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docs: address model experience review

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Tianyi Cui
2026-07-12 02:55:26 +08:00
parent a08485fc80
commit b5cd511f35
64 changed files with 443 additions and 410 deletions
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12
packages/hooks/hook-protocol/README.md
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@@ -4,12 +4,6 @@ The **shared core** of the Claude Code / Codex hook wire protocol. NOT a cordis
Why a shared lib at all: Codex deliberately reimplements a *subset* of the Claude Code hook protocol — the same `hooks.json` matcher-group shape, the same exit-code/stdout output contract, the same command-hook execution model. The genuinely-shared parts live here; each bridge owns only what differs.
## Model Experience
| Context surface | What the model sees | Token effect |
|---|---|---|
| None directly | This library registers nothing. Its `hook/invoked` and `hook/result` events are log-only and do not enter derived messages; bridge packages decide whether parsed `additionalContext`, blocks, or continuation feedback reach the model. | Zero direct tokens. Persisted hook audit records add no context tokens. |
## What's shared (here) vs. per-dialect (the bridges)
| Concern | Here (`dsh-hook-protocol`) | The bridge (`dsh-hooks-claude` / `-codex`) |
@@ -35,6 +29,12 @@ Declaration-merged into `SessionEventMap` (log-only, like `compact/*` — NOT a
Like every event they must sit inside an open turn. The mid-turn points (`PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse`/`UserPromptSubmit`/`Stop`) fire inside the loop's open turn by construction; `SessionStart` gets no `hook/*` record (its injected `context/message` is the durable evidence) — see the hooks RFC.
## Model Experience
| Context surface | What the model sees | Token effect |
|---|---|---|
| None directly | This library registers nothing. Its `hook/invoked` and `hook/result` events are log-only and do not enter derived messages; bridge packages decide whether parsed `additionalContext`, blocks, or continuation feedback reach the model. | Zero direct tokens. Persisted hook audit records add no context tokens. |
## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- **`HookOutput.updatedInput` is parsed but not honored** — input rewrite is a deferred consistency-design problem ([the pre-tool-input-rewrite RFC](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-06-30-pre-tool-input-rewrite.md)); a bridge logs + warns when a hook sets it. See `src/types.ts` for the full contracts.

14
packages/hooks/hooks-claude/README.md
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@@ -4,13 +4,6 @@ A cordis plugin that runs a user's existing **Claude Code** hook config (a `hook
A native cordis plugin could do everything this bridge does — more powerfully, with typed returns and no serialization boundary. **The bridge exists only to run UNMODIFIED external CC hooks faithfully**; anything bespoke should be a native plugin on the same seams (see [the interception-seams RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-30-interception-seams.md)).
## Model Experience
| Context surface | What the model sees | Token effect |
|---|---|---|
| Hook-provided context | `SessionStart`, accepted prompt, post-tool, and live in-process subagent-start hooks can add source-attributed context messages; a blocking `Stop` hook adds its reason as next-step steering. Remote-child injection has no local target. | No cost when hooks return no context. Hook text is data-dependent, logged, and resent in later conversation requests until compaction. |
| Blocked prompt or tool outcome | A hook can prevent a user prompt from reaching the model, deny or ask before a tool, block a post-tool result with feedback, or force another model step. `systemMessage` and `updatedInput` are logged or warned but are not model-visible in this implementation. | Blocking a prompt removes that prompt's request tokens; denial or feedback adds a retained error or context result; forced continuation pays another full request. |
## Config
```ts
@@ -57,6 +50,13 @@ The matcher subject is the tool name (`PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse`), the session s
Injected context carries an explicit `{ kind: 'plugin', plugin: 'hooks-claude' }` source. `agent.inject()` defaults a missing source to `{ kind: 'user' }`, which would mislabel plugin context as a user prompt — so the bridge always names itself.
## Model Experience
| Context surface | What the model sees | Token effect |
|---|---|---|
| Hook-provided context | `SessionStart`, accepted prompt, post-tool, and live in-process subagent-start hooks can add source-attributed context messages; a blocking `Stop` hook adds its reason as next-step steering. Remote-child injection has no local target. | No cost when hooks return no context. Hook text is data-dependent, logged, and resent in later conversation requests until compaction. |
| Blocked prompt or tool outcome | A hook can prevent a user prompt from reaching the model, deny or ask before a tool, block a post-tool result with feedback, or force another model step. `systemMessage` and `updatedInput` are logged or warned but are not model-visible in this implementation. | Blocking a prompt removes that prompt's request tokens; denial or feedback adds a retained error or context result; forced continuation pays another full request. |
## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- **`updatedInput` (tool-input rewrite)** is logged + warned, **not honored** — input rewrite is a deferred consistency-design problem ([the pre-tool-input-rewrite RFC](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-06-30-pre-tool-input-rewrite.md)).

14
packages/hooks/hooks-codex/README.md
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@@ -12,13 +12,6 @@ Codex's hook protocol is a deliberate **subset** of Claude Code's (same `hooks.j
A native cordis plugin could do everything this bridge does, more powerfully; the bridge exists only to run UNMODIFIED external Codex hooks faithfully (see [the interception-seams RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-30-interception-seams.md)).
## Model Experience
| Context surface | What the model sees | Token effect |
|---|---|---|
| Hook-provided context | `SessionStart`, accepted prompt, and post-tool hooks can add source-attributed context messages; a blocking `Stop` hook adds its reason as next-step steering. | No cost when hooks return no context. Hook text is data-dependent, logged, and resent until compaction. |
| Blocked prompt or tool outcome | A hook can prevent a user prompt from reaching the model, deny a tool, block a post-tool result with feedback, or force another model step. Codex `systemMessage` is not surfaced. | Blocking a prompt removes its request tokens; denial or feedback adds retained result text; forced continuation pays another full request. |
## Config
```ts
@@ -61,6 +54,13 @@ A tool call's payload carries the real `tool_name` (the same value the matcher t
Injected context carries an explicit `{ kind: 'plugin', plugin: 'hooks-codex' }` source (`agent.inject()` would otherwise default it to `{ kind: 'user' }`).
## Model Experience
| Context surface | What the model sees | Token effect |
|---|---|---|
| Hook-provided context | `SessionStart`, accepted prompt, and post-tool hooks can add source-attributed context messages; a blocking `Stop` hook adds its reason as next-step steering. | No cost when hooks return no context. Hook text is data-dependent, logged, and resent until compaction. |
| Blocked prompt or tool outcome | A hook can prevent a user prompt from reaching the model, deny a tool, block a post-tool result with feedback, or force another model step. Codex `systemMessage` is not surfaced. | Blocking a prompt removes its request tokens; denial or feedback adds retained result text; forced continuation pays another full request. |
## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- **Stop loop-guard** (`TODO(stop-loop-guard)`) — as in CC, a Stop hook that unconditionally blocks would force-continue every step (`stop_hook_active` is always `false` here); the loop-guard is deferred, and a hook author must self-limit until it lands.