ts`(派生的确定性/形态/相异性)、`grant.spec.ts`(真实 DACL 物化:可回收路径在 dispose 时撤销、常驻路径存活)、`acl.spec.ts` 的幂等授权快速路径与 dispose 后常驻 ACE 契约、`failure-paths.spec.ts` 的 suspension-orphan 回归(AssignProcessToJobObject 失败会终止子进程)与 `runner.spec.ts` 的 `--write-sid` 契约(调用者所有目录的授权、经 TMP/TEMP 的私有临时子目录、两种模式下的 CIM 拒绝探针、模式降级回归——驻留授权 ACE 在 read-only 下失效并在重新升级后再度生效——环境可写 Public-probe 回归(对 C:\Users\Public 子目录的写入在两种模式下都会被拒绝),以及两种模式下对 ConstrainedLanguage 的钉定,加上孙进程 stdio 矩阵钉定——继承/忽略的 stdio spawn 成功,而管道捕获在两种模式下都被**拒绝**)钉住。runner 失败分类以 127 退出码为门槛(受限命令仅仅在非 127 退出时打印 `windows-acl-run:` 签名,也绝不会被误分类为"命令未运行"——由 pwsh-sandbox helper 套件钉住)。
|
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|
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## Related
|
||||
|
||||
[pwsh 执行器决策](2026-08-01-pwsh-tool-and-executor.md)拥有本档所消费的 pwsh-sandbox/tool-pwsh 方言划分。
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user