refactor: apply repository naming contract
Apply the accepted pre-release package, service, type, directory, and role renames as one repository-wide change.
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/**
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* Delegation policy through child session events appended before publication:
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* the parent's sandbox override plus the pinned `approval/policy: never`.
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*/
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import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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import { mkdtemp, readFile, realpath, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import { Context } from '@deepseek-ai/cordis'
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import type { Agent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
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import AgentLoop from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent-loop'
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import { mountAgentLoopTestDependencies } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent-loop-testkit'
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import SandboxedFileSystem from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox'
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import type { ContentBlock } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm'
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import SandboxPolicyService, { setSandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy'
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import { SessionId, type SessionEvent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
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import * as ToolFs from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-fs'
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import ApprovalService from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval'
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import { snapshotSubagentDescriptor } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent'
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import { MockAdapter, textResponse, toolCallResponse } from '../../../core/agent-loop/tests/mock-adapter.ts'
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import { startInProcessRun } from '../src/index.ts'
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type Script = ConstructorParameters<typeof MockAdapter>[0]
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const READ_ONLY_DENIAL = '[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]'
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const contexts: Context[] = []
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let workspace: string
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beforeEach(async () => {
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workspace = await realpath(await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-inherit-')))
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})
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afterEach(async () => {
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for (const ctx of contexts.splice(0).reverse()) await ctx.fiber.dispose()
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await rm(workspace, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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async function setupWalled(script: Script): Promise<{ ctx: Context; parent: Agent }> {
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const ctx = new Context()
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contexts.push(ctx)
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await mountAgentLoopTestDependencies(ctx)
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await ctx.plugin(SandboxPolicyService, { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: workspace })
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await ctx.plugin(SandboxedFileSystem, { cwd: workspace })
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await ctx.plugin(ToolFs)
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await ctx.plugin(ApprovalService)
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await ctx.plugin(AgentLoop, { agents: [] })
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ctx.llm.registerAdapter(['mock'], new MockAdapter(script))
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const parent = ctx.agentLoop.create(
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SessionId('parent'),
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{ provider: 'mock', model: 'mock' },
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{ cwd: workspace },
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)
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return { ctx, parent }
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}
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function spawnRequest(parent: Agent) {
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return {
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label: 'child task',
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prompt: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: 'child task' }],
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parent,
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signal: new AbortController().signal,
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descriptor: snapshotSubagentDescriptor({
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mode: 'one-shot',
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provider: 'spawn',
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label: 'child task',
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}),
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}
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}
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function toolResultTexts(agent: Agent): string[] {
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return agent.session.events
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.filter((event): event is SessionEvent<'tool/result'> => event.type === 'tool/result')
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.map(event => event.data.message.content
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.flatMap(block => block.content)
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.filter((block): block is Extract<ContentBlock, { type: 'text' }> => block.type === 'text')
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.map(block => block.text)
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.join(''))
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}
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describe('in-process policy inheritance', () => {
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it('records the parent sandbox override and the approval pin before publishing a spawn child', async () => {
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const script: Script = []
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const { ctx, parent } = await setupWalled(script)
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const blocked = join(workspace, 'spawn-blocked.txt')
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setSandboxMode(parent.session, 'read-only')
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// No parent approval override: the child pin must not depend on one.
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expect(ctx.approval.overrideOf(parent.session)).toBeUndefined()
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const parentLogLength = parent.session.events.length
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script.push(
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toolCallResponse('write', 'write', { file_path: blocked, content: 'escaped' }),
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textResponse('child done'),
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)
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const run = await startInProcessRun(spawnRequest(parent), {})
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try {
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const result = await run.result
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const child = run.localAgent as Agent
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await expect(readFile(blocked, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' })
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expect(toolResultTexts(child).join('\n')).toContain(READ_ONLY_DENIAL)
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expect(result.stopReason).toBe('completed')
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expect(child.session.events.slice(0, 2)).toMatchObject([
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{ type: 'sandbox/mode', seq: 0, data: { mode: 'read-only', source: 'delegation' } },
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{ type: 'approval/policy', seq: 1, data: { policy: 'never', source: 'delegation' } },
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])
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expect(child.session.firstLiveSeq).toBe(0)
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expect(child.session.header.seedLength).toBeUndefined()
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expect(ctx.sandboxPolicy.overrideOf(child.session)).toBe('read-only')
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expect(ctx.approval.overrideOf(child.session)).toBe('never')
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const request = child.session.events.find(
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(event): event is SessionEvent<'request/header'> => event.type === 'request/header',
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)
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const runtimeContext = child.session.events.find(
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(event): event is SessionEvent<'user/message'> => event.type === 'user/message'
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&& event.data.source.kind === 'plugin'
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&& event.data.source.plugin === '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt',
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)
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if (request === undefined || runtimeContext === undefined) throw new Error('child request lacks its runtime policy context')
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expect(runtimeContext.seq).toBeLessThan(request.seq)
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const contextText = runtimeContext.data.content
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.filter((block): block is Extract<ContentBlock, { type: 'text' }> => block.type === 'text')
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.map(block => block.text)
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.join('\n')
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expect(contextText).toContain('Current DSH file policy: read-only')
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expect(contextText).toContain('Approval prompts are disabled')
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// The statement rides runtime context; the system prompt stays uniform.
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expect(contextText).toContain('You are a delegated subagent')
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expect(request.data.header.system).not.toContain('Approval prompts are disabled')
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expect(request.data.header.system).not.toContain('You are a delegated subagent')
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expect(parent.session.events).toHaveLength(parentLogLength)
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} finally {
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await run.dispose()
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}
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})
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it('places inherited events after a fork prefix so fresh policy wins stale seed state', async () => {
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const script: Script = []
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const { ctx, parent } = await setupWalled(script)
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const blocked = join(workspace, 'fork-blocked.txt')
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setSandboxMode(parent.session, 'workspace-write')
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const seed = [...parent.session.events]
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setSandboxMode(parent.session, 'read-only')
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script.push(
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toolCallResponse('write', 'write', { file_path: blocked, content: 'escaped' }),
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textResponse('child done'),
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)
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const run = await startInProcessRun(spawnRequest(parent), { seed })
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try {
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await run.result
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const child = run.localAgent as Agent
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expect(child.session.header.seedLength).toBe(1)
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expect(child.session.firstLiveSeq).toBe(seed.length)
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// seq 1 is the constructor's end-seed marker.
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expect(child.session.events.filter(event => event.type === 'sandbox/mode')).toMatchObject([
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{ seq: 0, data: { mode: 'workspace-write' } },
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{ seq: 2, data: { mode: 'read-only', source: 'delegation' } },
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])
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await expect(readFile(blocked, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' })
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expect(ctx.sandboxPolicy.overrideOf(child.session)).toBe('read-only')
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setSandboxMode(child.session, 'danger-full-access')
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expect(ctx.sandboxPolicy.overrideOf(child.session)).toBe('danger-full-access')
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} finally {
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await run.dispose()
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}
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})
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it('captures policy at delegation before asynchronous child creation', async () => {
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const script: Script = [textResponse('child done')]
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const { ctx, parent } = await setupWalled(script)
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setSandboxMode(parent.session, 'read-only')
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const starting = startInProcessRun(spawnRequest(parent), {})
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setSandboxMode(parent.session, 'danger-full-access')
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const run = await starting
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try {
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await run.result
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const child = run.localAgent as Agent
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expect(ctx.sandboxPolicy.overrideOf(parent.session)).toBe('danger-full-access')
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expect(ctx.sandboxPolicy.overrideOf(child.session)).toBe('read-only')
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} finally {
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await run.dispose()
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}
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})
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it('leaves an unswitched sandbox on the deployment default while still pinning approval', async () => {
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const script: Script = []
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const { parent } = await setupWalled(script)
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const allowed = join(workspace, 'default-allowed.txt')
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script.push(
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toolCallResponse('write', 'write', { file_path: allowed, content: 'fine' }),
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textResponse('child done'),
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)
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const run = await startInProcessRun(spawnRequest(parent), {})
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try {
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await run.result
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const child = run.localAgent as Agent
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expect(await readFile(allowed, 'utf8')).toBe('fine')
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expect(child.session.events.some(event => event.type === 'sandbox/mode')).toBe(false)
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expect(child.session.events.filter(event => event.type === 'approval/policy')).toMatchObject([
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{ seq: 0, data: { policy: 'never', source: 'delegation' } },
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])
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expect(child.session.firstLiveSeq).toBe(0)
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} finally {
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await run.dispose()
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}
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})
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it('rejects a child escalation deterministically even when an answerer would allow it', async () => {
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const script: Script = []
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const { ctx, parent } = await setupWalled(script)
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// A granting answerer proves the pin resolves before any answerer runs.
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let consulted = false
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ctx.on('approval/request', () => {
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consulted = true
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return Promise.resolve('allowed-once' as const)
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})
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const blocked = join(workspace, 'escalation-blocked.txt')
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setSandboxMode(parent.session, 'read-only')
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script.push(
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toolCallResponse('write', 'write', {
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file_path: blocked,
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content: 'escaped',
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sandbox_permissions: 'workspace-write',
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justification: 'test escalation from a delegated child',
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}),
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textResponse('child done'),
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)
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const run = await startInProcessRun(spawnRequest(parent), {})
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try {
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await run.result
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const child = run.localAgent as Agent
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await expect(readFile(blocked, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' })
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expect(consulted).toBe(false)
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expect(toolResultTexts(child).join('\n'))
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.toContain('the user rejected escalating this operation to "workspace-write"')
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const asked = child.session.events.find(
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(event): event is SessionEvent<'approval/asked'> => event.type === 'approval/asked',
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)
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const decided = child.session.events.find(
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(event): event is SessionEvent<'approval/decided'> => event.type === 'approval/decided',
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)
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expect(asked?.data.toolName).toBe('write')
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expect(decided?.data).toMatchObject({ id: asked?.data.id, outcome: 'rejected' })
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} finally {
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await run.dispose()
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}
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})
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})
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