refactor: apply repository naming contract

Apply the accepted pre-release package, service, type, directory, and role renames as one repository-wide change.

packages/fs/fs-sandbox/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/fs/fs-sandbox/README.md
-README.md: ae1fd746c711a86e308a02e0054ba478e8d913c0
-README.zh.md: e25a3467c06fbd93de9bb75d6b364e8da5a451fe
+README.md: 73df31d0f98b602c57a3e86340c3dfe0ee836cd0
+README.zh.md: f4000b200979e951f7e10d452a11773114484185

packages/fs/fs-sandbox/README.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ The per-call policy carries the effective mode (session override or escalation g
 
 ## Threat model: a policy fence, not a kernel boundary
 
-The fence is a check in TRUSTED code over a MODEL-CONTROLLED path — the operations are the seam's own (open, rename), only the target path is untrusted, so canonicalize-then-contain is the complete answer to this surface. This mirrors the `code-runtime` stance: containment, not a security boundary. Kernel-grade isolation of untrusted CODE stays `ctx.bash`'s job ([`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/README.md)). The residual TOCTOU (an ancestor symlink swapped between the containment re-check and the syscall) is narrowed by re-canonicalizing immediately before the write and is accepted for this threat model; a kernel-tight boundary needs `openat2`-class primitives not worth their portability cost here.
+The fence is a check in TRUSTED code over a MODEL-CONTROLLED path — the operations are the seam's own (open, rename), only the target path is untrusted, so canonicalize-then-contain is the complete answer to this surface. This mirrors the `code-runtime` stance: containment, not a security boundary. Kernel-grade isolation of untrusted CODE stays `ctx.shell`'s job ([`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../shell/bash-sandbox/README.md)). The residual TOCTOU (an ancestor symlink swapped between the containment re-check and the syscall) is narrowed by re-canonicalizing immediately before the write and is accepted for this threat model; a kernel-tight boundary needs `openat2`-class primitives not worth their portability cost here.
 
 A denial is a structured `FsError` (`FS_SANDBOX_DENIED`, carrying the effective mode) — no stderr text inference (unlike bash's kernel denials), because an in-process fence knows exactly what it refused. The model-facing `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker and the one-approved-wider retry live in the tool layer (`dsh-tool-fs`), exactly as bash's do. See [the cross-family fs sandbox Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md).
 
@@ -40,6 +40,6 @@ A standing-policy change appends an owner-rendered superseding runtime-context s
 
 ## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
 
-- **A policy fence, not a kernel boundary** — the check is trusted code over a model-controlled path, so the residual resolve-to-syscall TOCTOU is narrowed (by the in-place re-canonicalization) but not eliminated; adversarial host processes are out of scope. Kernel-grade isolation of untrusted code stays `ctx.bash`'s.
+- **A policy fence, not a kernel boundary** — the check is trusted code over a model-controlled path, so the residual resolve-to-syscall TOCTOU is narrowed (by the in-place re-canonicalization) but not eliminated; adversarial host processes are out of scope. Kernel-grade isolation of untrusted code stays `ctx.shell`'s.
 - **Fence-vs-runner parity is derived from one owner** — the writable set comes from `writableRoots`, shared with the Seatbelt profile; a runner profile that defines its writable set elsewhere would drift.
 - **Requires `ctx.sandboxPolicy`** — tools use it to resolve each session policy and the backend uses it for agentless-call fallbacks; the backend does not confine without it composed.

packages/fs/fs-sandbox/README.zh.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 
 ## 威胁模型：策略围栏，而非内核边界
 
-围栏是在可信代码中检查模型控制的路径。操作本身属于 seam（open、rename），只有目标路径不可信，因此「规范化后检查包含关系」就是该接口的完整答案。这与 `code-runtime` 的立场相同：提供约束，但不是安全边界。不可信代码的内核级隔离仍由 `ctx.bash` 负责（[`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/README.md)）。剩余 TOCTOU（在包含关系复查与系统调用之间替换祖先符号链接）会通过写入前立即重新规范化来缩小，并为该威胁模型所接受；内核严密边界需要 `openat2` 一类原语，其可移植性成本在此不值得。
+围栏是在可信代码中检查模型控制的路径。操作本身属于 seam（open、rename），只有目标路径不可信，因此「规范化后检查包含关系」就是该接口的完整答案。这与 `code-runtime` 的立场相同：提供约束，但不是安全边界。不可信代码的内核级隔离仍由 `ctx.shell` 负责（[`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../shell/bash-sandbox/README.md)）。剩余 TOCTOU（在包含关系复查与系统调用之间替换祖先符号链接）会通过写入前立即重新规范化来缩小，并为该威胁模型所接受；内核严密边界需要 `openat2` 一类原语，其可移植性成本在此不值得。
 
 拒绝是结构化 `FsError`（`FS_SANDBOX_DENIED`，携带有效模式），不通过 stderr 文本推断（不同于 bash 的内核拒绝），因为进程内围栏准确知道自己拒绝了什么。面向模型的 `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` 标记以及唯一一次获批的更宽权限重试位于工具层（`dsh-tool-fs`），与 bash 完全相同。见[跨能力族 fs 沙箱 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md)。
 
@@ -40,6 +40,6 @@
 
 ## 已知限制与暂缓事项
 
-- **策略围栏，而非内核边界**：该检查是可信代码处理模型控制的路径，因此解析到系统调用之间残留的 TOCTOU 会被原位重新规范化缩小，但不会消除；对抗性宿主进程不在范围内。不可信代码的内核级隔离仍属于 `ctx.bash`。
+- **策略围栏，而非内核边界**：该检查是可信代码处理模型控制的路径，因此解析到系统调用之间残留的 TOCTOU 会被原位重新规范化缩小，但不会消除；对抗性宿主进程不在范围内。不可信代码的内核级隔离仍属于 `ctx.shell`。
 - **围栏与 runner 的一致性由单一所有方派生**：可写集合来自 `writableRoots`，该函数与 Seatbelt profile 共享；在其他位置定义可写集合的 runner profile 会发生漂移。
 - **要求 `ctx.sandboxPolicy`**：工具使用它解析每个会话策略，后端用它处理无 agent（智能体）调用的回退；未组合该服务时，后端不会实施约束。

packages/fs/fs-sandbox/src/index.ts

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  * NOT a kernel boundary — the operations are the seam's own (open, rename),
  * and only the target path is untrusted, so canonicalize-then-contain is the
  * complete answer to this surface. Kernel-grade isolation of untrusted CODE
- * stays `ctx.bash`'s job (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`). This mirrors the
+ * stays `ctx.shell`'s job (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`). This mirrors the
  * `code-runtime` stance: containment, not a security boundary. The residual
  * TOCTOU (an ancestor symlink swapped between the containment re-check and the
  * syscall) is narrowed by re-canonicalizing immediately before delegating and

packages/fs/fs-sandbox/tsconfig.json

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
       "path": "../../sandbox/sandbox-policy"
     },
     {
-      "path": "../../support/invariants"
+      "path": "../../runtime-diagnostics/invariants"
     }
   ]
 }