Merge branch 'feat/subagent-report-semantics' into feat/subagent-settlement-delivery

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md
-2026-07-06-sandbox.md: 0214a202a41983c76fa25e3a82e1cfaec70a0d55
-2026-07-06-sandbox.zh.md: bd8dcdb74f723a955ea2a1cc5b224ef2ded4a8d5
+2026-07-06-sandbox.md: e1ec35cdcf3be2af03232f823d9a9cee57b4e8e8
+2026-07-06-sandbox.zh.md: d3b74d441f72fc4c218979c327546031fd1b24f1

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md

@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ Costs and accepted limits:
 
 - **The one-wrapper illusion is given up knowingly.** A `tools/pre-execute` wrapper plus prompt conventions does not solve sandbox approval — the correct design costs structured denials, native runner probes, per-call policy carriage, and consistent cross-family enforcement, and this design pays it.
 - **`read-only` became a cross-family boundary through a follow-up.** This RFC shipped bash-only enforcement; the [cross-family fs sandbox RFC](2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md) extends the same mode vocabulary to the filesystem tools through a sandboxed `ctx.fs` provider and relocates the mode/root config and the `sandbox/mode` override to `ctx.sandboxPolicy` (§ In-process tools).
-- **Windows has no backend.** Its chain slot is reserved empty — fail-closed, never a fallthrough; filling it is a deferred phase.
+- **Windows is a partial backend.** This RFC originally reserved an empty, fail-closed win32 chain; the later [Windows ACL sandbox decision](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md) filled it with the restricted-token runner. Its Everyone and hard-link gaps are reported as `enforcement: 'partial'`, never promoted to the full promise.
 - **The Seatbelt rung leans on Apple's deprecated-but-shipped `sandbox-exec` CLI.** As darwin's sole candidate it is selected without probing, so a future removal under a usable workdir surfaces as a runner-attributable spawn failure and an executable refusal through its fatal signature — both become `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`, and the command never runs; fail closed, never open.
 - **Landlock confinement is only as complete as the running kernel's ABI.** Reported as `enforcement: 'partial'` rather than refused — the deliberate trade that keeps the fallback available on older-kernel hosts.
 - **Runner attribution uses an in-band protocol.** Exit status plus stderr cannot cryptographically identify the writer, so a confined child can mimic a fatal runner line and status to cause an availability/diagnostic false attribution. The conjunction and exact notice exclusion reduce accidental matches; this is not a sandbox bypass because the child is already confined.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.zh.md

@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ fs/web/todo 在进程内执行，因此它们的沙箱语义是各自能力边
 
 - **单一包装的幻觉被有意放弃。**`tools/pre-execute` 包装加提示词约定无法解决沙箱批准——正确的设计需要结构化拒绝、原生 runner 探测、按调用策略承载和一致的跨工具族强制，本设计为此付出了代价。
 - **`read-only` 通过后续设计成为跨工具族边界。** 本 Agent Note 最初只交付 bash 强制；[跨工具族 fs 沙箱 Agent Note](2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md) 通过沙箱化的 `ctx.fs` 提供方把同一模式词汇扩展到文件系统工具，并将 mode/root 配置和 `sandbox/mode` 覆盖迁移到 `ctx.sandboxPolicy`（§ 进程内工具）。
-- **Windows 没有后端。** 其链槽保留为空——失败关闭，绝不穿透；填充它是延迟阶段。
+- **Windows 后端只提供部分强制执行。** 本 RFC 最初预留了一条空的、失败关闭的 win32 链；后续的 [Windows ACL 沙箱决策](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md)以受限令牌 runner 填充了它。其 Everyone 与硬链接缺口报告为 `enforcement: 'partial'`，绝不提升为完整承诺。
 - **Seatbelt 层级依赖 Apple 已弃用但仍交付的 `sandbox-exec` CLI。** 作为 darwin 的唯一候选，它无需探测即被选中，因此在 workdir 可用时，未来移除会表现为可归因于 runner 的 spawn 失败，可执行文件拒绝则通过其致命签名体现——两者都会变为 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`，且命令绝不会运行；失败关闭，绝不开放。
 - **Landlock 约束的完整度取决于运行内核的 ABI。** 报告为 `enforcement: 'partial'` 而非拒绝——这是有意的权衡，使备选在旧内核主机上仍可用。
 - **Runner 归因使用带内协议。** 退出状态与 stderr 无法以密码学方式识别写入者，因此受限子进程可以模仿 runner 的致命诊断行和状态，造成可用性或诊断误归因。多项证据的合取与精确通知排除减少了意外匹配；这不是沙箱绕过，因为子进程已经受到限制。

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md
-2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md: f0da86e52bcdd53a10b60164d7cc12261cfc5c49
-2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.zh.md: 41a6429eab8f86a8960ac4aa372aeacfda4661c4
+2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md: 4e681b32088954d870df86898e26fe2cae669f14
+2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.zh.md: a9d600f8a8e47db49c3733f33091e667e341c6a7

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ The harness's shipped execution profile is bash-first on every platform. Windows
 
 Windows hosts booting a shipped profile (`dsh web`, `dsh --profile headless`, one-shot tasks) get the PowerShell stack by default; POSIX hosts are unchanged.
 
-- **The platform layer is a data file, not a roster rewrite.** `@deepseek-ai/dsh-base` ships [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/windows.cordis.patch.yml) alongside its universal `cordis.patch.yml`: it disables `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` (the POSIX-only executor and its dialect tool) and inserts `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh`. Windows has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the layer drops the sandbox stack entirely — `sandbox`, `sandbox-policy`, and `fs-sandbox` are disabled and the unconfined `dsh-fs-local` provides `ctx.fs` — and degrades to danger-full-access: `permission`/`ui-permission` leave the roster (dsh-permission requires a confining executor — presets bundle a sandbox mode the unconfined executor cannot honor; see its constructor guard — and the client knob would advertise a boundary that does not exist), and the `approval` service is disabled — nothing in the Windows roster asks for approval, so the model is never told approval exists or that asks are auto-rejected. Keeping fs-only path rules would be theater: the unconfined shell can bypass them with one command, so the honest Windows posture is full access rather than a boundary only the fs tools pretend to enforce.
-- **The launcher injects the layer by platform.** `apps/cli/src/windows-shell.ts` resolves it from the base bundle layer's `packageDir` between the bundle layers and the user layers on `win32` hosts, in every composition path (boot, config-only HMR recomposition, config dumps). Overriding the shipped default is a composition decision: a Windows host that prefers the bash stack — or confinement — re-enables the bash rows through its profile or home `cordis.patch.yml`. Custom profiles without the base bundle are skipped (they own their shell stack); a base bundle that ships no Windows shell patch fails loud.
-- **Module resolution is restored for cold starts.** The profiles-rework CLI dropped the pwsh packages from `apps/cli`'s dependency closure, so `healProfilesModuleFallback` never linked them into `$DSH_HOME/profiles/node_modules` and a fresh Windows host could not resolve the inserted rows. `apps/cli` and `dsh-base` re-declare `dsh-pwsh-local`/`dsh-tool-pwsh`, and `dsh-base` also declares `dsh-fs-local`; the base bundle lists every row plugin as a dependency by house style.
+- **The platform layer is a data file, not a roster rewrite.** `@deepseek-ai/dsh-base` ships [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/windows.cordis.patch.yml) alongside its universal `cordis.patch.yml`. It disables the POSIX-only `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` rows and inserts `pwsh-sandbox`/`tool-pwsh`. The later [Windows ACL sandbox decision](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md) filled the win32 runner chain and superseded this note's original unconfined roster: `sandbox`, `sandbox-policy`, `fs-sandbox`, `permission`/`ui-permission`, and `approval` now stay enabled exactly as on POSIX, while the ACL backend truthfully reports its Everyone and hard-link gaps as partial enforcement.
+- **The launcher injects the layer by platform.** `apps/cli/src/windows-shell.ts` resolves it from the base bundle layer's `packageDir` between the bundle layers and the user layers on `win32` hosts, in every composition path (boot, config-only HMR recomposition, config dumps). Overriding the shipped default is a composition decision: a Windows host that prefers the bash stack re-enables the bash rows and disables both pwsh rows through its profile or home `cordis.patch.yml`. Custom profiles without the base bundle are skipped (they own their shell stack); a base bundle that ships no Windows shell patch fails loud.
+- **Module resolution is restored for cold starts.** The profiles-rework CLI dropped the pwsh packages from `apps/cli`'s dependency closure, so `healProfilesModuleFallback` never linked them into `$DSH_HOME/profiles/node_modules` and a fresh Windows host could not resolve the inserted rows. `apps/cli` and `dsh-base` declare `dsh-pwsh-sandbox`/`dsh-tool-pwsh`; the executor's dependency chain supplies `dsh-pwsh-local`, and the base bundle lists every row plugin as a dependency by house style.
 
 The pwsh GUI rendering shipped earlier with the [pwsh UI presentation matches bash decision](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md); the [pwsh tool bash parity decision](2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) ships the tool's surface. Nothing in this decision changes POSIX behavior.
 
@@ -24,21 +24,21 @@ The pwsh GUI rendering shipped earlier with the [pwsh UI presentation matches ba
 
 **Ship the platform layer from `apps/cli` code instead of a bundle data file.** Rejected: the patch belongs next to the rows it replaces, in the bundle that owns them, so the shipped roster stays visible as composition data and dumps carry its provenance; the launcher contributes only the win32 gate.
 
-**Keep `permission`/`ui-permission` on Windows.** Rejected: `dsh-permission` hard-requires `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` and fails loud at load over an unconfined executor; making it tolerate an unconfined shell would advertise presets the shell cannot honor.
+**Keep `permission`/`ui-permission` on Windows without a confining runner.** Rejected by the original delivery: `dsh-permission` hard-requires `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` and fails loud at load over an unconfined executor. The later ACL runner removed that premise, so the current roster retains both rows.
 
-**Keep fs path-rule confinement on Windows (`sandbox-policy` + `fs-sandbox` without OS runners).** Rejected: the shell is the model's primary tool and unconfined on Windows, so fs-only path rules are trivially bypassable and would overstate the boundary; the honest posture is full degradation to danger-full-access.
+**Keep fs path-rule confinement on Windows without an OS runner.** Rejected by the original delivery: an unconfined shell could bypass fs-only path rules. The current ACL runner confines the shell and the fs provider under one policy, so this rejected half-boundary is no longer the shipped shape.
 
 **Ship a `DSH_WINDOWS_SHELL` environment escape hatch.** Rejected: decisive behavior changes belong in composition config, which already overrides the platform layer row by id; a second override channel would split the single source of truth for roster decisions.
 
 ## Consequences
 
 - A Windows host running a shipped `dsh` surface gets `pwsh` as its shell tool and PowerShell as the `ctx.bash` executor without configuration; `bash` is absent from the model-visible roster there (its tool row is disabled).
-- Windows has no sandbox at all: the fs tools run unconfined (`dsh-fs-local`), the approval service is absent (nothing asks for approval, and the model is never told approval exists), and the permission switcher is gone. The model-visible posture is honest full access rather than a boundary the shell can bypass.
+- Windows commands and fs operations share the sandbox policy, permission switcher, and approval service. The ACL runner confines writes but reports `enforcement: 'partial'`; explicit `danger-full-access` remains the approved bypass rather than the platform default.
 - POSIX hosts are unchanged: the platform layer never applies, and the bash stack remains the universal `cordis.patch.yml` rows.
-- Windows hosts that prefer the bash stack (e.g. with WSL/Git-Bash on PATH) override the shipped default through their profile or home `cordis.patch.yml` — disabling `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh` and re-enabling `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` (both executors register the same `bash` service, so an incomplete recipe fails loud at load) — composition config is the one override channel.
+- Windows hosts that prefer the bash stack (e.g. with WSL/Git-Bash on PATH) override the shipped default through their profile or home `cordis.patch.yml` — disabling `pwsh-sandbox`/`tool-pwsh` and re-enabling `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` (both executors register the same `bash` service, so an incomplete recipe fails loud at load) — composition config is the one override channel.
 
 ## Verification
 
-- Unit: `apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts` pins the win32 default, the custom-profile skip, and the missing-patch failure with the platform injected, and composes the REAL shipped bundle layers (dsh-base + dsh-web-app resolved from the app installation) through the boot's patch algorithm to assert the win32 danger-full-access roster and the base-only-profile warning; `packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts` pins the shipped Windows patch file shape (disables, inserts, and the absent approval service).
+- Unit: `apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts` pins the win32 default, custom-profile skip, missing-patch failure, cold-start dependency closure, and real composed roster; `packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts` pins that the Windows layer disables only the bash rows, inserts the confined pwsh rows, and leaves sandbox, permission, fs, and approval ownership untouched.
 - Keyless: a win32 `dsh --profile <name> --dump-config` shows the pwsh rows with `windows.cordis.patch.yml` provenance and the bash rows disabled; the POSIX dump (CI Linux) is unchanged.
 - The real-composition smoke boots the web profile on win32 with the pwsh stack mounted (the exact roster this note describes).

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.zh.md

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ harness 交付的执行画像在每个平台都是 bash 优先。Windows 主机
 
 启动交付 profile（`dsh web`、`dsh --profile headless`、一次性任务）的 Windows 主机默认获得 PowerShell 栈；POSIX 主机不变。
 
-- **平台层是数据文件，不是清单重写。** `@deepseek-ai/dsh-base` 随通用 `cordis.patch.yml` 一起交付 [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/windows.cordis.patch.yml)：它禁用 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`（仅 POSIX 的执行器及其方言工具）并插入 `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh`。Windows 上没有 OS 级 sandbox runner（landlock/bwrap/seatbelt 均为 POSIX 专属），因此该层整体移除 sandbox 栈——`sandbox`、`sandbox-policy`、`fs-sandbox` 被禁用，由不限权的 `dsh-fs-local` 提供 `ctx.fs`——并完全退化为 danger-full-access：`permission`/`ui-permission` 离开清单（dsh-permission 要求有限权能力的执行器——preset 捆绑的是无限制执行器无法兑现的 sandbox 模式；见其构造函数守卫——客户端旋钮会宣传一个并不存在的边界），`approval` 服务也被禁用——Windows 清单里没有任何动作需要审批，模型也不会被告知"审批存在"或"请求会被自动拒绝"。保留仅限 fs 的路径规则是摆设：不限权的 shell 一条命令即可绕过，因此诚实的 Windows 姿态是全权访问，而不是一个只有 fs 工具假装执行的边界。
-- **启动器按平台注入该层。** `apps/cli/src/windows-shell.ts` 在 `win32` 主机上从 base bundle 层的 `packageDir` 解析它，置于 bundle 层与用户层之间，覆盖所有组合路径（启动、config-only HMR 重组合、配置转储）。覆盖交付默认是组合决策：偏好 bash 栈（或偏好有限权）的 Windows 主机通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 重新启用 bash 行。未挂 base bundle 的自定义 profile 被跳过（它们自己拥有 shell 栈）；base bundle 缺 `windows.cordis.patch.yml` 时 fail loud。
-- **冷启动的模块解析已恢复。** profiles 重构把 pwsh 包从 `apps/cli` 的依赖闭包中删掉了，`healProfilesModuleFallback` 因此从未把它们链接进 `$DSH_HOME/profiles/node_modules`，新 Windows 主机解析不到插入的行。`apps/cli` 与 `dsh-base` 重新声明 `dsh-pwsh-local`/`dsh-tool-pwsh`，`dsh-base` 还声明 `dsh-fs-local`；按仓库惯例，base bundle 把每个行插件都列为依赖。
+- **平台层是数据文件，不是清单重写。** `@deepseek-ai/dsh-base` 随通用 `cordis.patch.yml` 一起交付 [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/windows.cordis.patch.yml)。它禁用仅限 POSIX 的 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` 行，并插入 `pwsh-sandbox`/`tool-pwsh`。后续的 [Windows ACL 沙箱决策](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md)填充了 win32 runner 链，并取代了本笔记最初的不限权清单：`sandbox`、`sandbox-policy`、`fs-sandbox`、`permission`/`ui-permission` 与 `approval` 均与 POSIX 上一样保持启用，而 ACL 后端则如实把 Everyone 与硬链接缺口报告为部分强制执行。
+- **启动器按平台注入该层。** `apps/cli/src/windows-shell.ts` 在 `win32` 主机上从 base bundle 层的 `packageDir` 解析它，置于 bundle 层与用户层之间，覆盖所有组合路径（启动、config-only HMR 重组合、配置转储）。覆盖交付默认是组合决策：偏好 bash 栈的 Windows 主机通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 重新启用 bash 行，并禁用两个 pwsh 行。未挂 base bundle 的自定义 profile 被跳过（它们自己拥有 shell 栈）；base bundle 缺 `windows.cordis.patch.yml` 时 fail loud。
+- **冷启动的模块解析已恢复。** profiles 重构把 pwsh 包从 `apps/cli` 的依赖闭包中删掉了，`healProfilesModuleFallback` 因此从未把它们链接进 `$DSH_HOME/profiles/node_modules`，新 Windows 主机解析不到插入的行。`apps/cli` 与 `dsh-base` 声明 `dsh-pwsh-sandbox`/`dsh-tool-pwsh`；执行器的依赖链提供 `dsh-pwsh-local`，按仓库惯例，base bundle 把每个行插件都列为依赖。
 
 pwsh GUI 渲染已随 [pwsh UI 呈现与 bash 对齐决策](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md) 先行交付；[pwsh 工具与 bash 对齐决策](2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) 交付了工具表面。本决策不改变任何 POSIX 行为。
 
@@ -24,21 +24,21 @@ pwsh GUI 渲染已随 [pwsh UI 呈现与 bash 对齐决策](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-b
 
 **从 `apps/cli` 代码而非 bundle 数据文件交付平台层。** 否决：patch 应放在它替换的行旁边、属于拥有这些行的 bundle，让交付清单作为组合数据保持可见、转储带有出处；启动器只贡献 win32 门控。
 
-**在 Windows 上保留 `permission`/`ui-permission`。** 否决：`dsh-permission` 硬性要求 `ctx.bash.sandboxMode`，在无限制执行器上加载即 fail loud；让它容忍无限制 shell 会宣传 shell 无法兑现的 preset。
+**在 Windows 没有隔离 runner 时保留 `permission`/`ui-permission`。** 最初交付时否决：`dsh-permission` 硬性要求 `ctx.bash.sandboxMode`，并在不限权执行器上加载时 fail loud。后续的 ACL runner 消除了该前提，因此当前清单保留这两行。
 
-**在 Windows 上保留 fs 路径规则限制（无 OS runner 的 `sandbox-policy` + `fs-sandbox`）。** 否决：shell 是模型的主工具且在 Windows 上不限权，仅限 fs 的路径规则一行命令即可绕过，会夸大边界；诚实的姿态是完全退化到 danger-full-access。
+**在 Windows 没有 OS runner 时保留 fs 路径规则限制。** 最初交付时否决：不限权 shell 可以绕过仅限 fs 的路径规则。当前 ACL runner 用同一策略约束 shell 与 fs 提供方，因此这项被否决的半边界已不是当前交付形态。
 
 **交付 `DSH_WINDOWS_SHELL` 环境变量逃生门。** 否决：决定性的行为变更应集中在组合配置中，而组合配置已能按行 id 覆盖平台层；第二条覆盖通道会分裂清单决策的单一事实来源。
 
 ## 后果
 
 - 运行交付版 `dsh` 表面的 Windows 主机无需配置即获得 `pwsh` 作为 shell 工具、PowerShell 作为 `ctx.bash` 执行器；那里的模型可见清单中没有 `bash`（其工具行被禁用）。
-- Windows 上没有任何沙箱：fs 工具不限权运行（`dsh-fs-local`）、`approval` 服务不存在（没有任何动作需要审批，模型也不会被告知审批存在）、权限切换器消失。模型可见的姿态是诚实的全权访问，而不是一个 shell 可以绕过的边界。
+- Windows 命令与 fs 操作共用沙箱策略、权限切换器和 approval 服务。ACL runner 限制写入，但报告 `enforcement: 'partial'`；显式的 `danger-full-access` 仍是获准的绕过方式，而非平台默认。
 - POSIX 主机不变：平台层永不生效，bash 栈仍是通用 `cordis.patch.yml` 的行。
-- 偏好 bash 栈的 Windows 主机（例如 PATH 上有 WSL/Git-Bash 时）通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 覆盖交付默认——禁用 `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh` 并重新启用 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`（两个执行器注册同一个 `bash` 服务，配方不完整会在加载时 fail loud）——组合配置是唯一的覆盖通道。
+- 偏好 bash 栈的 Windows 主机（例如 PATH 上有 WSL/Git-Bash 时）通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 覆盖交付默认——禁用 `pwsh-sandbox`/`tool-pwsh` 并重新启用 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`（两个执行器注册同一个 `bash` 服务，配方不完整会在加载时 fail loud）——组合配置是唯一的覆盖通道。
 
 ## 验证
 
-- 单元：`apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts` 以平台注入固定 win32 默认、自定义 profile 跳过与缺文件失败，并通过启动所用的 patch 算法组合真实交付的 bundle 层（从应用安装解析的 dsh-base + dsh-web-app）断言 win32 danger-full-access 清单与 base-only profile 警告；`packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts` 固定交付的 Windows patch 文件形状（禁用、插入与缺席的 approval 服务）。
+- 单元：`apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts` 固定 win32 默认、自定义 profile 跳过、缺少 patch 时失败、冷启动依赖闭包和真实组合清单；`packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts` 固定 Windows 层仅禁用 bash 行、插入受限的 pwsh 行，并且不改变沙箱、权限、fs 与审批的归属。
 - Keyless：win32 上的 `dsh --profile <name> --dump-config` 显示带 `windows.cordis.patch.yml` 出处的 pwsh 行、被禁用的 bash 行；POSIX 转储（CI Linux）不变。
 - 真实组合冒烟在 win32 上启动 web profile，pwsh 栈挂载成功（即本笔记描述的确切清单）。

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md
-2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md: 7e8f229269233d9ac9baa65241ca02a4cf4c3f7c
-2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md: eeb346b228b3559f487448e5d4ec525b7bb89525
+2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md: 972713e02860218853f421aa700a8b60b33ada5b
+2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md: da41cb3f9aa46bab96a5fbb6c035205b22c442aa

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md

@@ -6,15 +6,15 @@ English | [中文](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md)
 
 ## Problem
 
-The [sandbox decision](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) leaves `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` empty, so shipped Windows profiles degrade to danger-full-access because no confining executor exists. The win32 rung must confine the two file-effect modes the sandbox vocabulary promises — `read-only` (zero writes) and `workspace-write` (writes under the workspace root plus a backend-defined temp area) — while leaving reads, network, and process visibility alone, because every mode permits reading.
+The original [sandbox decision](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) left `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` empty, so shipped Windows profiles degraded to danger-full-access because no confining executor existed. The win32 rung must govern the two file-effect modes in the sandbox vocabulary — `read-only` (no explicit writable root) and `workspace-write` (writes under the workspace root plus a backend-defined temp area) — while reporting any effects its mechanism cannot govern; reads, network, and process visibility remain outside this vocabulary.
 
 ## Decision
 
-Implement the rung directly on the raw ACL mechanism: duplicate the caller's token into a `WRITE_RESTRICTED` token (`CreateRestrictedToken` with `WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`) whose restricting SIDs include a write SID (`S-1-4-x-y`); the write SID's Write ACEs on the workspace and temp roots are the entire write allowlist, because `WRITE_RESTRICTED` intersects write accesses only and reads keep the caller's full ambient access. The mechanism is the one huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (`10e4dfb`) demonstrates; this port checks every API call and fails closed (the POC fail-opened on every ignored return value). The write SID is the PER-WORKSPACE identity, derived deterministically from the canonical workspace path (`workspaceWriteSid` — sha256 → `S-1-4-x-y`) and stored NOWHERE: the workspace-root ACE therefore materializes once per workspace per machine — the standing ACE is the cross-session reuse cache, and every later provision hits the exact-ACE skip (idempotent re-grant skips the eager full-tree re-propagation — no garbage collection) — instead of once per session, which is what the earlier per-session random SID paid a full tree propagation per session for. The seam derives the session's PRIVATE temp subdirectory from the session id + workspace (sha256, 16 hex — stored nowhere, so no tamper surface exists) and creates it exclusively; it is removed on provider dispose, and a crash leaves it as `%TEMP%` litter whose next resume fails loudly at the exclusive creation until temp hygiene reclaims it. The seam materializes the workspace ACE STANDING (never revoked — the cache) and the temp ACE REVOCABLY (revoked on provider dispose, so an inheritable ACE never outlives its session's temp directory on the ambient temp root). The token's restricting list is the keep-alive group plus the write SID only under workspace-write: read-only = [logon SID, Everyone] and workspace-write = [logon SID, Everyone, write SID]. The keep-alive invariants are logon SID + Everyone (early DLL init dies with 0xC0000142 and CNG crashes pwsh with 0xE0434352 without them). Read-only carries no write SID: a standing grant ACE from an earlier workspace-write period stays INERT (the pass-2 check grants only what the list carries, so read-only remains strictly zero-grant across a `/permission` downgrade or a crash-resumed session, while the standing ACE keeps the re-upgrade free). Authenticated Users is absent from BOTH lists — the WMI namespace security check fails (0x80041003), so CIM is unavailable in every confined mode, and the C:\-root tree-creation escape (standing `AU:(AD)` + `AU:(OI)(CI)(IO)(M)` ACEs) is closed in both; INTERACTIVE/LOCAL are likewise absent from both (the Public tree writes are denied — pinned by the runner's Public-probe regression). Workspace-write children see a PRIVATE per-session temp subdirectory (`<temp>\dsh-<16 hex>` derived from the session id + workspace — created exclusively, reparse points rejected, removed on provider dispose — TMP/TEMP rewritten by the runner — bwrap `--tmpfs /tmp` semantics). The restricted token's DEFAULT DACL is extended with a full-access write-SID ACE (`SetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl)`): new objects created without an explicit security descriptor (anonymous pipes — CreatePipe, sync objects) then carry a restricting-SID ACE and pass the write pass-2 check at creation; NAMED pipes are exempt — their default security descriptor is the Win32 layer's user-mode default SD template (built by KernelBase — owner/SYSTEM/Admins full, Everyone/ANONYMOUS read-only), which the token cannot influence, so piped stdio capture stays denied for confined grandchildren (the POC-documented boundary, pinned by the runner suite). It ships as [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md) (backend plus the `./runner` argv-prefix entry), the `win32` chain rung of [`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md), and [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) as the confining executor; the Windows platform layer re-enables the full permission surface (sandbox/sandbox-policy/permission/approval/fs-sandbox) over the confined pwsh stack.
+Implement the rung directly on the raw ACL mechanism: duplicate the caller's token into a `WRITE_RESTRICTED` token (`CreateRestrictedToken` with `WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`) whose restricting SIDs carry distinct workspace and private-temp capabilities. `WRITE_RESTRICTED` intersects write accesses only, so reads keep the caller's ambient access while a write must also match one of these capability ACEs. The mechanism is the one huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (`10e4dfb`) demonstrates; this port checks every API call and fails closed (the POC fail-opened on ignored failures). The per-workspace SID is derived deterministically from the canonical workspace path (`workspaceWriteSid` — sha256 → `S-1-4-x-y`); its standing workspace ACE is the cross-session reuse cache, and an exact-ACE skip prevents repeated eager tree propagation. Each live session/workspace pair instead gets a random private temp directory and a domain-separated SID derived from that path (`tempWriteSid`); its ACE is revocable, TMP/TEMP point at that directory, and the token default DACL names the temp SID so newly created temp objects do not acquire the shared workspace capability. A fork therefore cannot write its sibling's temp tree. A fresh provider chooses a new path and SID even for the same resumed session, so crash residue is inert litter rather than a collision or inherited capability; agentless calls create and remove the same shape per invocation. The ambient temp root is never an implicit grant. A workspace equal to or containing the temp root fails before any ACL mutation because its inheritable standing ACE would otherwise reach every private child; the direct API rejects overlap in either direction between a writable root and the actual private temp directory. PowerShell can complete its startup AppLocker probe through this private-temp capability, so `workspace-write` remains FullLanguage absent a host-wide policy; `read-only` cannot create the probe files and conservatively enters ConstrainedLanguage. That split is PowerShell startup behavior, not part of the ACL boundary. The token lists are read-only = [logon SID, Everyone] and workspace-write = [logon SID, Everyone, workspace SID, optional temp SID]. Logon SID + Everyone are keep-alive invariants (early DLL init dies with 0xC0000142 and CNG crashes pwsh with 0xE0434352 without them). Because Everyone remains, an external object granting Everyone write access clears both checks; because NTFS ACLs belong to file objects, a granted workspace hard link also grants an external alias. Rejecting all hard links would reject ordinary pnpm workspaces, so the provider reports `enforcement: 'partial'` and the native suite pins both gaps. Read-only carries no capability SID, so standing workspace ACEs remain inert across a mode downgrade. Authenticated Users is absent from both lists — CIM is unavailable, closing the C:\-root tree-creation escape — and INTERACTIVE/LOCAL are absent, denying Public-tree writes. New anonymous pipes and sync objects inherit the temp SID (or workspace SID when temp is disabled, Everyone under read-only) through `SetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl)`; named pipes keep the Win32 layer's owner/SYSTEM/Admins-full, Everyone/ANONYMOUS-read-only template, so piped grandchild stdio remains denied. It ships as [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md), the `win32` rung of [`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md), and [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) as the confining executor.
 
 ## How the restriction works (why no new identity)
 
-The identity routes restrict by *who* runs the child; this rung restricts by *token derivation*. An identity route (landstrip's restricted-user, AppContainer) runs the child under a fresh account or container SID that starts with zero ACEs on the host's files — everything, reads included, defaults to denied, and every path the child may touch must then be opened back up by writing ACEs for that identity: the wholesale DACL mutation that disqualified both alternatives. The restricted token keeps the caller's own SID and logon session: [`CreateRestrictedToken`](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-createrestrictedtoken) derives a token that adds the restricting SIDs and the `WRITE_RESTRICTED` flag, so Windows performs the access check twice — once against the normal SIDs, once against the restricting SIDs — and grants write-class access only where both checks pass. Reads pass on the normal check alone (the caller's SIDs already carry read access everywhere the caller can read), which is why this rung needs no read grants and no new account; writes must additionally clear the orphan-SID check, which only the workspace and temp ACEs satisfy. `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE | LUA_TOKEN` synthesize the limited-user effect of a fresh account token-side, so even an elevated caller derives a filtered token. The same primitive could restrict reads (`SidsToDisable` turning SIDs deny-only), but a read-restricted token would need per-path read grants — reintroducing exactly the cost the identity routes pay — and the sandbox vocabulary never requires read confinement.
+The identity routes restrict by *who* runs the child; this rung restricts by *token derivation*. An identity route (landstrip's restricted-user, AppContainer) runs the child under a fresh account or container SID that starts with zero ACEs on the host's files — everything, reads included, defaults to denied, and every path the child may touch must then be opened back up by writing ACEs for that identity: the wholesale DACL mutation that disqualified both alternatives. The restricted token keeps the caller's own SID and logon session: [`CreateRestrictedToken`](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-createrestrictedtoken) derives a token that adds the restricting SIDs and the `WRITE_RESTRICTED` flag, so Windows performs the access check twice — once against the normal SIDs, once against the restricting SIDs — and grants write-class access only where both checks pass. Reads pass on the normal check alone (the caller's SIDs already carry read access everywhere the caller can read), which is why this rung needs no read grants and no new account; writes must additionally clear the capability-SID check, which only the workspace and temp ACEs satisfy. `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE | LUA_TOKEN` synthesize the limited-user effect of a fresh account token-side, so even an elevated caller derives a filtered token. The same primitive could restrict reads (`SidsToDisable` turning SIDs deny-only), but a read-restricted token would need per-path read grants — reintroducing exactly the cost the identity routes pay — and the sandbox vocabulary never requires read confinement.
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 
@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ The [landstrip evaluation](../../rejected/feature/2026-07-26-evaluate-landstrip-
 
 ## Consequences
 
-Bought: write-only confinement with no new OS floor (`CreateRestrictedToken` predates the mxc releases by two decades), reads/network/process visibility untouched exactly as the mode vocabulary requires, and fail-closed errors carrying the API name and the exact Win32 code. Cost: no read-side or network isolation; console isolation unavailable (hidden-console children die with `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED`; children share the host console); standing ACE mutations on the granted roots (caller-owned directories; workspace ACEs stand forever by design — the reuse cache, invisible residue when a workspace is renamed — temp ACEs revoked by provider dispose together with the derived private temp directory — a crash leaves both behind and the next resume fails loudly at the exclusive creation until temp hygiene reclaims the directory); grant materialization is an EAGER full-tree propagation (`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` walks every descendant immediately — tens of seconds on large workspaces), paid once per workspace per machine by the per-workspace identity; CIM is unavailable in BOTH confined modes (AuthUsers dropped from both lists — the WMI namespace security check fails, and `Get-ComputerInfo` silently returns incomplete results) as the price of closing the C:\-root tree-creation escape in both; FAT-class (non-ACL) targets outside the granted roots remain writable under both modes (no security descriptors to intersect — a legacy residue treated as unsupported, warn-only, documented in the README); NULL-DACL directories are not identity-preserving under a grant+revoke round-trip (documented edge, the POC shares it); `whoami` and token-inspection cmdlets fail under the restricted token (diagnostic noise, documented); and BOTH confined modes run `pwsh` in ConstrainedLanguage mode — the restricted token trips PowerShell's lockdown detection, so `Add-Type`, non-core .NET statics (`[System.IO.*]::`, `[math]::`), COM objects, and reflection fail with "only core types" errors while `-f` formatting, property access, and core cmdlets/types keep working, and the language mode cannot be lifted back to FullLanguage from inside — taught to the model in the pwsh tool description and documented in the package README's Known Limitations; BOTH confined modes also deny named-pipe opens — libuv's piped-stdio spawns fail with EPERM (the POC-documented "no output redirection" boundary; inherited/ignored stdio and anonymous pipes work) — documented in the package README's Known Limitations and taught to the model in the pwsh tool description.
+Bought: write-only confinement with no new OS floor (`CreateRestrictedToken` predates the mxc releases by two decades), reads/network/process visibility untouched exactly as the mode vocabulary requires, and fail-closed errors carrying the API name and exact Win32 code. Sessions share the intentionally standing workspace capability but not their revocable temp capabilities; restart residue cannot block or authorize a resumed session. Cost: enforcement is structurally partial because Everyone-granted writes and NTFS hard-link aliases cannot be path-confined by this token shape; no read-side or network isolation; console isolation unavailable (hidden-console children die with `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED`; children share the host console); standing workspace ACE mutations (the reuse cache, plus inert residue when a workspace is renamed) and random temp litter after an unclean shutdown until OS hygiene reclaims it; EAGER full-tree workspace propagation (`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` walks every descendant immediately — tens of seconds on large workspaces), paid once per workspace per machine; CIM unavailable in both confined modes (Authenticated Users is absent, closing the C:\-root tree-creation escape); FAT-class non-ACL targets still writable; NULL-DACL directories not identity-preserving under a grant/revoke round trip; `whoami` and token-inspection cmdlets failing under the restricted token; read-only pwsh entering ConstrainedLanguage while workspace-write remains FullLanguage absent host policy; and named-pipe opens remaining denied, so libuv piped-stdio grandchildren fail with EPERM while inherited/ignored stdio and anonymous pipes work. The package README owns these operational limits.
 
 ## Testing
 
-The product-visible Windows roster flip is win32-only, so the keyless snapshot fixtures — which must replay on macOS/Linux — cannot cover it; the bundle composition specs ([`base.spec.ts`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts), [`windows-shell.spec.ts`](../../../../apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts)) plus the win32 real-runner suites (`packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/`, `packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/tests/`) are the substitute evidence, and the CI Windows lane owns the assembled signal. The grant machinery is pinned cross-platform by `packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-grants.spec.ts` (the derived private-temp identity — deterministic per session + workspace, distinct across sessions — one-shot materialization, exclusive temp creation with reparse-point rejection and self-cleanup on failure, clean-restart re-grant of the same derived directory, the standing-vs-revocable lifecycle across dispose and the mode-switch cycle, and the derived-SID argv contract — with the Win32 surface mocked) and on win32 by `workspace-sid.spec.ts` (derivation determinism/shape/distinctness), `grant.spec.ts` (real-DACL materialization: revocable paths revoke on dispose, standing paths survive it), the `acl.spec.ts` idempotent-grant fast-path and standing-ACE-after-dispose contract, the `failure-paths.spec.ts` suspension-orphan regression (AssignProcessToJobObject failure terminates the child), and the `runner.spec.ts` `--write-sid` contract (caller-owned grants, private temp subdir through TMP/TEMP, both-mode CIM-denial probes, the mode-downgrade regression — a standing grant ACE is inert under read-only and effective again on re-upgrade — the ambient-writable Public-probe regression (a C:\Users\Public subdirectory write is denied under both modes), and the ConstrainedLanguage pins in both modes, plus the grandchild-stdio matrix pins — inherited/ignored stdio spawns succeed while piped capture is DENIED in both modes). The runner-failure classification is exit-gated on 127 (a confined command that merely prints the `windows-acl-run:` signature on a non-127 exit is never misclassified as "the command did not run" — pinned in the pwsh-sandbox helper suite).
+The product-visible Windows roster flip is win32-only, so keyless snapshots that must replay on macOS/Linux cannot cover it; bundle composition specs plus the win32 real-runner suites are the substitute evidence, and the CI Windows lane owns the assembled signal. `sandbox-local/tests/acl-grants.spec.ts` pins random temp allocation, per-session/workspace reuse, fork/workspace separation, crash-resume non-collision, paired argv SIDs, failure cleanup, and standing-versus-revocable lifecycle with Win32 mocked. On Windows, `workspace-sid.spec.ts` pins workspace/temp derivation and domain separation; `acl.spec.ts` pins real DACL lifecycle; and `runner.spec.ts` pins paired-SID validation, sibling temp denial under a shared workspace SID, per-call agentless temp creation/removal, TMP/TEMP rewriting, mode downgrade, Public denial, Everyone/hard-link partial boundaries, mode-specific PowerShell language behavior, and grandchild stdio. ARM64 and emulated x64 native runs own the architecture-specific acceptance evidence.
 
 ## Related
 

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md

@@ -6,15 +6,15 @@ Status: implemented
 
 ## Problem
 
-[沙盒决策](2026-07-06-sandbox.md)把 `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` 留空，交付的 Windows profile 因为没有可用的隔离执行器而退化为 danger-full-access。win32 档必须实现沙盒词汇表承诺的两个文件效果模式——`read-only`（零写入）与 `workspace-write`（仅工作区根目录加后端定义的临时区域可写）——同时保持读、网络与进程可见性不受影响，因为所有模式都允许读取。
+最初的[沙箱决策](2026-07-06-sandbox.md)将 `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` 留空，因此交付的 Windows profile 因不存在隔离执行器而退化为 danger-full-access。win32 档必须约束沙箱词汇表中的两种文件效果模式——`read-only`（不显式授予任何可写根目录）与 `workspace-write`（允许写入工作区根目录及后端定义的临时区域）——并报告其机制无法约束的任何效果；读取、网络与进程可见性仍在这套词汇之外。
 
 ## Decision
 
-直接基于原始 ACL 机制实现该档：把调用者令牌复制为 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 受限令牌（`CreateRestrictedToken`，`WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`），其 restricting SIDs 中包含写入 SID（`S-1-4-x-y`）；工作区与临时目录上写入 SID 的 Write ACE 就是全部写入白名单，因为 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 只对写访问做交集检查，读保持调用者的完整环境访问。该机制来自 huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc（`10e4dfb`）的演示；本移植检查每一个 API 调用并 fail-closed（POC 因忽略返回值而 fail-open）。写入 SID 是**按工作区**的身份，由规范工作区路径确定性派生（`workspaceWriteSid`——sha256 → `S-1-4-x-y`），且**任何地方都不存储**：工作区根目录 ACE 因此每台机器每个工作区只物化一次——常驻 ACE 就是跨会话复用缓存，此后每次供给都命中精确 ACE 跳过（幂等重授权跳过急切的全树重传播——不做垃圾回收）——而不是每会话一次，这正是先前每会话随机 SID 每个会话都要付一次全树传播的代价。seam 从会话 id + 工作区派生会话的**私有**临时子目录（sha256、16 位 hex——任何地方都不存储，因此不存在篡改面）并独占创建；它在提供方 dispose 时移除，崩溃则把它留作 `%TEMP%` 垃圾，其下一次恢复会在独占创建处大声失败，直到临时目录卫生机制将其回收。seam 把工作区 ACE **常驻**物化（绝不撤销——就是缓存），把临时 ACE **可回收**物化（提供方 dispose（资源释放）时撤销，因此可继承 ACE 不会在环境临时根目录上比其会话的临时目录活得更久）。令牌的 restricting list 是保活组加上仅 workspace-write 下的写入 SID：read-only = [登录 SID、Everyone]，workspace-write = [登录 SID、Everyone、写入 SID]。保活不变式是登录 SID + Everyone（没有它们，早期 DLL init 会以 0xC0000142 死亡，CNG 会让 pwsh 以 0xE0434352 崩溃）。Read-only 不含写入 SID：先前 workspace-write 时期留下的常驻授权 ACE 保持**失效**（pass-2 检查只授予列表所携带的内容，因此 read-only 在 `/permission` 降级或崩溃后恢复的会话中始终保持严格零授权，而常驻 ACE 让重新升级保持零成本）。Authenticated Users 在**两种**列表中都缺席——WMI namespace 安全校验失败（0x80041003），因此 CIM 在每一种受限模式下都不可用，且 C:\-root 建树逃逸（驻留的 `AU:(AD)` + `AU:(OI)(CI)(IO)(M)` ACE）在两种模式下都被关闭；INTERACTIVE/LOCAL 同样在两种列表中都缺席（Public 树的写入被拒绝——由 runner 的 Public-probe 回归钉住）。Workspace-write 子进程看到的是私有的每会话临时子目录（`<temp>\dsh-<16 hex>`——由会话 id + 工作区派生、独占创建、拒绝 reparse point、提供方 dispose 时移除——TMP/TEMP 由 runner 重写——bwrap `--tmpfs /tmp` 语义）。受限令牌的**默认 DACL** 被扩展一条写入 SID 全权 ACE（`SetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl)`）：此后不带显式安全描述符创建的新对象（匿名管道——CreatePipe、同步对象）自带 restricting SID ACE，创建时的写 pass-2 检查通过；**named pipe 例外**——其默认安全描述符是 Win32 层在用户态安装的默认 SD 模板（由 KernelBase 构建——owner/SYSTEM/Admins 全权、Everyone/ANONYMOUS 只读），令牌无法影响，因此受限孙进程的管道 stdio 捕获保持拒绝（POC 记载的边界，由 runner 套件钉住）。它以 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md)（后端加 `./runner` argv 前缀入口）、[`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md) 的 `win32` 链档、以及作为隔离执行器的 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) 交付；Windows 平台层在受限 pwsh 栈之上重新启用完整权限面（sandbox/sandbox-policy/permission/approval/fs-sandbox）。
+直接基于原始 ACL 机制实现该档：把调用者令牌复制为 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 受限令牌（`CreateRestrictedToken`，`WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`），其 restricting SIDs 携带彼此独立的工作区能力与私有临时目录能力。`WRITE_RESTRICTED` 只对写访问做交集检查，因此读取保留调用者的环境访问，而写入还必须匹配这些能力 ACE 之一。该机制来自 huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc（`10e4dfb`）的演示；本移植检查每个 API 调用并 fail-closed（POC 因忽略失败而 fail-open）。工作区 SID 由规范工作区路径确定性派生（`workspaceWriteSid`——sha256 → `S-1-4-x-y`）；其常驻工作区 ACE 是跨会话复用缓存，精确 ACE 跳过可避免重复的急切全树传播。每个活跃的会话/工作区对则获得一个随机私有临时目录，以及一个从该路径派生的、经过域分离的 SID（`tempWriteSid`）；其 ACE 可回收，TMP/TEMP 指向该目录，令牌默认 DACL 列入该临时 SID，因此新建的临时对象不会获得共享的工作区能力。fork 因此无法写入同级会话的临时目录树。即使恢复的是同一会话，新的提供方也会选择新的路径和 SID，因此崩溃残留只是失效垃圾，而非冲突或继承的能力；无 agent（智能体）的调用会逐调用创建并移除同样的形态。环境临时根目录绝不会被隐式授权。如果工作区等于或包含临时根目录，调用会在任何 ACL 改动发生前失败，因为否则其可继承的常驻 ACE 会向每个私有子目录授权；直接 API 会拒绝可写根目录与实际私有临时目录在任一方向上的重叠。PowerShell 可借助这项私有临时目录能力完成启动时的 AppLocker 探针，因此在没有主机范围策略时，`workspace-write` 会保持 FullLanguage；`read-only` 无法创建探针文件，会保守地进入 ConstrainedLanguage。这一区别属于 PowerShell 启动行为，不是 ACL 边界的一部分。令牌列表为 read-only = [登录 SID、Everyone]，workspace-write = [登录 SID、Everyone、工作区 SID、可选临时 SID]。登录 SID + Everyone 是保活不变式（没有它们，早期 DLL 初始化会以 0xC0000142 死亡，CNG 会让 pwsh 以 0xE0434352 崩溃）。由于 Everyone 仍在列表中，向 Everyone 授予写访问的外部对象会通过两次检查；由于 NTFS ACL 属于文件对象，工作区内获授权的硬链接也会使同一对象的外部别名获得授权。拒绝所有硬链接会让普通 pnpm 工作区不可用，因此提供方报告 `enforcement: 'partial'`，原生套件则钉住这两个缺口。Read-only 不含任何能力 SID，因此常驻工作区 ACE 在模式降级后保持失效。Authenticated Users 在两种列表中都不存在——CIM 不可用，从而关闭 C:\-root 建树逃逸——INTERACTIVE/LOCAL 也不存在，因此 Public 树写入被拒绝。新建匿名管道和同步对象通过 `SetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl)` 继承临时 SID（禁用临时目录时继承工作区 SID，read-only 下继承 Everyone）；named pipe 保持 Win32 层 owner/SYSTEM/Admins 全权、Everyone/ANONYMOUS 只读的模板，因此受限孙进程的管道 stdio 仍被拒绝。它以 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md)、[`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md) 的 `win32` 档，以及作为隔离执行器的 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) 交付。
 
 ## How the restriction works (why no new identity)
 
-身份路线靠"**谁**在跑子进程"来限制，本档靠"令牌派生"来限制。身份路线（landstrip 的 restricted-user、AppContainer）用全新账户或容器 SID 运行子进程，该身份在宿主的文件上从零条 ACE 开始——一切访问（包括读）默认拒绝，子进程要碰的每条路径都必须事后为那个身份补写 ACE 才能放行：这正是让两个备选方案出局的全盘 DACL 改造。受限令牌保留调用者自己的 SID 与 logon session：[`CreateRestrictedToken`](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-createrestrictedtoken) 派生一个加入 restricting SIDs 与 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 标志的令牌，于是 Windows 做两次访问检查——一次按正常 SID，一次按 restricting SIDs——只有两次都放行，写类访问才被授予。读只凭正常检查即可通过（调用者的 SID 在其可读范围内本来就携带读权限），所以本档不需要任何读授权、也不需要新账户；写还必须额外通过孤儿 SID 检查，而只有工作区与临时目录的 ACE 能满足它。`DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE | LUA_TOKEN` 在令牌侧合成了新账户的受限用户效果，即使提升过的调用者派生的也是过滤令牌。同一原语其实也能限制读（`SidsToDisable` 把 SID 变为 deny-only），但受限读的令牌需要逐路径的读授权——恰好重新引入身份路线付出的代价——而沙盒词汇表从不要求读隔离。
+身份路线靠"**谁**在跑子进程"来限制，本档靠"令牌派生"来限制。身份路线（landstrip 的 restricted-user、AppContainer）用全新账户或容器 SID 运行子进程，该身份在宿主的文件上从零条 ACE 开始——一切访问（包括读）默认拒绝，子进程要碰的每条路径都必须事后为那个身份补写 ACE 才能放行：这正是让两个备选方案出局的全盘 DACL 改造。受限令牌保留调用者自己的 SID 与 logon session：[`CreateRestrictedToken`](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-createrestrictedtoken) 派生一个加入 restricting SIDs 与 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 标志的令牌，于是 Windows 做两次访问检查——一次按正常 SID，一次按 restricting SIDs——只有两次都放行，写类访问才被授予。读只凭正常检查即可通过（调用者的 SID 在其可读范围内本来就携带读权限），所以本档不需要任何读授权、也不需要新账户；写还必须额外通过能力 SID 检查，而只有工作区与临时目录的 ACE 能满足它。`DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE | LUA_TOKEN` 在令牌侧合成了新账户的受限用户效果，即使提升过的调用者派生的也是过滤令牌。同一原语其实也能限制读（`SidsToDisable` 把 SID 变为 deny-only），但受限读的令牌需要逐路径的读授权——恰好重新引入身份路线付出的代价——而沙盒词汇表从不要求读隔离。
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 
@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ AppContainer 令牌没有环境读访问：每个可读路径都必须预先通
 
 ## Consequences
 
-所得：仅写隔离、不引入新的 OS 版本下限（`CreateRestrictedToken` 比 mxc 的版本早二十年）、读/网络/进程可见性完全不受影响（与模式词汇表一致）、fail-closed 错误携带 API 名与精确 Win32 错误码。所失：无读侧或网络隔离；控制台隔离不可用（隐藏控制台子进程以 `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED` 死亡；子进程共享宿主控制台）；被授权根目录上有驻留 ACE 改动（目录须为调用者所有；工作区 ACE 按设计永久常驻——复用缓存，工作区改名时成为不可见残留——临时 ACE 由提供方 dispose 连同派生的私有临时目录一起回收——崩溃会把两者都留下，下一次恢复会在独占创建处大声失败，直到临时目录卫生回收该目录）；授权物化是急切的全树传播（`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` 立即遍历每个后代——在大型工作区上耗时数十秒），因按工作区身份，每台机器每个工作区只付一次；CIM 在**两种**受限模式下都不可用（AuthUsers 从两种列表中被移除——WMI namespace 安全校验失败，`Get-ComputerInfo` 静默返回不完整结果），作为关闭两种模式下 C:\-root 建树逃逸的代价；位于被授权根目录之外的 FAT 类（无 ACL）目标在两种模式下仍可写（没有可做交集的安全描述符——作为历史残留处理：不支持、仅警告、已在 README 中记录）；NULL DACL 目录在 grant+revoke 往返下不保持身份（记录在案的边角，POC 亦有此行为）；`whoami` 与令牌检查 cmdlet 在受限令牌下失败（诊断噪音，已记录）；且**两种**受限模式都以 ConstrainedLanguage 模式运行 `pwsh`——受限令牌触发 PowerShell 的锁定检测，因此 `Add-Type`、非核心 .NET 静态调用（`[System.IO.*]::`、`[math]::`）、COM 对象与反射都会以“only core types”错误失败，而 `-f` 格式化、属性访问与核心 cmdlet/类型继续工作，语言模式也无法从内部提升回 FullLanguage——已在 pwsh 工具描述中教给模型，并记录在包 README 的 Known Limitations 中；**两种**受限模式同样拒绝 named-pipe 打开——libuv 的管道 stdio spawn 以 EPERM 失败（POC 记载的“无法重定向输出”边界；继承/忽略的 stdio 与匿名管道可用）——记录在包 README 的 Known Limitations 中，并在 pwsh 工具描述中教给模型。
+所得：仅写隔离、不引入新的 OS 版本下限（`CreateRestrictedToken` 比 mxc 的版本早二十年）、读/网络/进程可见性完全不受影响（与模式词汇表一致），且 fail-closed 错误携带 API 名与精确 Win32 错误码。会话共享有意常驻的工作区能力，但不共享各自可回收的临时能力；重启残留既不能阻塞恢复的会话，也不能向其授权。所失：强制执行在结构上只能是部分的，因为此令牌形态无法把 Everyone 授予的写入与 NTFS 硬链接别名限制在路径边界内；无读侧或网络隔离；控制台隔离不可用（隐藏控制台子进程以 `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED` 死亡；子进程共享宿主控制台）；工作区常驻 ACE 改动（复用缓存，以及工作区改名后的失效残留）与异常关闭后遗留的随机临时目录垃圾，直到 OS 卫生机制将其回收；工作区授权采用急切的全树传播（`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` 立即遍历每个后代——大型工作区上耗时数十秒），每台机器每个工作区只付一次；CIM 在两种受限模式下均不可用（Authenticated Users 不存在，从而关闭 C:\-root 建树逃逸）；FAT 类无 ACL 目标仍可写；NULL-DACL 目录在 grant/revoke 往返下不保持身份；`whoami` 与令牌检查 cmdlet 在受限令牌下失败；read-only pwsh 会进入 ConstrainedLanguage，而在没有主机策略时 workspace-write 保持 FullLanguage；named pipe 打开仍被拒绝，因此 libuv 管道 stdio 的孙进程以 EPERM 失败，而继承/忽略的 stdio 与匿名管道可用。包 README 负责记录这些运行限制。
 
 ## Testing
 
-产品可见的 Windows 阵容切换仅存在于 win32，而 keyless 快照夹具必须在 macOS/Linux 上可重放，因此无法覆盖它；替代证据是 bundle 组合 spec（[`base.spec.ts`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts)、[`windows-shell.spec.ts`](../../../../apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts)）加上 win32 真实 runner 套件（`packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/`、`packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/tests/`），组装态信号由 CI 的 Windows lane 负责。授权机制在跨平台侧由 `packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-grants.spec.ts` 钉住（派生的私有临时身份——按会话 + 工作区确定性、跨会话相异——一次性物化、独占临时目录创建并拒绝 reparse point、失败时自我清理、干净重启时对同一派生目录的重新授权、dispose 与模式切换循环中的常驻/可回收生命周期，以及派生 SID 的 argv 契约——mock 掉 Win32 表面），win32 侧由 `workspace-sid.spec.ts`（派生的确定性/形态/相异性）、`grant.spec.ts`（真实 DACL 物化：可回收路径在 dispose 时撤销、常驻路径存活）、`acl.spec.ts` 的幂等授权快速路径与 dispose 后常驻 ACE 契约、`failure-paths.spec.ts` 的 suspension-orphan 回归（AssignProcessToJobObject 失败会终止子进程）与 `runner.spec.ts` 的 `--write-sid` 契约（调用者所有目录的授权、经 TMP/TEMP 的私有临时子目录、两种模式下的 CIM 拒绝探针、模式降级回归——驻留授权 ACE 在 read-only 下失效并在重新升级后再度生效——环境可写 Public-probe 回归（对 C:\Users\Public 子目录的写入在两种模式下都会被拒绝），以及两种模式下对 ConstrainedLanguage 的钉定，加上孙进程 stdio 矩阵钉定——继承/忽略的 stdio spawn 成功，而管道捕获在两种模式下都被**拒绝**）钉住。runner 失败分类以 127 退出码为门槛（受限命令仅仅在非 127 退出时打印 `windows-acl-run:` 签名，也绝不会被误分类为"命令未运行"——由 pwsh-sandbox helper 套件钉住）。
+产品可见的 Windows 阵容切换仅存在于 win32，而必须在 macOS/Linux 上可重放的 keyless 快照无法覆盖它；替代证据是 bundle 组合 spec 加上 win32 真实 runner 套件，组装态信号由 CI 的 Windows lane 负责。`sandbox-local/tests/acl-grants.spec.ts` 在 mock Win32 的情况下钉住随机临时目录分配、按会话/工作区复用、fork/工作区分离、崩溃后恢复不冲突、成对 argv SID、失败清理，以及常驻/可回收生命周期。在 Windows 上，`workspace-sid.spec.ts` 钉住工作区/临时目录派生与域分离；`acl.spec.ts` 钉住真实 DACL 生命周期；`runner.spec.ts` 钉住成对 SID 验证、共享工作区 SID 时对同级会话临时目录的拒绝、无 agent 调用的逐调用临时目录创建/移除、TMP/TEMP 重写、模式降级、Public 拒绝、Everyone/硬链接部分边界、按模式区分的 PowerShell 语言行为与孙进程 stdio。ARM64 与模拟 x64 原生运行负责提供架构特定的验收证据。
 
 ## Related
 

.agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-21-serial-cross-platform-ci-reference.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-21-serial-cross-platform-ci-reference.md
-2026-07-21-serial-cross-platform-ci-reference.md: 07dc430e6fed3fe75a006ca03523bd6e4fc969d0
-2026-07-21-serial-cross-platform-ci-reference.zh.md: 8bbb60cdead2957069de22ecaddf01c6cd9fb305
+2026-07-21-serial-cross-platform-ci-reference.md: c2ed11d40f7f5487117b5c72f11bc1709042f68a
+2026-07-21-serial-cross-platform-ci-reference.zh.md: bef8c3b640cf43942e380e921d5f62d91723eff8

.agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-21-serial-cross-platform-ci-reference.md

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Real-kernel sandbox proofs require specific hosted operating systems and archite
 
 ## Decision
 
-[CI](../../../../.github/workflows/ci.yml) gives pull-request and master-push events complementary responsibilities. Pull requests run consolidated Linux and Wine-hosted Windows jobs plus the Node compatibility and Python contracts on standard GitHub-hosted capacity; an independent native Windows job reports the complete Windows inventory without participating in the required aggregate. On a push to `master`, the active reference is `serial / linux (self-hosted standby)` on the in-house `vm-backup` pool — the hot-standby drill that continuously re-proves the failover target described in the [failover runbook](2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.md). The standard-hosted `serial / linux`, `serial / macos`, and `serial / windows` definitions remain disabled under `TODO(hosted-serial-ci)` until their portable capacity can be restored. The separate job definitions intentionally keep their short checkout, runtime setup, and immutable install sequences visible instead of hiding operating systems behind a matrix or reusable workflow. `workflow_dispatch` is reserved for runner benchmarks.
+[CI](../../../../.github/workflows/ci.yml) gives pull-request and master-push events complementary responsibilities. Pull requests run consolidated Linux and Wine-hosted Windows jobs plus the Node compatibility and Python contracts on standard GitHub-hosted capacity; an independent native Windows job reports the complete Windows inventory without participating in the required aggregate. On a push to `master`, the active references are `serial / linux (self-hosted standby)` on the in-house `vm-backup` pool and `serial / windows (self-hosted standby)` on the in-house `dsh-win-ci` pool — the hot-standby drills that continuously re-prove the failover targets described in the [failover runbook](2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.md). The standard-hosted `serial / linux`, `serial / macos`, and `serial / windows` definitions remain disabled under `TODO(hosted-serial-ci)` until their portable capacity can be restored. The separate job definitions intentionally keep their short checkout, runtime setup, and immutable install sequences visible instead of hiding operating systems behind a matrix or reusable workflow. `workflow_dispatch` is reserved for runner benchmarks.
 
 Each reference job runs `pnpm run check:ci` without any shard selector. `DSH_GATE_CONCURRENCY=1` makes the top-level aggregate execute one ready gate at a time; coverage, snapshot replay, built-bin smoke, and publication validation also receive worker counts of one. The reference jobs may run beside one another, but each host's repository gates are serial and complete. Linux installs bubblewrap before replaying snapshots, and Windows enables Developer Mode before installing the symlinked workspace.
 
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ The standalone [Sandbox](../../../../.github/workflows/sandbox.yml) workflow bel
 
 Master reference jobs are diagnostic and do not participate in the pull request's required `all checks passed` result. The CI and Sandbox workflows keep their cross-platform references on master pushes. Performance is evaluated from completed hosted-job timestamps and reported as a measurement; it is not encoded as a `timeout-minutes` value.
 
-The portable reference uses GitHub's standard `ubuntu-latest`, `macos-latest`, and `windows-2025` labels. The required pull-request Windows job runs under Wine on `ubuntu-latest`, while the independent pull-request native job uses standard `windows-2025` under the [dual Windows decision](2026-08-08-native-windows-pull-request-ci.md); when enabled, `serial / windows` remains a second complete, unsharded native-kernel oracle. Required pull-request jobs use portable standard capacity under the [required-CI decision](2026-07-23-portable-required-pull-request-ci.md). Higher-core hosted runners remain manual benchmarks because a correctness path must remain runnable without repository-external runner configuration.
+The portable reference uses GitHub's standard `ubuntu-latest`, `macos-latest`, and `windows-2025` labels. The required pull-request Windows job runs under Wine on `ubuntu-latest`, while the independent pull-request native job uses the hosted `dsh-windows-2025-16core` runner under normal operation and the self-hosted `[self-hosted, dsh-win-ci, windows]` pool under failover (see the [failover runbook](2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.md)), and is absent from the required aggregate under the [dual Windows decision](2026-08-08-native-windows-pull-request-ci.md); when enabled, `serial / windows` remains a second complete, unsharded native-kernel oracle. Required pull-request jobs use portable standard capacity under the [required-CI decision](2026-07-23-portable-required-pull-request-ci.md). Higher-core hosted runners remain manual benchmarks because a correctness path must remain runnable without repository-external runner configuration.
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 

.agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-21-serial-cross-platform-ci-reference.zh.md

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Status: implemented
 
 ## 决策
 
-[CI](../../../../.github/workflows/ci.yml) 为拉取请求事件与 master 推送事件赋予互补的职责。拉取请求在 GitHub 标准托管容量上运行合并后的 Linux 和由 Wine 承载的 Windows 作业，以及 Node 兼容性与 Python 约定；一个独立的原生 Windows 作业会报告完整的 Windows 清单，但不参与必需聚合流程。向 `master` 推送时，当前启用的参考作业是公司自有 `vm-backup` 池上的 `serial / linux (self-hosted standby)`——该热备演练持续验证[故障切换手册](2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.md)所描述的切换目标。标准托管的 `serial / linux`、`serial / macos` 和 `serial / windows` 定义仍处于禁用状态，并由 `TODO(hosted-serial-ci)` 标记，直到其可移植容量恢复。各自独立的作业定义有意显式保留简短的代码检出、运行时设置和依赖锁定的安装步骤，而不是用矩阵或可复用工作流隐藏操作系统差异。`workflow_dispatch` 仅用于运行器基准测试。
+[CI](../../../../.github/workflows/ci.yml) 为拉取请求事件与 master 推送事件赋予互补的职责。拉取请求在 GitHub 标准托管容量上运行合并后的 Linux 和由 Wine 承载的 Windows 作业，以及 Node 兼容性与 Python 约定；一个独立的原生 Windows 作业会报告完整的 Windows 清单，但不参与必需聚合流程。向 `master` 推送时，当前启用的参考作业是公司自有 `vm-backup` 池上的 `serial / linux (self-hosted standby)` 和 `dsh-win-ci` 池上的 `serial / windows (self-hosted standby)`——这些热备演练持续验证[故障切换手册](2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.md)所描述的切换目标。标准托管的 `serial / linux`、`serial / macos` 和 `serial / windows` 定义仍处于禁用状态，并由 `TODO(hosted-serial-ci)` 标记，直到其可移植容量恢复。各自独立的作业定义有意显式保留简短的代码检出、运行时设置和依赖锁定的安装步骤，而不是用矩阵或可复用工作流隐藏操作系统差异。`workflow_dispatch` 仅用于运行器基准测试。
 
 每个参考作业均在不设置任何分片选择器的情况下运行 `pnpm run check:ci`。`DSH_GATE_CONCURRENCY=1` 使顶层聚合每次只执行一个已经就绪的门禁；覆盖率、快照回放、built-bin 冒烟测试和发布验证的 worker 数量也设为 1。各参考作业可以彼此并行，但每台主机上的仓库门禁都串行运行且完整执行。Linux 在回放快照前安装 bubblewrap，Windows 则在安装采用符号链接的工作区前启用开发人员模式。
 
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ macOS 参考流程使用 fork 进程运行常规 Vitest 项目。macOS arm64 上
 
 master 分支的参考作业仅用于诊断，不参与拉取请求所要求的 `all checks passed` 结果。CI 与 Sandbox 工作流把跨平台参考流程保留在 master 推送上。系统根据已完成托管作业的时间戳评估性能，并将其报告为测量结果，而不是写成 `timeout-minutes` 值。
 
-可移植的参考流程使用 GitHub 标准的 `ubuntu-latest`、`macos-latest` 和 `windows-2025` 标签。拉取请求必需的 Windows 作业在 `ubuntu-latest` 上通过 Wine 运行，而独立的拉取请求原生作业依据[双 Windows 决策](2026-08-08-native-windows-pull-request-ci.md)使用标准 `windows-2025`；`serial / windows` 启用时，仍作为第二个完整且未分片的原生内核标尺。依据[必需 CI 决策](2026-07-23-portable-required-pull-request-ci.md)，拉取请求必需作业使用可移植的标准容量。更高核心数的托管运行器仍仅用于手动基准测试，因为正确性路径必须无需仓库外部的运行器配置即可运行。
+可移植的参考流程使用 GitHub 标准的 `ubuntu-latest`、`macos-latest` 和 `windows-2025` 标签。拉取请求必需的 Windows 作业在 `ubuntu-latest` 上通过 Wine 运行，而独立的拉取请求原生作业在正常运行下使用托管的 `dsh-windows-2025-16core` 运行器，故障切换时使用自托管 `[self-hosted, dsh-win-ci, windows]` 池（参见[故障切换手册](2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.md)），依据[双 Windows 决策](2026-08-08-native-windows-pull-request-ci.md)不参与必需聚合流程；`serial / windows` 启用时，仍作为第二个完整且未分片的原生内核标尺。依据[必需 CI 决策](2026-07-23-portable-required-pull-request-ci.md)，拉取请求必需作业使用可移植的标准容量。更高核心数的托管运行器仍仅用于手动基准测试，因为正确性路径必须无需仓库外部的运行器配置即可运行。
 
 ## 曾考虑的替代方案
 

.agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.md
-2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.md: 72261f95ea74b61e3915a1a6419b2c2e616efbd9
-2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.zh.md: 1ee679eabc296ab31d71b87945409788539425bd
+2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.md: 47901844f4ec581dff8500cc429c54a076b7642b
+2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.zh.md: 88a793e144a4d06718ffe323a94f8e81f8e62b82

.agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.md

@@ -6,25 +6,29 @@ English | [中文](2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.zh.md)
 
 ## Problem
 
-The three required Linux worker jobs in [CI](../../../../.github/workflows/ci.yml) (`node 24 / static`, `node 24 / coverage`, `node 24 / snapshots and artifacts`) run on the hosted enterprise 32-core pools; the required verdict job that aggregates them (`all checks passed`) runs on standard `ubuntu-latest`. When the enterprise pools degrade — jobs queue indefinitely or the enterprise labels vanish — every open pull request becomes unmergeable, and the ordinary recovery of merging a fix is itself deadlocked behind the very required checks that cannot run. **Scope: this switch recovers an enterprise Linux-pool outage.** The verdict's other required dependencies (`node-compat`, `python-sdk`, `windows`) stay on standard hosted runners by design (the portable boundary); in a broader GitHub-hosted capacity failure that also takes out the standard pools, those dependencies still block `all checks passed`, and only the Windows leg has no in-house substitute at all — during the 2026-07-27 outage the standard pools recovered first, which is the ordering this design bets on. An outage therefore needs a switch any responder with repository write access can throw without merging anything.
+The three required Linux worker jobs in [CI](../../../../.github/workflows/ci.yml) (`node 24 / static`, `node 24 / coverage`, `node 24 / snapshots and artifacts`) run on the hosted enterprise 32-core pools; the required verdict job that aggregates them (`all checks passed`) runs on standard `ubuntu-latest`; the independent native Windows job (`windows node 24 / native complete`) runs on the hosted `dsh-windows-2025-16core` larger runner. When the enterprise pools degrade — jobs queue indefinitely or the enterprise labels vanish — every open pull request becomes unmergeable, and the ordinary recovery of merging a fix is itself deadlocked behind the very required checks that cannot run. **Scope: this switch recovers an enterprise Linux-pool outage AND a hosted Windows-pool outage.** The verdict's other required dependencies (`node-compat`, `python-sdk`, `windows`) stay on standard hosted runners by design (the portable boundary); in a broader GitHub-hosted capacity failure that also takes out the standard pools, those dependencies still block `all checks passed`. An outage therefore needs a switch any responder with repository write access can throw without merging anything.
 
 ## Decision
 
-Each of the three required Linux worker jobs — and the `all checks passed` verdict job, which would otherwise stay queued on the failed pool even after every worker passed — resolves its runner pool through the `DSH_CI_FAILOVER` repository variable. Unset (normal), they run on the hosted enterprise pools. Set to `selfhosted` by any repository writer, all four retarget onto the in-house self-hosted `vm-backup` pool, coverage and snapshot concurrency drop to shared-VM bounds, and the hosted-path pnpm cache restores are skipped. The switch is writer-manageable repository state, not a merge, so it works while every check is red. The in-house pool's readiness is continuously re-proven by the `serial / linux (self-hosted standby)` lane, which runs the complete unsharded aggregate on every master push.
+Each of the three required Linux worker jobs, the independent native Windows job, and the `all checks passed` verdict job — which would otherwise stay queued on the failed pool even after every worker passed — resolves its runner pool through the `DSH_CI_FAILOVER` repository variable. Unset (normal), they run on the hosted enterprise pools. Set to `selfhosted` by any repository writer, all five retarget onto the in-house self-hosted pools: the Linux jobs and verdict onto the `vm-backup` pool, coverage and snapshot concurrency drop to shared-VM bounds, and the hosted-path pnpm cache restores are skipped; the native Windows job onto the `dsh-win-ci` pool. The switch is writer-manageable repository state, not a merge, so it works while every check is red. The in-house pools' readiness is continuously re-proven by the `serial / linux (self-hosted standby)` and `serial / windows (self-hosted standby)` lanes, which run the complete unsharded aggregates on every master push.
 
 ### What the in-house pool is
 
 `vm-backup`: one 64-core VM, six always-on systemd-managed runner instances. Its image must preinstall Playwright Chromium's Linux system packages; CI downloads the lockfile-selected browser but never runs `apt` on this persistent shared host. Check the latest `serial / linux (self-hosted standby)` run before switching: its aggregate includes browser replay, so a green standby verifies both ordinary capacity and this browser prerequisite.
 
+#### Windows pool
+
+`dsh-win-ci`: 32 always-on runner instances (scheduled tasks `GH-Runner-01`…`GH-Runner-32`) on the in-house Windows CI server (one 96-core / 580 GB machine). Labels: `[self-hosted, dsh-win-ci, windows]`. The image must preinstall Node 24, pnpm, Git (with Git Bash on `PATH`, i.e. `C:\Program Files\Git\bin` — the `bash` tool spawns `bash` by name), PowerShell 7, and enable Developer Mode for symlink support. Check the latest `serial / windows (self-hosted standby)` run before switching: a green standby verifies the pool can execute `check:ci:windows-complete` end-to-end.
+
 ### Switch (any repository writer, ~1 minute, no merge)
 
 1. Repository **Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions → Variables → New repository variable**: name `DSH_CI_FAILOVER`, value `selfhosted`.
 2. Retrigger the required jobs so they re-resolve their pool. Jobs already **queued** for the hosted labels do not retarget and cannot be re-run in place, so for the documented indefinite-queue outage, cancel the stuck run and re-run all jobs, or push a new commit; "Re-run failed jobs" only helps once a job has actually failed rather than queued.
 3. That is the entire switch. Under failover the workflow also, automatically: drops `DSH_COVERAGE_MAX_WORKERS` to 8 and `DSH_SNAPSHOT_MAX_CONCURRENCY` to 12 (sized for six always-on instances: worst case 6 × 8 = 48 coverage workers on the 64-core VM) (shared-VM contention bounds), and skips the hosted-path pnpm cache restores (the VM's persistent store serves warm installs).
 
-#**Dependabot exception.** All four selectors deliberately exclude `dependabot[bot]`: under failover, Dependabot PRs stay queued for the hosted pool rather than executing dependency-supplied code on the persistent VM. A Dependabot PR that remains queued during an outage is expected behavior, not a failed switch; it completes when the hosted pool recovers.
+#**Dependabot exception.** All five selectors deliberately exclude `dependabot[bot]`: under failover, Dependabot PRs stay queued for the hosted pool rather than executing dependency-supplied code on the persistent VMs. A Dependabot PR that remains queued during an outage is expected behavior, not a failed switch; it completes when the hosted pool recovers.
 
-**Who can flip the variable.** GitHub's API lets any collaborator with write access manage repository variables, so the switch is writer-level, not strictly admin-only. In this repository's trust model that is not an escalation: the runner group admits all workflows of this private, fork-disabled repository (a deliberate trade to make PR-ref failover possible at all), so any writer could already reach the VM by pushing a branch workflow. The boundary against untrusted code is repository membership; the variable only routes work for members.
+**Who can flip the variable.** GitHub's API lets any collaborator with write access manage repository variables, so the switch is writer-level, not strictly admin-only. In this repository's trust model that is not an escalation: the runner groups admit all workflows of this private, fork-disabled repository (a deliberate trade to make PR-ref failover possible at all), so any writer could already reach the VMs by pushing a branch workflow. The boundary against untrusted code is repository membership; the variable only routes work for members.
 
 ## Capacity during failover
 

.agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-26-ci-failover-runbook.zh.md

@@ -6,23 +6,27 @@ Status: implemented
 
 ## 问题
 
-[CI](../../../../.github/workflows/ci.yml) 中三个必需的 Linux 工作作业（`node 24 / static`、`node 24 / coverage`、`node 24 / snapshots and artifacts`）运行在托管的企业级 32 核池上；聚合它们的必需判定作业（`all checks passed`）运行在标准 `ubuntu-latest` 上。当企业池发生故障——作业无限排队或企业标签消失——所有开启的拉取请求都无法合并，而"合并一个修复"这一常规恢复手段本身正被那些无法运行的必需检查死锁。**适用范围：本切换恢复的是企业级 Linux 池故障。**判定作业的其余必需依赖（`node-compat`、`python-sdk`、`windows`）按设计留在标准托管运行器上（可移植边界）；若更大范围的 GitHub 托管容量故障连标准池一并击倒，这些依赖仍会阻塞 `all checks passed`，且只有 Windows 这条腿完全没有自有替代——2026-07-27 的故障中标准池率先恢复，本设计押注的正是这一顺序。因此故障需要一个任何具备仓库写权限的响应者都能在不合并任何代码的情况下触发的开关。
+[CI](../../../../.github/workflows/ci.yml) 中三个必需的 Linux 工作作业（`node 24 / static`、`node 24 / coverage`、`node 24 / snapshots and artifacts`）运行在托管的企业级 32 核池上；聚合它们的必需判定作业（`all checks passed`）运行在标准 `ubuntu-latest` 上；独立的原生 Windows 作业（`windows node 24 / native complete`）运行在托管的 `dsh-windows-2025-16core` 大型运行器上。当企业池发生故障——作业无限排队或企业标签消失——所有开启的拉取请求都无法合并，而"合并一个修复"这一常规恢复手段本身正被那些无法运行的必需检查死锁。**适用范围：本切换恢复的是企业级 Linux 池故障与托管 Windows 池故障。**判定作业的其余必需依赖（`node-compat`、`python-sdk`、`windows`）按设计留在标准托管运行器上（可移植边界）；若更大范围的 GitHub 托管容量故障连标准池一并击倒，这些依赖仍会阻塞 `all checks passed`。因此故障需要一个任何具备仓库写权限的响应者都能在不合并任何代码的情况下触发的开关。
 
 ## 决策
 
-三个必需的 Linux 工作作业——以及 `all checks passed` 判定作业（若不随切换，即使全部工作作业通过，它仍会滞留在故障池的队列中）——各自通过仓库变量 `DSH_CI_FAILOVER` 解析运行器池。变量不存在（正常）时它们运行在托管企业池上；由任何具备写权限的协作者设为 `selfhosted` 时，四者全部切换到公司自有的自托管 `vm-backup` 池，覆盖率与快照的并发降到共享虚拟机上限，并跳过托管路径的 pnpm 缓存恢复。这个开关是写者可管理的仓库状态而非一次合并，因此在所有检查都是红色时仍然有效。自有池的就绪状态由 `serial / linux (self-hosted standby)` 通道持续验证——每次 master 推送都在其上运行完整的未分片聚合流程。
+三个必需的 Linux 工作作业、独立的原生 Windows 作业，以及 `all checks passed` 判定作业（若不随切换，即使全部工作作业通过，它仍会滞留在故障池的队列中）——各自通过仓库变量 `DSH_CI_FAILOVER` 解析运行器池。变量不存在（正常）时它们运行在托管企业池上；由任何具备写权限的协作者设为 `selfhosted` 时，五个作业全部切换到公司自有的自托管池：Linux 作业与判定作业切到 `vm-backup` 池，覆盖率与快照的并发降到共享虚拟机上限，并跳过托管路径的 pnpm 缓存恢复；原生 Windows 作业切到 `dsh-win-ci` 池。这个开关是写者可管理的仓库状态而非一次合并，因此在所有检查都是红色时仍然有效。自有池的就绪状态由 `serial / linux (self-hosted standby)` 与 `serial / windows (self-hosted standby)` 通道持续验证——每次 master 推送都在其上运行完整的未分片聚合流程。
 
 ### 自有池是什么
 
 `vm-backup`：一台 64 核虚拟机，6 个常驻 systemd 管理的运行器实例。其镜像必须预装 Playwright Chromium 的 Linux 系统软件包；CI 会下载锁文件选定的浏览器，但绝不在这台持久化共享主机上运行 `apt`。切换前先看 `serial / linux (self-hosted standby)` 最近一次运行：其聚合流程包含浏览器回放，因此绿色热备同时验证常规容量和这项浏览器先决条件。
 
+#### Windows 池
+
+`dsh-win-ci`：公司内部 Windows CI 服务器（一台 96 核 / 580 GB 机器）上 32 个常驻运行器实例（计划任务 `GH-Runner-01`…`GH-Runner-32`）。标签：`[self-hosted, dsh-win-ci, windows]`。镜像必须预装 Node 24、pnpm、Git（Git Bash 在 `PATH` 上，即 `C:\Program Files\Git\bin`——`bash` 工具按名称 spawn `bash`）、PowerShell 7，并为符号链接支持启用开发人员模式。切换前先看 `serial / windows (self-hosted standby)` 最近一次运行：绿色热备验证该池能端到端执行 `check:ci:windows-complete`。
+
 ### 切换步骤（任何具备写权限的协作者，约 1 分钟，无需合并）
 
 1. 仓库 **Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions → Variables → New repository variable**：名称 `DSH_CI_FAILOVER`，值 `selfhosted`。
 2. 重新触发必需作业，使其重新解析运行器池。已经为托管标签**排队**的作业不会重定向，也无法原地 re-run，因此对于本手册所述的无限排队故障，应取消卡住的运行并 re-run all jobs，或推送一个新提交；“Re-run failed jobs”只有在作业真正失败（而非仍在排队）时才有用。
 3. 切换到此完成。故障切换状态下工作流还会自动：把 `DSH_COVERAGE_MAX_WORKERS` 降为 8、`DSH_SNAPSHOT_MAX_CONCURRENCY` 降为 12（按 6 个常驻实例定容：最坏情况下，6 × 8 = 48 个覆盖率工作进程运行在 64 核虚拟机上）（共享虚拟机的争抢上限），并跳过托管路径的 pnpm 缓存恢复（虚拟机的持久 store 直接提供热安装）。
 
-#**Dependabot 例外。**四个选择器都刻意排除了 `dependabot[bot]`：故障切换期间，Dependabot 拉取请求继续在托管池排队，而不是把依赖项提供的代码放到持久化虚拟机上执行。故障期间 Dependabot PR 持续排队是预期行为而非切换失败；托管池恢复后它会自行完成。
+#**Dependabot 例外。**五个选择器都刻意排除了 `dependabot[bot]`：故障切换期间，Dependabot 拉取请求继续在托管池排队，而不是把依赖项提供的代码放到持久化虚拟机上执行。故障期间 Dependabot PR 持续排队是预期行为而非切换失败；托管池恢复后它会自行完成。
 
 **谁能扳动这个变量。**GitHub 的 API 允许任何具有写权限的协作者管理仓库变量，因此该开关实际是写者级而非严格的管理员级。在本仓库的信任模型下这并不构成升权：runner group 接纳本私有、禁 fork 仓库的全部工作流（这是让 PR 引用的故障切换得以成立的刻意取舍），因此任何写者本就可以通过推送分支工作流触达这台虚拟机。抵御不可信代码的边界是仓库成员资格；变量只是为成员路由工作。