Default shipped UI sessions to workspace-write
This commit is contained in:
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ The TUI surface:
|
||||
|
||||
The Web and headless surfaces boot `base.cordis.yml` plus `web.cordis.yml`, then apply `$DSH_HOME/config.yaml`; an explicit `--config <path>` replaces that personal overlay. Both surfaces otherwise share the same composition: both treat the invoking directory as the default project and Workspace root, create named Workspaces beneath that root unless `--workspace-root <path>` overrides it, load applicable `AGENTS.md`/`CLAUDE.md` instructions into each agent-loop request prefix with a 65,536-byte render budget, opt into first-message model titles, use the same bounded transient model-request retry policy as the TUI, and mount a disposable in-memory SQLite content-index service. That service is ACTIVE at boot, while its `node:sqlite` module and database handle open only on the first content search. This keeps Node 22 startup output free of SQLite's experimental warning before search is used; the first actual search may still emit the runtime warning. Each service instance owns its database, so parallel invocations neither share unsupported SQLite state nor leave derived index files behind, and the first search lazily reconciles live and persisted logs. Headless differs only in listening on an OS-assigned port (parallel `dsh -p` runs never collide; the stderr-printed URL opens the live session in a browser). Both need the frontend dist and client bundles built (`pnpm run build && pnpm run build:web`).
|
||||
|
||||
The shared composition defaults new TUI, Web, and headless sessions to the `workspace-write` permission preset (`workspace-write` file mode plus `ask` approval policy). Sandbox-enforced bash and filesystem mutations may write only under the session workspace and platform temporary roots; reads, network access, and process visibility are not confined. The browser answers one-shot approval requests and exposes the Access picker; the TUI exposes `/permission`, but has no approval-request answerer, so an automatic wider retry there fails closed until the user deliberately changes the session preset. `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` changes the process fallback, while a stored General-settings Permission value applies to later sessions without changing an open one.
|
||||
|
||||
The shipped TUI and Web compositions register the native DeepSeek adapter plus pi-ai OpenAI and Anthropic profiles. Credentials and endpoint overrides come from the provider-standard `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` / `DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL`, `OPENAI_API_KEY` / `OPENAI_BASE_URL`, and `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` / `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` pairs in the boot's layered environment.
|
||||
|
||||
Every surface also registers `web_search` and only `web_search`. Search uses DeepSeek's Anthropic-compatible Messages endpoint, resolves the same `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` reference for every call, and accepts the separate `DEEPSEEK_SEARCH_BASE_URL` endpoint override; each search is an auxiliary model request with its own latency and token cost. `web_fetch` remains disabled and the composition mounts no default fetch provider, so deployments that need arbitrary page retrieval must opt in through an overlay. The deployment decision and its security boundary live in the [default Web search Agent Note](../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-31-web-default-search.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user