Merge branch 'master' into feat/plan-mode

.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-05-windows-fs-permissions.md

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Agent Note: Windows write-permission semantics — inherited DACLs, not mode bits
+
+Status: implemented
+
+The replacement-file decision in this record is superseded by [Windows DACL preservation](../bug-fix/2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.md).
+
+## Problem
+
+`writeFileAtomic` in `@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-local` protects write-in-progress content with POSIX mode bits: the staging directory is created `0o700`, the temp file is opened `0o600`, and new files default to `0o600`. On POSIX this keeps temporary content owner-only regardless of the parent directory's permissions.
+
+Windows has no working equivalent behind the same API. Node's `chmod` there drives only the read-only attribute (every mode this package passes carries owner-write, so the calls are benign no-ops), and `stat().mode` reports synthetic `0o666`/`0o444` bits. The real security state is the file's DACL: a newly created file or directory inherits from its parent, while replacement needs the explicit handling owned by the superseding Agent Note.
+
+## Decision
+
+New Windows files use directory inheritance rather than synthetic mode bits: the staging directory is created inside the target's parent directory (`dirname(absolutePath)`), so it and the temp file inherit the destination directory's DACL. Replacement files follow the stricter [DACL preservation contract](../bug-fix/2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.md).
+
+Tests assert mode bits on POSIX only. Native Windows coverage pins the package-owned replacement behavior; new-file inheritance remains an operating-system contract rather than a machine-specific ACL allowlist.
+
+## Alternatives considered
+
+**Explicit owner-only DACLs for new files.** Rejected because they would break inheritance and surprise users whose project directories are deliberately shared. Replacement writes copy the target's existing DACL rather than inventing an owner-only policy.
+
+**Test-side ACL verification.** A `Get-Acl` SID allowlist or `icacls` would verify Windows inheritance and the machine's `%TEMP%` ACL rather than package behavior; `icacls` also localizes well-known account names, making parsing locale-fragile.
+
+**Skip `chmod` on Windows.** Platform-guarding benign no-op calls adds branches without changing behavior.
+
+## Consequences
+
+POSIX keeps owner-only temp content regardless of the parent directory. A new Windows target inside a broadly accessible directory inherits that accessibility by design; a replacement retains the target's narrower DACL when one exists.
+
+Mode preservation across a replace degenerates to a no-op on Windows: a writable file probes as `0o666`, and replaying that through `chmod` leaves the read-only attribute clear. A read-only target cannot be replaced there because publication fails before the synthetic mode would matter.

.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-05-windows-jsonl-durable-publish.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Agent Note: Windows-native durable JSONL publication
+
+Status: implemented
+
+## Problem
+
+`dsh-session-persistence-jsonl` publishes a session log lazily on the first append. The POSIX protocol writes a temp file, fsyncs it, links it to the final name, fsyncs the parent directory, and then removes the temp link. The parent-directory fsync is part of the durability contract: a crash after the namespace change must not lose the committed final name while leaving callers believing the session log materialized.
+
+Windows has atomic namespace operations, but Node does not expose a POSIX-equivalent parent-directory fsync contract there. Treating Windows directory sync failures as success would silently weaken a durable backend. The Windows path therefore needs a different publication primitive rather than a conditional inside the POSIX `syncDir` helper.
+
+## Decision
+
+The JSONL backend forks inside `materialize()` before any namespace mutation. Shared code computes the session directory, final log path, and encoded header plus initial event batch; POSIX and Windows then run separate publication protocols.
+
+POSIX keeps the existing protocol: create the root and cwd bucket with parent directory fsyncs, write and fsync a temp file, publish with `link()` so an existing final log is never overwritten, fsync the bucket directory, then remove the redundant temp hard link.
+
+Windows creates missing directories through a durable staging publish: create a random sibling directory, then publish it to the final directory name with `MoveFileExW(..., MOVEFILE_WRITE_THROUGH)` without `MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING` or `MOVEFILE_COPY_ALLOWED`. File materialization writes and fsyncs the temp log, then publishes that temp file to the final path with the same write-through `MoveFileExW` call and no replacement. `koffi` is the minimal Win32 bridge for this API surface; its install script is allowed in `pnpm-workspace.yaml` because the package ships the native loader and prebuilt platform modules.
+
+## Alternatives considered
+
+**Ignore Windows directory-sync failures.** Rejected because it reports a first append as durable without forcing the published namespace entry to stable storage.
+
+**Use `CreateHardLinkW`.** Rejected because hard links are filesystem-dependent, do not publish directories, and expose no write-through option.
+
+**Use replacement or transactional APIs.** `ReplaceFileW` has replacement semantics that conflict with same-id collision rejection, and Transactional NTFS is not recommended for new application designs.
+
+## Consequences
+
+The backend keeps one external contract across platforms: first append either publishes a complete log at the final name or fails without overwriting an existing log. The platform split is an implementation detail; `SessionPersistence` APIs and the logical JSONL record format do not change. The later [Zstandard encoding decision](2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.md) applies before either platform publishes the opaque bytes.
+
+Windows tests exercise the real Win32 publish path on native Windows. Power-loss behavior remains an API-contract property rather than something unit tests can prove; the testable invariants are that directory fsync is not called on Windows materialization, final-path collisions fail, temp logs are fsync'd before publication, and the resulting log loads normally.
+
+Append and repair still use ordinary file-handle fsyncs on both platforms. A failed append closes its append-only handle, reopens the log read/write, truncates it to the pre-append size, and fsyncs the rollback because Windows rejects `ftruncate` on append-only handles.

.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
-2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.md: 09d30594fe31eed138a128dabc1947b15857808d
-2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.zh.md: 131531d9dba7cb01407191bf937f8b0ee3c6860a
+2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.md: ccfc81dd47504e6a9e9b19cda7c4b9fc40accecc
+2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.zh.md: de5436a6eaefcb45e52e0ff4fea8592c7efcd127

.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ The compressed artifact is a standard concatenation of independent [Zstandard fr
 
 Compression uses Node's built-in [`zstdCompress` and `zstdDecompress`](https://nodejs.org/download/release/v22.19.0/docs/api/zlib.html), available at the repository's Node 22.19 floor. The backend enables `ZSTD_c_checksumFlag`, otherwise accepts Node's defaults, and exposes neither a compression-level knob nor a new dependency. The API is marked experimental by Node, so the Node 22.19, 24, and 26 compatibility gate exercises the exact helper.
 
-First materialization compresses the two initial frames before opening the temporary file, then keeps the existing write, file `fsync`, collision-safe hard-link publication, and directory `fsync` sequence. Later batches are compressed before opening the destination and appended at EOF. A caught write or file-sync failure truncates to the prior byte length, syncs the rollback, and rethrows so the coordinator can retry the unchanged batch.
+First materialization compresses the two initial frames before opening the temporary file, then writes and `fsync`s that file. POSIX publishes it through a collision-safe hard link and directory `fsync`; Windows publishes it without replacement through `MoveFileExW(..., MOVEFILE_WRITE_THROUGH)`. Later batches are compressed before opening the destination and appended at EOF. A caught write or file-sync failure closes the append handle, reopens the log read/write, truncates to the prior byte length, syncs the rollback, and rethrows so the coordinator can retry the unchanged batch on both platforms.
 
 ### Read, listing, and crash recovery
 

.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.zh.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ JSONL 持久化后端会逐字保留每个 `SessionEvent`，其中包括数量
 
 压缩使用 Node 内置的 [`zstdCompress` 与 `zstdDecompress`](https://nodejs.org/download/release/v22.19.0/docs/api/zlib.html)，仓库最低支持的 Node 22.19 已提供这些 API。后端启用 `ZSTD_c_checksumFlag`，其余采用 Node 默认值，不公开压缩级别调节项，也不增加依赖。Node 将该 API 标记为实验性，因此 Node 22.19、24 与 26 兼容性门禁会执行同一个辅助实现。
 
-首次物化会在打开临时文件之前压缩两个初始帧，然后保留既有的写入、文件 `fsync`、避免冲突的硬链接发布与目录 `fsync` 顺序。后续批次也会先压缩，再打开目标并在 EOF 追加。捕获到写入或文件同步失败时，后端会截断到原有字节长度，同步回滚结果，再重新抛出错误，让协调器重试未变化的批次。
+首次物化会在打开临时文件之前压缩两个初始帧，然后写入该文件并执行 `fsync`。POSIX 通过避免冲突的硬链接和目录 `fsync` 发布该文件；Windows 通过 `MoveFileExW(..., MOVEFILE_WRITE_THROUGH)` 在不替换目标文件的情况下发布。后续批次也会先压缩，再打开目标并在 EOF 追加。捕获到写入或文件同步失败时，后端会关闭追加句柄，以读写方式重新打开日志，截断到原有字节长度，同步回滚结果，再重新抛出错误，让协调器能够在两个平台上重试未变化的批次。
 
 ### 读取、列举与崩溃恢复
 

.agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.i18n.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
+# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
+# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
+#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
+2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.md: 013119508da9be426c417797cf7a0ec14e276814
+2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.zh.md: 8ae82884c3b80409d07d3bbcfc8c273e8b227dc8

.agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Agent Note: Preserve Windows DACLs during atomic file replacement
+
+Status: implemented
+
+English | [中文](2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.zh.md)
+
+## Problem
+
+On Windows, creating the staging directory and temp file under the target's parent and relying only on inherited DACLs is sufficient for a new file, but not for replacing an existing file whose explicit or protected DACL is narrower than its parent: content is written under the broader parent DACL, and rename carries that staging descriptor onto the replacement.
+
+## Decision
+
+`dsh-fs-local` reads an existing target's DACL with `GetFileSecurityW`, applies it to the empty temp file with inheritance protected before writing content, and publishes the closed temp with `ReplaceFileW`. The protected staging descriptor prevents the temp directory's inherited entries from broadening access; `ReplaceFileW` preserves the original target access policy and other replacement metadata. Its ACL merge may reserialize auto-inheritance state or duplicate equivalent ACEs, so self-relative descriptor buffers are not a stable equality contract. New files have no prior descriptor to preserve and continue to inherit the destination directory's DACL.
+
+Native Windows coverage protects a target DACL, inspects the written staging file, and compares the final replacement's ordered, de-duplicated ACE policy. Host-independent binding tests cover Win32 error translation and every native call boundary.
+
+## Alternatives considered
+
+**Rely on directory inheritance for replacements.** Rejected because a target may carry a narrower explicit or protected DACL than its parent, so inheritance neither protects staged content nor preserves the target access policy.
+
+**Use `ReplaceFileW` without protecting the temp.** Rejected because it repairs the final descriptor only after the content has already been written under the staging file's inherited DACL.
+
+**Install an owner-only DACL for every write.** Rejected because it would discard deliberate project sharing. Copying the target DACL preserves the deployment's existing access policy instead of inventing one.
+
+## Consequences
+
+Replacing a Windows file now requires permission to read the target DACL and set the temp DACL; failure is loud before content is written. The package carries Koffi for the narrow Win32 calls, loaded only on Windows replacement paths. New-file behavior remains directory-inherited, and POSIX mode behavior is unchanged.

.agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.zh.md

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Agent Note: Windows 原子文件替换期间保留 DACL
+
+Status: implemented
+
+[English](2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.md) | 中文
+
+## 问题
+
+在 Windows 上，在目标文件的父目录下创建暂存目录和临时文件，并且只依赖继承的 DACL，足以满足新建文件的需要，但无法安全替换显式或受保护 DACL 比父目录更严格的现有文件：内容会在权限更宽松的父目录 DACL 下写入，而重命名又会把这个暂存安全描述符带到替换后的文件上。
+
+## 决策
+
+`dsh-fs-local` 通过 `GetFileSecurityW` 读取现有目标文件的 DACL，在写入内容前将其以禁止继承的形式应用到空临时文件，并通过 `ReplaceFileW` 发布已关闭的临时文件。受保护的暂存安全描述符可防止暂存目录中的继承条目扩大访问权限；`ReplaceFileW` 会保留原目标文件的访问策略及其他替换元数据。其 ACL 合并过程可能重新序列化自动继承状态或复制等价 ACE，因此不能把自相对安全描述符缓冲区的逐字节相等作为稳定契约。新建文件没有既有描述符需要保留，因此仍继承目标目录的 DACL。
+
+Windows 原生覆盖率测试会保护目标文件的 DACL、检查写入完成的暂存文件，并对比最终替换文件中保持顺序且去重后的 ACE 策略。与宿主平台无关的绑定测试覆盖 Win32 错误转换以及每个原生调用边界。
+
+## 备选方案
+
+**替换文件时依赖目录继承。** 不予采用，因为目标文件可能带有比父目录更严格的显式或受保护 DACL；目录继承既无法保护暂存内容，也无法保留目标文件的访问策略。
+
+**使用 `ReplaceFileW`，但不保护临时文件。** 不予采用，因为这只能在内容已经按暂存文件继承的 DACL 写入之后修复最终描述符。
+
+**每次写入都设置仅所有者可访问的 DACL。** 不予采用，因为这会破坏项目有意设置的共享权限。复制目标文件的 DACL 可以保留部署中已有的访问策略，无需另行创设策略。
+
+## 影响
+
+替换 Windows 文件现在要求调用方有权读取目标 DACL 并设置临时文件 DACL；如果权限不足，系统会在写入内容前明确失败。该包（package）引入 Koffi 以执行少量 Win32 调用，并且只在 Windows 替换路径上加载。新建文件仍按目录继承，POSIX mode 行为保持不变。

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
-2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md: 9b6312e5994469606bd1645902fc798f70258580
-2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.zh.md: d4816e03d94bdf12b2db875d71dccb7db3a2c0d7
+2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md: 0897695cc14b7573ebb53f3ffa6a460652882b37
+2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.zh.md: 15de061a0d2b18392f839c927e9b0f5d0cacf28b

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Three coordinated pieces, all composed from the leaf `cordis.yml`, none touching
 `packages/fs/fs-sandbox/` (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox`) mirrors the `bash-local`/`bash-sandbox` split: `SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem`, registered as `ctx.fs`, injecting `sandboxPolicy`. Reads (`resolve`/`stat`/`readText`/`streamText`/`listDir`) pass through untouched — every mode permits reading. The two mutations enforce by mode before delegating to the inherited atomic write:
 
 - `read-only` denies `writeText`/`editText` outright.
-- `workspace-write` fences the canonicalized target against the writable-root set — `writableRoots(policy)` in `dsh-sandbox`: the workspace root plus the platform temp areas (`/tmp`, `os.tmpdir()`), each realpathed — the SAME set the Seatbelt profile grants, so the fs fence is the fourth dialect of one mode meaning alongside the bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt profiles, and "the write tool cannot write `/tmp` but bash can" asymmetries cannot arise. Containment is prefix-inclusion on real paths; the target is re-canonicalized (`resolve` realpaths the deepest existing ancestor) immediately before delegating, so an ancestor symlink swapped since the tool resolved it is caught.
+- `workspace-write` fences the canonicalized target against the writable-root set — `writableRoots(policy)` in `dsh-sandbox`: the workspace root plus the platform temp areas (`/tmp`, `os.tmpdir()`), each realpathed — the SAME set the Seatbelt profile grants, so the fs fence is the fourth dialect of one mode meaning alongside the bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt profiles, and "the write tool cannot write `/tmp` but bash can" asymmetries cannot arise. Canonical spellings take a lexical containment fast path; when Windows exposes one directory through different casing or long-name/8.3 spellings, an ancestor walk compares filesystem identity rather than weakening the boundary to textual prefix guesses. The target is re-canonicalized (`resolve` realpaths the deepest existing ancestor) immediately before delegating, so an ancestor symlink swapped since the tool resolved it is caught.
 - `danger-full-access` delegates unfenced.
 
 A denial is the structured `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED` carrying the effective mode — distinct from `FS_PERMISSION_DENIED` (a host EACCES is the world refusing; this is policy refusing). No text inference: an in-process fence knows exactly what it denied. The per-call carrier is a trailing optional `sandboxMode` on `writeText`/`editText` (the filesystem twin of `BashExecRequest.sandboxMode`); the seam stays session-free (the caller stamps, exactly as `resolve` takes a cwd), and the bare local backend carries-and-ignores it. `FileSystem.sandboxMode` is the capability fact (`undefined` on the base and `fs-local`, the default on `SandboxedFileSystem`), so the tool layer advertises escalation from composition truth.
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ The sandbox Agent Note's original cross-family sketch put fs enforcement on the
 What shipped — the tiers in § Testing hold each:
 
 - Under `read-only`, `write`/`edit` return the `[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]` marker and the disk is untouched; `read`/`listDir` behave identically to `dsh-fs-local`.
-- Under `workspace-write`, mutations land under the workspace root and the temp areas and are denied outside; the containment matrix — `..` traversal, absolute paths outside, a pre-existing symlinked directory inside pointing out, and a new file created under such a symlink — denies every escape on real disks.
+- Under `workspace-write`, mutations land under the workspace root and the temp areas and are denied outside; the containment matrix — `..` traversal, absolute paths outside, a pre-existing symlinked directory inside pointing out, a new file created under such a symlink, and alias-equivalent root spellings — denies every escape while admitting the same directory identity on real disks.
 - A denied fs mutation retried once with `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` prompts through the composed approval chain; a grant runs exactly that call under the wider mode and the write lands; rejected/cancelled/unavailable each produce their verbatim fail-closed text and mutate nothing.
 - One `permission` preset switch governs both families: after a session switches modes, the next bash call and the next fs mutation both honor the new mode from the same `sandbox/mode` fold.
 - A direct `ctx.fs.writeText` with no per-call stamp is confined at the deployment default.
@@ -90,5 +90,5 @@ Costs and accepted limits:
 
 ## Testing
 
-- Unit: `dsh-sandbox` pins the escalation ladder, the marker builders, the argument-pairing validation, and `approveEscalation`'s ordered fail-closed sequence (non-widening, no-approval, no-agent, each outcome), plus `writableRoots`/`canonicalPath`. `dsh-sandbox-policy` pins the default accessors, the fold/setter, the load-time mode rejection, and HMR safety. `dsh-fs-sandbox` pins the per-mode fence and the containment matrix (inside, temp area, absolute-outside, `..`, symlinked-out directory, new file under one, path-equals-root, root-ending-in-separator) on a real filesystem, plus the per-call override and HMR safety. `dsh-tool-fs` pins advertisement gating, the mode stamp, the fold, denial-marker mapping, and the full escalation matrix (grant, reject, no-service, no-agent, pairing, non-confining guard). `dsh-tool-bash`, `dsh-bash-sandbox`, and `dsh-permission` migrate to the relocated policy/kit.
+- Unit: `dsh-sandbox` pins the escalation ladder, the marker builders, the argument-pairing validation, and `approveEscalation`'s ordered fail-closed sequence (non-widening, no-approval, no-agent, each outcome), plus `writableRoots`/`canonicalPath`. `dsh-sandbox-policy` pins the default accessors, the fold/setter, the load-time mode rejection, and HMR safety. `dsh-fs-sandbox` pins the per-mode fence and the containment matrix (inside, temp area, absolute-outside, `..`, symlinked-out directory, new file under one, path-equals-root, filesystem-root, and alias-equivalent spelling) on a real filesystem, plus the per-call override and HMR safety. `dsh-tool-fs` pins advertisement gating, the mode stamp, the fold, denial-marker mapping, and the full escalation matrix (grant, reject, no-service, no-agent, pairing, non-confining guard). `dsh-tool-bash`, `dsh-bash-sandbox`, and `dsh-permission` migrate to the relocated policy/kit.
 - Snapshot: the acp-agent example composes `dsh-sandbox-policy` + `dsh-fs-sandbox`; the pinned header carries the fs escalation fields and the `sandbox/mode` event name, re-recorded once.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.zh.md

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Status: implemented
 `packages/fs/fs-sandbox/`(`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox`)镜像 `bash-local`/`bash-sandbox` 的拆分:`SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem`,注册为 `ctx.fs`,注入 `sandboxPolicy`。读取(`resolve`/`stat`/`readText`/`streamText`/`listDir`)原样透传——每种模式都允许读。两个变更操作在委托给继承来的原子写之前按模式执行:
 
 - `read-only` 直接拒绝 `writeText`/`editText`。
-- `workspace-write` 把规范化后的目标围栏于可写根集合——`dsh-sandbox` 中的 `writableRoots(policy)`:工作区根加上平台临时目录(`/tmp`、`os.tmpdir()`),各自 realpath——与 Seatbelt profile 授予的是同一个集合,所以 fs 围栏是这一个模式含义在 bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt profile 之外的第四种方言,因此不会出现「write 工具不能写 `/tmp` 而 bash 能」的不对称。包含判定是对真实路径的前缀包含;目标在委托前被立即重新规范化(`resolve` 对最深的既有祖先做 realpath),因此自工具解析该目标以来被换出的祖先符号链接会被捕获。
+- `workspace-write` 把规范化后的目标围栏于可写根集合——`dsh-sandbox` 中的 `writableRoots(policy)`:工作区根加上平台临时目录(`/tmp`、`os.tmpdir()`),各自 realpath——与 Seatbelt profile 授予的是同一个集合,所以 fs 围栏是这一个模式含义在 bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt profile 之外的第四种方言,因此不会出现「write 工具不能写 `/tmp` 而 bash 能」的不对称。规范化路径写法采用词法包含的快速路径；当 Windows 以大小写不同的路径、长文件名或 8.3 短文件名表示同一目录时，系统会逐级遍历祖先目录并比较文件系统身份，而不会把边界弱化为依据文本前缀猜测包含关系。目标在委托前被立即重新规范化(`resolve` 对最深的既有祖先做 realpath),因此自工具解析该目标以来被换出的祖先符号链接会被捕获。
 - `danger-full-access` 不加围栏地委托。
 
 拒绝是结构化的 `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED`,携带生效模式——区别于 `FS_PERMISSION_DENIED`(宿主 EACCES 是世界在拒绝;这里是策略在拒绝)。无文本推断:进程内围栏确切知道它拒绝了什么。per-call 载体是 `writeText`/`editText` 上一个末尾可选的 `sandboxMode`(文件系统侧对应 `BashExecRequest.sandboxMode`);该 seam 保持无会话依赖(由调用方盖章,正如 `resolve` 接收一个 cwd),而裸的本地后端携带并忽略它。`FileSystem.sandboxMode` 是能力事实(在基类与 `fs-local` 上为 `undefined`,在 `SandboxedFileSystem` 上为默认值),所以工具层按组合真相来宣告升级。
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Status: implemented
 已交付的部分——§ Testing 的各层各自钉住:
 
 - 在 `read-only` 下,`write`/`edit` 返回 `[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]` 标记,磁盘不受触动;`read`/`listDir` 与 `dsh-fs-local` 行为一致。
-- 在 `workspace-write` 下,变更落在工作区根与临时目录下,其外被拒;包含矩阵——`..` 穿越、指向外部的绝对路径、一个既有的、指向外部的工作区内符号链接目录,以及在这样一个符号链接下新建的文件——在真实磁盘上拒绝每一种逃逸。
+- 在 `workspace-write` 下,变更落在工作区根与临时目录下,其外被拒;包含矩阵——`..` 穿越、指向外部的绝对路径、一个既有的、指向外部的工作区内符号链接目录、在这样一个符号链接下新建的文件,以及根路径的等价别名形式——在真实磁盘上拒绝每一种逃逸,同时允许文件系统认定为同一目录的路径。
 - 一个被拒的 fs 变更,携带 `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` 重试一次,会经组合的审批链提示;一次授权让恰好那一次调用在更宽的模式下运行且写入落盘;rejected/cancelled/unavailable 各自产生其逐字的 fail-closed 文案且不做任何变更。
 - 一次 `permission` 预设切换同时管辖两个家族:会话切换模式后,下一次 bash 调用与下一次 fs 变更都从同一个 `sandbox/mode` 折叠遵循新模式。
 - 一次无 per-call 盖章的直连 `ctx.fs.writeText` 会被围栏于部署默认值。
@@ -90,5 +90,5 @@ Status: implemented
 
 ## Testing
 
-- 单元:`dsh-sandbox` 钉住升级阶梯、标记构造器、参数配对校验,以及 `approveEscalation` 的有序 fail-closed 序列(非加宽、无 approval、无 agent、各结果),外加 `writableRoots`/`canonicalPath`。`dsh-sandbox-policy` 钉住默认访问器、折叠/setter、加载期模式拒绝,以及 HMR 安全。`dsh-fs-sandbox` 在真实文件系统上钉住 per-mode 围栏与包含矩阵(内部、临时目录、绝对路径-外部、`..`、指向外部的符号链接目录、其下的新建文件、路径等于根、以分隔符结尾的根),外加 per-call 覆盖与 HMR 安全。`dsh-tool-fs` 钉住宣告门控、模式盖章、折叠、拒绝标记映射,以及完整的升级矩阵(授权、拒绝、无服务、无 agent、配对、非受限守卫)。`dsh-tool-bash`、`dsh-bash-sandbox` 与 `dsh-permission` 迁移到迁移后的策略/工具集。
+- 单元:`dsh-sandbox` 钉住升级阶梯、标记构造器、参数配对校验,以及 `approveEscalation` 的有序 fail-closed 序列(非加宽、无 approval、无 agent、各结果),外加 `writableRoots`/`canonicalPath`。`dsh-sandbox-policy` 钉住默认访问器、折叠/setter、加载期模式拒绝,以及 HMR 安全。`dsh-fs-sandbox` 在真实文件系统上钉住 per-mode 围栏与包含矩阵(内部、临时目录、绝对路径-外部、`..`、指向外部的符号链接目录、其下的新建文件、路径等于根、文件系统根、等价别名形式),外加 per-call 覆盖与 HMR 安全。`dsh-tool-fs` 钉住宣告门控、模式盖章、折叠、拒绝标记映射,以及完整的升级矩阵(授权、拒绝、无服务、无 agent、配对、非受限守卫)。`dsh-tool-bash`、`dsh-bash-sandbox` 与 `dsh-permission` 迁移到迁移后的策略/工具集。
 - 快照:acp-agent 示例组合 `dsh-sandbox-policy` + `dsh-fs-sandbox`;被钉住的 header 携带 fs 升级字段与 `sandbox/mode` 事件名,一次性重录。