Default shipped UI sessions to workspace-write

packages/credentials/credentials-local/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/credentials/credentials-local/README.md
-README.md: 126140b10719dc6f7bc458a118ba1feb1f440270
-README.zh.md: c22575115ab44b5e86a847ffe8f1fa1a795b580d
+README.md: 02b883958faf8b695a3a2abf2df77790cc2fca86
+README.zh.md: 59c7fd5747f327e8998882ca4db1473173e793b5

packages/credentials/credentials-local/README.md

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ External edits publish `credentials/updated` per changed reference after the sna
 
 ## Security boundary
 
-The document is `0600` under a `0700` directory, which stops other OS users — **not** the model. Tool processes (bash, the filesystem tools) run as the same user, so under the shipped `danger-full-access` default they can read this file exactly like any other file the user owns, and no sandbox mode singles it out. What the harness does hold to is narrower: it never hands the model a resolved path to the document, and never loads it into the process environment (see [app-boot's Personal config](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#personal-config)), so reaching the value takes a deliberate read of a path the agent was not given.
+The document is `0600` under a `0700` directory, which stops other OS users — **not** the model. Tool processes (bash, the filesystem tools) run as the same user, and the shipped `workspace-write` file policy confines mutations rather than reads, so they can read this file exactly like any other file the user owns; no sandbox mode singles it out. What the harness does hold to is narrower: it never hands the model a resolved path to the document, and never loads it into the process environment (see [app-boot's Personal config](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#personal-config)), so reaching the value takes a deliberate read of a path the agent was not given.
 
 That is discretion, not a boundary. A deployment that must keep provider keys away from its own agent cannot get there with file permissions; an OS-keychain provider — a store the model's processes cannot read at all — is the deferred answer and belongs beside this provider as a sibling package.
 
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ No direct invalidation; credentials never enter a request prefix.
 
 - **Multi-line entries refuse `set`/`unset`** — the line editor will not rewrite an entry it would corrupt; `describe` reports them `writable: false` and edits must go to the file directly.
 - **Same-reference concurrent writes are last-write-wins** — the writer lock and the read-modify-write keep concurrent writers from dropping each other's entries, but two writers editing one reference still resolve to the later write; there is no revision check.
-- **A same-UID process can read the document** — see [Security boundary](#security-boundary): only a confining sandbox mode denies it, and an OS-keychain provider is deferred.
+- **A same-UID process can read the document** — see [Security boundary](#security-boundary): the file-effect sandbox modes do not deny reads, and an OS-keychain provider is deferred.
 - **Unrepresentable values fail loud** — control characters, or a mix of both quote styles with backslashes, cannot round-trip the dotenv line format.
 - **Environment changes are invisible** — `process.env` is read live per resolution, but no event can announce a change there.
 - **Atomic, not crash-durable** — inherited from `dsh-atomic-write`; the store re-reads on boot.

packages/credentials/credentials-local/README.zh.md

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ dotenv 格式，用 `dotenv` 解析；写回用物理行级编辑器，保留一
 
 ## 安全边界
 
-文档在 `0700` 目录下以 `0600` 权限存放，这挡得住其他 OS 用户，**挡不住**模型。工具进程（bash、文件系统工具）以同一用户身份运行，因此在出厂默认的 `danger-full-access` 下，它们读这个文件与读该用户拥有的任何其他文件毫无二致，也没有任何沙箱模式会把它单独挑出来。harness 真正守住的更窄：它绝不把该文档的解析后路径交给模型，也绝不把它载入进程环境（见 [app-boot 的个人配置](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#personal-config)），因此要拿到这个值，需要刻意去读一条并未交给 agent 的路径。
+文档在 `0700` 目录下以 `0600` 权限存放，这挡得住其他 OS 用户，**挡不住**模型。工具进程（bash、文件系统工具）以同一用户身份运行，而已交付的 `workspace-write` 文件策略限制的是修改而非读取，因此它们读这个文件与读该用户拥有的任何其他文件毫无二致；也没有任何沙箱模式会把它单独挑出来。harness 真正守住的更窄：它绝不把该文档的解析后路径交给模型，也绝不把它载入进程环境（见 [app-boot 的个人配置](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#personal-config)），因此要拿到这个值，需要刻意去读一条并未交给 agent 的路径。
 
 这是审慎，不是边界。必须让提供方密钥远离自身 agent 的部署无法靠文件权限做到；OS 钥匙串 provider——一个模型的进程根本读不到的存储——才是延后的答案，它应当作为平级包与本 provider 并列。
 
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ dotenv 格式，用 `dotenv` 解析；写回用物理行级编辑器，保留一
 
 - **多行条目拒绝 `set`/`unset`**——行编辑器不改写会被它破坏的条目；`describe` 把它们报为 `writable: false`，编辑必须直接落到文件上。
 - **同一引用的并发写入是后写胜出**——写锁加读-改-写让并发写入者不会丢掉彼此的条目，但两个写入者编辑同一个引用时仍以较后的写入为准；没有修订检查。
-- **同 UID 进程可以读取该文档**——见[安全边界](#security-boundary)：只有受限沙箱模式会拒绝它，OS 钥匙串 provider 仍是延后项。
+- **同 UID 进程可以读取该文档**——见[安全边界](#security-boundary)：文件效果沙箱模式不会拒绝读取，OS 钥匙串 provider 仍是延后项。
 - **无法表示的值响亮失败**——控制字符，或同时混用两种引号又含反斜杠的值，无法在 dotenv 行格式中往返。
 - **环境变化不可见**——每次解析实时读取 `process.env`，但那里的变化不可能发出事件。
 - **原子但不保证崩溃持久**——继承自 `dsh-atomic-write`；存储在启动时重新读取。